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 Abstract 
 
“Carceral Normativities: Sex, Security, and the Penal Management of Gender 
Nonconformity” examines the history of the incarceration of transgender and gender 
nonconforming people in the US from the early twentieth century to the present. While 
rarely discussed in prison scholarship and activism, gender nonconforming and 
transgender prisoners have garnered intense scrutiny from prison administrators and have 
experienced persistent and pervasive violence. Through archival and legal research, I 
historicize this violence, arguing that for the last century prison administrators have 
labeled gender nonconformity as a threat to institutional security or, as I call it, as queer 
dangerousness, which has structured penal practices and policies used to manage these 
prisoners and normalized violence against them. I argue that this construction of gender 
nonconformity as security threat is produced from a set of institutionalized logics, which 
I call racialized gender normativity.  
 
“Carceral Normativities” examines often overlooked and continually evolving prison 
policies and practices to trace the history of the construction of gender nonconformity as 
queer dangerousness and institutional security threat as well as how racialized gender 
normativity has been constructed and reconstructed as a constitutive logic of the prison 
system. Chapter One examines the history of the construction of penal sex-segregation 
alongside newspaper stories from the mid-twentieth century of penal administrators 
“discovering” sexually “misclassified” prisoners in their institutions, in order to argue 
that the prison system’s programmatic design and core understandings of rehabilitation 
and incorrigibility have been deeply shaped by racialized gender normativity, which 
produced the imperative to sex-segregate and constructed sexual ambiguity as 
administrative disorder. Chapter Two traces the history of the systematic segregation of 
gender nonconforming and transgender prisoners, which began in the early twentieth 
century and continues into the present, and argues that this segregation was created as a 
management tool as prison administrators began to identify gender nonconformity as a 
threat to institutional security, or as queer dangerousness. Chapter Three examines the 
relationship between dominant penological, social scientific, and legal narratives about 
sexual violence in penal institutions and the use of sexual violence as a tool of control—a 
practice I call carceral sexual violence. I argue that narratives, which portray prisons as 
sites of rampant sexual violence entirely perpetrated by prisoners, construct transgender 
and gender nonconforming prisoners as simultaneously unrapable and constantly subject 
to sexual violence, which justifies and obscures many quotidian forms of carceral sexual 
violence that target gender nonconformity. Chapter Four examines federal civil rights 
litigation regarding access to hormone therapy and sex reassignment surgery for 
transgender women and argues that carceral necropower, or the production of the prison 
as a space of death and prisoners as socially dead, and the racialized gender normative 
construction of gender nonconformity as queer dangerousness securitizes gender-
affirming medical treatment in prisons, constructing security concerns as a primary factor 
determining access to such treatment. Most broadly, “Carceral Normativities” expands 
our understanding of how the intersection of race, gender, and sexuality shapes carceral 
constructions of deviance and dangerousness as well as penal policies and practices. 
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  1 
Introduction 
 
[The Minnesota Department of Corrections] wanted me to hate myself as a trans woman. They wanted to 
force me to be someone that I wasn’t. They wanted me to pretty much delegitimize myself as a trans 
woman. And, I was not taking that. As a trans woman, as a proud black trans woman, I was not going to 
allow the system to delegitimize and hypersexualize and take my identity away from me. – CeCe 
McDonald1 
 
Prisons in general are not safe for anyone. – CeCe McDonald2 
 
 
One night in June 2011, as they walked through a South Minneapolis 
neighborhood to the grocery story, CeCe McDonald, a 23-year-old African American 
trans woman, and a group of her friends, all also African American and queer, were 
attacked by a group of white people yelling racist and transphobic slurs. This verbal 
attack escalated into a physical one when one of McDonald’s attackers smashed a glass 
into her face. During the ensuing fight, McDonald took a pair of fabric scissors out of her 
purse to defend herself. When one of her attackers ran at her, she stabbed him. This man, 
Dean Schmidt, later died from the stab wound. When police arrived on the scene, they 
arrested only McDonald. She was initially confined in the Hennepin County men’s jail.3  
Prosecutors eventually charged McDonald with two counts of second-degree 
murder, for which she could be sentenced to forty years in prison. In May 2012, just 
before opening arguments in her trial, McDonald decided to accept a plea agreement in 
which she pled guilty to a charge of second-degree manslaughter and was sentenced to 
prison for forty-one months. In June, she was transferred to the Minnesota Correctional 
Facility at St. Cloud, a closed-security men’s prison, which serves as the facility where 
                                                
1 “No One Can ‘Take My Identity Away From Me,” Melissa Harris-Perry (MSNBC, January 19, 2014). 
2 Ibid. 
3 For a description of what happened that night from McDonald, see Michelangelo Signorile, “CeCe 
McDonald, Transgender Activist, Recalls Hate Attack, Manslaughter Case,” Huffington Post, February 22, 
2014, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/02/22/cece-mcdonald-manslaughter-case_n_4831677.html. See 
also her support committee’s site and her blog at http://supportcece.wordpress.com. 
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new prisoners are processed into the Minnesota Department of Corrections (MNDOC). 
Along with the standard processing procedures for all prisoners, MNDOC officials 
convened a committee to determine McDonald’s sex, a decision that could impact her 
placement, whether her hormone treatment would be continued, the sex of the staff who 
searched her (including pat-down, strip, and body cavity searches), and whether she 
would receive bras and feminine hygiene products. A MNDOC representative explained 
to the media that they would “intake him [sic] as a male at St. Cloud prison” and that the 
state’s determination of her sex would involve “any and all collateral documentation and 
a physical and psychological evaluation.”4 Prison administrators ultimately affirmed their 
initial decision that McDonald was male, and she remained at St. Cloud for most of her 
incarceration. In January 2014, she was released after serving nineteen months in prison. 
McDonald’s experiences stitch together a web of racialized, gendered, and 
sexualized punitive violence and criminalization that many trans and gender 
nonconforming people, especially trans women of color, experience daily. The hate 
violence perpetrated by strangers in the street, the police targeting her for arrest, the 
prosecutor’s aggressive prosecution and refusal to recognize her actions as self-defense, 
and her experiences in jail and prison are intimately interconnected. At the heart of 
McDonald’s story is the violent negation of her gender identity and her gendered and 
racialized dehumanization in the hands of white, heterosexual strangers and the US state.5  
                                                
4 Quoted in Jorge Rivas, “Black Transgender Woman CeCe McDonald to be Housed in Male Prison,” 
Colorlines, June 4, 2012, http://colorlines.com/archives/2012/06/cece_mcdonald--
young_black_transgender_woman--to_be_housed_in_male_prison.html. See also, Abby Simons and Paul 
Walsh, “Transgender Defendant Gets 3 Years for Killing Bar Patron,” Star Tribune, June 5, 2012, 
http://www.startribune.com/local/157000805.html. 
5 In fact, the state and the individuals who attacked her cannot be separated. For example, an important 
factor in McDonald’s decision about whether or not to go to trial was that the court ruled that McDonald’s 
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Yet, out of these experiences of violence, McDonald has emerged as a powerful 
transgender and anti-prison activist, using her story to speak and write about the multiple 
and intersecting violences that trans women of color face daily.6 In the epigraph that 
opens this introduction, McDonald describes the gendered and sexualized violence that 
trans women experience within the US prison system, violence that is institutionalized 
and systemic. It is a violence, as McDonald explains, that at its core works to dehumanize 
trans and gender nonconforming prisoners who must constantly struggle to live and 
express their gender identities.  
“Carceral Normativities: Sex, Security, and the Penal Management of Gender 
Nonconformity” examines the forms and logics of state-sanctioned racialized, gendered, 
and sexualized punitive violence that targets trans and gender nonconforming people in 
US prisons and jails. McDonald’s experiences are just one example of the persistent and 
pervasive violence that trans and gender nonconforming people experience within the US 
prison system. Starting from the premise that this violence is not just the product of 
                                                                                                                                            
defense could not introduce key evidence about Schmidt, including his swastika tattoo, his history of 
violence, and his intoxication that night, nor could they introduce testimony detailing the general 
atmosphere of violence against trans women of color to contextualize the incident for the jury. The court’s 
decision to exclude this evidence functions as collusion between the state and her attackers to perpetrate 
violence against her. In addition, Schmitz’s brother explained that Schmitz got his swastika tattoo while he 
was incarcerated in St. Cloud, where McDonald would eventually be imprisoned. His brother explained 
that he “f[e]ll into a certain group, that ended up being white supremacist people, in order to survive. You 
know, you gotta pick a group.” Quoted in Andy Mannix, “The CeCe McDonald Murder Trial,” CityPages, 
May 9, 2012, http://www.citypages.com/2012-05-09/news/cece-mcdonald-murder-trial/. See also, Mary 
Emily O’Hara, “‘My Struggle Started When I Entered This World’: VICE News Interviews CeCe 
McDonald,” VICE News, April 25, 2014, https://news.vice.com/article/my-struggle-started-when-i-entered-
this-world-vice-news-interviews-cece-mcdonald; Akiba Solomon, “Where Will CeCe McDonald Serve Her 
Time? The Devil is in the Details,” Colorlines, June 8, 2012, 
http://colorlines.com/archives/2012/06/when_it_comes_to_where_cece_mcdonald_will_serve_her_time_th
e_devil_is_in_the_details.html. 
6 In response to her arrest and incarceration, McDonald organized a support committee that at first 
attempted to get the district attorney to drop the charges against her, largely through bringing public 
awareness to her case, and then continued to monitor and advocate for her throughout her incarceration. 
This campaign eventually garnered national and even international media attention. Since she was released, 
McDonald has remained an outspoken transgender and anti-prison activist. 
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individual transphobic prison staff and administrators, this dissertation investigates the 
history of the policies and practices used to manage this population of prisoners over the 
past century, looking to history to understand why this violence has been so persistent 
and pervasive. Contributing to recent scholarship that investigates the US prison system 
as an central site of state violence, social control, and the production of marginality and 
insecurity in US society, I argue that the US prison system is deeply invested in and helps 
produce normative, naturalized constructions of binary sex and gender and is 
fundamentally structured by racialized gender normativity—or the ideological investment 
in white heterosexual-gender norms and naturalized binary sex as valuable and key to 
rehabilitation and freedom in opposition to black and brown sexual and gender 
nonnormativity, dangerousness, and criminality. Carceral racialized gender normative 
logics construct gender nonconformity as dangerous and as a threat to institutional 
security and produce the imperative to punitively regulate and contain gender 
nonconformity. In doing so, these logics justify and normalize carceral violence against 
trans and gender nonconforming prisoners. While scholars of the US prison system have 
largely overlooked trans and gender nonconforming prisoners and trans and queer studies 
scholars have paid too little attention to prisons, I argue that trans and gender 
nonconforming prisoners are a primary target of carceral power, knowledge production, 
and violence. 
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Violence on the outside, violence on the inside 
My struggle didn’t start when I went to prison. My struggle started when I entered this world. 
 – CeCe McDonald 7 
 
That night in June 2011 was not the first time that McDonald was targeted for 
violence and criminalization. In her writings, she describes a lifetime of such 
experiences.8 Indeed, trans and gender nonconforming lives are far too often marked by 
multiple forms of violence—physical, sexual, economic, and structural. Trans and gender 
nonconforming people experience high rates of family rejection; discrimination in 
employment, education, housing, public accommodations, and other areas of life; and 
violence committed by family, partners, and strangers. We are disproportionately poor, 
homeless, and unemployed. Many turn to illegal economies, especially sex work, to earn 
money and survive. Police often profile and target trans people for harassment, violence, 
and arrest.9 Trans women of color are especially subject to police scrutiny, often because 
they are assumed be to sex workers, a phenomenon referred to as “walking while trans.” 
Race-based policing, racial profiling, and racial hate violence not only make trans and 
gender nonconforming people of color more visible and at risk of police scrutiny but 
                                                
7 Quoted in O’Hara, “‘My Struggle Started When I entered this World.’” 
8 See for example, CeCe McDonald, “Pursuit of Happiness,” CeCe’s Blog, November 5, 2011, 
http://supportcece.wordpress.com/2011/11/05/pursuit-of-happiness-3; CeCe McDonald, “As Long as We 
Live in Fear,…We Live in Ignorance…” CeCe’s Blog, November 20, 2011, 
http://supportcece.wordpress.com/2011/11/20/as-long-as-we-live-in-fear-we-live-in-ignorance. 
9 Jaime M. Grant, et al., Injustice at Every Turn: A Report of the National Transgender Discrimination 
Survey (Washington, DC: National Center for Transgender Equality and National Gay and Lesbian Task 
Force, 2011); D. Morgan Bassichis, “It’s War in Here”: A Report on the Treatment of Transgender and 
Intersex People in New York State Men’s Prisons (New York: Sylvia Rivera Law Project, 2007); Leslie J. 
Moran and Andrew N. Sharpe, “Violence, Identity and Policing: The Case of Violence Against 
Transgender People,” Criminal Justice 4 (2004); Eric C. Wilson, et al., “Transgender Female Youth and 
Sex Work: HIV Risk and a Comparison of Life Factors Related to Engagement in Sex Work,” AIDS and 
Behavior 13, no. 5 (2009); Masen Davis and Kristina Wertz, “When Laws are Not Enough: A Study of the 
Economic Health of Transgender People and the Need for a Multidisciplinary Approach to Economic 
Justice,” Seattle Journal for Social Justice 8, no. 2 (2010). 
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amplify profiling based on trans status, as McDonald’s experiences demonstrate. These 
various forms of individual and structural violence funnel trans and gender 
nonconforming people into the criminal legal system, a system that has been designed to 
target and contain people of color, poor people, and sexual and gender nonconforming 
people by producing nonwhiteness (especially blackness), poverty, and gender and sexual 
nonnormativity as dangerous and deviant to white, heteronormative, gender normative 
life and citizenry. Although they constitute a small percentage of the total incarcerated 
population, trans and gender nonconforming people, particularly low-income trans 
women of color like McDonald, may be the most overincarcerated group in the US.10  
But, of course, experiences of criminalization and state and carceral violence are 
uneven across different trans populations and are deeply enmeshed with racial, class-
based, and other forms of violence. My own experiences as a white, queer transmasculine 
person from an upper class background in contrast to McDonald’s illustrates this point 
well. When McDonald was arrested, I lived in Minneapolis, less than two miles from 
where she was attacked and arrested. While I, too, identify as trans, as a white, resourced, 
                                                
10 The most representative survey of trans people in the US found that 16% of respondents reported a 
history of incarceration, which is nearly six times the national rate of 2.7%. As this study shows trans 
people of color, especially black and Latina/o people, were much more likely to report histories of 
incarceration. While 12% of white respondents reported histories of incarceration, 13% of Asian 
respondents, 21% of multiracial respondents, 25% of Latina/o respondents, 30% of American Indian 
respondents, and 47% of Black respondents did so. Trans women were a little over twice as likely to have 
histories of incarceration than trans men: 21% and 10%, respectively. Twelve percent of gender 
nonconforming respondents also reported histories of incarceration. In addition, trans people of color, 
especially black trans people, and trans women were more likely to have spent more time in jail and prison. 
For example, 15% of black respondents had served more than five years in comparison to 4% of all 
respondents. These numbers are most likely low estimates because surveys of this kind tend to be able to 
access wealthier and more educated people and have a hard time accessing homeless and/or poor people 
(and trans people are disproportionately poor and homeless). Moreover, survey respondents did not include 
incarcerated people. Grant, et al., Injustice at Every Turn. I should also note that I participated in the 
writing of this survey as a Vaid Fellow at the Policy Institute of the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force 
in 2007-2008. 
  7 
male-looking person, my experiences of walking the streets in Minneapolis were 
generally free from violence, harassment, and police scrutiny, and my trans experience 
does not include being targeted by criminalization and punitive violence. In other words, 
my whiteness, monetary and educational resources, and masculinity insulate me from 
many of the most violent forms of transphobia. If I had been walking down that street 
that night in 2011, it is highly unlikely that I would have ended up in prison, now facing a 
“free” life with a felony record, as McDonald is.  
Yet, McDonald and I ostensibly share a community, and we share commitments 
to prison abolitionist, anti-racist, and radical trans politics. Soon after McDonald’s arrest, 
I became a member of her support committee and continued to work with the committee 
for the next year, through her plea agreement, sentencing, and transfer to St. Cloud. The 
coalition that came together to support McDonald was diverse. People came to the work 
with different investments, different life experiences, and different relationships to the 
US prison system. This diversity of life experience and investments was important to 
creating a broad coalition but also bred misunderstandings and contention, and I was 
constantly reminded that that while I could say I was part of McDonald’s community 
when it was most broadly defined, I am not a part of her everyday community and that 
our experiences as trans people are strikingly different. For me, these political 
commitments are ethical and about envisioning a better world but are not about 
immediate survival (my survival is generally ensured by a white supremacist, capitalist 
state and prison system), but for McDonald and trans women of color like her these 
commitments are about survival, as well as ethics and envisioning a better world. 
  8 
This fundamental and quite profound fracturing of trans experience—largely but 
not entirely because of race—structures how the criminalization of trans and gender 
nonconforming people functions. While I am not a target of the US prison system, 
McDonald and trans women of color in general—as well as other trans and gender 
nonconforming people of color to a slightly lesser extent—are primary targets. Not only 
does racialized policing and mass incarceration heighten the criminalization of trans and 
gender nonconforming people of color but proximity to and involvement with systems of 
social control designed for poor people increases state involvement in and regulation of 
certain trans and gender nonconforming people’s lives, increasing their criminalization 
and risk of incarceration. As legal scholar and activist Dean Spade has argued, sex 
segregation and gendered surveillance and regulation are “central organizing strategies” 
of these systems of social control, which means that in systems already designed to 
marginalize and regulate, trans and gender nonconforming people are further 
marginalized and subject to state control and violence.11 Again, poverty and racialization 
not are not additive factors in criminalization but exponentially increase the risk of 
criminalization because of trans and gender nonconforming status. These factors create a 
situation where the vast majority of trans and gender nonconforming people who are 
incarcerated are people of color.12 
This criminalization and overincarceration is not new. As Joey L. Mogul, Andrea 
J. Ritchie, and Kay Whitlock argue in Queer (In)Justice: The Criminalization of LGBT 
                                                
11 Dean Spade, “Compliance is Gendered,” in Transgender Rights, ed. Paisley Currah, Richard M. Juang, 
and Shannon Minter Price (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2006). 
12 Alisha Williams, interview by author, August 19, 2013, New York, NY, on file with author; Owen 
Daniel-McCarter, interview by author, September 5, 2013, Chicago, IL, on file with author. See also Grant, 
et al., Injustice at Every Turn. 
  9 
People in the United States, the policing and punishment of gender and sexual deviance 
have existed for centuries in the US and have been integral aspects of systems of racial 
violence and control, including colonization and chattel slavery.13 As same-sex desire and 
gender nonconformity became supposedly stable traits of specific types of people and as 
homosexual communities began to emerge in the latter half of the nineteenth century, 
police and the criminal legal system developed laws and methods to systematically target 
gender nonconformity and public displays of cross-gender living for arrest and 
imprisonment. Indeed, trans and LGBT studies scholars have argued that policing and 
criminalization have deeply affected queer and trans lives and helped shape identities and 
communities from the late nineteenth century to the present.14 Despite the important 
historical scholarship on the criminalization and policing of homosexuality, sexual 
nonnormativity, gender nonconformity, and cross-gender identity, little scholarship has 
substantively examined what happened to gender and sexual nonnormative people after 
their arrests.15 Yet, as this dissertation argues, the criminalization and violent punishment 
                                                
13 Joey L. Mogul, Andrea J. Ritchie, and Kay Whitlock, Queer (In)Justice: The Criminalization of LGBT 
People in the United States (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 2010). 
14 See for example, Susan Stryker, Transgender History (Berkeley, CA: Seal Press, 2008); Nan Alamilla 
Boyd, Wide Open Town: A History of Queer San Francisco to 1965 (Berkeley, CA: University of 
California Press, 2003); George Chauncey, Gay New York: Gender, Urban Culture, and the Making of the 
Gay Male World 189-1940 (New York: BasicBooks, 1994); Mogul, et al., Queer (In)Justice; Margot 
Canaday, The Straight State: Sexuality and Citizenship in Twentieth Century America (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2009). 
15 Historian Regina Kunzel’s brilliant study of the history of same-sex sexuality in US prisons is the 
primary exception here. Regina Kunzel, Criminal Intimacy: Prison and the Uneven History of Modern 
American Sexuality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008). George Chauncey also briefly discusses 
the experiences of homosexuals, especially gender nonconforming homosexuals, in the penitentiary on 
Welfare Island in his study of New York City gay history. Chauncey, Gay New York. 
An increasing number of scholars have begun to examine the experiences of incarceration of trans and 
gender nonconforming people currently. See for example, Mogul, et al., Queer (In)Justice; Eric A. Stanley 
and Nat Smith, ed., Captive Genders: Trans Embodiment and the Prison Industrial Complex (Oakland, 
CA: AK Press, 2011); Gabriel Arkles, “Safety and Solidarity across Gender Lines: Rethinking Segregation 
of Transgender People in Detention,” Temple Political and Civil Rights Law Review 18, no. 2 (Spring 
  10 
of gender and sexual deviance by the state outside of penal institutions extended into 
penal institutions, shaping how jail and prison administrators managed gender 
nonconformity.  
Once incarcerated, trans and gender nonconforming people encounter a system 
that is designed to strip all imprisoned people of choice, agency, and bodily integrity, 
while also targeting certain populations for specific forms of racialized, gendered, and 
sexualized violence and control. As such, trans and gender nonconforming prisoners 
experience particular formations of carceral power and violence that are directed towards 
gender nonconformity. While the specific features of these formations have changed 
somewhat over the last century or so, the broad outlines have remained largely consistent. 
At the core of carceral violence targeting gender nonconformity is sex segregation 
and sex classification. Upon imprisonment, people enter a sex-segregated system that 
sorts prisoners into male or female institutions and actively and punitively regulates 
gender within them. Trans and gender nonconforming people are stripped of their ability 
to determine their own sex, and in almost all cases, prisoners are classified based on their 
genital status, regardless of their gender identity or expression. Because few trans people 
have genital surgery—either because they do not want to or are unable to access such 
treatment—nearly all trans women are housed in men’s institutions and trans men in 
women’s institutions.16 Perhaps the most basic, mundane, and invisible form of carceral 
                                                                                                                                            
2009); Gabriel Arkles, “Correcting Race and Gender: Prison Regulations of Social Hierarchy through 
Dress,” New York University Law Review 87, no. 4 (October 2012). 
16 The inability to access adequate gender-affirming medical treatment is a huge problem for trans and 
gender nonconforming communities and people, especially those most likely to be incarcerated. Rampant 
discrimination continues to exist among healthcare providers throughout the US. Transgender-related 
medical treatment is exempt from most health insurance plans, including Medicaid. Hormones and, 
especially, surgical treatment are very expensive and out of reach for most who live in poverty as well as 
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violence is the prison system’s nearly totalizing authority to determine prisoners’ sex. For 
most prisoners, this determination is automatic and conforms to their gender identity, and 
therefore remains invisible, but for trans and gender nonconforming prisoners, like 
McDonald, this process is usually violent, antagonistic, and dehumanizing.  
McDonald’s experience is instructive here. McDonald was processed into the 
Minnesota prison system as male, despite her gender identity and lived experience as a 
woman. Like all departments of corrections, MNDOC places prisoners in sexed facilities 
based on their genital status. MNDOC’s official policy regarding the placement of trans 
prisoners authorizes a “Transgender Committee,” made up of medical and security staff, 
to determine trans prisoners’ sex and related placement and treatment.17 While the policy 
allows the committee to, “at its discretion, consult with the offender,” the prisoner’s 
gender identity is neither determinative nor even a required factor in the committee’s 
decision-making process. Instead, medical and security staff utilize physical and 
psychological evaluations and medical and security knowledge to make their 
determination. This policy constructs medical and carceral knowledge as determinative, 
delegitimizing trans prisoners’ knowledge about their own identities and needs.18 While 
not all departments of corrections have official policies that dictate protocol for managing 
                                                                                                                                            
many working-class and middle-class people. Grant, et al, Injustice at Every Turn; Pooja S. Gehi and 
Gabriel Arkles, “Unraveling Injustice: Race and Class Impact of Medicaid Exclusions of Transition-
Related Health Care for Transgender People,” Sexuality Research and Social Policy 4, no. 4 (December 
2007); Spade, “Compliance is Gendered.” 
17 Minnesota Department of Corrections, “Evaluation and Placement of Transgender Offenders,” 202.045 
(May 7, 2007). 
18 In discussing the policy and the general practice of the Committee, Katie Burgess—the executive director 
of the Trans Youth Support Network in Minneapolis and a core member of CeCe’s Support Committee—
explains, “The committee process is remarkably abusive and just disgusting…Generally, they’re made up 
of all non-transgender people with absolutely no cultural sensitivity.” Quoted in Solomon, “Where Will 
CeCe McDonald Serve Her Time?” 
  12 
trans prisoners, in practice they all have the authority to decide trans and gender 
nonconforming prisoners’ sex and use a similar calculus in making that decision. 
Prisoners are never authorized to self-determine their sex, and their gender identity is 
rarely taken into account. 
Sex classification is also deeply interconnected with the (often violent) regulation 
of gender within penal institutions. All prisons and jails regulate gendered appearance, 
access to clothing and grooming products, and access to gender-affirming medical 
treatment. For example, people in men’s prisons are usually not allowed to have clothing 
and grooming produces designated as female, such as bras, dresses, “feminine-cut” pants, 
and makeup. While prisons may provide certain medical treatment when it is not 
transgender-related, they restrict or prohibit the same or very similar treatment when it is 
transgender-related. For instance, prisoners in men’s institutions may be provided with 
testosterone hormone therapy, when prescribed, but denied estrogen hormone therapy. As 
such, trans and gender nonconforming prisoners’ access to gender-appropriate grooming 
products, clothing, and gender-affirming medical treatment are routinely restricted or 
denied in penal institutions around the US. While prison administrators usually claim that 
such hygiene products, clothing, or medical treatments are threats to institutional security, 
these restrictions aim to negate trans and gender nonconforming prisoners’ gender 
identity, to, as McDonald explained in the first epigraph that began this introduction, 
“take [their] identit[ies] away from” them, and are an important source of carceral 
violence targeting trans and gender nonconforming prisoners.19  
                                                
19 McDonald also experienced problems with medical treatment while incarcerated. While she received her 
hormones while she was in jail, she received inadequate medical treatment for the stab wound in her cheek, 
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Put another way, the prison system is a site of sex formation as it classifies the sex 
of millions of people every year. In doing so, the prison system (re)produces sex as 
natural, immutable, and binary and inextricably tied to gender norms. As trans studies 
scholars have shown, sex classification is a primary function of the state and is one of the 
most common and naturalized ways that the state identifies and regulates populations.20 
But, the work of sex classification is distributed across multiple state and federal agencies 
and sites that have created hundreds of formal and informal policies, most of which 
identify different methods of classifying a person’s sex, although all of which provide 
only two options (male and female). A few allow (re)classification based on gender 
identity, others (much more commonly) require a doctor’s letter with proof of varying 
forms of medical intervention (from none to genital surgery), while a few others only 
recognize birth-assigned sex.21 While the heterogeneity and inconsistency of this sex 
classification “rule matrix,” as Spade calls it, produces a situation in which many trans 
people have multiple “legal sexes,” sex is still generally constructed as inherently and 
naturally binary and the binaristic classification of sex is constructed as a 
                                                                                                                                            
which was the result of the glass that was smashed in her face during the fight. The wound would 
eventually become seriously infected. While the court that sentenced her mandated that she continue to 
receive hormone treatment at the dosage she was prescribed pre-incarceration, it took three weeks for her to 
begin receiving them and her initial doses were substantially lower than what she was prescribed on the 
outside. Only after she organized a call-in campaign through her support committee did MNDOC 
administrators give her the appropriate dose. Low dosage is, in fact, a common problem for trans people 
who are receiving hormone therapy in prisons and jails around the US. “Update from CeCe in St. Cloud: 
July, 2012,” SupportCeCe, August 2, 2012, http://supportcece.wordpress.com/2012/08/02/update-from-
cece-in-st-cloud-july-2012; Williams, interview; Gabriel Arkles, interview by author, August 12, 2013, 
Boston, MA, on file with author. 
20 Dean Spade, “Documenting Gender,” Hastings Law Journal 59 (2008); Dean Spade, Normal Life: 
Administrative Violence, Critical Trans Politics, and the Limits of Law (Brooklyn: South End Press, 2011); 
Paisley Currah, “The State,” Transgender Studies Quarterly 1, no. 1-2 (May 2014); Tey Meadow, “‘A 
Rose Is a Rose’: On Producing Legal Gender Classifications,” Gender & Society 24, no. 6 (December 
2010). 
21 For the most thorough explanation of these requirements, see Spade, “Documenting Gender.” 
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commonsensical and essential function of the state.22 Yet, as Spade and others have 
argued, the state regulation and classification of sex is a primary site of the social 
construction of sex and produces vulnerability and insecurity—including contributing to 
under- and unemployment, homelessness and housing insecurity, various forms of 
discrimination, criminalization, and state, street-based, and interpersonal violence—for 
those who do not conform to normative (birth-assigned) sex. Thus, the multiple forms of 
vulnerability and violence that trans people experience outlined at the beginning of this 
section are intimately tied to the state and to state sex formation and regulation. 
As Spade explains, this sex classification rule matrix does not simply classify sex 
according to some natural or neutral criteria but is fundamentally structured by social 
norms and systems of oppression. In so arguing, Spade draws on scholarship in critical 
race studies, queer studies, feminist studies, and trans studies, which has long argued 
against liberal notions of the state as a neutral arbiter of difference and instead argued 
that the state is fundamentally structured by and (re)produces white supremacy, 
heteropatriarchy, settler colonialism, ableism, and other systems of oppression.23 As 
Michael Omi and Howard Winant argue in their seminal book Racial Formations in the 
United States, the state is a racial formation and a racial project as it simultaneously 
                                                
22 Spade, “Documenting Gender.” See also Spade, Normal Life; Spade, “Compliance is Gendered.” 
23 See for example, Michael Omi and Howard Winant, Racial Formation in the United States: From the 
1960s to the 1990s (New York: Routledge, 1994); David Theo Goldberg, The Racial State (Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishing, 2002); Charles Mills, The Racial Contract (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
1997); Kimberlé Crenshaw, Neil Gotanda, Gary Peller, and Kendall Thomas, ed., Critical Race Theory: 
The Key Writings that Formed the Movement (New York: The New Press, 1995); Joy James, Resisting 
State Violence: Radicalism, Gender, and Race in U.S. Culture (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1996); Chandan Reddy, Freedom With Violence: Race, Sexuality, and the US State (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2011); Katherine MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1989). 
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produces meaning about race and distributes resources in racialized ways.24 In this 
regard, the state is also (and interconnectedly) a sexed and gendered project. Put another 
way, the state helps produce the epistemological and material conditions of US society, 
producing (racialized, gendered, and sexed) normativities and deviances across multiple, 
dispersed administrative and other sites, including the prison system. These constructions 
of the normative and deviant define which populations’ lives should be enhanced and 
which populations should be targeted for containment and violence. In doing so, as Spade 
argues, the state helps distribute life chances, vulnerability, and security/insecurity.25 The 
prison system is one such state arbiter of (racialized, gendered, and sexed) life chances 
and security/insecurity as it subjects those it targets to spectacular forms of violence 
while securing and extending the life of the (normative) populations it purportedly serves 
to protect. While Spade identifies the prison system as doing this work, few other 
scholars have explicitly done so. “Carceral Normativities,” therefore, helps us better 
understand how the prison system as a primary site of state sex formation produces 
insecurity for and has devastating effects on the life chances of trans and gender 
nonconforming people.  
Sex classification is a central component of state administrative functions that 
produce vulnerability and insecurity for trans and gender nonconforming populations, but 
sex classification and the vulnerability and insecurity that it produces are intimately 
interconnected with other forms of racial, gender, and sex formation and regulation, 
                                                
24 Omi and Winant, Racial Formations.  
25 Spade, Normal Life. See also, Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality: An Introduction (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1978); Michel Foucault, “Society Must Be Defended”: Lectures at the Collége de France, 
1975-1976 (New York: Picador, 1997). 
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especially the management, control, and eradication of sexual nonnormativity, including 
but not limited to homosexuality. In fact, the modern US state has long conflated gender, 
sexed, and sexual nonnormativity—especially homosexuality and gender nonconformity 
or cross-gender identity—and frequently racialized it. Historian Regina Kunzel’s recent 
study of the history of same-sex sexuality in the US prison system demonstrates both the 
prison system’s investment in regulating sexuality and the conflation of gender and 
sexual nonnormativity.26 Arguing that sexuality has both helped shape the modern prison 
system since its inception in the early nineteenth century and that the prison system was 
an important site of the construction of modern sexuality, Kunzel describes how sex 
segregation and the supposedly single-sex nature of prisons produced both complex 
gendered and sexual prisoner cultures and a great deal of anxiety about (homo)sexuality 
for prison administrators. In describing that anxiety, Kunzel previews how gender 
nonconformity was a nearly constant component of the construction and regulation of 
(homo)sexuality. Extending Kunzel’s important work by attending more specifically to 
gender nonconformity, I show that this conflation of homosexuality and gender 
nonconforming or cross-gender identity has long structured responses to, management 
strategies for, and carceral violence against trans and gender nonconforming prisoners.27 
Prison administrators in both policy and practice have long addressed the dangers of 
gender nonconformity as dangerous (homo)sexuality. They have identified homosexuals 
                                                
26 Kunzel, Criminal Intimacy.  
27 This conflation of gender and sexual nonnormativity was and is reflective and deeply interconnected with 
social scientific and medical constructions of homosexuality and gender nonconformity as well as 
homosexual and gender nonconforming people’s own conceptualizations of identity and community. See, 
Kunzel, Criminal Intimacy; Jennifer Terry, An American Obsession: Science, Medicine, and Homosexuality 
in Modern Society (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1999). 
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through performances and embodiments of gender nonconformity and cross-gender 
identity. As such, throughout this dissertation there is frequent slippage between sexuality 
and gender, homosexuality and gender nonconformity. I am deliberately imprecise in this 
regard.  
We should, therefore, understand carceral violence targeting trans and gender 
nonconforming prisoners as about sex, gender, and sexual (non)normativity, which also 
helps us understand that while sex classification is an important source and type of 
carceral violence, simply changing placement policies and practices will not eradicate 
carceral violence targeting trans and gender nonconforming prisoners. McDonald 
repeatedly emphasized this point throughout her incarceration. While many supporters 
sought to concentrate their energy on getting her transferred to a women’s prison as a 
way to keep her safe, McDonald resisted that strategy, deciding not to advocate for a 
transfer to a women’s prison because, as McDonald repeatedly pointed out, she would 
not have been safe or free from violence had she been classified as female and placed in a 
women’s prison. Of course, MNDOC’s classification of McDonald as male was both a 
type and source of carceral violence—both violently stripping her of gender self-
determination and making her vulnerable to other forms of violence from the regulation 
of her gender to sexual violence.28 Nevertheless, in deciding not to advocate for her sex 
reclassification, she shifted the focus back to the problem of carceral violence and mass 
                                                
28 McDonald did, in fact, experience many common forms of carceral violence while she was incarcerated, 
including the regulation of her appearance and gendered body, repeated segregation, and difficulty 
accessing her hormone treatment, and her supporters were constantly fearful of her experiencing sexual 
violence. 
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incarceration itself, arguing that “all prisons are fucked up…Prisons aren’t safe for 
anybody.”29  
Violence is rampant in women’s prisons as well as men’s prisons, and McDonald, 
in fact, might have been safer in a men’s prison than a women’s prison because men’s 
prisons are currently and historically where trans women are incarcerated. McDonald 
was, therefore, more likely to encounter other trans women and be familiar with certain 
parts of the culture and cultural norms among the prisoners in a men’s prison than in a 
women’s prison. Because of this familiarity, she would be better able to navigate the 
space and culture of a men’s prison and develop relationships and community with other 
prisoners to keep herself safe, not only from violence perpetrated by other prisoners but 
also violence perpetrated by staff. In fact, trans and gender nonconforming prisoners and 
their advocates often report that the majority of violence they experience is perpetrated or 
facilitated by staff and that certain housing placements, especially segregation, can 
increase the risk of staff-perpetrated violence by severing them from the potential safety 
of developing relationship with other prisoners. Indeed, McDonald reported that at St. 
Cloud, “she easily [got] along with other prisoners; it’s the guards and administration that 
are fucking with her relentlessly—and they say it’s for her ‘safety’ against the rest of the 
prison population. All of her issues thus far are with guards and administrators trying to 
control and regulate her gender as if it is outlaw.”30 
                                                
29 Quoted in O’Hara, “‘My Struggle Started When I entered this World.’” See also, “Update from CeCe in 
St. Cloud: July, 2012.” 
While other incarcerated trans woman do want to be transferred to a women’s prison, including safety, 
others like McDonald prefer to be housed in a men’s institution for various reasons, including because the 
culture is more familiar to them and therefore feels safer. 
30 CeCe’s Support Committee, “Dear CeCe Supporters,” FreeCeCe, July 9, 2012, 
http://freececemcdonald.tumblr.com/post/26834960331/dear-cece-supporters-two-of-ceces-friends. 
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While she could not be safe, there were certainly safer places for her to be 
housed, and McDonald determined that the safer place for her, at least most of the time, 
was general population in a men’s prison. This determination is somewhat 
counterintuitive to many people who have not experienced similar incarceration and 
indicates that no single, uniform placement policy can address the numerous complexities 
of violence and unsafety in prison, especially for trans women.31 Thus, we can understand 
the violence that McDonald experienced as fundamentally structural, as deeply embedded 
within the administrative functions and order of the US prison system. 
 
The Productivity of Carceral Violence 
Violence is the defining feature of the US prison system. Incarceration itself—or 
the forced removal of people from their homes and communities, their confinement in 
cages, and the denial of many of their basic forms of agency and bodily integrity—is 
inherently violent and a type of “state terror.”32 While carceral violence is often a blunt 
instrument of bodily domination and repression, it is also complex and productive 
epistemologically. Dylan Rodríguez argues that a theory of carceral violence must 
“comprehend[] it as a complex production rather than utilitarian application of power and 
racially gendered bodily domination, and…attempt[] to comprehend carceral violence in 
its specificity as both spectacle and routine, and across the intensities of its production on 
                                                
31 Indeed, advocates generally argue against a uniform policy and argue for taking the imprisoned person’s 
understanding of where they will be safest as the primary determining factor for placement. This strategy 
would, of course, allow for choice and self-determination, which are generally foreclosed by prison 
administrations. 
32 Dylan Rodríguez, Forced Passages: Imprisoned Radical Intellectuals and the U.S. Prison Regime 
(Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 2006). See also Ruth Wilson Gilmore, Golden Gulag: 
Prisons, Surplus, Crisis, and Opposition in Globalizing California (Berkeley, CA: University of California 
Press, 2007). 
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the bodies and subjectivities of people in prison.”33 In conversations with Rodríguez’s 
theory of carceral violence, this dissertation examines how carceral violence and penal 
policies and practices that target trans and gender nonconforming prisoners discipline, 
punish, and attempt to eradicate gender nonconformity—from the mundane, quotidian 
work of sex classification to spectacular forms of isolation, sexual violence, and the 
denial of medical treatment—and produce gender nonconformity as dangerous and 
threatening to institutional security. 
Understanding the complexities of carceral violence—particularly the ways that it 
is materially and discursively productive—has been a central project of critical prison 
studies. Rodríguez argues that carceral violence is a “fundamental organizing logic” of 
the US.34 More than just prisons and jails, the US prison system is a web of power that 
produces knowledge about people and populations, social categories, and social, state, 
and economic relations that are deeply integrated into and constitutive of US society.35 
This web of power—which extends throughout US society via auxiliary institutions such 
as the legal system, academia, the media, the economy, and others—helps produce the 
material relations of US society, infrastructures of social hierarchy and inequality, and 
relationships of protection or violence between populations and the state.  
                                                
33 Dylan Rodríguez, “I Would Wish Death on You…:Race, Gender, and Immigration in the Globality of 
the U.S. Prison Regime,” The Scholar and Feminist Online 6:3 (2008), 3.  
34 Rodríguez, Forced Passages, 7. See also, Joy James, ed., Warfare in the American Homeland: Policing 
and Prisons in a Penal Democracy (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2007). 
35 See a similar explanation of the US prison system, or prison industrial complex, see Rodríguez, Forced 
Passages; Angela Y. Davis, Are Prisons Obsolete? (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2003); Eric A. Stanley 
and Nat Smith, ed. Captive Genders: Trans Embodiment and the Prison Industrial Complex (Oakland, CA: 
AK Press, 2011); Julia Sudbury, “Celling Black Bodies: Black Women in the Global Prison Industrial 
Complex.” Feminist Review 80 (2005); Spade, Normal Life. 
See also Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (New York: Vintage Books, 
1995).  
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Critical prison studies scholars, like Rodríguez, have primarily articulated carceral 
violence and incarceration itself as a racial project, as produced from white 
supremacist—particularly antiblack—logics and technologies. In order to do so, scholars 
have often looked to the history of the prison system and related social and state 
institutions to argue that white supremacist and antiblack systems of control, including 
chattel slavery, Jim Crow, and other formations of racial segregation, produced 
hegemonic, racialized understandings of personhood, freedom, unfreedom, and captivity 
as well as an enduring relationship between blackness, sexual nonnormativity and 
dangerousness, and criminality, whose discursive and material legacies—or, as Saidiya 
Hartman phrased this, “afterlife”—continue in the contemporary prison system.36 Central 
to these systems of racial control were technologies of racial, gender, and sexual violence 
designed as tools of domination and control as well as a material and discursive means of 
producing racialized populations as dangerous and gender and sexually nonnormative. 
                                                
36 Saidiya Hartman, Lose Your Mother: A Journey Along the Atlantic Slave Route (New York: Farrar, 
Strause and Giroux, 2007), 6. Hartman explains, “This is the afterlife of slavery—skewed life chances, 
limited access to health and education, premature death, incarceration, and impoverishment.” See also, 
Rodríguez, Forced Passages; Dylan Rodríguez, “(Non)Scenes of Captivity: The Common Sense of 
Punishment and Death,” Radical History Review 96 (2006); Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow: Mass 
Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness (New York: The New Press, 2010); Angela Y. Davis, “Race 
and Criminalization: Black Americans and the Punishment Industry,” in The Angela Y. Davis Reader, ed. 
Joy James (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1998); Angela Y. Davis, “From the Prison of Slavery to the 
Slavery of Prison: Frederick Douglass and the Convict Lease System,” in The Angela Y. Davis Reader; 
Angela Y. Davis, “Racialized Punishment and Prison Abolition,” in The Angela Y. Davis Reader; Davis, 
Are Prisons Obsolete?; Michael Hames-García, Fugitive Thought: Prison Movements, Race, and the 
Meaning of Justice (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2004); Robert Perkinson, Texas Tough: 
The Rise of America’s Prison Empire (New York: Picador, 2010); Loïc Wacquant, “The New ‘Peculiar 
Institution’: On the Prison as Surrogate Ghetto,” Theoretical Criminology 4 (2000); Loïc Wacquant, 
“Deadly Symbiosis: When Ghetto and Prison Meet and Mesh,” Punishment and Society 3 (2001); Loïc 
Wacquant, “From Slavery to Mass Incarceration: Rethinking the ‘Race Question’ in the US,” New Left 
Review 13 (January/February 2002); Ethan Blue and Patrick Timmons, “Editor’s Introduction,” Radical 
History Review 96 (2006); David Oshinsky, “Worse than Slavery”: Parchman Farm and the Ordeal of Jim 
Crow Justice (New York: Free Press, 1996). Caleb Smith expands this to argue that Western expansion and 
the reservation system are also part of the genealogy of the contemporary prison system. Caleb Smith, The 
Prison and the American Imagination (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009). 
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Criminality and dangerousness, in other words, have long been important 
technologies and discourses of white supremacy that helped sustain, legitimize, and 
naturalize systems of racial control and violence. While taking different forms across 
racialized populations, geographies, and time periods, racialized criminality has marked 
certain bodies and populations as undesirable, threatening to the national body politic, 
and inherently dangerous, producing the imperative to control and, ultimately, to 
imprison criminalized populations and authorizing state violence against them. As Lisa 
Cacho argues, criminalized populations become “ineligible for personhood,” as the law 
and punishment target their bodies and beings, not their behavior. Criminality “takes 
away the right to have rights.”37 In other words, criminality dehumanizes. 
Dehumanization of criminalized populations and prisoners is necessary to justify and 
normalize imprisonment, which strips a person of their freedom, bodily integrity, and 
safety, or as Colin Dayan explains, reduces prisoners to subjectivity-less bodies, or 
“depersonalized persons.”38 White supremacy and racialization are key to this 
dehumanization, as people of color are produced as inherently fungible and violatable; as 
Grace Hong explains, “to be racialized is to not own oneself.”39 Put another way, as Ruth 
Wilson Gilmore argues, (racialized) dehumanization is “the very premise of the 
American prison.”40  
                                                
37 Lisa Cacho, Social Death: Racialized Rightlessness and the Criminalization of the Unprotected (New 
York: New York University Press, 2012), 6. See also, Sudbury, “Celling Black Bodies.” 
38 Colin Dayan, The Law is a White Dog: How Legal Rituals Make and Unmake Persons (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2011), 32. 
39 Grace Kyungwon Hong, The Ruptures of American Capital: Women of Color Feminism and the Culture 
of Immigrant Labor (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2006), 8.  
40 Gilmore, Golden Gulag, 29. Hames-García similarly argues that rehabilitation is actually a process of 
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While racialization structures this web of criminalization, dehumanization, 
incarceration, and carceral violence, so do gender and sexuality. The criminal legal 
system has long produced gender and sexual deviance as markers of criminality and 
dangerousness and targeted those who exhibit or embody sexual and gender deviance—
including but not limited to gender nonconformity, cross-gender identity, and same-sex 
desire—for policing and incarceration. White supremacist and racialized systems of 
control have constructed people and communities of color as gender and sexually 
nonnormative, which has supported and structured many forms of racialized criminality, 
and the policing of sexual and gender deviance has been used as a tool to target people of 
color for policing, incarceration, and punishment.41 As Joy James has argued, criminality 
and deviancy are “embodied in the black because both sexual and social pathology are 
branded by skin color (as well as by gender and sexual orientation).”42 Dominant 
constructions of incorrigibility and criminality are centered on the spectacle of the threat 
of black masculinity, particularly embodied in the black rapist, and the pathologization of 
black femininity. Penologists have also long linked racial deviance with gender and 
sexual deviance. Early prison reform tied rehabilitation to whiteness and gender and 
sexual normativity while blackness and gender and sexual nonnormativity were produced 
as signs of incorrigibility. In other words, as I will argue in Chapter One, racialized 
gender normativity was foundational to the construction and internal logics of the US 
                                                
41 Mogul, et al, Queer (In)Justice; Reddy, Freedom With Violence; Nayan Shah, Stranger Intimacy: 
Contesting Race, Sexuality, and the Law in the North American West (Berkeley, CA: University of 
California Press, 2011); Cacho, Social Death. 
42 James, Resisting State Violence, 26.  
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prison system and continues to structure the discursive and material impact of the prison 
system, including constructions of criminality and dangerousness.  
Put another way, criminality is both a marker and a producer of deviancy. It helps 
construct the boundaries of national social membership and which populations represent 
normative citizenship. Criminality, therefore, also works to decriminalize, humanize, and 
secure whiteness, heteronormativity, and gender normativity and the populations that 
embody these norms, as it constructs normative citizenship as white, hetero- and gender 
normative.43 Criminality works to define the relationship between marginalized people 
and the US state and mainstream society, ensuring their subordinate status and 
legitimizing, naturalizing, and normalizing imprisonment and carceral violence. 
Criminality also makes certain people and populations dangerous within penal 
institutions, particularly to penal security. Within the prison system, certain 
populations—especially gang members, terrorists, prison activists, and, as I will argue in 
the following chapters, trans and gender nonconforming people—are marked as 
inherently dangerous and threatening to security.  
“Security” is, arguably, the central organizing principle of US carceral power and 
organization and, more generally, the liberal state. Security justifies the existence of 
penal institutions (keeping the US state and normative US society secure), and it is the 
central purpose of prison administrators (keeping the penal institution secure). As Michel 
Foucault argues in Security, Territory, and Population, modern Western society is a 
                                                
43 Ibid.; Rodríguez, Forced Passages.  
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“society of security.”44 A “pact of security” binds the state to its citizenry by calculating 
risk and danger across the normal and the abnormal. Security, in other words, is a 
productive discourse and a biopolitical and necropolitical technology that produces and is 
organized by normativity.45 Security orients certain populations—those deemed 
normative, specifically white and hetero- and gender normative—towards life, freedom, 
safety, and mobility, while orienting others—the “abnormal,” or populations of color, 
sexual and gender nonnormative, and disabled—toward death, immobility, and 
violence.46 As Didier Bigo explains, security constructs an “environment of life” for 
normative populations while abnormalizing the margins, producing insecurity and 
exclusion for the marginalized.47 Security both marginalizes certain nonnormative 
populations and marks them for incarceration, punishment, and various forms of carceral 
containment. Security functions as the basis for, to paraphrase Max Weber’s well-known 
phrase, the state’s monopoly of the legitimate use of violence.48  
                                                
44 Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collége de France, 1977-1978 (New 
York: Picador, 2009). 
45 Foucault argues that security mechanisms are central to biopower’s purpose of regularizing, maximizing, 
and taking control of life for certain populations. As Michael Dillon has argued, “The war for life which 
biopolitics wages on behalf of its understanding of life, and in relentless pursuit of appropriate power 
relations to enact that understanding, is translated into biopolitical peace through an obsession with 
security. Biopolitically it is ‘life’ which has to be secured. Life is a continuous war against whatever 
threatens life. Life is thus a permanent security problem for biopolitics.” Michael Dillon, “Security, Race 
and War,” in Foucault on Politics, Security and War, ed. Michael Dillon and Andrew W. Neals (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillon, 2008), 168. On biopolitics, see Foucault, “Society Must Be Defended”; 
Foucault, History of Sexuality. On necropolitics, see Achille Mbembe, “Necropolitics,” Public Culture 15 
(2003).  
46 On “orientations,” see Sarah Ahmed, Queer Phenomenology: Orientations, Objects, Others (Durham, 
NC: Duke University Press, 2006).  
47 Didier Bigo, “Security: A Field Left Fallow,” in Foucault on Politics, Security and War, ed. Michael 
Dillon and Andrew W. Neals (New York: Palgrave Macmillon, 2008), 97. 
48 Max Weber, “Politics as a Vocation,” in From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, ed. Hans Heinrich Gerth 
and C. Wright Mills (London: Routledge, 1991). 
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The margins and marginalized are therefore marked by dangerousness and 
criminality, which work as the counterparts to security. As I have been discussing, 
dangerousness has long been produced as a trait of certain populations, describing more 
than behavior or acts but being. Foucault argues that dangerousness was an important 
technology of emerging penal regimes in the nineteenth century, that criminalization and 
penal regimes aimed to control dangerousness, becoming “a control not so much over 
what individuals did…as over what they might do, what they were capable of doing, what 
they were liable to do, what they were imminently about to do…The idea of 
dangerousness meant that the individual must be considered by society at the level of his 
potentialities, and not at the level of his actions; not at the level of the actual violations of 
an actual law, but at the level of the behavioral potentialities they represented.”49 Both 
dangerousness and security anticipate danger, locating its source in certain populations 
that must be contained, destroyed, or (under the best circumstances) normalized. For 
Foucault, the theory of dangerousness and security forged links between the prison, law, 
and auxiliary institutions, such as psychiatry and social science, which helped locate, 
diagnose, and explain dangerousness and dangerous people and populations. In doing so, 
these institutions use security and dangerousness to normalize state violence and 
incarceration against the abnormal or deviant and dangerous, the security threats. 
                                                
49 Michel Foucault, “Truth and Juridical Forms.” in Power: Essential Works of Foucault, 1954-1980, ed. 
James D. Faubion (New York: The New Press, 1994), 56-7. His emphasis. See also Ricky Wichum, 
“Security as Dispositif: Michel Foucault in the Field of Security,” Foucault Studies 15 (February 2013). 
While Foucault locates the emergence of dangerousness in criminal psychiatry in the early nineteenth 
century, the constructions of certain populations as inherently dangerous were foundational to racialized, 
gendered, and sexual systems of control. Michel Foucault, “About the Concept of the ‘Dangerous 
Individual’ in Nineteenth-century Legal Psychiatry, ” in Power: Essential Works of Foucault, 1954-1980, 
ed. James D. Faubion (New York: The New Press, 1994); Michel Foucault, Abnormal: Lectures at the 
Collége de France, 1974-1975 (New York: Picador, 1999).  
  27 
Even within prisons, prisoners marked as more normative and secure are given 
greater relative freedom, while those marked as security threats—the racialized 
(especially “gang members” and “terrorists”), sexually and gender nonnormative 
(especially gender nonconforming, trans, and queer people), and bodily and cognitively 
nonnormative (the disabled)—are isolated, immobilized, and subjected to greater carceral 
violence. Classification, including sex classification, is a primary means of maintaining 
security within the prison system, as it is a technology of surveillance, knowledge 
production, segregation, and control.50 Security, therefore, normalizes many forms of 
carceral violence.  
In other words, the negation of trans and gender nonconforming people’s gender 
identities and the carceral system of sex classification is and long has been a part of the 
security apparatus and an important productive piece of carceral violence. Sex 
classification, as it is defined through racialized gender normativity, also produces gender 
nonconformity as inherently dangerous and threatening to the institution. I argue that this 
production of “queer dangerousness” informs all policies and practices used to manage 
gender nonconforming and trans prisoners. I use “queer” to modify dangerousness to 
mark how this construction of the inherent danger of gender nonconformity is not only 
about gender but also about sexuality and race. Drawing from queer of color critique in 
particular, queer, here, is not a synonym for LGBT or an identity category but describes 
                                                
50 Foucault argues that while security is primarily biopolitical, disciplinary mechanisms, such as 
classification and the correction of prisoners, can be part of security. He explains, “For in order actually to 
guarantee this security one has to appeal, to take just one example, to a whole series of techniques for the 
surveillance of individuals, the diagnosis of what they are, the classification of their mental structure, of 
their specific pathology, and so on; in short one has to appeal to a whole disciplinary series that proliferates 
under mechanisms of security and is necessary to make them work.” Foucault, Security, Territory, 
Population, 8. 
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nonnormativity, particularly gender and sexual nonnormativity and deviance.51 It also 
marks the ways that historically and currently throughout US society, but especially in 
the prison system, (homo)sexuality and gender nonconformity cannot be disaggregated. 
Gender nonconforming and trans prisoners become dangerous and security threats in part 
because they are believed to be sexually dangerous, that they elicit sexual desire and 
sexual violence from other prisoners. “Queer,” thus, accounts for the slippage between 
homosexuality and gender nonconformity in carceral discourses and practices. These 
notions of sexual and gender deviance and dangerousness are deeply enmeshed in the 
antiblackness of the prison system, in constructions of the prison space as black and of 
blackness as (sexually) dangerous and criminal. Racialized criminality and deviance that 
pervade and structure the prison leaves an indelible mark on gender nonconformity and 
trans-ness within that space, having an especially devastating impact on black trans and 
gender nonconforming people and other trans and gender nonconforming people of color, 
who constitute the overwhelming majority of the incarcerated trans and gender 
nonconforming population. Queer dangerousness, therefore, is inextricably connected to 
racialization and antiblackness. Within the prison space, queer dangerousness devalues 
and dehumanizes. It deauthorizes trans and gender nonconforming prisoners as knowing 
                                                
51 In Aberrations in Black: Toward a Queer of Color Critique Roderick Ferguson coined the phrase “queer 
of color critique” to describe a mode of epistemological intervention and a reading practice that deploys an 
intersectional account of race, gender, sexuality, and class as mutually constitutive. Roderick Ferguson, 
Aberrations in Black: Toward a Queer of Color Critique (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota 
Press, 2004). See also, Cathy J. Cohen, “Punks, Bulldaggers, and Welfare Queens: The Radical Potential of 
Queer Politics?” GLQ 3 (1997); Jasbir Puar, Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2007); José Esteban Muñoz, Disidentifications: Queers of Color and the 
Performance of Politics (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1999); E. Patrick Johnson, 
“‘Quare’ Studies, Or (Almost) Everything I know About Queer Studies I learned from My Grandmother,” 
in Black Queer Studies: A Critical Anthology, ed. E. Patrick Johnson and Mae G. Henderson (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 2005). 
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subjects, taking away self-determination and producing them as “depersonalized 
persons.” It produces and authorizes carceral violence that target gender nonconformity. 
 
Overview 
“Carceral Normativities” examines the circuits of power within and around the 
US prison system that produce knowledge about gender nonconformity, gender 
normativity, sex classification, and queer dangerousness. In keeping with this 
understanding of carceral power and violence as productive, I examine how prison 
administrators, social scientists, the law, and medical establishment have produced trans 
and gender nonconforming prisoners as security threats, dangerous, and, therefore, 
subject to legitimate violence and violation. 
Because the experience of carceral violence targeting trans and gender 
nonconforming people is a national problem, I examine the national context. This 
breadth, which aims to think about how US carceral power and the penal policies and 
practices that it produces engage with gender nonconformity through violence, 
necessarily comes at the price of local specificity. There is enormous variation in the 
conditions and experiences of prisoners around the US, and while some of that variation 
is between states, much of it is within state systems. This dissertation contends that 
carceral logics in general construct gender nonconformity as a security threat and 
therefore manages it with violence; however, not every individual trans or gender 
nonconforming person’s experience is the same. While I would contend that all trans and 
gender nonconforming prisoners experience violence—since the confinement of humans 
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in cages is itself a form of violence—not all prisoners experience the specific forms of 
violence that I describe throughout the dissertation. Moreover, not every individual staff 
member wishes to perpetrate violence against trans and gender nonconforming prisoners. 
The national, large-scale focus obscures some of the individual nuances both in terms of 
individual prisoners experiences as well as staff actions. Nevertheless, there is a great 
deal of consistency in the violent treatment of trans and gender nonconforming prisoner, 
and this national focus allows me to examine overarching carceral power and logics. 
I also want to make note of the language that I use throughout this dissertation. 
The slippage and messiness of the relationship between gender and sexual nonconformity 
as well as the long historical time period that I discuss produces a difficulty of language. 
The prisoners that I describe and who are targeted by penal policies and practices are 
often quite diverse in their gender nonconformity. I use the term “gender nonconforming” 
to describe people who do not conform to birth-assigned-sex/gender norms, in gender 
expression and/or identification. Some are cross-gender identified and seek to medically 
transition, others are feminine male-identified people or masculine female-identified 
people who have always identified as their birth-assigned sex but eschew the gender 
norms associated with that sex in various ways. Many identify as gay or homosexual and 
nearly all are identified by prison administrators as such. Moreover, the language and 
ways of identifying have dramatically changed during the time period that I discuss in 
this dissertation. In the early and mid-twentieth century, gender nonconformity and even 
cross-gender identity and homosexuality were understood widely as two aspects of the 
same phenomenon, and they continue to be understood as such in significant ways. 
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“Transsexuality” as an identificatory category describing people who use medical 
technologies to “change sex” is a relatively recent phenomenon. Sex-reassignment 
medical technologies began to be produced in the early twentieth century, and 
“transsexuality” as a term was not coined until the mid-twentieth century. “Transgender” 
did not come into wide use until the 1990s. I, therefore, utilize the terms “gender 
nonconforming” to cast a wide net and acknowledge the historical specificity of the 
language of “trans,” “transgender,” and “transsexual,” and only use the latter terms when 
describing people or policies that specifically use that language.52 Moreover, I use the 
term “queer” to dissolve the often artificial boundaries between gender and sexual 
nonconformity and homosexuality, gender nonconformity, and trans status or cross-
gender identity. Queer functions throughout this text to describe the interconnectivity of 
gender and sexual nonnormativity in how prisoners identify themselves and how they are 
identified by carceral power.53  
Chapter One, “‘Trouble Over Sex’: Racialized Gender Normativity and the 
Construction of Sex-Segregation,” examines the history of the construction of the modern 
sex-segregated prison system, arguing that over the course of the nineteenth and well into 
the twentieth century, prison administrators and reformers constructed a prison system 
                                                
52 I also sometime use “trans” along with “gender nonconformity” when discussing the last few decades. To 
a certain extent, “trans” and “gender nonconforming” can be seen as synonyms. However, “trans” comes 
with historical specificity and identificatory implications that I find inappropriate to use in many 
circumstances. For a discussion of the emergence and use of “transgender,” see David Valentine, Imagining 
Transgender: An Ethnography of a Category (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2007). 
53 The relationship between “queer” and “trans” is complex and I am erasing some of the tensions here. 
However, I find the use of both terms vital to this project because of the complexity and messiness of how 
gender and sexuality function in regards to both how prisoners identify themselves and how they are 
identified by carceral power. For some discussion of these complexities, see Heather Love, “Queer,” 
Transgender Studies Quarterly 1, no. 1-2 (May 2014); Ki Namaste, “‘Tragic Misreadings’: Queer Theory’s 
Erasure of Transgender Subjectivity,” in Queer Studies: A Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender 
Anthology, ed. Brett Beemyn and Mickey Eliason (New York: New York University Press, 1996).  
  32 
whose architecture, programmatic design, and core understandings of rehabilitation and 
incorrigibility were deeply shaped by racialized gender normativity. By historicizing 
racialized gender normativity as a constitutive logic of the US prison system, I argue that 
sex segregation was and is more than a natural, commonsensical feature of the prison 
system but was produced from and is interconnected with the prison system’s 
investments in racialized, gendered, and sexual control. I juxtapose this history with 
newspaper stories from the mid-twentieth century of penal administrators “discovering” 
sexually “misclassified” prisoners in their institutions to reveal the “work” of sex 
segregation, arguing that the development and maintenance of sex segregation 
necessitated the (often unspoken) production of methods to classify sex. Sexual 
ambiguity within penal spaces, while generally explicitly articulate as a bizarre but 
simple fix (moving the “misclassified” prisoner to the “correct” sexed institution), 
actually produced anxiety and administrative disorder.  
Chapter Two, “‘A Means of Assuring the Safe and Efficient Operation of a 
Prison’: Segregation, Security, and Queer Dangerousness,” examines one of the primary 
ways that prison administrators have managed the sexed administrative disorder produced 
by gender nonconformity and cross-gender identity: the systematic segregation of gender 
nonconforming prisoners. Begun in the early twentieth century and continuing into the 
present, the practice of segregating gender nonconforming prisoners remains a prominent 
feature of penal management today. I argue that this segregation emerged in the early 
twentieth century as prison administrators and researchers identified gender 
nonconformity as a threat to institutional security. Segregation became an important tool 
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of containing gender nonconforming and eventually trans prisoners’ queer security 
threat—or as I call it, queer dangerousness.  
The construction of queer dangerousness and of gender nonconformity as 
institutional security threat was usually explicitly sexual. As they constructed gender 
nonconforming prisoners as security threats, prison administrators and social scientists 
depicted them as hypersexual, as inciters of sexual violence, and therefore unrapable. In 
Chapter Three, “‘Designed to Abuse’: Queer Deviance and Carceral Sexual Violence,” I 
examine the relationship between dominant penological, social scientific, and legal 
narratives about sexual violence in penal institutions and the use of sexual violence as a 
tool of control—which I call carceral sexual violence. I argue that dominant narratives 
about prisons as sites of rampant sexual violence entirely perpetrated by prisoners portray 
gender nonconforming and trans prisoners as simultaneously unrapable and constantly 
subject to sexual violence. This narrative about the impossibility and inevitability of 
sexual violence, coupled with discourses of queer dangerousness, justifies and obscures 
many mundane forms of carceral sexual violence that target gender conforming and trans 
prisoners. 
Chapter Four, “‘A Serious Medical Need?’: Carceral Necropower and Access to 
Gender-Affirming Medical Treatment,” examines another important form of carceral 
violence that trans and gender nonconforming prisoners experience: the denial of gender-
affirming medical treatment. Examining federal civil rights litigation regarding access to 
hormone therapy and sex reassignment surgery for trans women in men’s prisons, I argue 
that carceral necropower, or the production of the prison as a death world and the 
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imprisoned as the living dead, and the racialized gender normative construction of gender 
nonconformity as queer dangerousness securitizes gender-affirming medical treatment in 
prisons, constructing security concerns as a legitimate—even determinative—factor in 
determining access to such treatment. 
By focusing on the history of the four primary policy areas that have the greatest 
effect on trans and gender nonconforming prisoners as gender nonconforming—sex 
segregation and classification, administrative segregation, carceral sexual violence, and 
access to gender-affirming medical treatment—“Carceral Normativities” argues that sex-
and-gender-based carceral violence and the logics of racialized gender normativity are 
constitutive of the US prison system. In other words, this violence is not new and is 
deeply and inextricably enmeshed in the structure and organizing logics of the US prison 
system. 
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Chapter One 
 
“Trouble Over Sex”: 
Racialized Gender Normativity and the Construction of Sex Segregation 
 
 
In the summer of 1953, a white man named Vernon Bradshaw was arrested for 
embezzlement in Kenova, West Virginia. He was held for three days in the county jail 
then released on bond. The following February, Bradshaw was tried and convicted in an 
Ohio court and sentenced to the Ohio Penitentiary, the state prison for men. Following his 
sentencing, a court spectator stood and proclaimed: “My name is Patrick Bradshaw and 
I’m the defendant’s brother. You’ve made a terrible mistake. Vernon is really Violet, and 
she is a woman.”1 Newspaper stories of this event recount that this revelation was met 
with astonishment and confusion from the judge and spectators. In order to determine 
Bradshaw’s sex, the judge ordered a matron and a physician to physically examine him. 
Upon later receiving their report that Bradshaw was “a woman,” the judge resentenced 
him to the Marysville Reformatory for Women.2 
Bradshaw had lived nearly his entire life as a man. He marked “male” whenever 
asked about his sex. He was married to a woman, who, according to reports, “found out 
about his past in court,” and his brother claimed that everyone in their family considered 
him to be male. Nevertheless, the judge, matron, and physician classified him as a 
woman, and news report portrayed his life as a man as a masquerade, claiming that in 
                                                
1 “Double Life Befuddles Ohio Court,” Schenectady Gazette, February 11, 1954.  
2 According to the press, the judge characterized the situation as “the most amazing case I’ve ever heard in 
my years on the bench.” “Prisoner Sentenced, Revealed to Be Woman,” n.d. Box 3, Series IIIA, folder 1, 
Louise Lawrence Collection, Kinsey Institute Library and Special Collections, Indiana University.  
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court he was “unmasked as a woman.”3 In response, Bradshaw continued to assert his 
maleness. Wearing “grey trousers, red socks, blue suede shoes, a green shirt, and red, 
black, and white checked flannel jacket” to court, he told a reporter, “I was not 
masquerading. I always have considered myself a man…I have dressed, acted and 
worked like a man ever since I can remember.”4 When asked what name he wanted to be 
called by reporters, he replied, “My name is Vernon Bradshaw.”5 
Bradshaw’s experience was not an isolated incident. Similar stories of people 
being arrested, incarcerated, and later “discovered” to be the opposite sex appeared 
occasionally in the popular press, in the memoirs of prison administrators, and in some 
social scientific literature in the early and especially mid-twentieth century.6 As in 
Bradshaw’s story, “discovery” always involved a physical inspection that revealed the 
“truth” of these people’s sex via their bodies, presumably, specifically their genitals. In 
these stories, prison administrators and medical personnel would determine a prisoner’s 
sex and, accordingly, house them in a men’s or women’s institution. 
During Bradshaw’s resentencing, the sheriff was asked why Bradshaw “was not 
searched and her [sic] sex determined at the time she [sic] was taken to jail.” In response, 
                                                
3 “Woman, Who Dressed as Male, Receives Sentence,” Times Daily, February 11, 1954; “‘Vernon’ 
Becomes ‘Violet’ in Court Masquerade,” Spartanburg Herald, February 12, 1954.  
4 “35-Year Masquerade as Man Revealed in Court by Woman,” The Daily Telegraph (Eau Claire, WI), 
February 11, 1954; “Jail Makes Woman of Man,” Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, February 11, 1954.  
5 “Jail Makes Woman of Man.”  
6 See for example, Walter Wilson, Hell in Nebraska: A Tale of the Nebraska Penitentiary (Lincoln, NE: 
The Bankers Publishing Company, 1913); Frederick S. Baldi, My Unwelcome Guests (Philadelphia: J. B. 
Lippincott Company, 1959); Harvey Bluestone, Edward P. O'Malley, and Sydney Connell, “Homosexuals 
in Prison,” Corrective Psychiatry and Journal of Social Therapy 12 (1966); Perry M. Lichtenstein, “The 
"Fairy" and the Lady Lover,” Medical Review of Reviews 27 (August 1921); John M. Murtagh and Sara 
Harris, Cast the First Stone (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 2012); James Melvin 
Reinhardt, Sex Perversions and Sex Crimes (Springfield, IL: C.C. Thomas, 1957); David A. Ward and 
Gene G. Kassebaum, Women's Prison: Sex and Social Structure (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1965). 
See below for newspaper citations. 
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he explained, “It’s a matter of not having enough room in the jail; we cannot look after 
everything.”7 This simple exchange reveals how penal administrators dealt with and 
continue to deal with sex. Sex is assumed to be self-evident and therefore does not 
require investigation (beyond a glance or the reading of a name) until confronted with sex 
ambiguity or confusion. The sheriff and his staff did not think it necessary to expend the 
labor to inspect Bradshaw’s genitals when he was first arrested because they believed his 
sex to be self-evidently male. This lack of inspection would not have been a “problem” 
for the court if Bradshaw’s brother had not disclosed his birth-assigned sex. Yet, despite 
the sheriff’s claim to the contrary, Bradshaw’s sex was determined by jail staff the 
moment he was taken to the men’s jail. Stories of “misclassification,” like Bradshaw’s, 
help us think about the work of sex segregation and the classification of prisoners into 
two completely separate sexed categories, perhaps the most normalized and invisibilized 
work of penal management.8 They show that sex classification is indeed constructed, not 
just natural and self-evident.  
Sex segregation is one of the most basic elements of prison organization and 
architecture, so basic that it is rarely remarked upon. But like all elements of the US 
prison system, it has a history. Prison reformers of the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries viewed sex segregation as a key feature of a modern prison system. These 
reformers sought to create a criminal punishment system that featured imprisonment and 
correction for certain prisoners deemed capable of reform. White sexual difference was a 
key element of the design of these new correction-oriented prison systems and white 
                                                
7 “Prisoner Sentenced, Revealed to Be Woman.” 
8 I use the term “misclassification” throughout this chapter to mark how prison administrators thought of 
situations like Bradshaw’s, not to make a judgment about how these prisoners should have been classified.  
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gender normative prisoners were their primary targets. Blackness and gender and sexual 
deviance were constructed as irredeemable and in need of containment. In other words, 
racialized gender normativity—understood here as the ideological investment in a 
naturalized binary sex system inextricably tied to white hetero-gender norms as valuable 
and key to rehabilitation and freedom in opposition to black and brown sexual and gender 
nonnormativity, dangerousness, and criminality—shaped the design of the modern prison 
system. Through its valuation of binary sex, racialized gender normativity produced the 
imperative to sex-segregate.  
Despite the centrality of sex segregation to the modern prison system, the 
historical literature on the US prison system rarely remarks upon it. Most histories of 
state or regional prison systems, especially those that do not explicitly focus on women’s 
prisons, pay little-to-no attention to gender and sex. Instead, they assume an unmarked 
male subject and overwhelmingly focus on the history of men’s prisons.9 Histories of 
women’s prisons, on the other hand, treat gender as a central theme, something that was 
vitally important to the development of women’s prisons.10 Because the history of 
                                                
9 See, for example, W. David Lewis, From Newgate to Dannemora: The Rise of the Penitentiary in New 
York, 1796-1848 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1965); Michael Stephen Hindus, Prison and 
Plantation: Crime, Justice, and Authority in Massachusetts and South Carolina, 1767-1878 (Chapel Hill, 
NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1980); David J. Rothman, The Discovery of the Asylum: 
Social Order and Disorder in the New Republic, rev. ed. (New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 1990); Adam Jay 
Hirsch, The Rise of the Penitentiary: Prisons and Punishment in Early America (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1992); David M. Oshinsky, “Worse Than Slavery”: Parchman Farm and the Ordeal of 
Jim Crow Justice (New York: Free Press Paperbacks, 1996); Robert Perkinson, Texas Tough: The Rise of 
America’s Prison Empire (New York: Picador, 2010). Lewis discusses women the most out of all these 
sources; he devotes one chapter to them. 
10 See, for example, Estelle B. Freedman, Their Sisters’ Keepers: Women’s Prison Reform in America, 
1830-1930 (Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press, 1981); Nicole Hahn Rafter, Partial Justice: 
Women, Prisons, and Social Control, 2nd ed. (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1990); Anne 
M. Butler, Gendered Justice in the American West: Women Prisoners in Men’s Penitentiaries (Urbana, IL: 
University of Illinois Press, 1999); Kathryn Watterson, Women in Prison: Inside the Concrete Womb, rev. 
ed. (Boston: Northeastern University, 1996); Nancy Kurshan, “Behind the Walls: The History and Current 
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women’s prisons is a history of the separation of female prisoners from male prisoners, 
they also describe the construction of sex segregation. However, they do not discuss sex 
classification. This absence of any consideration of sex classification or cross-gender 
identity naturalizes a binary sex system and the segregation of all people by sex into 
binaristic institutions.  
This chapter reexamines prison history from its modern beginnings at the end of 
the eighteenth century to the mid-twentieth century, focusing specifically on the 
construction of sex segregation, in order to argue that racialized gender normativity is a 
constitutive logic of the US prison system and has produced, designed, and maintained 
sex segregation. I reexamine this history alongside stories of “misclassified” prisoners, 
such as Bradshaw, from the early to mid-twentieth century, to think about how prison 
administrators managed the administrative sex disorder that these prisoners created. 
While these stories denaturalize sex classification and sex segregation, I argue that prison 
administrators produced discursive and management tools to explain away this 
denaturalization, working to (re)consolidate a (racialized gender normative) sex binary. 
Examining this history of the carceral investment in racialized gender normativity also 
helps us understand administrators’ reactions to “misclassified” prisoners, or, for 
example, why an admission in court that Bradshaw was “really female” would cause 
anxiety and concern when his sex had not caused problems during his prior incarceration. 
                                                                                                                                            
Reality of Women’s Imprisonment,” in Criminal Injustice: Confronting the Prison Crisis, ed. Elihu 
Rosenblatt (Boston: South End Press, 1996); Esther Heffernan, “Gendered Perceptions of Dangerous and 
Dependent Women: ‘Gun Molls ‘ and ‘Fallen Women,’” in Women in Prison: Gender and Social Control, 
ed. Barbara H. Zaitzow and Jim Thomas (Boulder, CA: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003). 
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Put another way, why did it matter to prison administrators and the judge what 
Bradshaw’s genitals looked like or what sex he was assigned at birth? 
 
Racialized Gender Normativity and the Construction of Sex Segregation 
As historians of prisons have long shown, prisons and the use of imprisonment as 
criminal punishment is a relatively recent phenomenon.11 States began to build prisons 
and regularly sentence people convicted of crimes to terms of imprisonment in them at 
the end of the eighteenth century. The late eighteenth through late nineteenth centuries 
saw sweeping and relatively rapid criminal punishment reform throughout the United 
States, driven by changing economic and social conditions and by reformers who sought 
to create more humane and “civilized” criminal punishment. However, the 
implementation of imprisonment as the primary criminal punishment and the 
establishment of prisons was a long and uneven process, often looking strikingly different 
regionally and for different populations. The process and forms that criminal punishment 
reforms took were structured by the racial and economic landscape of regions and states 
as well as the race, gender, sexuality, dis/ability, and class of targeted populations. 
Nevertheless, the development and refinement of the modern prison system across the US 
followed similar logics of white, sexual and gender normative correction and black 
dangerousness, irredeemability, and sexual nonnormativity. By the early to mid-twentieth 
century, prisons had become a normalized feature of the US landscape and a primary 
vehicle for racialized, gendered, and sexualized state violence and control.  
                                                
11 See for example, Lewis, From Newgate to Dannemora; Hirsch, The Rise of the Penitentiary; Rothman, 
The Discovery of the Asylum; Freedman, Their Sisters’ Keepers. 
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A central concern of prison reform throughout the nineteenth and into the 
twentieth century was sex segregation. In early prisons in the Northeast and Midwest, 
male- and female-classified prisoners were placed in the same institutions and lived in 
very similar conditions. While at least some sex segregation existed in almost all early 
penal institutions, it was frequently imperfect and hinged, in part, on race. While men and 
women were usually held in different cells or wings at least at night, they might share 
common areas and mingle together at least part of the time. In prisons and penitentiaries, 
prison farms, and convict labor in the South and West during the nineteenth and early 
twentieth century, male- and female-classified prisoners were often held in even closer 
proximity to one another.12 Prison reformers and penologists viewed sex segregation as a 
vital feature of “modernizing” criminal punishment systems.13 However, implementing 
sex segregation, like other reforms, was an uneven process, influenced by racial and 
economic conditions. Whiteness and white correction often drove sex segregation as it 
drove most reforms, while blackness and other markings of irredeemability produced less 
concern about it, as those marked by irredeemability were incarcerated in greater 
numbers but generally subjects of correction. As scholars have shown, prison reform was 
                                                
12 The overwhelming majority of these prisoners, especially after Emancipation, were black, especially 
among female-classified populations. In the South, especially, and the West, white women were often 
sparred from imprisonment. Sometimes all of the female-classified people in mixed sex confinement were 
black. Second Report of the Prison Association of New York (1845) (New York: Prison Association of New 
York, 1846); Prison Progress: The Sixty-Ninth Annual Report of the Prison Association of New York 
(1913) (Albany: J. B. Lyons Company, 1914). 
13 As the American Correctional Association explained in 1954, “Women prisoners should not be kept on 
the same property with male prisoners. In modern times, there has been no disagreement on the proposition 
that male and female prisoners of all ages should be kept separate form each other.” A Manual of 
Correctional Standards (New York: American Correctional Association, 1954), 171. 
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fundamentally structured by white supremacy and capitalist labor needs.14 Less often 
discussed is that it was also structured by heteropatriarchy and, as I will argue here, by 
racialized gender normativity.15 Racialized gender normativity produced the imperative 
to segregate prisoners by sex, especially among correction-oriented reformers. Sex 
segregation was understood as vital to rehabilitation—and the production of normative 
citizens—and eventually penal management in general. 
The segregation of different types of prisoners has long been an important tool of 
penal management. As historian Regina Kunzel has argued, early prison administrators 
were very concerned with the “promiscuous” mixing of different types of prisoners, 
including by age, criminal history, race, potential for rehabilitation, and sex.16 Kunzel 
explains that this intermixing was believed to have perverting effects and dangerous and 
disorderly consequences. This concern, arguably, has continued into the present. The 
history of prison reform is, in many ways, a history of different forms of segregation: 
younger from older, first-time offenders from recidivists, white from black from other 
people of color, gender nonconforming and homosexual from gender conforming (as I 
                                                
14 See for example, Caleb Smith, The Prison and the American Imagination (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 2009); Hindus, Prison and Plantation; Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow: Mass 
Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness (New York: The New Press, 2010); Ruth Wilson Gilmore, 
Golden Gulag: Prisons, Surplus, Crisis, and Opposition in Globalizing California (Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press, 2007); Oshinsky, “Worse than Slavery.” 
15 See Freedman, Their Sisters’ Keepers; Rafter, Partial Justice; Angela Y. Davis, “Race and 
Criminalization: Black Americans and the Punishment Industry,” in The Angela Y. Davis Reader, ed. Joy 
James (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1998); Angela Y. Davis, Are Prisons Obsolete? (New York: Seven 
Stories Press, 2003); Julia Sudbury, “Celling Black Bodies: Black Women in the Global Prison Industrial 
Complex,” Feminist Review 80 (2005); Beth E. Richie, Compelled to Crime: The Gender Entrapment of 
Battered Black Women (New York: Routledge, 1996); Joey L. Mogul, Andrea J. Ritchie, and Kay 
Whitlock, Queer (In)Justice: The Criminalization of LGBT People in the United States (Boston, MA: 
Beacon Press, 2010). For recent discussion of gender normativity and the US prison system, see Eric A. 
Stanley and Nat Smith, ed., Captive Genders: Trans Embodiment and the Prison Industrial Complex 
(Oakland, CA: AK Press, 2011). 
16 Regina Kunzel, Criminal Intimacy: Prison and the Uneven History of Modern American Sexuality 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008). 
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will discuss in the next chapter), and male-classified from female-classified.17 These 
different forms of segregation had two general purposes: to facilitate the correction of 
certain prisoners and to manage deviant populations in order to reduce violence, disorder, 
and (often) sex. Sex segregation also followed these logics. Reformers and penologists 
argued that the mixing of men and women would “have a disturbing influence upon both 
groups.”18 This disturbing influence was primarily about sexuality. Male prison reformers 
and penologists believed that women’s sexuality was potentially dangerous and 
uncontrollable and could incite men to lust and potentially violence.19 Women prison 
reformers, too, were especially concerned with female sexual immorality and, therefore, 
wanted them separated from men, including male staff and guards, who might lead them 
astray.  
In the nineteenth and early twentieth century, sex segregation not only separated 
men and women (or, to be more specific, male- and female-classified people) but also 
created different types of institutions, marked by sex, that addressed the supposedly 
different natures of men and women. Sex segregation, in other words, was produced from 
dominant understandings of sexual difference, which constructed men and women as two 
separate, essential categories of human, not only physically but also mentally, 
                                                
17 This concern about intermixing helped produce the juvenile justice system. It also facilitated a long 
history of racial segregation in prison systems throughout the country. Prisons often remained segregated 
long after desegregation started elsewhere. In some states, especially in the South, entire prisons were 
racially segregated well into the 1960s and 1970s. For example, Texas prisons were completely segregated 
by race until 1965. In 1965, prisons were desegregated on the unit level, but not cells, cellblocks, or work 
squads. Texas was forced to desegregate its prisons by court order in 1977. After resisting the order, Texas 
finally agreed to submit to a plan for in-cell desegregation in 1991. Chad R. Trulson, et al., “Racial 
Desegregation in Prisons,” The Prison Journal 88, no. 2 (June 2008). Racial segregation continues in some 
systems. See Johnson v. California 125 S. Ct. 2419 (2005). 
18 Fred E. Haynes, The American Prison System (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1939), 88. 
19 Esther Heffernan, “Gendered Perceptions of Dangerous and Dependent Women.” 
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psychologically, and morally. Throughout most of the nineteenth and into the twentieth 
century, sexual difference was also explicitly linked to “civilization” and progress, and 
white people were constructed as fundamentally more sexually divergent than people of 
color, especially black people. Racialized sexual difference, therefore, also helped 
determine who should be subject to correction-oriented imprisonment or custodial-
oriented imprisonment by determining who was rehabilitatable and who was 
fundamentally criminal and irredeemable.  
As sex segregation became a fundamental feature of penal institutions, sex 
classification became a basic part of penal administration. Like most people, prison 
administrators and reformers took for granted that they would naturally “know” who was 
male and who was female. While there was often disagreement and struggle over the 
inherent nature of men and women, the notion that they constituted two separate, 
mutually exclusive types of person was not in dispute. Historians of the US prison system 
have generally reproduced this assumption. The work of sex classification is, therefore, 
absent from narratives about the construction of the modern prison system in historical 
literature. Yet, sex classification was a constant but invisible part of the work of 
managing prisoners and only became visible when cross-gender identified people entered 
the prison system. Ideologies of racialized gender normativity produced the valuation of 
sexual difference and the imperative to sex-segregate, shaping the architecture, 
management systems, and assumptions about prisoners.  
The earliest prison reform movements began in the Northeast and Midwest—two 
regions whose populations were mostly white and that were in the midst of the Industrial 
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Revolution—in order to create a punishment system that would promote the 
rehabilitation of white male (and later female) citizens. Although the use of imprisonment 
as a criminal punishment and the development of prisons began slightly earlier, the first 
major prison reform movement was the penitentiary movement of the early to mid-
nineteenth century.20 The penitentiary was a new type of penal institution, one that 
featured massive walls and individual cells and was designed to “correct” white male 
criminals. This correction aimed to produce a normative, economically productive, 
obedient white male citizen through silent penitence, isolation, regimentation, and 
labor.21 Identifying only this subset of the population as capable of rehabilitation and 
socially valuable enough to invest state resources in, the penitentiary system of penal 
management and correction was organized by and reproduced white heteropatriarchy, 
gender normativity, and sexual difference.  
The penitentiary was vital to establishing our current models of prisons that 
feature cells, high walls, and armed guards, but its model of correction through penitence 
                                                
20 This work began at the end of the eighteenth century. However, the earliest prisons looked dramatically 
different from penitentiaries our current ones. They were co-correctional facilities that resembled large 
houses and held prisoners in groups in large rooms. Male- and female-classified prisoners were usually, 
although not always, housed in separate rooms or wings. For example, New York’s Newgate Prison, which 
opened in 1797 in Greenwich Village and was the first prison that held only people convicted of felonies, 
held both men and women and featured small cells for eight people. Female- and male-classified prisoners 
were separated in different wings, but they were able to mingle at times and were held in very similar 
conditions except for being required to perform different gendered labor: women washed and sewed while 
the men made shoes and did other manufacturing. Despite similar treatment, early prisons, like Newgate, 
were constructed and designed for men; women occupied them but drew little attention from prison 
reformers. Rafter, Partial Justice; Lewis, From Newgate to Dannemora; Rothman, The Discovery of the 
Asylum; Second Report of the Prison Association of New York. 
21 Unlike the first state prisons, which held several prisoners together in a room, penitentiaries separated 
male prisoners into individual cells to prevent them from morally contaminating one another. Two primary 
models of the penitentiary emerged in the early nineteenth century: New York’s Auburn model and the 
Pennsylvania model. The two systems held prisoners in slightly different forms of isolation but both 
adhered to similar models of correction. See Rafter, Partial Justice; Lewis, From Newgate to Dannemora; 
Hirsch, The Rise of the Penitentiary; Rothman, The Discovery of the Asylum. 
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and silence was short-lived. By the second half of the nineteenth century, the penitentiary 
movement began to decline, and penitentiaries lost their rehabilitative focus. 
Administrators’ ability to maintain silence and isolation between male prisoners was 
undermined as institutions experienced overcrowding and became increasingly filled with 
“hardened criminals” and Southern and Eastern European immigrants, who 
administrators and reformers deemed to be less racially capable of rehabilitation and 
worthy of state investment.22 Penitentiaries increasingly became sites of custody and 
control of deviant populations instead of sites of (white male) correction. As prison 
reformers lost faith in the penitentiary system, a new system of white, male correction 
emerged: the men’s reformatory. Instead of focusing on white men in general, men’s 
reformatories focused on the correction of young, generally first-time white male 
prisoners through education, vocational training, religion, and a system of rewarding 
good behavior.23 
These criminal punishment systems designed around white, male correction also 
produced shadow systems that were designed to warehouse populations deemed 
incorrigible, the detritus of the new prison system. Women were one such population. 
Consistent with dominant constructions of womanhood and femininity during the 
                                                
22 The construction of whiteness, or who counts as white, has changed over the last two centuries. During 
the nineteenth century and into the twentieth, Southern and Eastern European people were considered off-
white at best, lower on the racial hierarchy than Northern and Western Europeans, who represented its 
pinnacle. Beginning in the mid-nineteenth century, the US experienced a massive influx of immigration 
from Europe, especially Ireland, Eastern, and Southern Europe, which increased racial anxieties and caused 
“a fracturing of whiteness into a hierarchy of plural and scientifically determined white races.” Matthew 
Frye Jacobson, Whiteness of a Different Color (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), 7. White 
supremacist and nativist sentiment in the US viewed these European immigrants as prone to criminality, 
feeblemindedness, and other undesireable traits. This immigration and the greater numbers of these less 
“desirable” white people in the Northeast, especially, and the Midwest, impacted prison reform as well. See 
also, David R. Roediger, Working Toward Whiteness: How America’s Immigrants Became White: The 
Strange Journey from Ellis Island to the Suburbs (New York: Basic Books, 2005).  
23 Rothman, The Discovery of the Asylum; Rafter, Partial Justice. 
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nineteenth century, prison administrators and reformers believed that women were 
fundamentally less capable and less rehabilitatable than men and, therefore, were not 
proper subjects for penitentiary treatment.24 Because nineteenth century racialized gender 
ideology constructed white women as inherently morally superior to men, most prison 
reformers believed that white female criminality was more injurious to society than male 
criminality.25 A white female criminal not only had “further to fall” than male criminals 
but transcended or fell out of womanhood. Reformers believed that criminality was a 
natural, if negative and aberrant, feature of men’s role in society, since crimes were 
understood as public acts of aggression and men were viewed as naturally aggressive. 
Therefore, most (white) men—especially young, white, first-time offenders—were 
reformable. White women who committed crimes, on the other hand, “had gone against 
[their] very nature.”26 While black women were also considered irredeemable, this 
irredeemability was primarily produced from their race. Black women were believed to 
be outside the domain of true womanhood by racial inheritance. They were, therefore, 
also considered incorrigible, not because they had fallen, but because they were black.27 
                                                
24 (White) women’s relationship to labor, which was a primary concern for prison administrator, was also a 
factor in their determination that penitentiary treatment was not appropriate for women. They believed that 
women did not need the same sort of physical exertion as men did; that it was not appropriate for women to 
perform maintenance, heavy work, and industry, like male prisoners; and that women’s labor did not add 
economic value to the prison, a central concern of prison administrators in the nineteenth century. “The 
Sexual Segregation of American Prisons” The Yale Law Journal 82, no. 6 (May 1973); John Bartlow 
Martin, Break Down the Walls (New York: Ballantine Books, 1954); Freedman, Their Sisters’ Keepers; 
Rafter, Partial Justice; Eugenia Cornelia Lekkerkerker, Reformatories for Women in the United States 
(Groningen: BIJ J.B. Wolters’ Uitgevers Maatschappij, 1931).  
25 Rafter, Partial Justice; Louise Michele Newman, White Women’s Rights: The Racial Origins of 
Feminism in the United States (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999). 
26 Lewis, From Newgate to Dannemora, 157. 
27 Newman, White Women’s Rights. Importantly, fallen white women did not become equivalent to black 
women in prison administrators and reformers’ eyes; they remained superior. White women were often 
protected from incarceration in ways that black women were not and in prison often lived in better (if still 
horrible) conditions. Black women were disproportionately incarcerated compared to white women. In fact, 
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This intersection of black criminality and female criminality put black women at greater 
risk for imprisonment, and while female-classified prison populations were 
predominantly white because the general populations of the Northeast and Midwest were 
overwhelmingly white, black women were disproportionately represented in prison 
populations, usually in greater proportion than black men. 
Female-classified criminals, therefore, were condemned more harshly and 
considered uncorrectable by most reformers and penologists during the nineteenth 
century. For example, in their 1845 report, the Prison Association of New York described 
the female prisoners housed in the New York City House of Detention’s tier for vagrants 
and intoxicated women as “the most disgusting exhibitions of degradation that any city 
affords. At any hour of the day may be seen, lolling on their filthy beds, or on benches in 
the hall, in rags, brutish with sensuality, or consuming with the consequences of reckless 
indulgence, old, young, bleared, bloated, deformed—the wrecks of what were once 
bright, happy girls.”28 While the report describes male prisoners in the House of 
Detention as well, it does not use the same kind of condemnatory, disgusted language. 
Over sixty years later, the keeper at the Erie County Penitentiary in Buffalo described 
female prisoners to the Prison Association of New York as “a class utterly insusceptible 
to reformatory treatment.” He explained that “the only way to cure them would be to cut 
their heads off.”29 
                                                                                                                                            
black women constituted a greater proportion of female prisoners than black men did of male prisoners. For 
example, between 1797 and 1801, 44% of women in New York were black compared to 24% of men. At 
the Ohio Penitentiary in 1840, 49% of women were black, while 10% of men were black. Rafter, Partial 
Justice. 
28 Second Report of the Prison Association of New York, 67. 
29 Sixty-First Annual Report of the Prison Association of New York (1905-1906) (Albany: Brandow 
Printing Company, 1906), quoted on 88-89. Female criminals were seen as especially depraved and 
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Because female-classified prisoners were constructed as irredeemable and not 
worth state investment, they were crowded into a corner of early and mid-nineteenth 
century penitentiaries—a one-room attic over the kitchen at New York’s Auburn Prison, 
for example—where they lived in horrible, violent, and often unsanitary and dangerous 
conditions, generally in a single cell or room. The core provisions of the penitentiary 
system—solitary confinement, silence, and labor—were not applied to them, and they 
were usually almost entirely ignored.30 While sex segregation was built into the design 
and logic of the penitentiary, the burden of that segregation was generally borne by 
women, as their movement and access to programming, resources, and even air and light 
were restricted.31 In other words, the increased separation of male- and female-classified 
people physically was contingent on conceptualizations of racially and sexually different 
criminal natures, which also produced different penal conditions.  
Despite the emphasis on supposed differences between male- and female-
classified prisoners, writings by reformers and administrators as well as publications 
outlining correctional standards, like the ones published by the Prison Association of 
                                                                                                                                            
irredeemable if her “offense” was sexual in nature, which was a common offense category for female 
prisoners in the nineteenth century. Many prison reformers and researchers in the nineteenth and well into 
the twentieth century believed that sexual immorality was the greatest and most important source of 
corruption among women. Lekkerkerker, Reformatories for Women. 
30 Before the construction of a women’s prison in 1893, women—who could number as many as thirty—
imprisoned at Auburn suffered extreme neglect and crowding in this attic. The windows were sealed to 
prevent communication with the men, which made the attic dark and stifling. Before a matron was hired in 
1832, they had no supervision. Once a day, a male prisoner delivered food and removed waste; otherwise, 
they were alone. There were also a number of cases of women prisoners becoming pregnant, which 
indicates that sexual coercion and rape were not uncommon experiences. While Auburn and its system of 
imprisonment for men was lauded and became a model upon which prisons throughout much of the US 
were based, in a 1832 report, inspectors argued that the women’s quarters at Auburn presented “a specimen 
of the most disgusting and appalling features of the old system of prison management, at the worst period 
of its history.” Lewis, From Newgate to Dannemora, quoted on 163-64. See also, Kurshan, “Behind the 
Walls”; Rafter, Partial Justice. 
31 While the conditions were horrible for all women, they were often worse for black women than white 
women. Freedman, Their Sisters’ Keepers; Rafter, Partial Justice; Watterson, Women in Prison. 
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New York, mentioned above, did not outline how to classify prisoners by sex nor 
mention sex classification at all. This absence, however, does work, naturalizing binary 
sex as the architects of penal management and institutions produced the supposed sexual 
difference between male and female prisoners as natural, self evident, and mutually 
exclusive. Ideologies of sexual difference—within and outside of the penal context—did 
not allow for the possibility of cross-gender-identity or sexual ambiguity. Despite 
marking certain peoples—particularly people of color, disabled people, and other people 
marked as inferior—as gender nonnormative and less sexually dimorphic than white 
people, they were still assumed to fall into the two binaristic categories of sex: male and 
female. Yet, sexually ambiguous prisoners—either those who were intersex and whose 
bodies were visibly sexually ambiguous or who lived as the sex opposite their birth 
assignment—certainly existed in penal institutions in the nineteenth century. Their ability 
to exist was constantly erased by the material and discursive management techniques of 
penal administrators and reformers.  
The increased physical separation of male- and female-classified prisoners—an 
important component of prison reform throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries—was one important technique in this regard as it materially and symbolically 
formed normative binaristic sexual difference, reinforcing the erasure of sexual 
ambiguity in penal institutions. By the 1830s, a few states began to further separate male- 
and female-classified prisoners by creating separate buildings for women. At first these 
buildings were located within the walls of the main penitentiaries, but through the 
nineteenth century and into the twentieth century, prison administrators put increasing 
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distance between men’s and women’s buildings as some states opened semiautonomous 
women’s institutions, usually located immediately adjacent or within a few miles of the 
men’s prison, and then autonomous institutions.32 The early separate women’s 
institutions were created mainly by male reformers and administrators not because of a 
concern for women but because of supposed management problems. Male prison officials 
generally viewed women as a source of trouble and annoyance and did not want them in 
their institutions. In particular, women were seen as a source of sexual trouble. The 
proximity of women to men was thought to drive men to the “unhealthy” practices of 
masturbation and could lead to scandals when they became pregnant or staff were 
discovered to be facilitating prostitution.33 
This increased separation of female-classified prisoners from male-classified 
prisoners was also driven by a women’s prison reform movement that began in the 1930s 
with small groups of women in New York, Massachusetts, and Indiana and, by the 1860s, 
had gained enough momentum and clout to effect change in the Northeast and Midwest. 
Women prison reformers challenged the construction of (certain) female criminals as 
irredeemable and argued that the traditional prison structure was unsuitable for women, 
who required a gentler environment and training in femininity and domesticity. The 
movement advocated for the creation of entirely independent women’s institutions whose 
architecture and treatment programs suited what they saw as women’s unique nature and 
                                                
32 In most cases, especially in the non-autonomous units, conditions for female-classified prisoners changed 
little as women continued to be largely neglected and the units were generally severely overcrowded and 
featured terrible unsanitary conditions. By the end of the nineteenth century, nearly every state operated a 
unit for women of some kind. Freedman, Their Sisters’ Keepers; Rafter, Partial Justice; Lewis, From 
Newgate to Dannemora; Watterson, Women in Prison. 
33 Lewis, From Newgate to Dannemora; Haynes, The American Prison System; Butler, Gendered Justice in 
the American West; Rafter, Partial Justice. 
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needs and which featured complete segregation from men, even male staff, who were 
seen as not only not able to attend to women’s needs but also as contaminating or 
“exciting” influences.34  
The women’s prison reform movement was one piece of a larger women’s 
movement, which also advocated for suffrage and temperance and against sexual 
immorality and delinquency, that emerged after the Civil War. While women’s activism 
was complex, diverse, and exceeded any singular “movement” during this time, the 
women’s movement—often referred to as the first wave—was primarily organized by 
middle-class white women and shared the normative investment in white sexual 
difference but used the understanding of women’s uniqueness to shape their 
conceptualizations of social change.35 They envisioned a shifting of sex roles that 
                                                
34 For example, at a hearing on separate prison for women in the early 1870s before the Prison Committee 
of Massachusetts state legislature, one women argued that women “needed to be governed by kindness. It 
was necessary to make them feel that their rulers were their friends, in order to get the best result.” “A 
Separate Prison for Women,” The Women’s Journal 5, no. 9 (February 28, 1874). In 1827, Elizabeth Fry, a 
leading British women’s prison reformer, argued that one matron will be able to maintain greater order than 
several male guards in part because “her influence is less exciting.” Elizabeth Fry, Observations in Visiting, 
Superintendence, and Government of Female Prisoners (London: John and Arthur Arch, 1827), 27. 
35 For example, in her 1827 essay on women prisoners, Fry explained the aim of her reform work for her 
“own sex”:  
Far be it from me to attempt to persuade women to forsake their right province. My only 
desire is, that they should fill that province well; and, although their calling, in many 
respects, materially differs from that of the other sex, and may not perhaps be so exalted 
an one – yet a minute observation will prove that, if adequately filled, it has nearly, if not 
quite, an equal influence on society at large.  
Fry, Observations, 2. 
Nineteenth and early twentieth century feminist activism was, of course, more complex than I am 
describing here. The women’s movement that I describe was the most visible. Even within it there were 
disagreements and complexity, both around the essential nature of women and men as well as around race. 
Not all feminists believed in sexual difference nor were all involved in this woman’s movement. Many 
white feminists were centrally involved in the abolitionist movement—although the belief in abolition and 
white supremacy was not mutually exclusive. Black women were even more important to abolition and 
black feminists were also highly active throughout the nineteenth century, although often separately from 
the central woman’s movement. Angela Y. Davis, Women, Race, and Class (New York: Vintage Books, 
1981); Paula Giddings, When and Where I enter: The Impact of Black Women on Race and Sex in America 
(New York: Bantam Books, 1984); Rosalind Rosenberg, Beyond Separate Spheres: Intellectual Roots of 
Modern Feminism (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1982). 
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allowed women to enter and remain in the public sphere, primarily by arguing that 
(white) women’s supposed innate moral superiority made them uniquely qualified to do 
public work to aid the poor, especially poor women. Sexual difference and sex 
segregation were central to the women’s movement, and the movement created separate 
women’s public spheres—women’s colleges, settlement houses, women’s clubs, and 
eventually women’s prisons—where white middle-class women taught “true 
womanhood” by promoting (white) domesticity and piety to poor and deviant white 
women. Importantly, white women reformers linked their supposedly innate morality not 
only to their sex but also to white racial superiority, which both made them racially 
similar to white men and authorized their reform work. Conforming to and perpetuating 
the dominant racial narratives of the time, which imagined sexual difference as a sign of 
civilization and racial superiority, many reformers viewed sexual difference and white 
supremacy as central to both the reforms they sought and their justifications for the public 
work.36 
Women’s prison reformers shared these understandings of white womanhood and 
sexual difference and endeavored to inscribe them in the penal architecture and 
management of (certain) female-classified prisoners. For these reformers, rehabilitation 
for women required both separating women into their own institutions run entirely by 
female staff and teaching conformity to white, middle-class domesticity, the ideals of 
“true womanhood.”37 As the Women’s Prison Association explained in their 1864 annual 
                                                
36 Newman, White Women’s Rights; Freedman, Their Sisters’ Keepers; Rosenberg, Beyond Separate 
Spheres. 
37 Freedman, Their Sisters’ Keepers; Butler, Gendered Justice in the American West; Fry, Observations; “A 
Separate Prison for Women.”  
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report, “We would take [the fallen woman] by the hand, lift her from her degradation, 
whisper hope to her amid her despair, teach her lessons of self-control, instill into her 
ideas of purity and industry, and send her forth to work her own way upward to her final 
destiny.”38 In order to fulfill their goals, women prison reformers created a new kind of 
penal institution: the woman’s reformatory. 
The first women’s reformatory was built in Indiana in 1871 and over the next 
three decades four more were built in Massachusetts and New York.39 Throughout these 
decades, women reformers and penologists developed the unique architecture and 
correction treatment of the women’s reformatory. By the twentieth century, women’s 
reformatories generally featured a cottage system on a large rural campus without walls 
where women lived in private rooms and shared a kitchen and living room, which was 
made homelike with rugs, pictures, plants, and sometimes a piano. As Nicole Hahn 
Rafter has argued, the cottage system was “an architectural embodiment of the notion that 
criminal women could be reformed through domestic training.”40 Women’s reformatories 
developed a program of rehabilitation that promoted white, middle-class femininity as 
“the ideal of female behavior” by fostering sexual morality, sobriety, obedience, and 
conformity to the roles of mother and homemaker. Reformatories primarily taught 
domestic skills, feminine labor, and featured few industries, usually only sewing, laundry, 
                                                
38 Freedman, Their Sisters’ Keepers, quoted on 32. 
39 For a discussion of women’s reformatories see, Rafter, Partial Justice; Freedman, Their Sisters’ Keepers; 
Lekkerkerker, Reformatories for Women; Rose Giallombardo, Society of Women: A Study of a Women’s 
Prison (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1966); Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, The Alderson Story: My Life 
as a Political Prisoner (New York: International Publishers, 1963); Watterson, Women in Prison; “The 
Sexual Segregation of American Prisons”; Murtagh and Harris, Cast the First Stone; Haynes, The 
American Prison System; Barbara H. Zaitzow, “‘Doing Gender’ in a Women’s Prison,” in Women in 
Prison: Gender and Social Control, ed. Barbara H. Zaitzow and Jim Thomas (Boulder, CA: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 2003). 
40 Rafter, Partial Justice, 33.  
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or farm work.41 Constructing reformatories as “homes” was of vital importance to this 
mission. In their 1851 report, the Female Department of the Prison Association of New 
York envisioned such a women’s institution:  
A home, in the widest sense of the word, is the very heart of the undertaking on behalf of 
female convicts. Household influences, including those of industry, order, self-restraint, 
temperance, kindness and religion, are the anchors of our hope. These require space, 
utensils, suitable furniture, opportunities for classification and separation.42  
 
Reformers and administrators often described women’s reformatories not as places of 
punishment and forced confinement but as “a happy mingling of kindness and firmness,” 
“pleasant,” or like boarding schools.43 
Women’s reformatories were designed for young, native-born white women who 
were convicted of minor offenses, usually moral offenses related to sexuality. Women’s 
prison reformers saw their mission as correcting potentially normative women who had 
                                                
41 For example, the Iowa Women’s Reformatory offered classes in domestic science, canning, millinery, 
common school subjects, rug making, basket weaving, embroidery, typewriting, and stenography. The 
institution’s chief industries were power sewing, which manufactured clothing for other state institutions, 
and farm work. Lekkerkerker, Reformatories for Women. From its opening in 1928 through at least the 
mid-twentieth century, the Federal Industrial Institution for Women in Alderson, West Virginia, taught 
women sewing, dressmaking and millinery, “Laundry Theory,” poultry raising, cooking, as well as “more 
advanced” courses in typing, stenography, filing, business English, appreciation of art and literature, travel, 
table service, household decoration, and candymaking. The reformatory also had a garment factory where 
women made clothing for other federal prisoners. According to one of the superintendents of Alderson, 
learning domestic skills would “equip women to make life happier and so lead away from antisocial acts.” 
Haynes, The American Prison System, 90. See also, Mary B. Harris, I Knew Them in Prison (New York: 
The Viking Press, 1936); Watterson, Women in Prison. While these institutions aimed to teach women to 
become homemakers, in reality, because most of the women were working-class or poor, they generally 
taught them to be domestic servants. Some women were even sent to labor in middle-class homes as 
domestic servants upon parole. Rafter, Partial Justice. In contrast, men’s reformatories, which similarly 
centered education, vocational training, and moral uplift, featured more varied industries and education that 
supposedly promoted (white) masculinity. Rothman, The Discovery of the Asylum; Rafter, Partial Justice. 
42 Sixth Report of the Prison Association of New York (Albany: Charles Van Benthuysen, 1851), 53-54. 
43 Sixty-First Annual Report of the Prison Association of New York, 93; Murtagh and Harris, Cast the First 
Stone, 274. See also, A Manual of Correctional Standards (New York: American Correctional Association, 
1959), 467-68. 
In fact, none of the early statues establishing women’s reformatories mentioned punishment, instead 
emphasizing rehabilitation. For example, the Indiana statute said, “to reform the character (of the inmates), 
preserve the health, secure fixed habits of industry and morality, to the end that the inmates shall be 
rendered intelligent, industrious and useful citizens.” The Iowa statute said: “for the purpose of preparing 
the inmates to lead orderly and virtuous lives and to become self-supporting and useful embers of society.” 
Lekkerkerker, Reformatories for Women, quoted on 162. 
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slipped off the path of respectability. To fulfill this mission, they sought to extend 
imprisonment for a group of women who had never been previously subject to prison 
sentences, such as vagrants, unwed mothers, prostituted, and wayward women, and 
argued that these women should stay in prison for as long as it took to rehabilitate them. 
As states passed legislation establishing women’s reformatories, many also passed 
special indeterminate sentencing laws for women. These indeterminate sentences enabled 
the state to incarcerate women for pettier offenses than those for which men could be 
held and greatly extended women’s prison terms by making it possible to imprison 
women for misdemeanors and other minor offenses for years. This legislation established 
a category of female state prisoners that had no male counterpart, extending the sexually 
divergent nature of the developing prison system.44 Black women and immigrant women, 
even those convicted of minor offenses, were generally considered unsuitable for 
reformatories because they were less or even incapable (especially black women) of 
chastity, purity, and moral virtue, of achieving “true womanhood.”45 
Because sex segregation was produced from rehabilitation organized around 
white sexual difference, its development was less important for criminal punishment 
systems that did not center white correction. These other criminal punishment systems, 
which housed populations deemed racially, sexually, gender, bodily or mentally, or 
otherwise incorrigible, featured the warehousing or forced labor of these deviant 
populations. 
                                                
44 Legal challenges to this system in the early and mid-twentieth century generally failed, producing legal 
precedent that sanctioned and normalized sex segregation and sexually different criminal punishment. See 
State v. Heitman, 105 Kan. 139 (1919). 
45 Newman, White Women’s Rights; Rafter, Partial Justice; Kurshan, “Behind the Walls”; Lekkerkerker, 
Reformatories for Women. 
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In the Northeast and Midwest, women were not the only cast offs of the 
penitentiary and (men’s) reformatory movements; people of color, Southern and Eastern 
European immigrants, many poor people, disabled people, older men and women, and 
recidivists were also subjected to neglect, abuse, and warehousing as they increasingly 
inhabited a separate system of criminal punishment and imprisonment that developed and 
matured coterminously with the penitentiary and reformatory movements. This other 
criminal punishment system was made up of custodial prisons, most of which held both 
men and women. While the prison reform movements helped facilitate the expansion of 
these custodial prisons by developing legal codes that centered imprisonment as the 
primary criminal punishment in these regions, the prison reform movements’ 
rehabilitative work had little impact on them.46  
While the new prison system in the Northeast and Midwest was primarily 
organized around white sexual difference and gender and sexual normative correction, in 
the South and West criminal punishment systems were primarily organized around 
punitive, forced labor systems that centered black criminality and irredeemability. While 
the Northeast and Midwest had industrialized economies and nearly all white 
populations, which helped facilitate criminal punishment reforms that centered 
rehabilitation (for some), the South and parts of the West featured slavery and/or 
                                                
46 The women’s reformatory movement, therefore, did not impact the vast majority of the female prisoners 
who were held in custodial prisons. Most women’s custodial units remained within or attached to central 
state (men’s) prisons, although a few separate custodial women’s prisons, which largely resembled men’s 
prisons, also opened. In these custodial prisons, women continued to live in horrible conditions, often 
worse than men’s conditions, and like earlier the burdens of sex segregation were borne by female-
classified prisoners. For example, Kate Richards O’Hare, who served time in the Missouri state penitentiary 
during World War I, described how the windows in the women’s unit were covered with gray paint, 
excluding all natural light, “to prevent the women flirting with the men on the other side of the wall.” Kate 
Richards O’Hare, In Prison (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1923), 64.  
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agrarian-based economies and had significant populations of color, which produced 
criminal punishment systems with little-to-no interest in rehabilitation. The nineteenth 
century was also a time of Western expansion, Indian removal, and wars with Mexico 
and various American Indian nations that, alongside slavery, helped construct racialized 
understandings of captivity, violence, and criminality that deeply impacted state criminal 
punishment systems.47 This racial and economic context produced criminal punishment 
systems that featured corporal punishments, brutal (non-correction oriented) forced labor 
systems, and extra-legal “justice.”48 
As the Northeast and Midwest developed the penitentiary system in the early 
twentieth century, in the South and much of the West chattel slavery served as the 
primary criminal punishment institution. Chattel slavery was a form of imprisonment and 
site of containing a supposedly socially and criminally deviant population. A central 
aspect of the racist justifications for the enslavement of black people was the belief that 
black people were inherently prone to criminality and violence. Slavery was viewed as a 
way to contain a population that could harm white society.49 In contrast, few white men 
and almost no white women were subject to criminal punishment for most of the 
                                                
47 Smith, The Prison and the American Imagination.  
48 This narrative, of course, erases a lot of complexity in all four region, especially differences between the 
Midwest and Northeast, and South and West.  
49 Slavery also literally functioned as a criminal punishment system. Most crimes committed by enslaved 
black people were responded to by “plantation justice”; only the most serious, such as capital crimes or 
crimes that crossed plantation boundaries, were dealt with by the state. Despite this, in many states, 
enslaved black people were prosecuted by the state at higher rates than white people. While a small 
percentage of the population, free black people were prosecuted at much higher rates than enslaved black 
people. While free black people might be imprisoned, very few enslaved people were jailed because it 
negatively affected the wealth of the white people who owned them. When convicted by the state, they 
were, therefore, most commonly whipped. Enslaved black people were also subject to execution. When 
they were executed by the state, their owners were compensated. In southwest states, such as Texas, 
Mexican people were disproportionately incarcerated as well. Hindus, Prison and Plantation; Perkinson, 
Texas Tough; Oshinsky, “Worse Than Slavery.”  
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nineteenth century. Nevertheless, in the early and mid-nineteenth century, most Southern 
and Western states embarked on state-wide criminal punishment reforms, which usually 
aimed to create a more humane and moral criminal punishment system for white men 
through instituting imprisonment as their primary punishment. By the Civil War, the 
prison became the primary site of punishment for white men.50 Despite the centrality of 
white maleness in the motivations for the construction of these prisons, few, if any, were 
designed for or interested in rehabilitation. Instead, most Southern and Western prisons 
were sites of secure confinement.51 
After Emancipation, prisons and state criminal punishment systems became an 
important site of the containment and, in many respects, reenslavement of black 
populations. First through black codes then through Jim Crow, most Southern and some 
Western states created an explicitly racially stratified criminal legal system that continued 
to be structured around black criminality and irredeemability. These systems led to a 
swift racial demographic shift in Southern and some Western prisons from nearly all 
white to predominantly black and to rapidly rising penal populations, driven almost 
entirely by the imprisonment of formerly enslaved black people.52 Instead of building 
more prisons, Southern and some Western states began to lease their prisoners to private 
                                                
50 The border states, such as Virginia, Kentucky, Georgia, Maryland, and Tennessee, were the first to build 
prisons. In the late 1830s and 1840s, most other Southern states did so as well. Florida, South Carolina, and 
North Carolina were the only Southern states that did not build a prison until after the Civil War. 
Perkinson, Texas Tough; Oshinsky, “Worse Than Slavery”; Hindus, Prison and Plantation. 
51 In most Western states, early penitentiaries were little more than stockades when they first opened. It 
took years for prisoners to built permanent, stone prisons. Butler, Gendered Justice in the American West; 
Perkinson, Texas Tough; Oshinsky, “Worse Than Slavery”; Hindus, Prison and Plantation. 
52 For example, many black codes required that black people not only have a job but have written proof of 
the job. If any black person was found without this proof, they would be deemed vagrant and fined, often 
around $50. If he could not pay this fine, which was very likely, he would be imprisoned and hired out to 
any white person willing to pay it for him. In some states, such as Mississippi, preference would be given 
to formerly enslaved people’s former owners. Oshinsky, “Worse Than Slavery.” 
  60 
companies and individuals, many of whom were former slave owners, and convict 
leasing became the dominant form of criminal punishment in the South and parts of the 
West from the late nineteenth into the twentieth century. While prisons continued to exist 
during the system of convict leasing, they remained of secondary importance to state 
criminal punishment systems, housing the majority of white male prisoners, who were 
usually convicted of serious crimes. Most black people, both men and women, the vast 
majority of whom were convicted of low-level offenses, were leased.53 In the early 
twentieth century, states abolished convict leasing but continued forced convict labor in 
fields on state-run prison farms and chain gangs.54  
Like in the Northeast and Midwest, the racial stratification of criminal punishment 
was usually even more stark among female-classified prisoners than male-classified 
prisoners. Black women were more likely to be prosecuted, more likely to receive 
                                                
53 Modeled on chattel slavery, convict leasing was a corrupt, cruel, and incredibly violent system that 
targeted black men and women. Formerly enslaved people found themselves back on former slave-holding 
plantations, sometimes the plantations where they had been enslaved. As historian David M. Oshinsky 
points out, convict leasing was often “worse than slavery” because lessees had no incentive to keep 
prisoners alive; if a leased prisoner was hurt or killed, they could be easily replaced with no additional cost. 
Hundreds to thousands of prisoners died or were permanently disfigured because of the horrible conditions 
each year throughout the South, the vast majority of whom were black. Scholars estimate that between 
1866 and 1920 over 30,000 people died throughout the South because of convict leasing. Oshinsky, 
“Worse Than Slavery”; Perkinson, Texas Tough. However, while convict leasing is associated with the 
South, as Heather Ann Thompson notes, it originated in the North in the penitentiary system when some 
prisons leased their prisoners to private manufacturers. Heather Ann Thompson, “Blinded by a ‘Barbaric’ 
South: Prison Horrors, Inmate Abuse, and the Ironic History of American Penal Reform,” in the Myth of 
Southern Exceptionalism, ed. Matthew D. Lassiter and Joseph Crespino (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2010). 
54 The abolition of convict leasing was the result of prison reformers interested in curbing its abuses by 
providing greater state control. As Jane Zimmerman explained in her history of this reform movement, with 
the end of leasing, prison administrators “had to find new methods of employment for their convicts,” so 
they generally turned to road building and farm work. Jane Zimmerman, “The Penal Reform Movement in 
the South During the Progressive Era, 1890-1917,” The Journal of Southern History 17, no. 4 (Nov 1951).  
Once again, prison farms and especially chain gangs were predominantly black. For example, of the 
1,521 prisoners the examined in Jesse F. Steiner and Roy M. Brown 1927 study of chain gangs, 1,036 were 
black, 469 white, and 12 American Indian. Jesse F. Steiner and Roy M. Brown, The North Carolina Chain 
Gang: A Study of County Convict Road Work (Westport, CT: Negro Universities Press, 1970 [1927]). 
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imprisonment as a sentence, and less likely to get early release or a pardon than white 
women. Like before Emancipation, white women were rarely imprisoned because the 
criminal legal system in most, if not all, Southern and Western states tended to protect 
white women from imprisonment through lack of prosecution, pardons, or short 
sentences.55 This racialized gendered dynamic often produced state female prison 
populations that were almost entirely—and sometimes all—black.56 In other words, 
Southern and Western criminal punishment systems shared the dominant investment in 
white sexual difference, which effectively saved most white women from punishment 
while enfolding black women into a system of racialized punishment and forced labor. 
Prisons and the forced labor of leasing, chain gangs, and prison farms were generally 
considered too horrible—and masculine—for white women because of their (white) 
womanhood but not for black women. As black women were confined to state prisons 
and forced to work in fields and on chain gangs with men, state and prison officials 
confirmed and reconstructed black women as inherently masculine and deviant.57 
                                                
55 Some judges never sent a white woman to prison, even those convicted of murder. Even when white 
women were convicted and imprisoned for murder, they often received shorter sentences than black women 
convicted of property crimes. Oshinsky, “Worse Than Slavery”; Kurshan, “Behind the Walls.” 
56 In Arkansas, in 1910, all female prisoners were black. Butler, Gendered Justice in the American West. 
When the women’s camp at Parchman Farm in Mississippi opened in 1915, all 26 prisoners were black. 
Ten years later, the forty-eight female-classified prisoners were still all black. Oshinsky, “Worse Than 
Slavery.” In Texas in the early twentieth century, 94% of female prisoners were black. Perkinson, Texas 
Tough. See also, Heffernan, “Gendered Perceptions of Dangerous and Dependent Women”; Kurshan, 
“Behind the Walls”; Rafter, Partial Justice; Butler, Gendered Justice in the American West. 
57 Sarah Haley’s analysis of the racialized gender dynamics of Georgia’s 1908 law establishing chain gangs 
to replace the convict lease system illustrates this point well. This law allowed judges to exclude women 
from the chain gang and instead confine them to the women’s prison. While the law was race-blind, Haley 
argues that judges understood the racial specificity of the gendered directive. Between 1908 and 1938, only 
four white women were sent to labor on chain gangs, compared to nearly 2000 black women. Haley argues 
that this law and Georgia’s prison system codified woman and female as white, reinforced gendered and 
racialized constructions of labor, and upheld the prominent symbolic rationale for Jim Crow, the protection 
of women women’s bodies. Sarah Haley, “‘Like I Was a Man’: Chain Gangs, Gender, and the Domestic 
Carceral Sphere in Jim Crow Georgia,” Signs 39, no. 1 (Autumn 2013): 53-77. 
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Convict leasing, prison farms, and chain gangs were a continuation of racialized 
forced captivity and labor. Under these systems, like their predecessor, chattel slavery, 
sexual difference meant little when it came to black people. While sex segregation 
existed in Southern and Western penal systems, it tended to be much less strict, especially 
for black women and men, than in the Northeast and Midwest. In many Southern and 
Western states, women, usually black women, joined men, usually black men, on lease 
and on chain gangs to labor in fields, in mines, and on railroads. Women usually slept in 
separate rooms or tents but were otherwise not segregated from men and were even 
chained to them.58 Sex segregation might be stricter on prison farms because they tended 
to have more permanent locations and structures, but women, especially black women, 
continued to labor alongside men at least some of the time.59  
Within central state prisons, especially in the West, women and men also 
mingled. Prior to the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, most prison 
administrators did not develop separate policies, programs, and even units for men and 
women. For example, in the 1860s, men and women in Arkansas shared cells and 
common waste buckets. Arizona’s territorial prison, originally little more than an adobe 
building and two stone cells, accepted its first fifteen prisoners in 1876 but did not 
provide any kind of a female ward until 1897. Before 1915, no Western state had built a 
                                                
58 Sometimes instead of doing the same work, women would cook and wash for the men but still stayed in 
the same camp. Black women were also leased to white families to work as domestic servants. Perkinson, 
Texas Tough; Haley, “‘Like I Was a Man.’”  
59 Under these circumstances, women and men experienced similar violence and horrifying labor and living 
conditions, but gender still impacted their experiences of violence as women were also subjected to sexual 
coercion, rape, and forced prostitution by penal administrators, overseers, and other prisoners. Rafter, 
Partial Justice; Butler, Gendered Justice in the American West; Kurshan, “Behind the Walls”; Perkinson, 
Texas Tough.  
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separate institution for women, and only one women’s prison was built before the 
1960s.60 
Despite regional differences, criminal punishment systems throughout the US 
constructed sex segregation through shared understandings of black incorrigibility, white 
supremacy, sexual difference, and racialized gender normativity. Scholars have argued 
that antiblackness produced criminal punishment systems that eschewed rehabilitation 
and centered captivity and warehousing of deviant populations; it also produced systems 
that were much less invested in sexual difference.61 In other words, criminal punishment 
systems throughout the US helped produce sexual difference as central to white racialized 
gender normativity. Racialized gender normativity also produced a certainty about sexual 
difference and gendered nature that obscured the work of sex-classification, constructing 
it as not work at all. Yet, some prisoners challenged this administrative certainty as they 
entered the prison system as one sex and were later “discovered” to be another.  
 
“Man Prisoner Really Woman, Court Finds” 
As prison reformers and administrators constructed sex segregation and gendered 
prison architecture, labor, and programming throughout the nineteenth and into the 
twentieth centuries, they took for granted that they would be able to easily and 
                                                
60 Eventually, sex segregation and some gendered programming was developed in Southern and Western 
prisons as part of their processes of modernizing their prison systems. For example, in 1905, Idaho made a 
concerted effort to sex segregate, building a women’s prison surrounded by a high, thick wall inside the 
main prison. As part of this effort to sex segregate, they devised a work program for the women, including 
a domestic program of cleaning, washing, and cooking for themselves and future plans for women to make 
shirts for male prisoners. Butler, Gendered Justice in the American West. 
61 See, for example, Smith, The Prison and the American Imagination; Dylan Rodríguez, Forced Passages: 
Imprisoned Radical Intellectuals and the U.S. Prison Regime (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 
2006); Hindus, Prison and Plantation. 
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unquestionably “know” which prisoners should be housed in men’s prisons and which 
should go to women’s prisons or units. This assumption was, of course, consistent with 
understandings of sexual difference, which constructed women and men as essential, 
unchanging, self-evident, and mutually exclusive categories. However, as we saw with 
Vernon Bradshaw, sex classification was not always so simple, and Bradshaw’s story of 
“misclassification” was not unique. In the early and, especially, mid-twentieth century, 
prison administrators, social scientists, and the press began to occasionally describe other 
instances of “misclassified” prisoners and administrative sex confusion.  
Discussions and treatment of these “misclassified” prisoners were deeply 
interconnected with changing understandings of gender and sexual deviance in the early 
twentieth century, as gender and sexual nonconformity began to be regarded as traits of 
particular “types” of people, homosexuals and later transvestites and transsexuals. For 
example, in 1921, Perry M. Lichtenstein, a physician in New York City’s City Prison and 
House of Detention, published an article describing the “fairies,” “fags,” and “lady 
lovers”—or gender nonconforming homosexuals—that he encountered in New York City 
penal institutions, two of whom were initially housed in the women’s prison and later 
“discovered” to be “men.” In his recounting of one of these prisoners’ stories, 
Lichtenstein explained that after being arrested for solicitation as a woman and brought to 
the women’s prison, the prisoner was strip searched by a matron, who “found that we 
were dealing with a male.”62 Lichtenstein described this person as feminine in mannerism 
and body—including having “small…genitals” covered with “very little hair”—
                                                
62 Lichtenstein, “The ‘Fairy’ and the Lady Lover,” 371.  
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recounting that, when questioned, s/he stated that s/he “was effeminately inclined.”63 In 
the face of this sex trouble, prison administrators isolated hir, presumably after 
transferring hir to a men’s prison. Before s/he was released, they cut off hir hair and 
dressed hir in men’s clothing. Throughout his discussion of this prisoner, Lichtenstein—
in agreement with prison administrators—asserts that this person was really male, 
implying that hir femininity was a deception that hid hir true sex (male), which was 
eventually “discovered” by prison staff. This narrative and analysis—deception and 
discovery of true sex through bodily examination—would become common in later 
descriptions of such “misclassified” prisoners. Yet, as I will argue, despite Lichtenstein’s 
and prison administrators’ attempt to restabilize sexual difference in the face of 
administrative sex confusion, this story of “misclassification” destabilizes and contests 
the naturalness and commonsensical nature of sex segregation.  
Lichtenstein’s article was on the vanguard of a flood of penological, social 
scientific, and popular writing on sex in prison and prison sexual culture.64 As Kunzel has 
documented, sex between prisoners had long been a concern for prison reformers and 
administrators, and throughout the nineteenth century prisons were viewed as sites of 
rampant perversion. By the early twentieth century, influenced by the emergence of 
homosexual communities and identities in major cities such as New York and sexological 
                                                
63 Ibid, 371. Here and for the rest of the chapter, I will use the gender-neutral pronouns “s/he” (instead of 
he/she) and “hir” (instead of her/his) when referring to gender nonconforming people whose gender 
identity or pronoun preference was unclear or perhaps fluid.  
64 As a physician in New York City’s City Prison and House of Detention, Lichtenstein was well situated to 
observe this new “type” of person—indeed, he claimed to have, in his “official capacity,” “come in contact 
with several hundred of such individuals.” Lichtenstein, “The ‘Fairy’ and the Lady Lover,” 369. As 
historian George Chauncey has shown, New York City was home to early, often visible homosexual 
communities, and this visibility spawned policing, criminalization, and sometimes imprisonment. George 
Chauncey, Gay New York: Gender, Urban Culture, and the Making of the Gay Male World 189-1940 (New 
York: BasicBooks, 1994).  
  66 
research that named homosexuals as a specific “type” of person, prison administrators 
and researchers began to view prisons as, to borrow Kunzel’s words, a “home to 
perverts,” as containing a distinct, and deviant, sexual culture.65 In turn, the focus on 
(homo)sexuality in prisons deeply influenced the continued development of 
homosexuality as a sexual identity. Kunzel argues that prison administrators’ 
preoccupation with (homo)sex—including changing understandings of sexual identity 
and type—shaped the space of the prison. 
Early understandings of homosexuality inextricably tied together same-sex desire 
and gender nonconformity, and writings on prison homosexuality reflected this 
understanding. For example, Lichtenstein described the fairies and fags—the 
homosexuals—who he encountered as “freak[s] of nature who in every way attempt[] to 
imitate woman.”66 To Lichtenstein, their femininity or gender nonconformity marked 
them as homosexual just as much as their sexual desire for other men. Lichtenstein’s 
description was consistent—and probably deeply influenced by—contemporary 
sexology. In the mid-nineteenth century and into the beginning of the twentieth, 
sexologists who studied same-sex desire and sexuality labeled it “inversion,” referring to 
inversion of gender. To many sexologists, the primary aspect of inversion was an 
identification with or embodiment of the opposite sex or gender from their birth-assigned 
sex, which could be psychological, social, or physical. Some even considered inverts a 
kind of “third sex.” Same-sex desire was one aspect of a much larger constellation of 
gender inversion: desire for men was considered fundamentally a woman’s desire and 
                                                
65 Kunzel, Criminal Intimacy, 12. 
66 Lichtenstein, “The ‘Fairy’ and the Lady Lover,” 369. 
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desire for women was a man’s desire. In this conceptualization, a “true” male 
homosexual was a feminine man who preferred the passive or “female” position in sex 
and a “true” lesbian was a masculine woman who preferred the active or “male” role. In 
contrast, the men who engaged in sex with other homosexual men and played the “male” 
role were not considered homosexual nor were the women who had sex with lesbians and 
played the “female” role.67 In the early and mid-twentieth century, same-sex desire and 
gender nonconformity began to be disaggregated as sexologists constructed new 
categories for people who exhibited gender nonconformity or cross-gender identity but 
not same-sex desire: transvestites and, by the late 1940s and 1950s, transsexuals.68 
However, gender nonconformity and homosexuality remained deeply interconnected 
throughout the twentieth century and into the present, especially within penal institutions.  
While homosexuals or inverts only became a “species,” to use Foucault’s famous 
phrase, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, people had been living as the 
sex opposite their birth assignment in the West for centuries.69 Historical accounts of 
                                                
67 See for example, Havelock Ellis and John Addington Symonds, Sexual Inversion (New York: Arno 
Press, 1975 [1897]); Richard von Krafft-Ebing, Psychopathia Sexualis (New York: Bell Publishing 
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these people—which primarily focused on female-assigned people living as male, who 
have been referred to by historians as “passing women”—sometimes describe people, 
like Bradshaw, living for decades without being “discovered.” Others only changed sex 
for short periods, and some changed sex a number of times throughout their lives. Some 
did it for economic opportunities (most likely those who lived as men), some for love or 
sex, and some because they seemed to identify as the sex opposite their birth assignment. 
Some of these people ended up in prison.70 However, prior to the late nineteenth century, 
little state infrastructure existed to identify and target these people for regulation, 
criminalization, and imprisonment, in large part because gender nonconformity was not 
understood as indicating an identity or particular type of person. Instead, it was often seen 
as a sign of illness or degeneracy. Therefore, cross-gender-identified people who entered 
prison throughout most of the nineteenth century would have been interpreted and dealt 
with differently than they were in the twentieth century. For example, in his history of the 
penitentiary system in New York, historian W. David Lewis briefly discusses a prisoner 
who dressed in “feminine apparel” prior to hir imprisonment in Sing Sing in the early or 
mid-nineteenth century.71 Lewis describes this person as “insane,” and he explains that 
prison administrators labeled hir an “idiot,” continually tortured hir, and confined hir to a 
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cell, where s/he later died. In his discussion of this prisoner, Lewis never describes hir as 
a homosexual or a particular sexual type—in fact, he showed little interest in hir gender 
nonconformity, identifying it as part if hir insanity—which most likely reflects how 
prison administrators discussed hir. In other words, while this prisoner’s gender 
nonconformity was met with violence and pathologization by prison administrators, 
responses that continue into the present, they did not view hir as a particular gendered or 
sexual type of person—such as a homosexual—but as insane or mentally “defective.” It 
is likely that other prison administrators treated gender nonconformity similarly during 
the nineteenth century. 
The increased visibility of gender nonconformity and same-sex desire—which 
drove the growth in research on and changing attitudes toward them—was deeply 
interconnected with social and economic phenomena that also drove prison reform, 
including industrialization, urbanization, and changing familial structures and gender 
norms. While opening new opportunities for new gender and sexual formations, these 
changing economic and social conditions in the US also helped build state bureaucracies 
and produced new methods for targeting and regulating deviance—from immigration 
regulations to a welfare bureaucracy to criminal legal systems, including prisons. Greater 
visibility of homosexual and gender nonconforming people marked them as a somewhat 
new target for state regulation, and policing was central to this in the early and mid-
twentieth century.72 For example, in the mid-nineteenth century, many cities began to 
pass anti-cross-dressing ordinances that would be used for well over the next century to 
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police—and in some cases imprison—gender nonconforming people, especially those 
assigned male at birth.73 The increased policing outside of prisons was interconnected 
with the growing anxiety about “perverts” inside of prisons. These stories of 
misclassification, therefore, emerged in a context of heightened anxiety and attention to 
gender and sexual nonnormativity, which likely prompted the press to publish accounts 
of them. These media accounts, in turn, amplified the visibility of gender and sexual 
nonnormativity.  
As historian Joanne Meyerowitz has documented, in the 1930s, stories of “sex 
change” or sex confusion began to appear in US newspapers and magazine, generally in 
marginal publications such as tabloids, sensationalist magazines, or popular scientific 
publications. Meyerowitz argues that early articles usually described sexual 
metamorphosis, rare biological problems, and surgical change and often presented cross-
gender behavior, intersexuality, homosexuality, and transvestism as interrelated problems 
or pathologies in need of medical cure. Appearing during a time when surgical “sex 
changes” began to be performed in Western Europe but not yet the US, many of these 
stories portrayed “sex change surgery as unveiling a true but hidden physiological sex,” 
which “tied the change to a biological mooring that justified surgical intervention.”74  
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A related, but slightly different, kind of news story describing gender 
nonconforming or cross-gender identified people’s interactions with the criminal legal 
system emerged during the same period. In contrast to the stories that Meyerowitz 
focused on, stories involving the criminal legal system identified the truth of these 
people’s sex in their birth assignments or their genital configuration, a “truth” waiting to 
be discovered by criminal legal actors—police, judges, and prison administrators or 
medical staff. These “discoveries” were usually at or immediately before arrest and 
resulted in charges related to their gender (or sexual) nonconformity—such as cross-
dressing—and in confinement for at least some time in a men’s or women’s section of a 
jail, in accordance with their police-designated sex.75 For many male-assigned people 
who lived or presented as female part or all of their lives, encounters with police became 
a primary site of “discovery.”  
A small but significant subset of these stories were of people, like Bradshaw and 
the prisoners that Lichtenstein discusses, who were not “discovered” until after they were 
imprisoned. These articles about “misclassification” seem to have been primarily 
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published in small local newspapers, and while they often featured sensationalist titles—
such as “L.A. Police Arrest Pretty Girl on Street, Find ‘She’s’ Boy, 18,” “‘Josephine’ Is 
Man, Prison Check Discloses,” “Chase Woman Bandit, Catch Her, Jail Him,” and 
“Oakland Jail Has Trouble Over Sex”—the articles tended to be short and not overly 
sensationalistic.76 Nevertheless, their authors seemed to aim to titillate readers with 
stories of men who looked like women being confined in women’s prisons or women 
who passed as men in men’s prisons, and they described sex confusion and anxiety. 
For example, in 1950, the same short article, featuring different headlines, 
appeared in small local newspapers from Reading, Pennsylvania, to St. Petersburg, 
Florida, to Ardmore, Oklahoma, to Kalispell, Montana, describing the “misclassification” 
of Josephine Montgomery, a prisoner in California.77 Montgomery was incarcerated in 
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the women’s wing of Imperial County Jail for two months and at the California Prison for 
Women at Tehachapi for at least one night until “a routine physical examination 
disclosed that ‘Josephine’…was a man.” Following this discovery, California prison 
administrators “rushed [Montgomery] to a men’s cell at San Quentin prison.” The article 
portrays this transfer to San Quentin as a quick, simple, and commonsensical “fix” to the 
(strange) problem of Montgomery’s “misclassification.” However, the use of “rushed” 
indicates that the discovery of Montgomery’s supposed maleness caused administrative 
disorder and anxiety. While this anxiety would have been at least in part because of the 
concern about housing a “man” among “women” (and related concerns about consensual 
sex and sexual violence), her “misclassification” also reveals an administrative error in 
one of the most automatic and unquestioned functions of the management of prisoners. 
The article explains this error by describing Montgomery as “disguised as a woman when 
arrested” and maintaining a “feminine identity” through conviction. Montgomery is 
produced as deceptive and untrustworthy, as actively thwarting prison administrator’s 
attempts to manage her and their institutions, as a threat to institutional security.  
“Disguise” and “masquerade” were frequent descriptors in similar stories. For 
example, numerous articles described Bradshaw as “masquerading as a man” or 
“unmasked as a woman.”78 The use of such language implies deception of a (hidden) 
                                                                                                                                            
the mid-twentieth century, that is held in the Kinsey Institute’s special collections. I found other articles 
through searching digitalized newspaper databases.  
78 For the language of “masquerade,” see “Prisoner Sentenced, Revealed to Be Woman”; “Masqueraded as 
a Man From Her Early Childhood,” Daily Journal (Fergus Falls, MN), February 11, 1954; “‘Vernon’ 
Becomes ‘Violet’”; “Woman Revealed as Man Masquerade is Disclosed in Columbus Court Case,” The 
Marion Star (Marion, OH), February 11, 1950. For the language of “unmasked,” see “Woman, Who 
Dressed as Male, Receives Sentence”; “Woman Revealed as Man Masquerade is Disclosed in Columbus 
Court Case”; “Prisoner Sentenced, Revealed to Be Woman,” Brainerd Daily Dispatch (Brainerd, MN), 
February 11, 1954. See also, “This Hooker is a ‘He’”; “Posed as Woman for Ten Years.”  
  74 
truth, in this case “true” sex. This supposed “truth” of sex worked to restabilize 
immutable binary sex, waiting to be discovered through inspection (of the person’s 
body/genitals). This language also produces these prisoners’ gender expressions—and 
perhaps identities—as illegitimate, fake, and treacherous and (re)produces these prisoners 
as criminal and potentially dangerous. 
Like in the case of Montgomery, the discussion of the “discoveries” of 
misclassification portrayed the problem as fixed by transferring the prisoner to the 
“correct” penal institution. The moment of “discovery” in these stories implies a moment 
of learning the truth about who a prisoner is naturally, essentially, and unalterably. While 
“disguise” produces prisoners’ self-determination as illegitimate and treacherous, this 
“discovery” of truth invests the power of identification in prison officials and doctors, 
who decide a prisoner’s “real” sex, no matter how the prisoner identifies. Because these 
discoveries involved physical examination—usually during a medical exam or strip 
search—true sex is resecured to genital configuration. In other words, the truth of sex for 
prison administrators was found in the visual economy of the body, particularly the 
genitals. 
As Robyn Wiegman has argued, vision and observation are central to modern 
investigation and constructions of race and sex. Economies of visibility “produce the 
network of meanings attached to bodies.”79 The visible defines the essentialized truths of 
sex and race and renders those truths “real.” The visual economy of bodies was 
particularly important to nineteenth century constructions of sexual difference and race, 
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via comparative anatomy, scientific racism, and sexology. Not only did these 
racial/sexual sciences produced methods of visibly and scientifically measuring bodies to 
better “know” human nature and racial and sexual difference, but they also invested new 
authority in doctors and scientists to know the “truth” about people, especially those 
considered racially and sexually inferior.80 This was previewed in Lichtenstein’s 
discussion of the misclassified prisoner when he described hir as having small genitals 
with little pubic hair. Not only does this indicate that Lichtenstein performed a bodily, 
genital investigation to discover hir true sex, but secures hir gender nonconformity as 
produced from hir nonnormative body. This link of nonnormative body and 
nonnormative sexuality or gender expression was a common theme in sexology and 
scientific racism of the time, as sexual and gender deviance were linked to bodily and 
mental underdevelopment. 
These racial and sexual sciences also helped to shape and substantiate the 
racialized gender normative logics of prison reformers and the prison system, and 
therefore helped shape penal sex segregation and sex classification. During the nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries, as they produced and reformed penal management, 
rehabilitation, and warehousing techniques, prison administrators drew liberally from 
(and contributed to) these racial/sexual sciences as they developed measuring methods to 
better “know” criminals, for example measuring prisoners’ bodies often in minute detail 
and giving them intelligence and other tests. But administrators also drew on these 
racial/sexual sciences (often unconsciously) to determine the sex of all prisoners. By 
                                                
80 Terry, An American Obsession; Somerville, Queering the Color Line; Rosenberg, Beyond Separate 
Spheres. 
  76 
seeing prisoners’ bodies and determining their sex, prison administrators reproduced sex 
as visibly self-evident and natural, and, as they classified prisoners, they physically 
separated them into a binary sex system, producing a visible economy. 
The construction of these prisoners as “masquerading” and the investment in the 
authority of penal “discoveries” of their true sex also connected the experience of these 
prisoners to those policed and criminalized because of gender nonconformity and, 
especially, cross-dressing outside of penal institutions. Cross-dressing laws often utilized 
anti-masquerading statutes, designed to keep people from hiding their “true” identities for 
the purpose of illegal activity. While the people who I am discussing here were not 
originally arrested for cross-dressing or any other explicitly gender- or sexuality-related 
offense, the language of “masquerading” connects them to this other “crime,” resecuring 
their gender expression to criminality and dangerous deception.  
This construction of misclassified prisoners as “masquerading” allowed reporters, 
as well as prison administrators, to not engage with the implications about the nature of 
sex posed by these misclassifications and prisoners. If sex is so obvious and immutable, 
how could prison administrators misclassify prisoners in the first place? What of gender 
identity and expression? Many of these people continued to be gender nonconforming 
and even cross-gender identified in the supposedly correctly sexed institutions, a 
“problem” that these articles never discussed. Instead, framing these prisoners as 
deceptive but fixed with a transfer to the “correctly” sexed facility reinvisibilized the 
work and contradictions of sex classification and sex segregation. 
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Despite the certainty of prison officials in their sex reclassifications, these stories 
reveal moments of crisis for a penal system based on an immutable sex binary, which 
posed challenges to prison organization and management. In some cases, people would 
spend days and even weeks or months in one sexed facility until they were “discovered” 
and moved to another.81 These lengthy stays prior to “discovery” allow us to imagine that 
there were probably some prisoners who were never “discovered.” Reclassifications often 
placed female-identified or female-presenting people in men’s prisons and male-
identified or male-presenting prisoners in women’s prisons. Within these institutions, 
these prisoners would likely not have been the only gender nonconforming or even cross-
gender identified prisoners. As Kunzel has documented, by the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century, many penal institutions featured complex sexual and gendered 
cultures, in which gender nonconforming prisoners played a prominent role.82 The deep 
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irony—of which prison administrators were at least somewhat aware—was that sex 
segregation helped produce and make more visible these gendered sexual subcultures. 
The construction of gender nonconforming and cross-gender-identified prisoners 
as masquerading and misclassified also produced cross-gender-identity as not real or at 
least incomprehensible within the (racialized gender normative) prison space. Cross-
gender-identified prisoners become incoherent, administratively disorderly, actually 
unclassifiable. Their continued existence in penal institutions was a visible reminder that 
sex segregation was never complete, always in negotiation. Gender nonconforming and 
cross-gender-identified prisoners were, therefore, administratively and otherwise 
dangerous. This queer dangerousness was generally managed through the violent 
negation of their gender identity and expression—as was previewed by Lichtenstein who 
described how jail staff not only transferred the person who was originally classified as 
female to the man’s jail but also cut off hir hair and dressed hir in men’s clothing—and 
segregation, as I will discuss in the next chapter. 
One interesting, if complicated, exception to the general rule of management 
through violence was described by Florence Monahan—who headed a number of 
women’s penal institutions in Minnesota, Illinois, and California during the early to mid-
twentieth century—as she discussed a “misclassified” prisoner in her 1941 memoir. 
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Monahan explained, perhaps somewhat jokingly, that in 1938 “a young man was 
sentenced to the California Institution for Women [at Tehachapi].”83 Originally arrested 
and confined in a men’s jail, where doctors “discovered” him “to be a woman,” this 
prisoner was reclassified and later sentenced to Tehachapi, where Monahan was 
superintendent. She described him as “an individual with an entirely masculine 
background,” who “had always lived as a boy or a man.”84 While Monahan literally 
identified this person as a “man,” she did not challenge his classification as female and 
confinement in a women’s prison. Nevertheless, Monahan seemed to understand this 
prisoner as fundamentally, unalterably masculine, if also essentially female, implicitly 
drawing on sexological constructions of the invert as a particular type of person. Indeed, 
Monahan discussed this prisoner in a chapter called “The Sex Problem,” which focused 
on the problem of homosexuality and “perversion” in prisons. Describing a changing of 
the times from secret discussions of sex between prisoners by prison administrators when 
she began her career in the late 1910s and 1920s, to open discussions of homosexuality a 
decade or two later, along with the increased visibility of gender nonconformity—or 
prisoners “flaunt[ing] their abnormality” by “dress[ing] like a man”—Monahan’s ability 
to see this prisoner’s masculinity as innate and at least somewhat benign was likely the 
result of changing understandings of gender and sexual nonconformity.85 While Monahan 
was sympathetic to his masculinity and accommodated his gender expression by giving 
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him a job in the garden where he could wear overalls for most of the day, she still viewed 
him as essentially female and, therefore, awkwardly and somewhat problematically but 
rightly confined in a women’s prison and legitimately subject to feminine requirements. 
Modeled on the women’s reformatories in the Northeast and Midwest, Tehachapi 
featured feminine management and rehabilitation, including requiring prisoners to wear 
dresses most of the time. Monahan required staff to refer to this prisoner as “she/her” and 
by his birth name—although most of the other prisoners called him “Bud”—and forced 
him to wear dresses in the dining room and in the cottage because “after all, she [sic] was 
living in a women’s institution and she [sic] had to adhere to our rules.”86  
While Monahan did not seek to correct this person’s gender identity nor did she 
seem interested in “correcting” him in any way, she still required him to conform to 
certain female gender norms while in the presence of other prisoners. This required 
conformity to gender norms was likely for the benefit of other prisoners’ feminine 
rehabilitation, as the presence of masculinity would cause gender and sexual disorder and 
work again the racialized gender normative carceral correction of a women’s 
reformatory. Indeed, Monahan described how she “dreaded having such a person come to 
Tehachapi” because of the seemingly inevitable “free-for alls among the women who 
doubtless would fight for her [sic] favors.”87 Put another way, she was concerned about 
the (sexual) disorder that gender nonconformity would cause. Monahan describes her 
concerns as “groundless” as this prisoner had no interest in interacting with other 
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prisoners. Monahan’s sympathy toward this prisoner was likely aided—and even 
contingent on—his disinterest in engaging sexually or in any other way with other 
prisoners. Despite the accommodations, this prisoner was still subject to gendered 
regulation and suspicion.  
 
As these stories show, sex segregation was fragile and often incomplete. Not only 
could prisoners who might later be reclassified as the opposite sex reside in these penal 
institutions, waiting to be “discovered” by prison administrators or medical staff, but 
prisoners who prison administrators believed were correctly reclassified could identify as 
and even look like the opposite sex. In other words, misclassified prisoners, such as 
Montgomery who maintained a “feminine identity” through conviction and initial 
imprisonment and probably continued to identify as feminine in San Quentin, 
destabilized sex segregation both prior to their “discovery” and after they were 
transferred to the “correct” institution.88  
By the mid-twentieth century, sex segregation had become the norm in penal 
institutions throughout the US. While women’s and men’s institutions continued to 
feature some differently gendered programming and architecture, as the prison system 
became less and less interested in correction and more and more focused on warehousing 
and retribution, many of the earlier differences between sexed institutions disappeared. 
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While sex segregation was initially produced as vital to (white) rehabilitation, it 
eventually became a way to manage deviant populations. Today, when sex segregation is 
discussed, it is viewed as vital to reducing violence, especially sexual violence against 
female-classified prisoners and institutional disorder, as male and female prisoners 
continue to be viewed as inherently different.89 Put another way, racialized gender 
normativity and naturalized sexual difference continues to produce an imperative to sex 
segregate and obscure the work of sex classification, even as normative constructions of 
sex and gender have dramatically changed and the investment in rehabilitation has almost 
entirely disappeared.  
Prison administrators have encountered and managed cross-gender-identified or 
“misclassified” prisoners through the racialized gender normative logics that had 
structured penal administration since the prison system’s modern inception. These 
“misclassified” prisoners created administrative disorder that prison administrators 
attempted to invisibilize by claiming that these were simple cases of mistaken identity or 
that they initially fell for these prisoners’ gender deception but corrected through bodily 
investigation and reclassification. Prisons became a site of state administration that 
reified the sex binary and secured it to racialized gender normative constructions of 
correction, rehabilitation, dangerousness, and criminality, producing the prison system as 
a legitimate site of sex classification and prison administrators as classification 
authorities. These racialized gender normative logics produced cross-gender identified 
                                                
89 My use of “female-classified” is especially important here because prison administrators often argue 
against housing trans women, who are almost always classified as male, in women’s institutions because of 
supposed fear of sexual violence (perpetrated by the trans woman). Moreover, this concern about sexual 
violence against woman does not lead to prison administrators understanding trans women as particularly at 
risk for sexual violence as women. 
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and gender nonconforming prisoners as dangerous and threatening to the prison, in need 
of (often violent) containment, as the following chapters will argue, and laid the 
foundation for the management of gender nonconforming and trans prisoners into the 
present. While prison administrators did not begin to publically “recognize” that cross-
gender identified or trans people existed in their populations until the 1970s and 1980s, 
these media reports as well as the stories from a few prison administrators that I have 
discussed, indicate that many—although certainly not all—prison administrators were 
aware of these “types” of prisoners much earlier. In particular, the work of managing 
“misclassified” prisoners helped construct bodily investigation as the key to penal 
administration of sex disorder, creating procedures to classify ambiguously sexed 
prisoners that endured as transsexual prisoners began to challenge their sex classifications 
in the 1970s and 1980s and continue into current ubiquitous policies of placing prisoners 
based on genital status. 
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Chapter Two 
 
“A Means of Assuring the Safe and Efficient Operation of a Prison”:  
Segregation, Security, and Queer Dangerousness  
 
“I was a ‘disruptive influence’ because of my physical feminization.”  
– Trans woman in the Texas prison system, describing the reasoning for her placement in segregation1 
 
 “The stated purpose of administrative segregation is that people being confined within it are a proven 
danger to themselves, staff, or other inmates. By using this classification for transgender prisoners, the 
message is being sent that a person’s gender identity itself is threatening to the institution and that person 
must be locked away in a prison within the prison.” 
– Christopher Daley, former Executive Director of the Transgender Law Center2 
 
 
 
During the early 2000s, four trans women separately sued the Sacramento County 
Jail.3 All were former or current prisoners at the jail, and all told similar stories of 
mistreatment and extreme segregation. The jail automatically housed trans women as in 
the jail’s most restrictive housing classification in the men’s wing, known as “total 
separation,” or “T-Sep,” “to protect [them] from other prisoners and the County from 
possible liability.”4 Prisoners in T-Sep were severely isolated; they were forbidden from 
having any physical or verbal contact with or even being in the same room as other 
prisoners. T-Sep prisoners spent twenty-three to twenty-four hours per day in their cells, 
and their access to programming, religious services, recreation, exercise, the law library, 
and even showers and telephones were severely limited, if not denied. They were also 
required to be shackled and manacled whenever they left their cells, including during 
                                                
1 “Transsexuals Harassed,” Coalition for Prisoners’ Rights Newsletter 10, no. 6 (July 1985): 5. Box 2, 
Bromfield Street Education Foundation Prisoner Newsletters, Northeastern University Libraries. 
2 Christopher Daley, Written testimony submitted to the National Prison Rape Elimination Commission, 
August 15, 2005, 
http://www.prearesourcecenter.org/sites/default/files/library/transgenderlawcenterpreatestimony05.pdf. 
3 Tates v. Blanas (No. 00-2539, E.D. Cal.); Medina-Tejada v. Sacramento County (No. 04-00138, , E.D. 
Cal.); Sanders v. Sacramento County (No. 03-2506, E.D. Cal.); McAllister v. Sacramento County (No. 03-
2009, E.D. Cal.).  
4 Tates v. Blanas, No. 00-2539, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27633 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 4, 2002), at *2. 
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court appearances. The classification was generally reserved for prisoners with 
“disciplinary problems,” gang members, and trans women. While jail policy required that 
each prisoner’s classification be periodically re-examined, in practice an exception was 
made for trans women.5 
Jackie Tates was one of these prisoners. An African American trans woman then 
in her mid-30s, Tates was a pretrial detainee in the jail from October 2000 to April 2001 
and again in 2002. She sued, challenging these conditions and asking for an injunction 
ordering her transfer to general population. Tates reported not only harsh, restrictive, and 
isolating conditions but also ridicule, harassment, and abuse from staff and other 
prisoners because of her trans status, including being called “he/she,” “it,” and “faggot.” 
She reported that staff served trans prisoners’ meals on the floor, commented on their 
bodies, grabbed their breasts, sexually harassed them, and threatened rape and other 
violence. Tates was forced to live in a filthy cell and received delayed and inadequate 
medical treatment. While jail policy stated that T-Sep prisoners were supposed to have at 
least one hour of dayroom time every day, Tates received far less, often only ten to 
fifteen minutes between 11:00pm and 4:00am. Tates claimed that staff frequently 
falsified logbook records, either recording that she had been in the dayroom for an hour 
when she really received far less time or claiming that she refused dayroom time when 
she did not. The lack of access to the dayroom not only denied her a vital means to 
relieve the mental and emotional torture of being locked in a small cell alone, but also 
severely restricted her access telephones and showers, which were only accessible 
                                                
5 Cosmo Garvin, “What’s She Doing in the Men’s Jail?” Sacramento News and Review, February 13, 2002; 
Tates, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27633; Tates v. Blanas, No. 00-2539, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26029 (E.D. 
Cal. Mar. 6, 2003). 
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through the dayroom.6 Tates and other trans prisoners often went two or three days and 
sometimes a week without a shower and were usually prevented from using a phone 
during normal business hours.7 Finally, Tates and other trans prisoners described being 
forced to walk through the jail bare-breasted, with only a towel around their waist, in 
order to get clean clothing during the weekly laundry call.8 During these laundry calls, 
which she described as “very humiliating as well as cruel,” they were catcalled, 
propositioned, ridiculed, and threatened by other prisoners and staff.9 In her 
communications with the district court, she interpreted these conditions as discrimination 
against and punishment for her gender identity. Because of the isolation, harassment, and 
violence she experienced at the jail, Tates suffered from severe depression and other 
emotional distress. Tates told a reporter, “I started having suicidal thoughts. I started to 
hate the fact that I was transgender.”10 
Unlike most cases brought by incarcerated trans women, the district court was 
sympathetic to Tates and ultimately ruled in her favor, finding “serious 
discrimination…against transgenders [sic]” at the jail and ordering the jail to create a new 
housing policy for trans prisoners that did not automatically classify them as T-Sep.11 
While jail officials complied with the order, creating a new policy that automatically 
classified trans women to protective custody housing and stated that they would “not 
tolerate” any discrimination, harassment, or abuse of trans women by other prisoners or 
                                                
6 Tates was not allowed in the dayroom with other prisoners, even other trans women. 
7 This restricted access to telephones caused her to often be unable to talk to her family or her lawyer.  
8 Tates, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27633; Tates, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26029. Defendants’ Status Report, 
Tates v. Sacramento County, No. 03-1950, (E.D. Cal. Sept 16, 2005).  
9 Jackie Tates, “Letter to Judge” (Nov. 22, 2002), Attached to Order, Tates (No. 00-2539), Dec. 4, 2002. 
Her emphasis. 
10 Garvin, “What’s She Doing in the Men’s Jail?” 
11 Tates, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26029, at *26. 
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staff (although they did not institute any training or other policies to prevent these 
actions), they continued to assert that T-Sep was the only “safe” option for trans women. 
In their proposed plan, jail administrators stated that they “continue[] to believe that 
transgender inmates are highly susceptible to physical assaults and injury due to their 
unique circumstances. As such, in order to protect the transgender inmate from injury and 
the Department from liability, [jail administrators] believe[] that Total Separation (T-Sep) 
is the most appropriate classification to protect all interests.”12 By understanding T-Sep 
as “protective” and “safe,” jail officials render only prisoner-perpetrated violence legible 
as violence, while staff-perpetrated violence and the institutionalized violence of T-Sep 
officially become protection. 
Despite ruling in Tates’ favor, the district court similarly rendered T-Sep 
conditions illegible as (unconstitutional) violence as they affirmed these conditions, 
which are quite common in similar maximum security housing around the US, as a 
legitimate security-management strategy. While the Tates court found these conditions 
too restrictive for classification based solely on gender identity, the court upheld their use 
for prisoners for other reasons, even affirming T-Sep placement for trans women if the 
jail provided an additional reason. In finding that the jail “discriminated” against trans 
women, the court argued that by automatically classifying them as T-Sep, jail 
administrators treated them as “inherently more dangerous than most other inmates.”13 
While arguing that trans women should not be seen as “inherently dangerous” or as a 
security threat, the court constructed the problem as “a failure of [jail administrators] to 
                                                
12 “Defendant’s Proposed Plan re Classification of Transgender Inmates,” Tates (No. 00-2539), April 1, 
2003.  
13 Tates, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26029, at *11. 
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promulgate rules and discipline to protect transgenders [sic] from discrimination.”14 In 
other words, the discrimination was isolated and individual. However, the jail’s policy of 
automatically classifying trans women in maximum security housing was the logical 
outcome of a larger set of prison logics that construct trans women as security threats, as 
I will argue in this chapter. By focusing only on this policy, the court did not address this 
larger dynamic, which causes trans women to frequently be targeted for disciplinary 
punishment that could lead to their confinement in T-Sep. These conditions, therefore, 
became constitutional and legitimate for trans women, as long as their placement is not 
based solely and explicitly on their gender identity, as well as other problem prisoners, 
most notably “gang members,” the other “type” of prisoner who was specifically targeted 
for T-Sep placement. “Gang members” are a group overly determined by race, especially 
within the California prison system, as “gang” often functions as a racialized code word 
and many black and brown prisoners are targeted for discipline and segregation in prisons 
as gang members.15 By upholding T-Sep classification for gang members as a group, the 
court also constructs them as “inherently more dangerous than most other inmates,” 
affirming the portrayal of black and brown men as inherently violent and dangerous. In 
other words, despite ruling in Tates’ favor, the court upholds the racialized and gendered 
use of T-Sep and similar administrative segregation.  
Since the early twentieth century, jail and prison officials around the US 
systematically segregated homosexual, gender nonconforming, and trans prisoners in 
                                                
14 Ibid. at *26. 
15 See for example, Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499 (2005). See also, Lisa Cacho’s discussion of gang 
member as a racialized category in Social Death: Racialized Rightlessness and the Criminalization of the 
Unprotected (New York: New York University Press, 2012). 
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often violent and isolating conditions similar to T-Sep. They justified these policies and 
practices by portraying these prisoners as dangerous, as threats to both other prisoners 
and to institutional security because of their gender and sexual deviance. This chapter 
examines the history of this segregation, a history that shows that Sacramento County Jail 
administrators’ actions are consistent with the treatment of these prisoners over the past 
century. During the first half of the twentieth century, recommendations for segregation 
focused on protecting otherwise “normal” prisoners in the general population from 
sexually and gender deviant prisoners. To its advocates, segregation represented the only 
effective means of “controlling” gender nonconforming prisoners, stopping sex in 
prisons, and eliminating a major source of prison disorder and as necessary to keep 
gender and sexually deviant prisoners from corrupting or contaminating others. During 
the second half of the twentieth century, prison officials continued to segregate gender 
nonconforming prisoners, but they increasingly justified this action by claiming that 
segregation was for their protection from violence perpetrated by heterosexual, gender 
conforming prisoners. 
Today, trans and gender nonconforming prisoners are frequently segregated 
throughout the US for reasons directly and indirectly related to their trans status and 
gender expression, especially in men’s institutions. Like all prisoners, trans and gender 
nonconforming prisoners usually experience a number of different housing classifications 
throughout their incarceration, including general population. Housing is often 
complicated, quick to change, and arbitrary.16 Segregation can also take different forms, 
                                                
16 Describing New York City and state placement decisions, Gabriel Arkles explained, “frankly it didn’t 
make any sense to me. I can’t really say how they figured it out.” Gabriel Arkles, interview by author, 
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including protective custody, administrative segregation, and disciplinary segregation. 
While the former two classifications are not supposed to be punitive in nature, all three 
classifications frequently result in similar housing conditions and are sometimes housed 
in the same unit. Like at Sacramento County Jail, these housing classifications can 
involve extreme, prolonged isolation that can destroy a persons’ mental health. Prisoners 
in both disciplinary segregation and protective custody usually lose access to recreation 
and educational, vocational, and treatment programs. These programs are not only 
important to break up the isolation and boredom of incarceration but can be the only way 
that prisoners make money in order to buy basic necessities or to pay debts they owe 
because of their convictions. Not being able to participate in programs can also 
negatively affect a prisoner’s parole or conditional release, which means that segregated 
prisoners can end up incarcerated longer than they would have if they were not 
segregated.17 Another form of segregation is in units specifically designed for gay, gender 
                                                                                                                                            
August 12, 2013, Boston, MA, on file with author. Gender nonconforming and trans prisoners are rarely 
given serious input into their housing, and they are frequently placed in housing that they believe is not the 
safest option. Talking about his experiences advocating for clients incarcerated in New York state, Chase 
Strangio, a former staff attorney at the Sylvia Rivera Law Project and current attorney at the American 
Civil Liberties Union, explained that prison administrators “usually plac[ed trans people] in the exact 
opposite situation of what they wanted. Anyone who wanted to be in general population was almost always 
in involuntary protective custody. Anyone who wanted to be in protective custody was almost always in 
general population.” Chase Strangio, interview by author, August 20, 2013, New York, NY, on file with 
author. Similarly, Arkles explained, “Most of my clients whatever their gender identity, whatever the 
gender they were assigned at birth, got placed wherever they didn’t want to be.” Arkles, interview. While 
many prisoners prefer general population because they are not isolated, can build community with other 
prisoners, and can access official programs and underground economies, which they are cut off from in 
segregation, some prefer segregation because they view it as safer. However, when a trans or gender 
nonconforming prisoner is in general population, it is often very hard for them to access protective custody. 
Arkles, interview; Owen Daniel-McCarter, interview by author, September 5, 2013, Chicago, IL, on file 
with author. 
17 Chase Strangio and Z Gabriel Arkles, Sylvia Rivera Law Project written comments on the National 
Standards to Prevent, Detect, and Respond to Prison Rape, May 10, 2010; Sarah Bergen, et al., “Protecting 
Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Intersex, and Gender Nonconforming People from Sexual Abuse and 
Harassment In Correctional Settings: Comments Submitted in Response to National Standards to Prevent, 
Detect, and Respond to Prison Rape,” April 4, 2011, 
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nonconforming, and trans prisoners. Today these units only exist in a few institutions, 
primarily large city jails, but they seem to have been more common in the past.18 
                                                                                                                                            
http://transequality.org/PDFs/PREA_Comments_April_2011.pdf; Gabriel Arkles, “Safety and Solidarity 
across Gender Lines: Rethinking Segregation of Transgender People in Detention,” Temple Political and 
Civil Rights Law Review 18, no. 2 (Spring 2009). However, the conditions do vary greatly across and 
within departments of corrections. 
Not only can disciplinary and protective segregation have similar conditions, but they can sometimes 
overlap to keep trans and gender nonconforming prisoners in isolating conditions for prolonged periods. 
For example, Arkles and Williams both described an incarcerated Puerto Rican trans woman, who had 
initially been segregated for disciplinary reasons but had been kept in segregation “for her protection,” 
despite her protests, for over a decade. Williams explained that on paper the reasons for her needing 
protection had to do with a potential gang-related threat—another prisoner believed she was in a gang and 
had threatened her. Yet, Williams and Arkles both described the actual reasons as transphobia, and prior to 
the ten years in segregation and before there was any concern about gangs, she had been placed in isolation 
because she was trans. This woman and her advocates had tried to get her out of protective custody for 
years. Arkles, interview; Alisha Williams, interview by author, August 19, 2013, New York, NY, on file 
with author.  
Protective, administrative, and disciplinary segregation can also factor into security classification, and 
repeated segregation can lead to higher security classification. Maximum security placement also 
potentially makes prisoners more vulnerable to violence from both staff and other prisoners, at least in part 
because maximum security prisons tend to have more violently racist, homophobic, and transphobic 
institutional cultures. Both Daniel-McCarter, talking about Illinois, and Gabriel Arkles, talking about New 
York, said that most of their trans women clients were housed in maximum security facilities. Arkles, 
interview; Daniel-McCarter, interview. In addition, a study of trans women incarcerated in California found 
that they were more likely to be classified as needing the highest level of security, even while they were 
more likely to be convicted of a non-violent crime, in comparison to non-trans prisoners. Lori Sexton, 
Valerie Jenness, and Jennifer Sumner, “Where the Margins Meet: A Demographic Assessment of 
Transgender Inmates in Men’s Prisons,” Justice Quarterly 27, no. 6 (December 2010). 
18 The LA County Jail and San Francisco County Jail have units for house gay men and trans women 
together, and the Cook County Jail has a new unit specifically for trans women. Rikers Island also had a 
unit that was opened in the 1970s and closed in 2005. Gay, gender nonconforming, and trans prisoners in 
the California state system are frequently housed in the California Medical Facility at Vacaville. For 
discussion of the LA County Jail unit, see Russell K. Robinson, “Masculinity as Prison: Sexual Identity, 
Race, and Incarceration,” California Law Review 99 (2011); Sharon Dolovich, “Strategic Segregation in 
the Modern Prison,” American Criminal Law Review 48, no. 1 (2011); Sharon Dolovich, “Two Models of 
the Prison: Accidental Humanity and Hypermasculinity in the L.A. County Jail,” The Journal of Criminal 
Law & Criminality 102, no. 4 (2013). For a discussion of the Rikers Island unit, Benish A. Shah, “Lost in 
the Gender Maze: Placement of Transgender Inmates in the Prison System,” Journal of Race, Gender and 
Ethnicity 5, no. 1 (February 2010); Paul von Zielbauer, “New York Set to Close Jail Unit for Gays,” New 
York Times, December 30, 2005. For a discussion of the trans unit at Cook County Jail, Kate Sosin, “Cook 
County Jail Works on Transgender Policy,” Windy City Times, May 22, 2013, 
http://www.windycitymediagroup.com/lgbt/Cook-County-Jail-works-on-transgender-policies-/42906.html; 
Daniel-McCarter interview.  
In most cases, these units are in men’s facilities. One recent exception is the Fluvanna Correctional 
Center for Women in Virginia, a maximum security prison and the state’s largest women’s prison, which 
made headlines in 2009 when it was reported that prison administrators had created a segregation wing for 
gender nonconforming and lesbian prisoners. While ostensibly created to segregate lesbians, prison staff, 
who “derisively” named this unit the “butch wing,” targeted any prisoners who did not conform to feminine 
gender norms and subjected them to verbal harassment. “Virginia Women’s Prison Segregated Lesbians in 
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Prison officials often justify segregation by claiming that gender nonconforming 
and trans prisoners are vulnerable to violence from other prisoners and therefore need to 
be protected or that segregation is unrelated to their trans status. In practice, trans and 
gender nonconforming prisoners are segregated for a variety of reasons directly and 
indirectly related to their gender identities and expressions. Legal scholar Gabriel Arkles 
explains that “a lot of profiling goes on” within prisons that can lead to both 
administrative and disciplinary segregation; some, but not all, of which is obviously 
related to gender and sex.19 In many men’s and women’s facilities, prisoners are punished 
for being too feminine or too masculine. They are required to conform to the gender 
norms of a sex that they do not identify with and can be punished when they fail or refuse 
to comply. It is not uncommon for trans women and gender nonconforming people in 
men’s facilities to receive disciplinary tickets and punishment for offenses such as having 
contraband (like makeup or bras) or for “destroying state property” when they alter state-
                                                                                                                                            
‘Butch Wing,’” Fox News, June 10, 2009, http://www.foxnews.com/story/2009/06/10/virginia-women-
prison-segregated-lesbians-in-butch-wing; Arkles, “Safety and Solidarity across Gender Lines.” 
These units tend to be less isolating and less restrictive than other forms of protective custody, and 
prisoners often report that there is less violence in these units, largely because guards tend to be less 
homophobic and transphobic. Nevertheless, violence still happens, both perpetrated by prisoners and 
guards and programming is often restricted, although not as severely as other forms of segregation. Many 
trans women seem to prefer these units because they tend to be safer and less restrictive than the 
alternatives, while others do not. Arkles, interview; Strangio, interview; Daniel-McCarter, interview. 
Arkles, “Safety and Solidarity across Gender Lines”; Cynthia Lea Ann, letter to the editor, GIC TIP 
Journal 1, no. 4 (Fall 2001). 
19 Arkles, interview. Trans and gender nonconforming prisoners can also be segregated for other reasons 
that are seemingly disconnected from their gender identity or expression, including because of mental 
illness, because prison officials believe they are in gangs or would be targets for gang violence, or because 
they were seen as participating in sex so often that they needed to be isolated. Arkles, interview; Daniel-
McCarter, interview. While not explicitly about their gender expression or trans status, these latter reasons 
are often deeply connected to prisoners’ gender, racial, and sexual identities and can be used as indirect 
justifications for segregating prisoners because they are trans. Alisha Williams, a staff attorney with the 
Sylvia Rivera Law Project, explains that prison staff often avoid officially justifying placement in 
protective custody based on a prisoners’ gender identity or trans status because it is much harder for a 
prisoner and their advocates to challenge their placement without an explicit justification related to their 
gender. Williams, interview. 
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issued clothing to make them more feminine. Trans men and gender nonconforming 
people in women’s facilities can be punished for refusing to wear skirts, for cutting their 
hair short, or for shaving or refusing to shave their facial hair. In both men’s and 
women’s facilities, trans and gender nonconforming prisoners are punished for sexual 
activity, which remains a disciplinary offense throughout the US, and many prison 
officials in men’s and women’s facilities target trans and gender nonconforming 
prisoners as hypersexual and more likely to engage in or initiate sexual activity. They are 
also punished for infractions such as insolence or physical altercations with another 
person when they try to protect themselves from violence and harassment. Like all 
prisoners, trans and gender nonconforming prisoners live in conditions that render 
behaviors that are considered normal in the outside world criminal and punishable. 
Because they are constructed as sexually and gender deviant, they are targeted for 
punishment for particular kinds of “infractions,” such as having sex or wearing makeup. 
Moreover, because the vast majority of trans and gender nonconforming prisoners are 
people of color, constructions of racialized deviance and criminality compound their 
perceived sexual and gender dangerousness, including being viewed as sexually 
excessive or threatening, unruly, potentially violent, and disrespectful or insolent, which 
puts them at even greater risk for being targeted for disciplinary segregation.20 While this 
profiling can lead to disciplinary segregation, trans and gender nonconforming prisoners 
and their advocates emphasize that administrative segregation and protective custody are 
                                                
20 Arkles, “Safety and Solidarity across Gender Lines;” Arkles, interview; Daniel-McCarter, interview; 
Jody Marksamer, testimony to National Prison Rape Elimination Commission’s hearing At Risk: Sexual 
Abuse and Vulnerable Groups Behind Bars, San Francisco, CA, August 19, 2005. 
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also violent and punitive.21 In other words, while the practice of segregation can be messy 
and inconsistent, it generally conforms to a punitive logic.  
I argue that the seeming dissonance between official justifications for segregation 
(to protect trans and gender nonconforming prisoners) and their punitive and violent 
practices can be explained by looking at the systematic segregation of gender 
nonconforming prisoners in the early and mid-twentieth century, which reveals the 
punitive and violent roots of purportedly “protective” housing. As I’ve argued, the 
modern prison system was built on an edifice of organizational and management 
practices grounded in (racialized) sexual difference. Sexual ambiguity shakes this edifice. 
Security—the primary mission of penal management—is centrally focused on prison 
administrators’ ability to maintain order and control over prisoners, not only their actions 
or behaviors but also classificatory or administrative control. Gender nonconforming and 
trans prisoners often exceed their (gender normative, sexually binary) classificatory 
system, creating administrative disorder, which many prison administrators inextricably 
link to the creation of physical (sexual) disorder. Thus, these prisoners become threats to 
institutional security, or queerly dangerous, and segregation is used to control and punish 
this disorder. By historicizing current practices of segregation, I argue that the logics of 
queer dangerousness that constructed gender nonconforming prisoners as a security threat 
and in need of punishment and isolation were the foundation for segregation throughout 
                                                
21 Valjean Royal, Written testimony to the National Prison Rape Elimination Commission, Black and Pink 
Newsletter (June 2010); Kim Shayo Buchanan, “Our Prisons, Ourselves: Race, Gender and the Rule of 
Law,” Yale Law and Policy Review 29, no 1 (2010); Daley, Written Testimony; Arkles, “Safety and 
Solidarity across Gender Lines”; Stories from the Inside: Prisoner Rape and the War on Drugs (Los 
Angeles: Stop Prisoner Rape, 2007); “Eyeman Arizona Sister,” GIC TIP Journal 3, no. 1 (Winter 2002); 
Strangio and Arkles, Sylvia Rivera Law Project written comments; Arkles, interview; Daniel-McCarter, 
interview. See also the Chapter 3. 
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the twentieth century and continue to inform current segregation practices. The threat of 
queer dangerousness facilitates and justifies the violent and isolating conditions that trans 
and gender nonconforming prisoners often experience in segregation, turning protection 
into punishment.  
 
Isolating Queerness 
Since the modern prison system’s creation in the nineteenth century, segregation 
and solitary confinement have been important tools of control for jail and prison 
administrators. In the earliest prisons, segregation was thought to be an central aspect of 
rehabilitation, forcing prisoners to reflect on their behavior, hopefully leading to remorse 
and change or at least breaking their spirit and making them docile and submissive. Over 
the course of the nineteenth century, researchers began to notice that solitary conditions 
broke prisoners in ways that made them lose their mental and physical health, and 
solitary confinement lost favor as a tool for rehabilitation. This change, coupled with the 
demands of a growing prison population, led prison administrators to reserve segregation 
and solitary confinement for only the most troublesome prisoners, transforming a practice 
that was originally for correction to a tool for punishment and containment of particularly 
threatening types of prisoners.22  
In the early twentieth century, some prison and jail administrators began to target 
gender nonconforming and homosexual prisoners for segregation. This segregation was 
first documented in New York City men’s jails and penitentiaries in the 1910s when 
                                                
22 Caleb Smith, The Prison and the American Imagination (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009); 
Joan Dayan, “Legal Slaves and Civil Bodies,” in Materializing Democracy, ed. Russ Castronovo and Dana 
D. Nelson (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002). 
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some homosexual prisoners were segregated in a cellblock called “the Annex” in the 
New York City House of Detention.23 The practice spread throughout the US over the 
next few decades, and by the 1930s, segregation of homosexual prisoners was becoming 
a common practice in many US men’s jails and prisons.24 In 1934, Joseph Fishman, who 
was the nation’s first and only federal inspector of prisons, claimed that every major 
men’s penitentiary tried to segregate homosexuals from the general population.25 Some 
prisons and jails, like the NYC House of Detention, created separate homosexual units; 
others placed homosexual and gender nonconforming prisoners in other isolating housing 
including maximum security or disciplinary segregation units.  
While prison administrators and researchers had expressed anxiety about sex 
between prisoners long before the 1910s, they viewed deviant sexuality as a product of 
the abnormal conditions of prisons, as something any prisoner could potentially engage 
                                                
23 It is possible that sexually and gender deviant prisoners were segregated earlier either in New York City 
or elsewhere, but I have not found evidence of it. Perry M. Lichtenstein, “The ‘Fairy’ and the Lady Lover,” 
Medical Review of Reviews 27 (August 1921); George Chauncey, Gay New York: Gender, Urban Culture, 
and the Making of the Gay Male World 189-1940 (New York: BasicBooks, 1994).  
Perry Lichtenstein described the type of homosexuals who were segregated in the Annex as gender 
nonconforming: “In every respect they resembled the female. The names they used in calling one another 
were feminine…They had a typical feminine walk. One of these prisoners was taken with indigestion, and 
when I questioned him as to the cause of his ailment, one of the others suggested that he was probably 
having his period. They all wore bow ties, some of which were brightly colored. They invited the keepers 
and myself to their ‘rooms,’ and were not at all insulted when one of the trustees called them ‘fags.’ Many 
of these unfortunates are diseased and may readily infect others.” Lichtenstein, “The ‘Fairy’ and the Lady 
Lover,” 370. 
24 Regina Kunzel, Criminal Intimacy: Prison and the Uneven History of Modern American Sexuality 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008), 62. Throughout this chapter, I pay little attention to regional 
differences or specificities. While the segregation of homosexual, gender nonconforming, and transgender 
prisoners, especially in the early and mid-twentieth century, seems to have been pioneered in New York 
City and state and California, there is evidence of this segregation in most other parts of the country, 
including the Midwest. The exception to this is the South. A large portion of my historical research relies 
on prison memoirs and research, very little of which was written about the South, which had a very 
different looking penal system during the early and into the mid-twentieth century. The literature that does 
mention the South never mentions homosexuality or gender nonconformity. I, therefore, do not have 
evidence that gender nonconforming people were segregated nor do I have evidence that they were not 
segregated.  
25 Joseph Fulling Fishman, Sex in Prison: Revealing Sex Conditions in American Prisons (National Library 
Press, 1934). 
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in.26 This belief that any prisoner could engage in “perversions” reflected dominant 
understandings of sexuality at the time, which viewed same-sex sexuality as deviant, 
pathological, and/or sinful acts but not as indicating anything about the inherent nature of 
the person. As I discussed in the previous chapter, in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, ideas about sex and sexuality began to shift. During this time, 
sexologists developed a new taxonomy of sexual types and argued that people who 
engaged in same-sex sexuality constituted a distinct type of person: variously termed the 
homosexual, the pervert, or the invert. According to sexologists, the homosexual’s same-
sex desire was an inherent part of their person—inborn or “natural,” if also pathological, 
defective, and even criminal. Early constructions of homosexuality not only described a 
person’s sexual desire but also their gender. Same-sex desire was believed to be part of or 
even the consequence of the larger problem of “sex inversion;” homosexual men had 
feminine or female souls and homosexual women had masculine or male souls. This 
construction of sex inversion deeply and inextricably tied together same-sex sexuality 
and gender nonconformity.27  
As historian Regina Kunzel has shown, these new articulations of sexual/gender 
types deeply influenced penologists, who in turn influenced prison administrators, who 
used this knowledge to alter prison space in various ways, including instituting new 
                                                
26 Kunzel, Criminal Intimacy. 
27 See for example, Havelock Ellis and John Addington Symonds, Sexual Inversion (New York: Arno 
Press, 1975 [1897]); Richard von Krafft-Ebing, Psychopathia Sexualis (New York: Bell Publishing 
Company, 1965 [1894]); Magnus Hirschfeld, The Homosexuality of Men and Women (New York: 
Prometheus Books, 2000 [1922]). See also Jennifer Terry, An American Obsession: Science, Medicine, and 
Homosexuality in Modern Society (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1999); Kunzel, Criminal 
Intimacy. 
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segregation policies.28 In other words, the development of segregation was tied to the 
construction of modern notions of homosexuality. The key to segregation was the 
development of a (sexually) deviant type of person to identify and remove from the 
general population. By the early twentieth century, prison observers identified prisons as 
“sites in which perverts could be found in abundance,” which caused them great anxiety 
and led to segregation.29  
Reflecting and informing sexological and popular understandings, prison officials 
described and treated homosexuality and gender nonconformity as criminal, dangerous, 
destructive, contaminating, and immoral. They viewed isolation as the only way to keep 
otherwise normal prisoners safe from homosexual and gender nonconforming prisoners. 
Throughout most of the US, gender nonconforming homosexuals in many men’s 
institutions were kept in separate cellblocks or wings, and they generally ate and worked 
by themselves, usually working in the laundry because it was considered women’s work. 
In a few cases, departments of corrections attempted to segregate homosexual prisoners 
in a specific facility in order to rid entire institutions of them. As early as the mid-1910s, 
the New York State Department of Corrections assigned “perverts” to Clinton Prison 
because, according to the New York Prison Association, “they usually required a rigid 
form of discipline and close supervision.”30 By the mid-twentieth century, the Federal 
Bureau of Prisons placed all known homosexual prisoners at the Medical Center at 
                                                
28 Kunzel also argues that prison administrators and penologists helped construct modern sexuality, not just 
inside prison walls but also outside them. Kunzel, Criminal Intimacy. 
29 Ibid., 48.  
30 Ibid., quoted on 62. 
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Springfield, Missouri.31 Beginning in the 1950s, the California Department of Correction 
mandated that all homosexual prisoners in the California system should be transferred to 
Soledad Prison’s Wing Z.32 For many prison administrators, total segregation—no 
contact between “normal” and gender/sexual deviant prisoners—was the aim.33 
The original rationale and practical implementation of segregation were also 
clearly punitive.34 Sex was a disciplinary offense in all penal institutions throughout the 
twentieth century.35 While the systematic segregation of homosexuals was linked to this 
designation of (homo)sex as a disciplinary infraction, the practice went beyond this to 
target a specific type of person believed to be most likely to engage in or illicit the desire 
                                                
31 John Bartlow Martin, Break Down the Walls: American Prisons: Present, Past, and Future (New York: 
Ballantine Books, 1954); Charles E. Smith, “The Homosexual Federal Offender: A Study of 100 Cases,” 
Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science 44 (1954); Charles E. Smith, “Some Problems in 
Dealing with Homosexuals in the Prison Situation,” Journal of Social Therapy 2 (1956). 
32 Richard A. McGee to All Institutions, “Transfer of Homosexuals and Potential Homosexuals,” July 16, 
1954, Folder: California Medical Facility, 1954-64, Kinsey Era Correspondence Collection, Kinsey 
Institute Library and Special Collections, Indiana University. 
33 For example, describing the segregation at New York City’s penitentiary on Welfare Island, Samuel 
Kahn, who was a psychiatrist at the penitentiary in the early twentieth century, explained that prison 
officials attempted to ensure “that there shall be no chance for the homosexuals to mingle with the 
nonhomosexuals.” Samuel Kahn, Mentality and Homosexuality (Boston: Meador Publishing Company, 
1937), 24. See also, Louis Berg, Revelations of a Prison Doctor (New York: Minton, Balch & Company, 
1934); Fishman, Sex in Prison. 
34 Joan W. Howarth points out that segregation was also justified with a therapeutic rational. Joan W. 
Howarth, “The Rights of Gay Prisoners: A Challenge to Protective Custody,” Southern California Law 
Review 53 (1980). Indeed, throughout most of the twentieth century, most correctional and social scientific 
literature characterized homosexuality as a psychological or medical problem. See Terry, An American 
Obsession. One manifestation of this “therapeutic” rationale was that homosexual, trans, and gender 
nonconforming prisoners were and are sometimes segregated in medical wings of institutions or in the 
system’s security hospital. For example, once the California Medical Facility at Vacaville was opened in 
1955, the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation segregated gender nonconforming and 
homosexual prisoners there. Over the next few decades, Vacaville became known as the prison with a large 
trans and gay population. A report by Join Hands in 1974 describes the segregated unit at Vacaville as 
exclusively for “flamboyant homosexuals,” mainly drag queens or pre-op transsexuals. A00494 Join Hands 
– San Francisco, 6/18/74. International Gay Information Center collection – (Audiovisual Materials), New 
York Public Library, New York, NY. See also Edwin Johnson, “The Homosexual in Prison,” Social Theory 
and Practice 1, no. 4 (1971). 
35 Kunzel, Criminal Intimacy. The American Correctional Association’s 1954 Manual of Correctional 
Standards designates “sex perversion” in a short list of necessary disciplinary offenses, alongside larceny 
and assault. Manual of Correctional Standards (New York: The American Correctional Association, 1954). 
Sexual activity continues to be a disciplinary offense in most, if not all, jails and prisons in the US. 
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to engage in sex. Instead of marking all people who engaged in sex in prisons as 
dangerous and needing isolation, the practice marked only a specific subset of this group, 
one usually identified by their gender nonconformity. 
In practice and rhetoric, prison officials targeted gender nonconforming prisoners 
for segregation. While institutions relied on a number of tactics to identify homosexuals, 
including disciplinary reports regarding sexual activity, psychological examinations, and 
criminal and social histories, most institutions “rel[ied] upon dress, mannerisms, and the 
stereotyped manner of speech as their diagnostic tool.”36 In other words, they relied on 
some display of gender nonconformity. For example, in 1954, Richard McGee, who was 
the first director of the California Department of Corrections, sent a memo mandating 
that “inmates who have homosexual tendencies” in the California system should be 
transferred to Soledad Prison’s Wing Z. McGee specifically singled out “inmates who 
have definite effeminate characteristics and/or who consistently play the feminine role in 
sex relationships” as those prisoners who should be segregated.37 McGee’s mandate 
                                                
36 Richard W. Nice, “The Problem of Homosexuality in Corrections,” American Journal of Correction 28 
(June 1966): 31.  
37 While McGee did not specify that he is talking about men’s prisons and prisoner classified as male, he 
was clearly only concerned with these prisoners. He never mentioned women’s prisons or female prisoners, 
nor did he mention masculinity as problematic. This absence reflected the anxieties of the time period, 
which focused on men’s prisons. McGee, “Transfer of Homosexuals and Potential Homosexuals.”  
Homosexuality and the segregation of homosexuals would remain important administrative concerns 
for California prison administrators throughout the 1950s. In the late 1950s, the department held a 
Departmental Management and Clinical Seminar on Homosexuality, after which administrators appointed a 
Special Committee on Homosexuality to address the “problem” of homosexuality in men’s institutions and 
develop a long-term “plan for handling the male homosexual to include Departmental placement, control 
and treatment.” Final Report of the Special Committee Regarding Homosexuality (State of California 
Department of Corrections, June 15, 1959), Corrections Administration – Reports and Studies – 
Homosexuality, 1959, F3717: 1692, Department of Corrections Records, California State Archives. The 
committee seemed to be tasked specifically with addressing the segregation of homosexuality and 
recommending best practices for that segregation. See also, John P. Conrad (Supervisor of Inmate 
Classification) to Milton Burdman (Chief Classification and Treatment Division), “Report of Special 
Committee on Homosexuality” (December 29, 1959), Corrections Administration – Reports and Studies – 
Homosexuality, 1959, F3717: 1692, Department of Corrections Records, California State Archives. 
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reflected the common practice at the time: most of the “known homosexuals” who were 
segregated were “known” because of their gender nonconformity, reflecting dominant 
understandings of sex inversion.38 Put another way, prison administrators viewed gender 
nonconformity as an act of homosexuality (and, by extension, homosexuality as an act of 
gender nonconformity). For example, in a 1959 report by the Special Committee 
Regarding Homosexuals, California prison administrators described that their policy for 
many years had been to segregate “all homosexuals whose conduct involves the 
assumption of the female role in institutional settings.” Explaining that they did not 
segregate those who might have “a homosexual orientation” but who were “sufficiently 
able to control their conduct that they do not become involved in overt acts,” 
administrators framed femininity among a male-classified population was an “overt act” 
of homosexuality.39 Elsewhere they explain that segregation was “the predominant 
method of managing the troublesome homosexual within the correctional setting.”40 
Prison administrators, therefore, understood femininity as “an overt act” of 
homosexuality as a problem for institutional management. This troublesome gender 
nonconformity included a wide variety of gender expressions, from men with slightly 
effeminate mannerisms or speech patterns who were otherwise masculine and gender 
conforming to male-assigned people who dressed, acted, and looked female and clearly 
                                                
38 By the 1950s, same-sex desire and gender nonconforming had begun to disaggregate in sexological, 
medical, and popular understandings. While “inversion” was no longer the dominant model of 
homosexuality, same-sex desire and gender nonconformity continued to be strongly linked, especially 
within penal institutions.  
39 Final Report of the Special Committee Regarding Homosexuality, 2. 
40 Ibid., 5. In their recommendations, they further explain that only those groups of homosexuals who 
“present severe problems to management of the institution should be segregated.” They identified these 
groups as: “Inmates who request segregation if such requests are supported by documentation and/or 
clinical findings,” “those with obviously provocative effeminate mannerisms,” and “those who have been 
specifically recommended by staff for homosexual segregation.” Ibid., 5.
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articulated a female identity. Prisoners who were aggressive, masculine, and only took 
the role of the “man” in sex were generally not considered true homosexuals and seemed 
not to be segregated as often, particularly in the first half of the twentieth century.41 
Therefore, while not all segregated homosexuals were feminine or gender 
nonconforming, the vast majority were. 
Because of the targeting of gender nonconforming prisoners, segregation practices 
and policies exceeded a state interest in ending (homo)sexual activity in penal institutions 
and isolating those who participated in it. The disciplining of gender—more specifically 
the isolation and punishment of gender nonconformity and cross-gender identification, 
which decades later would often be called transgender or transsexuality—was central to 
the systematic segregation of homosexual prisoners. As segregation practices and policies 
were formed, articulated, and justified, they helped construct and reinforce the dominant 
view that gender nonconformity was abnormal, dangerous, and in need of containment 
and punishment, which also dehumanized gender nonconforming prisoners, further 
justifying their isolation and often violent segregation. 
As they justified this segregation, prison administrators and researchers described 
gender nonconformity as not only a threat to other prisoners but also a threat to the 
security of the institution as a whole. By the early twentieth century, many prison 
administrators and researchers described gender and sexual nonnormativity as a central 
problem contributing to disorder and challenging security. By the mid-twentieth century, 
this “threat” was clearly articulated in correctional standards. For example, in the 1954 
                                                
41 These men were often considered “situational homosexual.” In other words, men who were pushed into 
homosexuality by their abnormal single sex environment. See Kunzel, Criminal Intimacy; Terry, An 
American Obsession.  
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edition of their Manual of Correctional Standards, the American Correctional 
Association designated homosexual prisoners as “a serious problem,” who should be 
“segregated immediately, promptly and completely from other inmates in the jail. The 
jailer should be under no illusions about the homosexual or a sex deviate. Complete 
isolation and at least segregation from other prisoners is the only method by which they 
may be rendered harmless within the jail.”42 As prison administrators and researchers 
continued to link sexual and gender nonconformity well into the second half of the 
twentieth century, this “security threat” that homosexuals posed was deeply rooted in 
anxieties about both sexual and gender deviance.  
Administrators and researchers expressed serious concerns about the supposed 
physical dangers of homosexuality, including homosexual assault and rape, violence over 
sexual frustration, competition, and spurned advances, and potential venereal disease 
infection. Many claimed that a significant percentage, if not most, of the violence 
between prisoners was because of sex. Clinton Duffy, who was warden of California’s 
San Quentin Prison from 1940 to 1952, called homosexuality “a nightmare for years” in 
San Quentin. Before he became warden, homosexuals were not segregated. He claims 
that they “fomented more violence, engaged in more feuds, and perhaps cost more lives 
than all other prisoners put together. In the old days most of the fights which drew shots 
from the gun towers had arisen over what are known in prison parlance as ‘queens.’”43 In 
                                                
42 Manual of Correctional Standards, 116. 
43 Clinton T. Duffy, The San Quentin Story (New York: Doubleday, 1950), 150. This hyperbolic rhetoric 
continued well into the latter half of the twentieth century. For example, Ellis C. MacDougall, the 
commissioner of the Connecticut DOC in the 1970s, explained that homosexuals “are actually running” 
penal institutions. Carl Weiss and David James Friar, Terror in the Prisons: Homosexual Rape and Why 
Society Condones It (Indianapolis, IN: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1974), quoted on 163. He claimed that 
80-90% of murders are “a result of homosexual situations.” Ibid, 163. 
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his memoir, Duffy explained that having witnessed this dynamic while he was an 
assistant to a previous warden, he “naturally” was convinced that homosexuals “needed 
special attention.”44 Within a year or two of becoming warden, he instituted a policy of 
segregating homosexual prisoners.  
While Duffy seemed to mark all homosexuals as problems, no matter their gender 
expression, he specifically mentioned “queens,” who were homosexuals both inside and 
outside prison and who were usually gender nonconforming and sometimes cross-gender-
identified, as those who incite violence. Like Duffy, early-twentieth-century prison 
administrators and researchers focused most of their attention on the supposed dangers of 
feminine prisoners, not because they actively perpetrated violence, which in few cases 
they did; in fact, like gender nonconforming and trans prisoners today, they were more 
likely to be the victims of violence.45 Instead, prison officials and researchers believed 
                                                
44 Duffy, The San Quentin Story, 150. 
45 In fact, researchers and officials frequently acknowledged that the people who perpetrated almost all the 
(homosexuality-related) violence were gender conforming, masculine, and usually heterosexual (although 
often labeled “situational homosexuals”). Despite this acknowledgement—which was often implicit rather 
than explicit or at least buried within a great deal of anxiety about homosexuality—administrators and 
researchers placed much less emphasis on their segregation than gender nonconforming prisoners’ 
segregation, unless it was as a (temporary) punishment.  
While these gender conforming male prisoners were pathologized and considered perverse and 
dangerous, many writers extended some sympathy to them because it was assumed that their need for sex 
was a fundamental part of manhood and therefore they were almost forced into perverted sexual practices 
by both the abnormal conditions of incarceration and the temptations of the femininity of the queens and, to 
a lesser extent, other less masculine, often younger prisoners, often called “punks.” Masculine male 
prisoners, who engaged in sexual activity, were considered dangerous because they deployed violence that 
could cause problems for the prison administration (but, importantly, this was a masculine violence) and 
because they forced some otherwise “normal” men to submit to sex, thereby feminizing and perverting 
them. For many writers, however, the most dangerous and perverse prisoners were the gender 
nonconforming prisoners. 
A few social scientists believed that gender conforming prisoners who engaged in same-sex sexuality 
were actually more dangerous because they “mask[ed] their abnormal inclinations under a cloak of 
outwardly normal behavior” and were therefore harder to spot and control. Joseph G. Wilson, Are Prisons 
Necessary? (Philadelphia: Dorrance and Company Publishers, 1950), 201. As I will discuss, by the 1950s 
and 1960s, more researchers focused on the danger of aggressive masculine homosexuals, which partially 
reflects the ways that definitions of homosexuality outside prisons changed over time. By the second half of 
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that their femininity elicited strong desire and inflamed the violent passions and 
jealousies of some masculine prisoners. For example, in his 1951 study of sex in prisons, 
psychologist and popular author Robert Lindner dramatically claimed that the “feminine-
type homosexuals” become “a storm-center, a veritable vortex of sex disquiet” and often 
left “a trail of blood and cracked heads along with broken hearts.”46  
Many prison officials and researchers expressed concerns that the presence of 
gender nonconforming people was “a serious menace to discipline” and could “impair the 
general welfare of the whole prison population.”47 Their queer dangerousness manifested 
in a number of ways. First, officials and researchers argued that the mere presence of 
desirable (queer) femininity incited violence as other prisoners fought over them. 
Officials and researchers also frequently complained that gender nonconforming 
prisoners would manipulate other prisoners in order to intentionally cause violence and 
disorder, describing gender nonconforming prisoners as treacherous, untrustworthy, and 
reveling in the violence that they supposedly caused.48 In doing so, they described gender 
nonconforming prisoners’ queer dangerousness using feminized rhetoric. Rarely claiming 
that they physically participated in the fights (that was the province of masculine male 
                                                                                                                                            
the twentieth century, scientific, medical and even popular models of homosexuality separated same-sex 
desire from gender nonconformity, and therefore some social scientists began to mark masculine prisoners 
who engaged in same-sex sexuality as also fundamentally homosexual. Nevertheless, through the mid-
twentieth century, most discussions of the dangers of homosexuality focused on gender nonconforming 
prisoners. 
46 Robert M. Lindner, “Sex in Prison,” Complex 6 (1951): 10-11. 
47 Fishman Sex in Prison, 69; Smith, “The Homosexual Federal Offender.” 
48 One major concern was sex work, which was linked to excessive sexuality, untrustworthiness, and 
violence. Many prison administrators and researchers believed that homosexuals were very likely to engage 
in sex work of some kind. For example, in describing how some “fags” engaged in sex work, Leo Carroll 
explained, “The common knowledge that ‘fags’ are treacherous in this manner further crowds the 
relationship with mistrust and suspicion, adding to its instability.” Leo Carroll, Hacks, Blacks, and Cons: 
Race Relations in a Maximum Security Prison (Lexington: D.C. Heath and Co., 1974), 79. 
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prisoners), officials and researchers claimed they intentionally manipulated men through 
their promiscuous sexuality in order to create violent chaos within prisons and jails. 
Finally, administrators and researchers often described the dangers of queer 
sexuality and gender as “contaminating,” “contagious,” and “invidious.”49 In their 1954 
edition of the Manual of Correctional Standards, the American Correctional Association 
strongly urged prison and jail administrators to segregate “sex deviated from normal 
inmates” in order to “prevent moral contamination…[and] custody risks.”50 They 
advocated their confinement in closed custody units, which are an institution’s “most 
secure housing units” and in which they can be “under constant supervision.”51 The 1964 
Jail Practices and Procedures Manual, published by the California State Peace Officers 
Association, used similar language, stating that “overt homosexuals,” who could usually 
be picked out by their mannerisms, “should be segregated in a separate part of the 
institution where there will be no opportunity to contaminate other prisoners.”52  
While administrators and researchers were concerned that otherwise sexually 
normal prisoners would be drawn into participating in queer sexuality because of the 
allure of queer femininity in the ostensibly sex-segregated male prison environment, 
thereby being contaminated and sexually perverted, they also frequently expressed 
concern beyond the sexual. This queerness was potentially morally and psychologically 
corrupting, leading to further criminality and immorality. As Louis Berg explained in 
                                                
49 Joseph G. Wilson and Michael James Pescor, Problems in Prison Psychiatry (Caxton Printers, 1939), 
199. See also Victor Folke Nelson, Prison Days and Nights (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1933); 
Martin, Break Down the Walls; Fishman, Sex in Prison. See also, Kunzel, Criminal Intimacy. 
50 Manual of Correctional Standards, 177. 
51 Ibid., 199. 
52 Howarth, “The Rights of Gay Prisoners,” quoted on 1232.  
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1934, “the homosexual” was a “menace…to general prison morality.”53 Of course, 
prisons were not considered particularly moral places, which was part of the problem. 
The danger of this queer contamination was heightened because of the setting in which it 
existed, or more specifically because the supposedly “normal” prisoners that could be 
contaminated were not really normal at all. They were “criminals,” abnormal in their 
behaviors, their inclinations, and even their very constitution. Because prisoners are 
already queered, they were considered particularly ripe for sexual and gender queer 
contamination. They were, as Berg explained, “a ready source for pollution to a soil eager 
for the seed of abnormality.”54 In other words, total segregation was the only way that 
prison officials could prevent queer contamination in a site prone to moral contamination, 
which they feared could permanently pervert otherwise “normal” prisoners, leading to 
violence and disorder in penal institutions as well as danger to outside communities.55 
For researchers and administrators describing women’s institutions in the early 
twentieth century, queer sexuality produced a racial anxiety. While only a handful of 
                                                
53 Berg, Revelations of a Prison Doctor, 163. 
54 Ibid., 140-41. See, also, Kunzel’s discussion of the prison’s “apparent queering affects.” Kunzel, 
Criminal Intimacy, 14. 
55 See for example, Fishman, Sex in Prison; Nelson, Prison Days and Nights; Benjamin Karpman, “Sex 
Life in Prison,” Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology, and Police Science 38 (February 1948); Roger S. 
Mitchell, The Homosexual and the Law (New York: Arco Publishing, 1969); Justin K. Fuller, “Medical 
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the New York City House of Detention for Women (New York: E.P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1967). 
Interestingly, none of the officials and researchers describing men’s institutions expressed an explicit 
concern that queer contamination would cause gender nonconformity in other prisoners. The only prison 
writer I found who mentioned this expressed this concern only in relation to women’s institution, claiming 
that in the Woman’s Workhouse in New York City many women learn the “art” of “taking the part of a 
man,” including dressing like a man and living with a woman. Kahn, Mentality and Homosexuality, 124. 
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articles by researchers and books by prison administrators addressing women’s 
institutions were published before the 1960s, most of them focused on what they saw as 
the rampant “perversion” of black and white women engaging in interracial sexual 
relationships. Black women were often described as sexual aggressors, as sometimes 
“excit[ing] the white girls into perverted behavior,” and as usually taking the masculine 
role in relationships with white women.56 Writers argued that racial difference took “the 
place of difference in sex” and that white women interpreted black women’s dominance 
and sexual knowledge as “maleness.”57 As historian Estelle Freedman explained, this 
literature racialized the sexual pathology of inversion, often blaming black women for 
homosexuality and the sexual perversion of white women. This construction of racialized 
queer sexuality in women’s institutions confirmed the contemporary belief that black 
women were unable to conform to proper femininity and exhibited greater criminality, 
which was linked to their supposedly innate aggression, sexual excess, and gender 
nonnormativity.58 This interracial queer sexuality led some institutions to racially 
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segregate prisoners. So, in some women’s institutions, racial segregation became a proxy 
for the segregation of gender and sexual deviance.59  
Segregation of homosexuals and gender nonconforming prisoners was rare in 
women’s institutions throughout the twentieth century. I found no documented evidence 
showing that administrators in women’s institutions created separate cellblocks or wings 
for lesbians and gender nonconforming prisoners prior to the 1960s. However, at least 
one prison administrator, Florence Monahan, who headed a number of female penal 
institutions in the early twentieth century, reported that she tried to segregate “the 
[sexually] abnormally inclined from the normal” because of the danger of “permanent 
injury both physically and psychologically.”60 While her reasoning echoed the anxiety of 
administrators of men’s institutions, Monahan was an outlier in her call for segregating 
homosexual prisoners in women’s institutions before the 1960s. Most administrators and 
researchers in the first half of the twentieth century viewed homosexuality as less 
corrupting and dangerous, more temporary and also more rampant in women’s 
institutions than men’s. For most, it was more easily dismissed but also much more 
difficult to control because it was so common. The exception to this largely dismissive 
attitude was interracial relationships, which included the added concern of racial 
                                                
59 In contrast, before the late 1960s, writers discussing men’s prisons rarely mentioned race. In keeping 
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corruption, which heightened concerns about sexual corruption.61 Indeed, Monahan 
echoed these concerns as she noted that her “biggest difficulty” was with interracial 
relationships, which she addressed by racially segregating prisoners.62  
By the 1950s and 1960s, more administrators and researchers began to discuss 
sexual and gender deviance in women’s institutions in similar language as writing on 
men’s institutions. While some writers continued to express concern about interracial 
relationships and racialized sexual/gender deviance, most adopted the race-neutral 
language that writers discussing men’s prisons had long used. This new generation of 
writers expressed concern about sexual perverts corrupting younger, innocent girls. Like 
in men’s institutions, his corruption was not only sexual but also moral; it could lead to 
the creation of more hardened criminals and to recidivism.63 In 1956, social worker 
Katharine Sullivan explained that homosexuality in women’s prisons “is widespread and 
an extremely serious moral and administrative problem.”64 In 1950, psychiatrist Joseph 
G. Wilson even recommended “strict segregation” for lesbians so that they “cannot 
corrupt others.”65 A few writers echoed some of the dramatic language used in earlier 
writings on men’s institutions, arguing that lesbianism and gender nonconformity caused 
violence, murder, and even “mayhem.”66 Nevertheless, the anxiety about gender and 
                                                
61 In her reading of this literature, Kunzel similarly notes that intraracial relationships remained largely 
invisible to researchers because they probably viewed them as friendships or as benign. Kunzel, Criminal 
Intimacy. 
62 Monahan, Women in Crime, 224. 
63 See Frank Samuel Caprio, Female Homosexuality: A Psychodynamic Study of Lesbianism (New York: 
The Citadel Press, 1954); Frederick S. Baldi, My Unwelcome Guests (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott 
Company, 1959); Russ Trainer, Prison: School for Lesbians (Van Nuys, CA: Triumph News Company, 
1968); Wilson, Are Prisons Necessary?; Sullivan, Girls on Parole; Harris, Hellhole. 
64 Sullivan, Girls on Parole, 123. 
65 Wilson, Are Prisons Necessary?, 219.  
66 Trainer, Prison, 8. See also Harris, Hellhole. 
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sexual deviance in women’s institutions was never as urgent and consistent nor was the 
rhetoric as dramatic and condemnatory as in men’s institutions. This difference in 
rhetoric reflected assumptions about the inherently sexually different natures of women 
and men. Administrators and researchers believed that women were less violent, more 
docile, and more easily controlled in general. Even when writers discussed violence in 
women’s institutions, they rarely claimed that homosexuality led to widespread disorder, 
chaos, and murder, like it could in men’s prisons.  
By the late 1960s, at least one women’s institution segregated lesbian and gender 
nonconforming prisoners in a similar manner as many men’s institutions. Following an 
incident in 1965 in which a lesbian attacked another woman, the Sybil Brand Institute, a 
women’s county jail in Los Angeles, created the “Daddy Tank,” a maximum security 
wing where they placed lesbian and masculine prisoners. Women were segregated if they 
admitted to being a lesbian, if they were the aggressor in a known sexual encounter or 
relationship (apparently the “passive” partner was not segregated), or if they were 
masculine or otherwise gender nonconforming. If a person arrived at the jail in men’s 
clothing, prison officials would automatically place them in the Daddy Tank. Reports 
indicate that most people in the unit were gender nonconforming. Jail officials claimed 
that segregation was necessary both for the protection of others from lesbians as well as 
for the protections of the lesbians themselves.67 However, a writer for Lesbian Tide 
argued that jail officials assumed that lesbians had to be segregated because they believed 
                                                
67 “No Touching, No Human Contact—In Cell Block 4200” Lesbian Tide 6, no. 3 (Nov/Dec 1976); Jeanne 
Cordova, “Prison Reform—New Freedoms for Daddy-Tanked Lesbians” Lesbian Tide 6, no. 5 
(March/April 1977); Kelly, “Cell Block 4200” Lesbian Tide 1, no 10 (May 1972), LGBT Periodical 
Collection, New York Public Library. 
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that lesbians would “automatically prey upon other inmates, offending them and 
disrupting the institution.”68 
As prison administrators created and institutionalized policies and practices of 
systematic segregation of homosexual and gender nonconforming people, they also 
created and institutionalized a punitive relationship between penal institutions and this 
“type” of prisoner, which continues to inform current policies and practices. Penal 
administrators in the first half of the twentieth century constructed homosexuality and 
gender nonconformity as dangerous and threatening to institutional security and as 
contrary to rehabilitation. Segregation, isolation, and punishment became the logical and 
acceptable means of addressing queer dangerousness.  
 
Conditions of Punishment 
Sybil Brand Institute officials’ argument that segregation was for the protection of 
both other prisoners and the lesbians themselves reflected a shift in rhetoric that began 
during that time. In the 1960s and 1970s, prison officials began to argue that the 
segregation of homosexual and gender nonconforming prisoners was for their own 
protection. More concern began to be placed on the “dangers” of aggressive gender 
conforming prisoners (in men’s institutions), who sexually assaulted other prisoners or 
coerced them into sexual relations, and researchers and officials began to admit that 
homosexual and gender nonconforming prisoners were targets of violence from other 
prisoners. Over the following decades, prison officials’ explicit justifications for 
                                                
68 “No Touching, No Human Contact.”  
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segregation became increasingly focused on protecting these prisoners from straight, 
gender conforming prisoners, especially in men’s institutions.69  
Despite the rhetorical change, the practice and experience of segregation and the 
conditions in which homosexual, gender nonconforming, and trans prisoners live have 
changed little. Conditions within segregation have long been harsh, violent, and 
significantly more restrictive than conditions in general population. Throughout the 
twentieth century, segregated homosexual, gender nonconforming, and transgender 
prisoners were often forced into extreme isolation and subjected to intense surveillance, 
both in homosexual units as well as other forms of segregation. At the Federal Medical 
Center at Springfield in the mid-twentieth century, segregated homosexual prisoners were 
housed alone in cells, closely supervised, and explicitly prohibited from having physical 
contact with other prisoners. They were also given only work assignments in which they 
could be closely surveilled. Segregated federal prisoners complained that they lost 
privileges and access to programs, which was and remains a common problem for those 
who were segregated in other institutions.70 John Bartlow Martin, who was imprisoned in 
the State Prison of Southern Michigan at Jackson in the early 1950s, wrote in his memoir 
that homosexual prisoners were segregated in the disciplinary cellblock where they were 
on the highest restriction and forced to stay in their cells all the time except for a three-
                                                
69 While the rhetoric about the danger of violence perpetrated by prisoners has been mostly used in the 
context of men’s prisons then and now, it has been used occasionally in the contact of women’s institutions 
as well, including as a justification for not placing a trans women in a women’s prison. For example, 
responding to a lawsuit filed by a trans woman who was a federal prisoner in the 1980s challenging her 
placement in a men’s prison, prison administrators argued that if she was placed with women she’d “be in 
grave danger from the very persons she seeks to imitate.” Quoted in Sharon Reynolds, “Wrong Body, 
Wrong Jail,” n.d. Bromfield Street Education Foundation Records, box 13, folder 53. Northeastern 
University.  
70 Smith, “The Homosexual Federal Offender”; Smith, “Some Problems in Dealing with Homosexuals.”  
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minute bath once a week. They were allowed radio earphones, books, and newspapers but 
were not allowed to participate in recreation, go to the cafeteria, or participate in other 
programming.71 Many prisons, such as the Ohio Penitentiary and San Quentin, housed 
the homosexual segregation units in the oldest and dirtiest cellblocks.72 These conditions 
were often accompanied by harassment, discrimination, and violence from staff and other 
prisoners.  
Prison officials justified these conditions by describing homosexual and gender 
nonconforming prisoners as dangerous. Their explicit logic was that it was “better for 
society to let [homosexual prisoners] rot alone, then to turn [them] loose to rot others.”73 
Yet, segregation conditions largely remained the same even as jail and prison officials 
described homosexual, gender nonconforming, and trans prisoners as dangerous 
increasingly less often. By the 1970s, as officials were regularly justifying segregation at 
least in part by claiming that gay, gender nonconforming, and trans prisoners had to be 
protected, these prisoners described experiencing endemic discrimination, violence, and 
punishment for their queerness.74 In protective custody, prisoners continued to faced 
                                                
71 This cellblock held both “aggressive homosexuals” and those they “preyed upon.” In other words, rapists 
and those who were raped were held in the same cellblock, under the same conditions, both for being 
“homosexual.” Martin, Break Down the Walls. 
72 Prisoner X, Prison Confidential (Los Angeles: Medco Books, 1969); Malcolm Braly, False Starts: A 
Memoir of San Quentin and Other Prisons (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1976); “Proposed: 
California Medical Facility and Northern California Guidance Center, Vacaville, California,” Corrections – 
Administration, Institutions – California Medical Facility, Vacaville-Proposal, F3717:314, Department of 
Corrections Records, California State Archives. 
73 Wilson, Are Prisons Necessary?, 219. 
74 Because a small but significant segment of gay activists on the outside in the 1970s focused attention on 
jails and prisons, currently and formerly incarcerated gay, gender nonconforming, and trans people were 
able to publish descriptions of their conditions and experiences to people on the outside for the first time. 
See for example, Join Hands, No More Cages: A Women’s Prison Newsletter, Through the Looking Glass, 
Gaycon Press Newsletter, and Inside Out: A Newsletter for Prisoners and their Gay Friends. Many gay 
publications that were not specifically prisoner-focused also extensively covered prison issues, such as Gay 
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discriminatory and violent treatment by staff, including being housed with an “aggressive 
straight inmate,” who might physically and sexually assault them.75 Stories from the 
1970s about the “Homosexual Unit” at California Medical Facility at Vacaville—where 
many gay, gender nonconforming, and transgender prisoners in the California system had 
been segregated since the facility opened in 1955—included medical neglect, cruelty, and 
even death.76 Prisoners in this unit were placed in cells alone that were totally enclosed; 
they could not see out nor talk to anyone. There were reports of medical experiments, 
including drug and shock therapy, on gay prisoners by Vacaville doctors, supposedly to 
find cures for homosexuality.77 While queer prisoners were confined to the unit, other 
prisoners were allowed to wander in for sex, which was not always consensual.78 In Sybil 
Brand Institute’s “Daddy Tank” in the 1970s, prisoners were subjected to isolation, 
restrictions, overcrowding, and harassment by guards. They were also given the filthiest 
                                                                                                                                            
Community News, Lesbian Tide, and RDF. See also, Regina Kunzel, “Lessons in Being Gay: Queer 
Encounters in Gay and Lesbian Prison Activism,” Radical History Review 100 (Winter 2008).  
75 Jon Wildes, “To Be Young, Gay and Behind Bars,” Village VoiceI, January 9, 1978. 
76 California prison officials had moved the primary homosexual segregation unit to Vacaville after it 
opened in large part because they wanted to treat these prisoners’ homosexuality (and probably, by 
extension, their gender nonconformity). Understanding homosexuality as an illness or the result of “an 
arrest in an infantile state” that was frequently accompanied by “failure of development in the emotional 
and other fields,” within four years, they determined that homosexuality was largely untreatable, not 
because officials no longer viewed it as a mental illness but because of homosexuals’ supposed emotional 
maladjustment and because “they are rarely motivated for a change in their way of life.” In their 1959 
report on the “problem” of homosexuality, prison administrators explained that “rarely will anything less 
than long-term individual psychoanalysis produce satisfactory adjustment” and determined that this was a 
waste of resources. The report, instead, recommended that they begin to segregate prisoners in units in 
different facilities, in particularly at Soledad, while leaving a small group at Vacaville who were interested 
or amenable to psychotherapy. Final Report of the Special Committee Regarding Homosexuality, 1-2. See 
also, Special Committee Regarding Homosexuality, Minutes of Committee Meeting, April 10, 1959, 
California Medical Facility, Corrections Administration – Reports and Studies – Homosexuality, 1959, 
F3717: 1692, Department of Corrections Records, California State Archives. 
77 Don Jackson, “Gay Death at Vacaville,” Rough Times 2, no. 7 (June 1972), LGBT Periodicals 
Collection, New York Public Library. Vacaville was not the only prison to do this during the 1970s. See 
also “Prison Life Behind the Lavender ‘H,’” Join Hands 6, no. 4 (January/February 1977), LGBT 
Periodical Collection, New York Public Library; “Prolaxin Warning,” Join Hands 2 (February-March 
1976), Kinsey Institute Library and Special Collections, Indiana University.  
78 A00494 Join Hands – San Francisco, 6/18/74, International Gay Information Center Collection – 
(Audiovisual Materials), New York Public Library. 
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jobs, smaller commissary allowances, less correspondence privileges, and less access to 
books and magazines. Prisoners felt that “they were constantly being made examples 
of.”79 As Jon Wildes, a gay prisoner, wrote in the Village Voice in 1978, “The situation 
can become so bad that the gay inmate will usually choose to return to [general] 
population even through he may get killed by doing so.” He explained that the violent, 
isolating, and restrictive conditions in protective custody “punished [prisoners] for 
seeking protection of [their] life.”80 
Despite rhetorical changes about the reasons for segregation in the 1970s, 
underlying heteronormative and racialized gender normative logics that authorized 
violent and punitive treatment of gender and sexual deviance and had been constructed in 
part through the work of segregation since the early twentieth century remained 
unchallenged. As prison officials shifted the official justifications for segregation from 
protection from to protection for gender nonconforming prisoners, constructions of queer 
dangerousness structured how their protection was practiced. Violence and punishment 
remained commonsensical, if not officially advocated for. Administrators often used 
                                                
79 Kelly, “Cell Block 4200”; “No Touching, No Human Contact—In Cell Block 4200.” 
Gay, lesbian, and feminist activists on the outside protested the Daddy Tank in the early 1970s. In 
December of 1976, because of these protests, jail officials phased the maximum security “Daddy Tank” 
into the medium security “daddy dorm.” While lesbians and gender nonconforming people were still 
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80 Wildes, “To Be Young, Gay and Behind Bars.” While many queer prisoners were placed in segregation, 
not all were. And, despite the violent conditions of segregation, some who were in general population 
requested to be placed in segregation because of the violence they experienced in general population, yet 
were denied by prison officials. For example, one gay man, who served federal time at McNeil Island and 
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first.” Ibid. 
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other justifications to continue the same or similar punitive practices. For example, in a 
letter to Join Hands in 1976, a feminine gay prisoner described how California prison 
officials would use minor rules violations to justify the segregation of gender 
nonconforming gay prisoners in the Deuel Vocational Institution in Tracy, California. He 
argued that these minor infractions, for which heterosexual prisoners would not be 
segregated, were cover for their real motive: “We are supposed to be uncontrollable 
homosexuals and management problems.” Once in segregation, they were repeatedly 
refused general population status “because of our homosexuality and our feminine traits.” 
He also described how psychologically violent these restrictive and punitive conditions 
were, explaining that many “have to fight to keep our minds intact struggling with our 
sexual identity which can lead to attempted or successful suicide.”81 Thus, queer 
dangerousness remained an important structuring feature of penal logics, and gay, gender 
nonconforming, and trans prisoners continued to be viewed and treated as dangerous 
because of their queerness and punished for their gender and sexual deviance. 
Punitive treatment of gender and sexual deviance remained folded into the prison 
system in other policies and practices in addition to the conditions of segregation. Prisons 
and jails still prohibited any sexual activity. Not only were gay and gender 
nonconforming prisoners punished for engaging in sexual activity, they were punished 
for being perceived as potentially doing so because of their sexual and gender identities. 
Many prisoners described receiving harsher punishments in general because they were 
                                                
81 Charles Ackert, letter to the editor, Join Hands 3 (April/May 1976), Kinsey Institute Library and Special 
Collections, Indiana University. Indeed, in the 1950s, California prison administrators began to segregate 
homosexuals incarcerated through the Youth Authority at the Deuel Vocational Institution. Inter-
Departmental Communication, from Conrad to Burdman, “Report of Special Committee on 
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gay or gender nonconforming. David A. Ward and Gene G. Kassebaum explain that this 
was the practice at the California Institute for Women at Frontera. In their 1965 study of 
the prison, they describe how many staff members were “offended by the sight of a 
person with outward homosexual appearances,” which they often associated with 
masculinity.82 By the 1950s, homosexual and gender nonconforming prisoners began to 
complain that their parole was being delayed or denied because of their homosexuality.83 
In a 1975 letter to Join Hands, a gay prisoner newspaper published in the 1970s, Edward 
Loftin, a gay prisoner in California, described being denied parole and sent to the 
California Medical Center at Vacaville to undergo testing: “They also said I would get a 
parole ‘if’ Vacaville sees that I could make it on the outside...I think you know why the 
parole board didn’t give me parole, they ‘do’ think that ‘ALL’ gay people are sick and 
need to be in a Hospital…Everyone that I know, even the officers and councelor [sic] 
thought I would get parole. The true reason is I am ‘Gay’ and proud of it.”84 The Join 
Hands editor describes being gay as “the other half of Eddie’s ‘crime.’”85 
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Prisoners also described a system whose idea of rehabilitation was overtly hetero- 
and gender normative and that actively viewed homosexuality and gender nonconformity 
as lack of rehabilitation. One queen confined in the segregated unit at Vacaville claimed 
that s/he was told that one of the conditions s/he had to meet in order to be released into 
general population was that s/he had to stop plucking hir eyebrows and let them grow 
back. A Join Hands reporter explains, “What rehabilitation means for a gay prisoners is 
that he becomes straight. As long as you persist in being gay, especially if you flaunt it, 
you’ll just stay in prison. Because in California’s indeterminate prison sentence system, 
you get a sentence of the minimum to life and the criterion for release is that you become 
rehabilitated.”86 
Join Hands and other prisoner newspapers that were inclusive of gay and trans 
prisoners in the 1970s were rife with similar complaints and analysis. These prisoners 
understood their segregation and the violence they experienced as deliberate, 
interconnected, and punishment for being gay and/or gender nonconforming. They did 
not describe their experiences as individual discrimination but as punishment for their 
gender and sexual deviance. In other words, these were not the actions of a few or even 
many biased individuals but the actions and logic of a hetero- and gender normative 
system that targeted queerness and gender and sexual deviance for elimination, 
punishment, and containment.  
 
 
 
                                                
86 A00494 Join Hands. 
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Dehumanization as “Protection” 
By the late 1970s and 1980s, many prison and jail officials began to recognize 
that their populations included transsexual prisoners. As they adopted policies and 
practices to manage this “new” type of prisoner, they utilized similar practices and 
rhetoric that treated gender nonconformity and transsexuality as a security threat. For 
example, in 1977, Diane Quirros, a Latina trans woman, entered the New York State 
prison system to serve a six- to twelve-year sentence, becoming, according to prison 
officials, New York State’s first transsexual prisoner. While there certainly were trans 
women incarcerated in New York State before Quirros, she seems to have been the first 
acknowledged by the New York State prison officials. This new “recognition” probably 
reflected the increased media and legal attention on trans women.87 Quirros, who had 
lived as female since she was a teenager and had taken hormones prior to her 
incarceration, described herself to a reporter as beautiful and feminine, with long hair that 
she loved. At the reception and classification center, prison staff shaved her head, strip 
searched her, and then sent her to segregation because, as a sergeant explained, she “was 
a threat to security.”88 
                                                
87 For example, Quirros entered New York state prison the same year that the New York Supreme Court 
ruled the United States Tennis Association had discriminated against Richards when they barred her from 
playing as a woman following her transition. Richards v. USTA, 400 NYS 2d 267 (Sup. Ct. 1977). 
Richards was perhaps the most widely known trans woman at the time and her case received quite a bit of 
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88 Ralph Gardner Jr., “Prison of Gender,” The Soho News, February 4, 1981, Folder: Transexualism, 
International Gay Information Center collection – (Ephemera—subjects), New York Public Library. 
Quirros’ description of the intake process reveals that it was a traumatic experience for her, especially when 
they shaved her hair, during which she “cried and begged them to stop.” After she was moved out of the 
reception center, she was allowed to regrow her hair. Like many of the gender nonconforming prisoners 
that I discussed in the previous chapter, Quirros made her own makeup, despite it being considered 
contraband. She also repeatedly requested to have sex reassignment treatment while incarcerated, but was 
refused by the department of corrections. Quirros came to the attention to reporters not when she first 
entered prison, but because David Berkowitz, known as the Son of Sam serial killer, reportedly fell in love 
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While Quirros was later allowed to grow her hair back out, throughout her 
incarceration, she was shuffled between maximum security prisons. Quirros was 
classified as maximum security not because she was violent but because she was seen as 
a problem for the internal security of the New York State prison system. Martin Horn, the 
assistant to the New York State Commissioner of Corrections at the time, described her 
as such: “[Quirros] is an exhibitionist and a flirt…He [sic] incited other inmates to come 
on to him.” He explained that whenever officials moved Quirros, she “attracted trouble” 
and officials would “quickly pass her off to another prison.” Quirros denied that she 
flirted and said that she did not engage in sex work. She explained that “the first thing I 
do when I get to a prison is to get myself a little boyfriend” in order to protect herself.89 
Despite this strategy, she was gang raped at least once and was subject to constant sexual 
pressure and harassment from other prisoners and staff.90 Quirros described her 
experience in the maximum security prisons as “a living hell” and “a nightmare,” but not 
necessarily because of the rape and sexual harassment. Instead, she points to the violence 
of the isolation of maximum security lock up as she told reporters that she would “rather 
deal with the rapes than be locked up into one of those bird cages 23 hours a day.”91  
                                                                                                                                            
with her while they lived in the same cellblock. Once this came to the prison officials’ attention, she was 
moved for her own safety. Paul Ellman, “Son of Sam’s Heartthrob is Transsexual,” New York Post, 
February 6, 1981, Folder: Transsexualism, International Gay Information Center collection – (Ephemera—
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The practice of shaving newly processed male-classified prisoners, including trans women, continues 
today in New York State. Williams interview. 
89 Gardner, “Prison of Gender.” 
90 Quirros also reported that she had a sexual relationship with a guard, who also brought her hair dye and 
makeup from the outside. However, most guards verbally and physically harassed her: “They’d call me 
‘freak’ and ‘the thing.’ They gave me the worst jobs. I was slapped and punished a few times in my face 
and in my breasts.” A prison official explained, “Correctional officers have a macho thing. They don’t 
know how to deal with Diane. It’s a question of fear.” Ibid. 
91 Ibid. 
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Horn’s descriptions of Quirros echoed past descriptions of gender nonconforming 
prisoners in men’s institutions as queer threats, sexually manipulative, and intentionally 
creating violence and chaos. As prison administrators did in the past, Horn showed little 
concern about the violence Quirros experienced and categorized her efforts to protect 
herself as pathological and deserving of punishment. He refused to recognize or respect 
Quirros’ gender identity as he continued to refer to her as “he,” reiterating New York 
State’s refusal to recognize her womanhood by placing her in men’s institutions. In doing 
so, Horn dehumanized Quirros, negating her right to safety, bodily integrity, and gender 
self-determination. 
 Over the past three and a half decades, prison officials began to favor justifying 
segregation as protecting trans and gender nonconforming prisoners from (prisoner-
perpetrated) violence. Nevertheless, trans and gender nonconforming prisoners have been 
treated very similarly to Quirros, and prison officials continue to express concern about 
the threat of their prisoners’ queer dangerousness. The continuation of portraying trans 
and gender nonconforming prisoners as a threat has been most clearly articulated in 
prison officials’ responses to the lawsuits brought by trans prisoners challenging the 
conditions of their incarceration, as well as the courts’ reasoning for finding not only 
segregation but also violent and isolating conditions constitutional and justified.  
Approximately a decade after Quirros entered the New York State prison system, 
Lavarita Meriwether sued the Indiana Department of Corrections, challenging, in part, 
her indefinite confinement in administrative segregation. Within the Indiana prison 
system, Meriwether—who identified as a transsexual woman, had been taking hormones 
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for nearly a decade, and had undergone a number of gender-affirming surgeries prior to 
her incarceration—was confined in segregated “protective custody” units at two different 
men’s institutions for months at a time. In her complaint, Meriwether told of constant 
harassment, violence, and sexual assault at the hand of prison officials and other 
prisoners both in the general population and in segregation. Within the segregated units, 
she was denied access to adequate recreation, living space, vocational and educational 
programs, and other resources.92 
An Indiana district court dismissed her claim, arguing that her confinement in 
segregation was “a means of assuring the safe and efficient operation of a prison on a 
day-to-day basis.”93 While the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district 
court’s dismissal, calling it “premature,” the court largely affirmed the lower court’s 
reasoning. The court expressed concern that Meriwether had thirty years more to serve, 
during which she could remain in segregation; nevertheless, they argued that determining 
whether prolonged segregation constitutes cruel and unusual punishment and was 
therefore unconstitutional is at least in part reliant on “the existence of feasible 
alternatives.”94 They stated:  
A prisoner such as [Meriwether] poses particularly serious management problems for 
prison officials. Given her transsexual identity and unique physical characteristics, her 
being housed among male inmates in a general population cell would undoubtedly create, 
in the words of the district court, “a volatile and explosive situation.” Under such 
circumstances it is unlikely that prison officials would be able to protect her from the 
violence, sexual assault, and harassment about which she complains.95 
 
                                                
92 Meriwether v. Faulkner, 821 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1987). 
93 Quoted in Meriwether at 414. 
94 Ibid. at 416. 
95 Ibid. at 417. 
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Here we can see prison officials’ shifting rhetoric. Meriwether was simultaneously a 
“serious management problem” (and therefore in need of punishment) and a vulnerable 
prisoner in need of protection. While this reasoning may seem contradictory, the court’s 
logic ultimately made them compatible because the “protection” that the Indiana 
Department of Corrections provided was in the form of violent, isolating segregation, 
where the same victimization they claimed to be protecting her from continued. 
“Protection” of Meriwether in practice became protection of Indiana prison facilities 
from the disruption of her queer, feminine body and gender identity and punishment of 
Meriwether’s queer dangerousness.  
Since the early 1980s, security management has become an important tool used 
by prison officials to argue for the constitutionality of indefinite segregation. As Colin 
Dayan has shown, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Supreme Court began to 
“defined away the substance” of constitutional protections for prisoners, especially the 
Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment.96 A series of Supreme Court 
opinions created a distinction between “administrative segregation” (including 
“protective custody”) and “disciplinary segregation” in prison administrators’ 
constitutional obligation. The latter requires due process procedures, such as written 
notice of charges, a hearing, or an opportunity to defend oneself; the former does not. The 
Court has said that it must extend prison administrators a great deal of deference to their 
expertise, especially regarding security concerns.97 Even if the conditions of confinement 
are the same—and they often are—this linguistic distinction makes these classifications 
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legally distinct. Protection becomes security for the institution, which becomes 
punishment for the segregated prisoner. This legal reasoning legitimizes the violent and 
isolating conditions that Meriwether and other trans prisoners, such as Jackie Tates, live 
in as “protective” and necessary.  
Indeed, the Seventh Circuit’s Meriwether decision relies on these opinions to find 
that the use of administrative segregation was a legitimate security management tool and 
that prisoners, including Meriwether, do not have a liberty interest or due process rights 
to be held in general population rather than segregation.98 Among the precedents that the 
Seventh Circuit relies on is their opinion in Caldwell v. Miller, decided the year before.99 
Caldwell addressed the conditions of confinement of the lockdown of the United States 
Penitentiary at Marion, Illinois, then the highest security federal prison in the US. In 
1983, administrators put Marion on permanent lockdown, confining prisoners to their 
cells for twenty-four hours per day and effectively suspending all prisoner activities, 
following the murder of two guards and one prisoner. The court found that permanent 
lockdown did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment, arguing that the difference 
between conditions of lockdown and the “normal” conditions at Marion “is one of degree 
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general prison population rather than in restrictive segregation…Given the broad uses of administrative 
segregation – ‘to protect the prisoner's safety, to protect other inmates from a particular prisoner, to break 
up potentially disruptive groups of inmates, or simply to await later classification or transfer’ – the Court 
ruled that inmates should reasonably anticipate being confined in administrative segregation at some point 
in their incarceration.” Meriwether, 821 F.2d at 414. 
99 Caldwell v. Miller, 790 F2d 589 (7th Cir. 1986). 
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and not of kind” and therefore did not constitute “additional punishment.”100 In making 
this argument, the court explained that they “accord, as we must, prison officials wide-
ranging deference in adopting policies that are needed to preserve internal order and 
security” and that permanent lockdown did not “intrude upon Caldwell's personal 
security in a way that would set them apart from normal confinement.”101 
This lockdown of Marion, which ultimately lasted twenty-three years, became the 
first of a “new generation” of segregation units—security housing units (SHU) and 
supermax prisons, which have introduced new technologies of extreme isolation and 
sensory deprivation into the experience of segregation.102 Over the past few decades, 
departments of corrections around the US have relied on these new extreme segregation 
units to “manage” their most “problematic” prisoners. While these units are sometimes 
used for disciplinary placement, they are also often used for indefinite detention of 
certain groups and prisoners viewed as most dangerous and threatening to the security of 
the prison system. But as the history of Marion shows, these units do not just “bury” or 
warehouse individual prisoners in isolation but targeted problematic groups in order to 
modify behavior. 
                                                
100 Ibid. at 604, 605. The following is a description of the conditions of confinement that they found 
constitutional: “Immediately following the October 23, 1983, lockdown, all indoor and outdoor recreation 
and exercise privileges were suspended, and Caldwell was confined to his cell twenty-four hours a day. 
Approximately one month later, Caldwell and the other inmates were permitted one hour of daily indoor 
exercise. By May of 1984, seven months after the lockdown, Caldwell was given an hour of weekly 
outdoor exercise in addition to that allowed indoors. In June of 1984, Caldwell's outdoor exercise privileges 
increased to two hours weekly, but for each hour spent outdoors he received an hour less indoors.” Ibid. at 
600. 
101 Ibid. at 596. 
102 In 1994, ADX Florence was opened to replace Marion as the highest security prison (a supermax) in the 
Federal Bureau of Prisons. The lockdown then ended, and Marion was reclassified as a medium security 
prison. 
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Built as a replacement for Alcatraz in 1963, Marion was intended to house “the 
worst of the worse.” By the early 1970s, federal prison administrators began to use 
Marion to contain political prisoners and prison activists, particularly black nationalist 
and other politicized people of color, within the federal system. Historian Alan Eladio 
Gómez explains that administrators sought to contain “problem prisoners” in one 
institution and employed “a series of behavior-modification techniques, as well as 
physical and psychological torture” in order to control dissent.103 Marion’s behavior-
modification programs were “designed to ‘cure’ deviants,” to control and forcefully 
change prisoners’ behavior, beliefs, and thoughts.104 In other words, they not only 
attempted to contain and stop dissent but alter how these prisoners behaved, what they 
thought, and even what they believed, not for rehabilitative purposes but for control, to 
render them docile. The prisoners who underwent these programs would eventually be 
placed in segregation units as they continued to resist and dissent. These units became 
control units, which are the model for today’s SHUs, supermax prisons, and other 
extreme security classifications, likely including Sacramento County Jail’s T-Sep 
housing. 
Gómez, Dayan, Dylan Rodríguez, and Lorna A. Rhodes have argued that these 
units constitute a new kind of prison technology, which is meant to strip a prisoner of 
their sense of self and bodily integrity.105 This new technology relies on the 
                                                
103 Alan Eladio Gómez, “Resisting Living Death at Marion Federal Pentientiary, 1972,” Radical History 
Review 96 (Fall 2006): 59. 
104 Ibid., 59. See also, Stephen Dillon, “Fugitive Life: Race, Gender, and the Rise of the Neoliberal-
Carceral State” (PhD diss., University of Minnesota, 2013). 
105 Gómez, “Resisting Living Death”; Dayan, “Legal Slaves and Civil Bodies”; Dayan, “Held in the Body 
of the State”; Dylan Rodríguez, Forced Passages: Imprisoned Radical Intellectuals and the U.S. Prison 
Regime (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 2006); Lorna A. Rhodes, Total Confinement: 
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dehumanization of prisoners to justify its violence as necessary and legitimate.106 These 
units have been constructed and used to warehouse the most “threatening” and 
problematic prisoners, those deemed too dangerous for the prison yard and even for 
human interaction. According to prison administrators, these units do not “punish” but 
segregate prisoners in accordance with the needs of the internal security of the prison 
system. But, what counts as most threatening is usually determined by race and 
racialization. Indeed, in most systems, people of color are disproportionately housed in 
such units.107 In particular, the most commonly identified group “threat” is the 
euphemistically termed “security threat groups,” which officially stands in for “gang 
members,” often a codeword for specific racially criminalized groups of black and brown 
men. These “security threat groups” are seen as (racially) dangerous and particularly 
violent and uncontrollable because of their racialized masculinity.108 In practice, many 
black and brown men in prisons are profiled as “gang members” because of their 
blackness or brownness—often coupled with a certain tattoo, friend, or other “attribute” 
                                                                                                                                            
Madness and Reason in the Maximum Security Prison (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 
2004). See also Christian Parenti, Lockdown America: Policing and Prisons in the Age of Crisis (New 
York: Verso, 1999). 
106 Despite the often extreme conditions of these new units, they are not aberrant in the US prison system, 
which houses millions of people in cages for part or all of their lives. As Ruth Wilson Gilmore has argued, 
the conditions of the entire prison system relies on the dehumanization of those living in cages. Ruth 
Wilson Gilmore, Golden Gulag: Prisons, Surplus, Crisis, and Opposition in Globalizing California 
(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2007).  
107 See for example, Margo Schlanger, “Symposium Introduction and Preliminary Data on Racial 
Disparities,” Michigan Journal of Race and Law 18 (2013). 
108 Of course, there is violence perpetrated by both men of color and white men in gangs. I do not mean to 
dismiss this violence, which can be a serious problem for many people inside and outside prisons, including 
trans and gender nonconforming people. However, prison administrators often blame violence in prisons 
entirely or almost entirely on racialized gangs, while also often, although not always, neglecting to mention 
how white supremacist gangs are also part of the “gang problem.” Prison officials profile many men of 
color in prisons as actual or suspected gang members, a designation that can prolong their sentences, get 
them segregated, or make them vulnerable to staff violence. This focus on racialized gang violence 
occludes systemic violence within the prison system that is experienced by all prisoners but also in 
particular ways by those who are or are suspected to be involved in gangs.  
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in order to justify the presumptively “colorblind” designation—regardless of their 
behavior or actual affiliation. As Dayan, Rodríguez, and Rhodes argue, these new units 
have been created to contain a racialized threat, a threat that remains interconnected with 
the original targeted threat, politically radical prisoners, particularly politicized prisoners 
of color. 
This racialized threat is key to courts finding administrative segregation in control 
units constitutional. For example, in Caldwell, the Seventh Circuit explained that their 
opinion was influenced by the type of prisoners housed in Marion, arguing that such 
prisoners “cannot be free of discomfort.”109 Dayan argues that the destruction of 
constitutional protections for prisoners has relied on “negating the humanity of the 
confined body,” or the dehumanization of prisoners, as well as constructing violent prison 
conditions as ordinary and mundane.110 This legal dehumanization—what Dayan calls 
“negative personhood”—couples with and legitimizes the material dehumanization of 
indefinite solitary confinement, which can strip a prisoner of their sense of self, their 
bodily integrity, and their sanity, arguably the aim, at least in part, of these units.111 
Similarly, Lisa Cacho argues that permanently (racially) criminalized groups, of which 
“gang members” are one of her primary examples, become “ineligible for personhood.” 
These criminalized populations enter the criminal legal system as targets of containment, 
not as subjects or people in need of protection.112 
                                                
109 Caldwell, 790 F2d at 601. Key to this finding was that the court found that the conditions of lockdown 
were no “more than incontinence and discomfort.” Ibid, 601. See also Meriwether, 821 F.2d 408. 
110 Dayan, “Legal Slaves and Civil Bodies,” 78. 
111 Colin Dayan, The Law is a White Dog: How Legal Rituals Make and Unmake Persons (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2011), xii. Dayan argues that the prison and the law have become 
“collaborators in a new form of punishment that could evade constitutional claims.” Ibid., xvi.  
112 Cacho, Social Death. 
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Dayan argues that these units are something new, that they have changed the use 
of isolation by making it a management tool rather than solely a disciplinary one. While 
these units are certainly something new in the extent of their capacity to isolate and 
sensorily deprive prisoners, the use of indefinite isolation for management is not new, as I 
have discussed. Isolation, segregation, and dehumanization have long been used to 
manage certain types of prisoners viewed as particularly threatening to the prison as an 
institution, including gender and sexually deviant prisoners as well as other types, such as 
mentally ill, developmentally disabled, and groups of color.113 
Gender nonconforming and trans prisoners described this dehumanization and the 
use of segregation to manage their deviance and change their behavior and sense of self 
as they discuss the conditions of their segregation over the past few decades. For 
example, the feminine gay prisoner who was imprisoned in the Deuel Vocational 
Institution in Tracy, California, in the 1970s described the purpose of segregation as 
“brainwashing or pressuring” the segregated gender nonconforming and gay prisoners to 
become heterosexual and “to lose our total identity as a person.” He explains that he and 
others had to “fight to keep our minds intact.”114 Similarly, Tates described one of the 
effects of T-Sep as causing her “to hate the fact that I was transgender.”115 More recently, 
Paula, a trans woman incarcerated in Texas, described her 2007 initiation into a new 
prison: “From the CO's to the Captain on shift, I was stripped of my identity, ridiculed, 
                                                
113 Racial segregation in prisons, while not isolating, was a management tool to keep different types or 
prisoners separate, especially to keep prisoners of color from corrupting white prisoners. For example, in 
his 1912 prison memoir, Donald Lowrie described the existence of “Kid Alley,” “Crazy Alley,” and “China 
Alley,” indicating that San Quentin segregated at least young prisoners, mentally ill prisoners, and Chinese 
prisoners. Donald Lowrie, My Life in Prison (New York: Mitchell Kennerley, 1912). 
114 Ackert, letter to the editor.  
115 Garvin, “What’s She Doing in the Men’s Jail?” 
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called names, and told I must become a man now! My head was shaved, nails cut short, 
put on exhibition and for 3 days the ranking officers tried to find a way to get my finger 
and toe polish off.”116 The prisoner at Deuel, Tates, and Paula describe this stripping of 
their sexual and gender identities and subjectivities as intentional, a part of the 
dehumanizing intent of segregation and incarceration in general. Over the past few 
decades, the courts have officially legalized this dehumanization, constructing the 
prisoners who experience it as at fault and deserving. 
While gender nonconforming and trans prisoners were not the primary targets for 
these new control units, as courts and prisons created the legal and material infrastructure 
of this new generation of indefinite segregation, the segregation of trans and gender 
nonconforming prisoners continued, informing and being informed by this (somewhat) 
new technology of racialized and sexed management, incapacitation, and 
dehumanization. In Meriwether, the Seventh Circuit secured trans and gender 
nonconforming prisoners’ experiences of segregation to the work of these control units as 
they argued that Meriwether’s claim was “indistinguishable from Caldwell and was 
therefore properly dismissed.”117 By the late 1980s, courts had designated the targeting of 
trans and gender nonconforming prisoners as “clearly a proper utilization of 
administrative segregation,” enfolding these prisoners as a type of “security threat 
group,” even if they are not officially labeled as such.118  
While this current security threat classification system is designed to contain a 
racialized threat, it is also designed to contain gendered and sexual ones. Most scholars 
                                                
116 Paula W., “Paula W.’s Story,” Black & Pink Newsletter (February 2010): 2. 
117 Meriwether, 821 F.2d at 414. 
118 Farmer v. Carlson, 685 F. Supp. 1335, 1344 (M.D. Penn. 1988). 
  132 
who have written about this new generation of indefinite segregation have focused on its 
racialized logics and practices to the near total exclusion of gender and sex. Gang 
members, the official “security threat group,” are viewed as especially threatening and 
violent because of their racialized masculinity. Gender nonconforming and trans 
prisoners are also viewed as a gendered and racialized threat—even if the racialization is 
often less overt. These prisoners embody a racialized (queer) feminine threat that is 
reliant on constructions of black femininity and femaleness—as well as other forms of 
racialized femininity—and also constructions of queer dangerousness that have utilized 
similar racialized language and logics as excessively sexual, sexually dominant and 
manipulative, and deviantly and dangerously feminine. It is also not a small point that 
incarcerated trans and gender nonconforming people are disproportionately black. 
Women’s prisons and their administrators function under similar logics, although the use 
of security housing units or supermax facilities is less common and the concern about 
gangs much less present. Gender nonconforming and trans prisoners are viewed as 
threatening because of their often racialized (queer) masculinity and targeted for 
disciplinary segregation because administrators believe that they are more violent, more 
likely to flagrantly break rules and be disrespectful, and more likely to engage in sexual 
activity.119  
 
One hundred years of designating queerness and gender nonconformity as 
dangerous and threatening, of dehumanizing gender nonconforming and trans prisoners 
and managing them through segregation, continues to structure the treatment of trans and 
                                                
119 Arkles, interview.  
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gender nonconforming prisoners today. This living history created the social and material 
conditions that allow trans and gender nonconforming prisoners around the US to be 
thrown in maximum security prisons, isolation units, and other types of administrative 
segregation and high security lockups, often indefinitely. Whether or not prison officials 
have explicitly articulated it as such, the totality of the conditions in which gender 
nonconforming and trans prisoners live remains punitive. Prisoners are punished for their 
sexual and gender deviancy, as the prison system constructs gender nonconformity as 
dangerous, as a threat to institutional security. Because security is the central concern and 
reason for the existence of prisons, queerness and gender nonconformity become 
dangerous and threats to the prison system itself.  
This long and continuing history of systematic segregation of trans and gender 
nonconforming people within penal institutions reveals that racialized gender normativity 
is integral to understandings of security, practices of security maintenance, and the logics 
and practices of the US prison system as a whole. Safety, security, and order are hetero- 
and gender normative. They require homogeneity, whiteness, and normativity. 
Difference, nonnormativity, nonwhiteness, and queerness disrupt. They are contrary to 
institutional security and a threat to the normative functionings of the US prison system. 
Notions of security, which are at the heart of the organization and purpose of the prison 
system, are set up in opposition to racialized queerness. The rhetoric and practice of 
maintaining penal security relies on and reproduces constructions of racialized, gendered, 
and sexual threat that mark all prisoners as others, as outsiders, as threats, and as 
undeserving of life, safety, and humanity. This racialized queer threat bears out most 
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obviously in how prison administrators manage and discuss sexual violence within penal 
institutions.  
  135 
Chapter Three 
 
“Designed to Abuse”:  
Queer Deviance and Carceral Sexual Violence 
 
 
In 2008, Angela Brandywine Toth, a white trans woman who had been 
incarcerated in California since 1992, sued the California Department of Corrections and 
Rehabilitation (CDCR), challenging the conditions of her incarceration. In her lengthy 
complaint, Toth documented nearly constant harassment, discrimination, and physical 
and sexual violence, including gang rapes and forced prostitution, perpetrated by other 
prisoners and staff throughout her imprisonment. Staff routinely refused to protect her or 
process her grievances, often simply “losing them.” They refused to believe that she was 
sexually assaulted, insinuating that because she was a “homosexual,” she “must have 
asked for it.”1 They denied her medical attention after being raped and for other injuries 
and medical issues. When she reported sexual assaults, they laughed at her and made 
jokes about her body. She was placed with cellmates who were physically and sexually 
abusive, and she reported hearing from other prisoners that staff were intentionally 
placing her in cells with these men. She also reported other insidious and mundane forms 
of violence, including theft of property, public strip searches, abusive cell searches, and 
false disciplinary reports. Prison administrators, including medical staff and lawyers, 
refused to recognize her transsexuality and her identity as female. Most of the doctors 
                                                
1 First Amended Complaint at 7, Toth v. Yates, No. 08-01219 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 1, 2008). For example, 
during one instance, Toth describes being assaulted by a number of officers, who physically beat her as 
they called her a “piece of shit”, “faggot”, “cocksucker”, “freak”, and other names. During this encounter, 
they fractured her neck. Following the assault, she received inadequate medical attention and continued to 
experience assault from both staff and other prisoners, which caused her neck injury to never heal properly. 
Ibid. See also Toth v. Schwartzenegger (No. 11-00247, E.D. Cal.); Order Dismissing Plaintiff’s Amended 
Complaint, Toth (No. 11-00247), Aug. 30, 2012. 
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and psychiatrists she encountered in California prisons also refused to diagnose her as a 
transsexual and refused to provide her with hormone treatment. One doctor told her that 
staff and prisoners would stop harassing and assaulting her if she chose to no longer be 
transgender. The violence and harassment she experienced was not confined to her time 
in general population but followed her into administrative segregation and protective 
custody, where she continued to be beaten, raped, and denied medical treatment. 
Toth’s horrifying experiences are, unfortunately, not isolated or rare. As she 
repeatedly asserts in her complaints, discrimination, harassment, and violence against 
LGBTQ prisoners is endemic in the US prison system, and trans and gender 
nonconforming prisoners, especially transfeminine people in men’s prisons, experience 
some of the highest rates of sexual violence.2 Throughout her complaints, Toth refuses to 
                                                
2 For example, a study of sexual assault in California men’s prisons conducted in the mid-2000 found that 
59% of transgender prisoners reported being sexually assaulted at some point in their incarceration, a rate 
that was thirteen times higher than the entire population. Transgender respondents also often reported 
multiple incidents. This study found that transgender, non-heterosexual, mentally ill, and black prisoners 
were considerably more vulnerable than other prisoners. The study also found that transgender prisoners 
were far less likely to report rapes or request medical attention. Valerie Jenness, Cheryl L. Maxson, Kristy 
N. Matsuda, and Jennifer Macy Sumner, “Violence in California Correctional Facilities: An Empirical 
Examination of Sexual Assault,” UC Irvine Center for Evidence-Based Corrections Bulletin 2, no. 2 (June 
2007). See also, Alex Coolman, Lamar Glover, and Kara Gotsch, Still in Danger: The Ongoing Threat of 
Sexual Violence Against Transgender Prisoners (Los Angeles: Stop Prisoner Rape and the ACLU National 
Prison Project, 2005); D. Morgan Bassichis, “It’s War in Here”: A Report on the Treatment of 
Transgender and Intersex People in New York State Men’s Prisons (New York: Sylvia Rivera Law Project, 
2007); Stonewalled: Police Abuse and Misconduct Against Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender 
People in the US (New York: Amnesty International USA, 2005); Pascal Emmer, Adrian Lowe, and R. 
Barrett Marshall, This is a Prison, Glitter is Not Allowed: Experiences of Trans and Gender Variant People 
in Pennsylvania’s Prison System (Philadelphia: Hearts on a Wire Collective, 2011). 
In addition, the pages of newsletters and journals for incarcerated LGBT people, such as Black & Pink 
Newsletter, GCI TIP Journal, feature many horrifying stories of sexual violence. See for example, William 
(Lilly) P., “Lilly’s Story,” Black & Pink Newsletter (March 2010); “A Letter from DONNA,” GIC TIP 
Journal 1, no. 3 (Summer 2001); Paula W., “Paula W.’s Story,” Black & Pink Newsletter (February 2010); 
PK Bunny, “Massachusetts Survivor,” GIC TIP Journal 1, no. 3 (Summer 2001); Donna, “Gay, Lesbian Bi 
and Transgendered Prisoners: Their Silent Crisis,” GIC TIP Journal 2, no. 1 (Winter 2001); Robert Linnet, 
“The Cruel & Unusual Punishment of She-Males Why Her Warden Calls Her Mister,” GIC TIP Journal 2, 
no. 1 (Winter 2001); “Qualified Immunity Denied in Washington Guard’s Rape of Transsexual Prisoner,” 
GIC TIP Journal 2, no. 2 (Spring 2002); “Kerri,” GIC TIP Journal 2, no. 3 (Summer 2002); “Eyeman 
Arizona Sister,” GIC TIP Journal 3, no. 1 (Winter 2002); “Myqy,” GIC TIP Journal 4, no. 1 (Winter 
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individualize or exceptionalize her experiences; instead, she argues that they are the 
product of the “heteroconforming” culture of the CDCR that “clearly is designed to 
aggravate and abuse her” and other gay, trans, and gender nonconforming prisoners.3 
That gender nonconforming and trans prisoners are particularly vulnerable to 
sexual violence in men’s prison would probably surprise few people. Current popular, 
social scientific, and other representations of men’s prisons portray them as violent, 
especially sexually violent. Over the past few decades, the commonness of prison rape 
has become a frequently heard pop culture trope, the punch line of jokes and the 
threatening promise of TV cops. These representations portray prison sexual violence an 
inherent feature of (men’s) prisons because of the supposedly inherently violent nature of 
prisoners. This supposedly inherently violent nature of prisons and prisoners is also often 
racialized as representations focus on racialized gang violence and black male rapists.4 
On the other hand, pop culture, as well as social scientific research and the law, tend to 
barely acknowledge the existence of sexual violence in women’s prisons. In most 
dominant representations of prisons, rape is perpetrated only by excessively violent (often 
black) male prisoners, which works to obscure and justify the violence of incarceration 
and most staff-perpetrated violence. These representations have a long history grounded 
                                                                                                                                            
2003); “Vanity’s Story,” GIC TIP Journal 4, no. 4 (Fall 2004); Valjean Royal, Written testimony to the 
National Prison Rape Elimination Commission, Black and Pink Newsletter (June 2010). 
3 First Amended Complaint at 28, Toth, No. 08-01219. Toth further explains, “The system is not made for 
Transgender or Gay prison Queens, and is only meant for ‘real’ men [Heteronormativity].” Ibid., 7. 
In her complaint in a different lawsuit, Toth makes the case that the totality of prison conditions are 
cruel and unusual, inhumane, and inadequate for LGBTQ prisoners. She therefore asks the district court for 
injunctive relief to force the CDCR to change its transphobic, homophobic culture. In order to do so, Toth 
provides a detailed list of 31 policies and practices that the CDCR should adopt. Ibid.; Order Denying 
Plaintiff’s Motion for a T.R.O. and Prelim. Inj., Toth (No. 11-00247), Sept. 7, 2011. 
4 Kim Shayo Buchanan, “Our Prisons, Ourselves: Race, Gender and the Rule of Law,” Yale Law and Policy 
Review 29, no 1 (2010). 
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in penological and social scientific constructions of sexual violence in prisons and the 
prisoner culture that supposedly creates that violence.  
This chapter examines how prison administrators, social scientists, and the law 
have constructed and addressed sexual violence, particularly against trans and gender 
nonconforming prisoners, in penal institutions. Since the mid-twentieth century, prison 
administrators and social scientists have produced dominant narratives that construct 
prisons as sites of endemic, uncontrollable sexual violence and disorder, generally 
perpetrated by (racialized) hypermasculine male prisoners who are often incited to sexual 
violence by gender nonconforming prisoners. I argue that these narratives simultaneously 
(and contradictorily) constructed gender nonconforming and eventually trans prisoners as 
hypersexual and, therefore, unrapable and as inevitably subject to sexual violence. As 
such, sexual violence has long been a key aspect of the discursive and material penal 
management of gender nonconforming and trans prisoners. These dominant narratives 
work to obscure how sexual violence is institutionalized in penal management. Prison 
administrators have long used sexual violence as a tool of control, a tool that at once 
punishes racialized, sexual, and gender deviance and that produces understandings of 
queer dangerousness and security threat. By portraying prisoners as (queerly) dangerous 
and sexual security threats, prison administrators become protectors and quotidian, 
institutionalized forms of sexual violence—what I call carceral sexual violence—are 
normalized and produced as necessary in the name of security. In the last two sections of 
the chapter, I examine how this narrative of the impossibility and inevitability of sexual 
violence against gender nonconforming and trans prisoners was structured into legal 
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understandings of sexual violence as courts and eventually legislatures began to address 
sexual violence in penal institutions over the last few decades. By examining Eighth 
Amendment jurisprudence and the recent Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003, I argue 
that these narratives often legitimize or obscure carceral sexual violence even as the law 
was purportedly eliminating it.  
Drawing from feminist, particularly women of color feminist, activism and 
scholarship, this chapter approaches sexual violence as a tool of power and control, as a 
tool of systems of oppression—including heteropatriarchy, white supremacy, and 
colonialism—and as not only punitive and repressive but also productive.5 As Andrea 
Smith argues in Conquest: Sexual Violence and American Indian Genocide, sexual 
violence is both a tool of direct sexual bodily violence and “a tool by which certain 
people become marked as inherently ‘rapable.’”6 This construction of rapability or 
violability relies on the production of racialized sexual nonnormativity and 
                                                
5 See for example, Andrea Smith, Conquest: Sexual Violence and American Indian Genocide (Cambridge, 
MA: South End Press, 2005); Andrea Smith, “Not an Indian Tradition: The Sexual Colonization of Native 
Peoples,” Hypatia 18, no. 2 (Spring 2003); Incite! Women of Color Against Violence, The Color of 
Violence: The INCITE! Anthology (Cambridge: South End Press, 2006; Angela Y. Davis, Women, Race, 
and Class (New York: Vintage Books, 1981); Angela Y. Davis, “JoAnn Little: The Dialectics of Rape,” in 
The Angela Y. Davis Reader, ed. Joy James (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 1998); Joy James, 
Resisting State Violence: Radicalism, Gender, and Race in U.S. Culture (Minneapolis, MN: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1996); Estelle B. Freedman, Redefining Rape: Sexual Violence in the Era of Suffrage and 
Segregation (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013); Antonia I. Castañeda, “Sexual Violence in 
the Politics and Policies of Conquest: Amerindian Women and the Spanish Conquest of Alta California,” in 
Building with Our Hands: New Directions in Chicana Studies, ed. Adela de la Torre and Beatríz M. 
Pesquera (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1993); Kimberlé Crenshaw, “Mapping the 
Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color,” Stanford Law Review 
43 (July 1991). 
While Susan Brownmiller and Catherine MacKinnon often failed to understand how race and 
racialized systems of oppression were integral parts of constructions and experiences of sexual violence, 
they did important work theorizing rape as a tool of heteropatriarchy and an act of power and domination 
(although they differed in their theorizations about rape’s relationship to sexuality and desire). Susan 
Brownmiller, Against Our Will: Men, Women, and Rape (New York: Fawcett Columbine, 1975); Catherine 
MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989). See 
also, Ann J. Cahill, Rethinking Rape (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001). 
6 Smith, Conquest, 3. 
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dangerousness. Long dominant constructions of black and brown sexual excess and 
danger produces people of color as inferior, primitive, deviant, and undeserving of 
citizenship and, in doing so, justifies violence against and state control over them.7 
Sexual violence has been used to destroy the perceived humanity and personhood of 
oppressed people, both on individual and community-wide levels. Put another way, the 
embodied experience of sexual violence is an outcome of and reproduces constructions of 
criminality, deviance, danger, and threat as embodied in nonwhiteness (particularly 
blackness) and sexual and gender nonnormativity.8 
Smith advocates for a broad understanding of sexual violence that includes direct 
bodily assault by another person (or persons) but also violence perpetrated by the state. 
Drawing from Smith’s definition of sexual violence, I understand sexual violence as 
encompassing a broad range of forms of violence that target the sexual (as in sexuality) 
or the sexed (as in gender or sex-classified) body. This definition includes violent sexual 
penetration and touching as well as sexual harassment, segregation based on sexuality or 
gender nonconformity, denial of gender-related medical treatment, sterilization or other 
disruptions of an imprisoned person’s reproductive capacity, nonconsensual sex-
classification, and other related violence.9  
                                                
7 Joey L. Mogul, Andrea J. Ritchie, and Kay Whitlock, Queer (In)Justice: The Criminalization of LGBT 
People in the United States (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 2010); Freedman, Redefining Rape; Davis, 
Women, Race, and Class; Davis, “JoAnn Little”; Smith, Conquest; Smith, “Not an Indian Tradition”; 
James, Resisting State Violence. 
8 James, Resisting State Violence. Here, I am also borrowing from and expanding on Ann J. Cahill’s 
conceptualization of rape as an embodied experience. Cahill, Rethinking Rape.  
9 In using this definition of sexual violence, I do not mean to imply that all these forms of violence are 
equivalent. Instead, I use this broad definition in order to help us understand that these forms of violence 
are interrelated.  
  141 
Incarceration itself is an intimate form of violence, a violence that targets the 
body and destroys bodily integrity. Penal staff and administrators have nearly complete 
control over prisoners’ bodies and lives. In jail and prison, prisoners are denied the 
fundamental ability to protect, defend, and even take care of themselves as they are 
stripped of most forms of bodily autonomy. As Dylan Rodríguez has argued, through 
imprisonment, the state dehumanizes prisoners and renders incarcerated bodies as 
“infinitely fungible objects, available for whimsical and gratuitous productions of bodily 
and psychic violence, while presumed always already ‘dangerous’ and criminally 
disobedient.”10 Rodríguez argues that fungibility is produced from white supremacist, and 
particularly antiblack, carceral logics, but it is also—and interconnectedly—produced 
from carceral racialized gender normative logics, which produce all prisoners, but 
particularly gender nonconforming prisoners, as inherently (racially) gender and sexually 
nonnormative and dangerous. In practice, the fungibility of prisoners authorizes many 
forms of carceral violence, many of which are sexual. Put another way, sexual violence is 
woven into the fabric of incarceration and the logic and mechanisms of carceral 
violence.11 The near total control of prisoners and their bodies produces a situation that 
not only facilitates rape and sexual assault perpetrated by staff with near legal immunity 
                                                
10 Dylan Rodríguez, Forced Passages: Imprisoned Radical Intellectuals and the U.S. Prison Regime 
(Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 2006), 149.  
11 This understanding of prisons and incarceration also draws from a long history of trans, gender 
nonconforming, and gay prisoners and activists, like Toth, arguing that prisons are sexually violent and that 
sexual violence is used as a tool of control. See for example, Angela Y. Davis, Are Prisons Obsolete? (New 
York: Seven Stories Press, 2003); Assata Shakur, Assata: An Autobiography (Chicago: Lawrence Hill 
Books, 1987); “Dear Prisoners,” Join Hands 1 (1976), Kinsey Institute Library and Special Collections, 
Indiana University; Don Cotton, Speech quoted in “Gays Support the SQ Six,” Join Hands 1 (1976), Ibid.; 
“Prison Life Behind the Lavender ‘H,’” Lesbian Tide 6, no. 4 (January/February 1977), LGBT Periodicals 
Collection, New York Public Library; Anthony Smith, Letter, n.d., Folder 42, Box 13, Broomfield Street 
Education Foundation Records (M64), Northeastern University Libraries; Donald G. Swaffer, Letter, 
October 9, 1986, Ibid.; Jason Lydon, interview by author, February 5, 2014, over phone, on file with 
author. 
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but also facilitates rape and sexual violence perpetrated by prisoners, often with full 
knowledge and even support by staff. This situation is worsened by the prison system’s 
authority to classify and discipline prisoners’ sex. As Toth’s story exemplifies, sexual 
violence against trans and gender nonconforming people in prisons is multidimensional, 
pervasive, and institutionalized within the prison system.  
Rape, sexual assault, sexual harassment, and coerced sex perpetrated by prisoners 
and staff is common throughout the US. In men’s prisons, while prisoner-perpetrated 
violence is a pervasive, enormous problem, prisoners identify staff as perpetrators around 
half of the time and report that staff-perpetrated violence—both sexual assaults and the 
facilitation of sexual assault perpetrated by other prisoners—is a much larger concern 
than prisoner-perpetrated violence.12 In women’s prisons, the vast majority of sexual 
violence is perpetrated by staff.13 Sexual violence is also integrated into imprisonment in 
many mundane, institutionalized ways, such as poor and sometimes violent medical 
treatment, sex classification that refuses to acknowledge a trans persons’ gender identity, 
                                                
12 Allen J. Beck, Ramona R. Rantala, and Jessica Rexroat, Sexual Victimization Reported by Adult 
Correctional Authorities, 2009-11 (Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Statistics, January 2014); The 
Basics About Sexual Abuse in US Detention (Just Detention International, August 2013). 
The one-half statistic refers to sexual assaults that was officially reported to prison authorities and, 
therefore, only accounts for a small percentage of all sexual assaults in penal institutions. It also does not 
address staff involvement or facilitation of prisoner-perpetrated sexual violence. For example, like in 
Toth’s case, staff place prisoners in potentially dangerous situations and refuse to help them. Some 
prisoners have reported that officers run prostitution rings where some or even all transgender or gender 
nonconforming prisoners are forced to participate. Dean Spade, Testimony at Hearing: At Risk: The Gay, 
Lesbian, and Transgender Populations, Before the Prison Rape Elimination Commission, San Francisco, 
California (August 19, 2005); Z Gabriel Arkles to the National Prison Rape Elimination Commission, 
August 15, 2005, http://archive.srlp.org/files/documents/NPREC_testimony_Arkles.pdf; Chase Strangio 
and Z Gabriel Arkles to Robert Hinchman, “Docket No. OAG-131; AG Order No. 3143-2010, National 
Standards to Prevent, Detect, and Respond to Prison Rape,” May 10, 2010, 
http://srlp.org/files/SRLP%20PREA%20comment%20Docket%20no%20OAG-131.pdf; Just Detention 
International, “The Rape of LGBT Prisoners”; William (Lilly) P., “Lilly’s Story”; “Eyeman Arizona 
Sister”; Buchanan, “Our Prisons, Ourselves.” 
13 “Not Part of My Sentence”: Violations of Human Rights of Women in Custody (Amnesty International, 
1999); All Too Familiar: Sexual Abuse of Women in US Sate Prisons (Human Rights Watch, 1996). 
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forced conformity to gender norms, and abusive strip, body cavity, and pat-down 
searches.14 Central to this carceral sexual violence, as Toth’s experiences demonstrate, is 
the production of trans and gender nonconforming prisoners as hypersexual and therefore 
unrapable. Many staff view homosexuality, gender nonconformity, or trans status as a 
blanket consent to sex or as to blame for sexual violence. In practice, these attitudes lead 
staff to ignore reports of threats or violence against trans and gender nonconforming 
prisoners. Some laugh at reports of sexual violence, respond with harassment or threats of 
further violence, or punish prisoners for defending themselves.15 In doing so, they 
                                                
14 Prisoners are often denied medical treatment, including following a sexual assault. Prisoners in women’s 
facilities report feeling sexually assaulted during gynecological exams, which staff sometimes force them 
to submit to. In both men’s and women’s facilities, medical staff sometimes trade health care for sexual 
favors, or they harass or assault prisoners. Furthermore, medical staff have the authority to decide the 
gender identity and trans status of a prisoner, including in men’s prisons frequently getting to decide if a 
trans woman has a “legitimate” need for a bra, and with this authority they routinely deny trans and gender 
nonconforming peoples’ identities. Robin Levi, Testimony at Hearing: At Risk: Sexual Abuse and 
Vulnerable Groups Behind Bars, Before the Prison Rape Elimination Commission, San Francisco, 
California (August 19, 2005); Gabriel Arkles, interview by author, August 12, 2013, Boston, MA, on file 
with author; Alisha Williams, interview by author, August 19, 2013, New York, NY, on file with author. 
The refusal to provide survivors with medical treatment after assaults can not only be physically and 
mentally disastrous for a survivor, but it also means that no medical record or other types of evidence exist 
of the assault. Furthermore, when prisoners try to keep and hide physical evidence of an assault, officers 
will sometimes find it, destroy it, and retaliate against them. Because of these actions, little to no evidence 
exists, which makes “proving” the assault difficult. Indeed, when prison administrators do investigate rape 
allegations, they rarely find them substantiated. According to Kim Shayo Buchanan, prison officials report 
that more than 80% of reports are found to be either “unsubstantiated” or “unfounded.” Buchanan, “Our 
Prisons, Ourselves.” 
15 For all of these reasons, prisoners frequently choose not to report rapes or file complaints against other 
prisoners or staff. If they do, they are potentially subject to violence and retaliation from both other 
prisoners and staff. Even when they are not intentionally punished for reporting abuse, their experiences of 
protection are often punitive and violent. For example, prisoners regularly report that they are raped while 
in administrative segregation, both by other prisoners and by staff. In fact, because segregation is so 
isolating and takes prisoners away from any kind of community with other prisoners, they are more at risk 
for sexual violence perpetrated by staff. Coolman, et al., Still In Danger; Just Detention International, “The 
Rape of LGBT Prisoners,” in Hate Violence against LGBT People in the US (New York: National 
Coalition of Anti-Violence Programs, 2008); “A Letter from DONNA”; In the Shadows: Sexual Violence in 
U.S. Detention Facilities (Los Angeles: Stop Prisoner Rape, 2006); Masen Davis, et al., to Eric H. Holder, 
“Preventing the Sexual Abuse of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, and Intersex People in Correctional 
Settings: Comments Submitted in Response to Docket No. OAG-131; AG Order No. 3143-2010, National 
Standards to Prevent, Detect, and Respond to Prison Rape,” May 10, 2010; Arkles to the National Prison 
Rape Elimination Commission; Bassichis, “It’s War in Here”; Emmer, et al., This is a Prison, Glitter is 
Not Allowed; Gabriel Arkles, “Safety and Solidarity across Gender Lines: Rethinking Segregation of 
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normalize sexual violence against trans and gender nonconforming prisoners, both 
invisibilizing prisoner- and staff-perpetrated sexual assault and rape and justifying other 
forms of sexual violence, such as abusive searches. As a trans woman incarcerated in 
Arizona explained in a 2002 letter to a prisoner newsletter, prison staff view gender 
nonconforming, trans, and gay prisoners as “sub-human.”16 
 
The Prison as a Space of Queer Dangerousness 
Today’s dominant construction of rape as an endemic—even natural—part of 
men’s prison life dates back to the late 1960s and 1970s. Prior to the late 1960s, sexual 
violence in prisons was rarely explicitly marked as sexual assault or rape. Nevertheless, 
prison administrators and social scientists documented the existence of sexual violence in 
penal institutions since the nineteenth century as they discussed sex between prisoners. In 
Criminal Intimacy: Prison and the Uneven History of Modern American Sexuality, 
historian Regina Kunzel argues that prison administrators and social scientists were 
preoccupied with sex in prisons since the inception of the contemporary prison system. 
By the early twentieth century as homosexuality and heterosexuality were increasingly 
viewed as (supposedly) stable sexual identities, they began to view penal institutions as 
sites of sexual perversion and sex between prisoners as an integral (and perverse) aspect 
of prison culture, particularly in men’s institutions.17 Instead of thinking about “rape,” 
                                                                                                                                            
Transgender People in Detention,” Temple Political and Civil Rights Law Review 18, no. 2 (Spring 2009); 
Alexander L. Lee, “Gendered Crime & Punishment: Strategies to Protect Transgender, Gender Variant & 
Intersex People in America’s Prisons,” GIC TIP Journal 4, no. 1 (Winter 2003); Jody Marksamer to the 
National Prison Rape Elimination Commission, August 15, 2005. 
16 “Eyeman Arizona Sister,” 22. 
17 Regina Kunzel, Criminal Intimacy: Prison and the Uneven History of Modern American Sexuality 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008). In Criminal Intimacy, Kunzel describes how constructions 
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they tended to conflate consensual, coercive, and forced sex. During this time, prison 
administrators and social scientists constructed narratives about men’s prisons as sites of 
rampant perversion and violence perpetrated entirely by prisoners. Key to these narratives 
of prison perversion was an understanding of gender nonconforming prisoners as 
particularly (queerly) dangerous, as threats to institutional security and to other prisoners. 
Prison administrators viewed gender nonconforming prisoners as hypersexual, actively 
inciting the desire and sexual aggression of other (masculine) prisoners and therefore as 
unrapable (as always asking for it). In fact, prison officials and social scientists often 
described prison as “a rather happy place” or “a paradise” for homosexual and gender 
nonconforming people, a place where they were desirable and received constant sexual 
attention.18 Yet, in their discussions of rampant sexual violence that surrounded them, 
prison officials and social scientists implied (although rarely, if every explicitly stated) 
                                                                                                                                            
of sex between prisoners shifted from “the abominable practice of a lustful individuals” with a sexual 
economy based on “the unnatural mixing of inmates of different types and status”—age in men’s prisons 
and race in women’s prisons—in the nineteenth century to “a culture unto itself” in the early and mid-
twentieth century. Instead of age and/or race, this new sexual culture was primarily organized around 
differences of gender expression, especially in men’s institutions. Ibid., 49, 29. Nearly all research and 
writings on prisons focused on men’s institutions until the mid-twentieth century and the anxieties about 
sex were much more acute in the context of men’s institutions.  
18 John Bartlow Martin, Break Down the Walls: American Prisons: Present, Past, and Future (New York: 
Ballantine Books, 1954), 178; Daniel Lee, “Seduction of the Guilty: Homosexuality in American Prisons,” 
Fact 2 (December 1965), 58. Unlike most writers during this time, Martin also briefly mentions that 
homosexual and gender nonconforming prisoners were vulnerable to violence and sexual assault from both 
other prisoners and guards.  
A few writers discussing women’s prisons made similar claims. For example, Florence Monahan, who 
was the head of a number of women’s institutions in the Midwest and California in the early twentieth 
century, claimed that many lesbians “deliberately put [themselves] in prison” because “a women’s 
reformatory is a happy hunting ground. These women, failures in all they touch ‘outside’ and finding no 
point in existence in normal society, come to prison where they are housed, fed, and clothed at the State’s 
expense and where, having no wage-earning duties to interfere, they can pursue their chief interest without 
distraction.” Florence Monahan, Women in Crime (New York: Ives Washburn, Inc., 1941), 226.  
I should note that there were certainly some homosexual and gender nonconforming people that did 
prefer prison for a variety of reasons, including regular access to food and a bed and easy access to sexual 
partners. My point is not that this construction of prison as a happy place for these people was not always 
accurate, but that this construction both produced prisons as perverse or queer spaces and normalized and 
elided sexual violence against homosexual and gender nonconforming prisoners.  
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that gender nonconforming prisoners were the victims of that violence. Moreover, this 
construction of the unrapability of gender nonconforming prisoners authorized and 
necessitated various forms of carceral violence, most notably their segregation, as they 
were viewed as inciting violence. Gender nonconforming prisoners were, therefore, 
constructed as simultaneously unrapable and constantly surrounded by (and potentially 
subject to) sexual violence.  
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the narrative about sexual violence in prison 
dramatically shifted as prison administrators and researchers began to explicitly discuss 
rape as a central problem in (usually men’s) prisons. As Kunzel argues, this new 
construction of sexual violence focus on a narrative about men’s prison sexual culture 
that emerged in the 1950s, which described a highly stratified gendered sexual culture of 
violence, coercion, hypermasculinity, and hypersexuality. Writers identified three main 
categories of prisoner who participated in this sexual culture: “wolves” or “jockers,” who 
were (hyper)masculine, heterosexual (or “pseudo-homosexual”) prisoners, who took the 
dominant or “male” role in sex; “punks,” who were “weaker” heterosexual-identified 
prisoners, who were forced or coerced into sex by wolves; and “fags” or “queen,” who 
were homosexuals outside prisons and who were generally marked by some kind of 
gender nonconformity. Kunzel argues that in the late 1960s and 1970s, this narrative was 
racialized, as administrators and researchers began to claim that rape in prison was 
primarily perpetrated by black men against white prisoners as a means of racial control 
and retribution.19 While the language and other specifics of the new narrative were 
                                                
19 Kunzel, Criminal Intimacy. See for example, Leo Carroll, Hacks, Blacks, and Cons: Race Relations in a 
Maximum Security Prison (Lexington: D.C. Heath and Co., 1974); Arthur V. Huffman, “Sex Deviation in a 
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different from earlier discussions of sex and sexual violence in prisons, prisons continued 
to be constructed as spaces of sexual violence and disorder, perpetrated entirely by 
prisoners. Gender nonconforming prisoners—the “fags” and “queens”—also continued to 
be viewed as dangerously hypersexual and inciters of (sexual) violence and disorder and 
therefore unrapable; however, prison administrators and social scientists also began to 
describe them as constantly subject to sexual violence. 
The shift in narrative about sexual violence and rape in prisons facilitated prison 
administrators’ recognition that gender nonconforming prisoners were subject to sexual 
violence, as they focused more attention on the sexual violence perpetrated by 
(racialized) hypermasculine prisoners. By midcentury, prison administrators and social 
scientists had begun to argue that, as sociologist Gresham Sykes explained, the “pains of 
imprisonment” included the deprivation of heterosexual sex, leading to masculine, 
otherwise heterosexual male prisoners to participate in often violent homosexual sex.20 
As psychiatrist Benjamin Karpman explained, the deprivation of heterosexuality, coupled 
with “the sight and smell of naked bodies…parading [around which]…charges the 
atmosphere with excessive stimulation,” led prisoners to lose “self-control” in violent 
                                                                                                                                            
Prison Community,” Journal of Social Therapy 6 (1960); C. Scott Moss, Ray E. Hosford, and William R. 
Anderson, “Sexual Assault in a Prison,” Psychological Reports 44 (1979); John Irwin, The Felon 
(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1970); Anthony M. Scacco, Rape in Prison (Springfield, IL: 
Charles C. Thomas Publisher, 1975); John Haggarty, Sex in Prison (New York: Ace Books, 1975); Aryeh 
Neier, “Sex and Confinement,” The Civil Liberties Review 5, no. 2 (July-Aug 1978).  
This timing also coincides with the emergence of feminist anti-rape activism that shifted cultural and 
legal understandings of sexual violence and constructed a new vocabulary to talk about sexual violence. 
See for example, Brownmiller, Against Our Will. 
20 Gresham M. Sykes, The Society of Captives: A Study of a Maximum Security Prison (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1958). See also, Robert M. Lindner, Stone Walls and Men (New York: Odyssey 
Press, 1946); Benjamin Karpman, “Sex Life in Prison,” Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology, and Police 
Science 38 (February 1948). Kunzel argues that the participation of masculine, ostensibly heterosexual 
prisoners in homosexual activity caused prison administrators and social scientists great anxiety because of 
its implications for the nature of heterosexuality, as sex in prison potentially “reveal[ed] heterosexual 
identity as fragile, unstable, and, itself, situational.” Kunzel, Criminal Intimacy, 8. 
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ways.21 As Kunzel details, the narrative about (hyper)masculine prisoners committing 
sexual violence was explicitly racialized in the 1970s and secured to criminalized black 
masculinity. While earlier discussions of sex in prisons had focused on the unmet sexual 
needs of men, these new discussions focused on black masculinity and power, claiming 
that black rapists were driven to rape white prisoners out of racial rage and antiwhite 
hatred. Kunzel argues that this new narrative read prison rape through the shifts in the 
racial composition of prisons at the beginning of mass incarceration and the period’s 
militant black activism, especially black nationalism, and was used to delegitimize black 
militancy by portraying it as irrationally and violently antiwhite as well as to confirm 
constructions and fears of black men’s supposed dangerous and excessive masculinity.22 
This narrative constructed the prison as racially and sexually violent, often on the brink 
of chaos, and took some of the focus from the dangerousness of gender nonconforming 
prisoners. In this new context, some prison observers began to argue that gender 
nonconforming and homosexual prisoners were subject to sexual violence.23 
Nevertheless, prison administrators and social scientists continued to argue 
explicitly that gender nonconforming prisoners were unrapable, even as they 
simultaneously admitted that they might be subject to sexual violence. For example, in 
                                                
21 Karpman, “Sex Life in Prison,” 479.  
22 These depictions of black sexual violence reinforced and reinterpreted black criminality, aggression, 
violence, and pathology. In other words, constructions of sexually dangerous and criminal black 
(hyper)masculinity, or the myth of the black rapist, that had been used to justify chattel slavery and then 
extra-legal lynching in previous eras was now being used to justify the mass incarceration of black men and 
the violence of imprisonment. As the now ubiquitous popular construction of prisons as sites of nearly 
constant and uncontrollable sexual violence was constructed during the 1970s and racialized as black, it 
worked with the rise of mass incarceration and constructions of black criminality that justified it to 
(re)racialize the space of the prison as black. 
23 For example, Sykes explained that “habitual homosexuals,” the queens and fags, were likely to be 
victimized by aggressive masculine prisoners “who turn to homosexual as a temporary means of relief.” 
Sykes, The Society of Captives, 71. 
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his study of homosexuality in prison published in 1971, sociologist George L. Kirkham 
claimed that most “queens” were “relatively immune” to institutional sexual coercion and 
violence because of their (desirable) femininity. Yet, Kirkham also acknowledged that if 
they were not attached to a stronger, heterosexual prisoner who protected them, they were 
constantly at risk of sexual assault and coercion. Nevertheless, he focused his concern on 
what he viewed as the sexual excessiveness of most queens, who “skip[] from marriage 
to marriage” and “leave in her wake a series of beatings and stabbings, spread veneral 
[sic] disease, and occasionally produce riots.”24 To Kirkham, queens were more 
dangerous than in danger. By focusing on their queer dangerousness, Kirkham, like other 
prison administrators and social scientists that I discussed in the last chapter, both erases 
and justifies gender nonconforming prisoners’ experiences of insecurity and sexual 
violence.25  
Similarly, in his 1975 book Sex in Prison, John Haggarty discusses a female-
identified person named the Duchess who had a history of imprisonment in men’s penal 
institutions. While Haggarty identifies her as a homosexual, the Duchess had been on 
hormones prior to incarceration, had breast implants, was planning on having sex 
                                                
24 George L. Kirkham, “Homosexuality in Prison,” in Studies in the Sociology of Sex, ed. James M. 
Henslin. (New York: Meredith Corporation, 1971), 337. Kirkham explains that queens are “quickly 
identifiable” because of their “effeminancy, a bizarre caricature of real femininity.” Ibid., 333. Kirkham 
also mentions that in some cases, “the more serious gender aberration of transsexualism is sometimes 
apparent.” Ibid., 335. 
25 Moreover, some prison administrators and researchers argued that homosexual and gender 
nonconforming prisoners reveled in the violence. George Deveureux and Malcolm C. Moss explain that for 
gender nonconforming homosexual prisoners, who are fought over, the violence of the wolves “affords 
opportunities for masochistic satisfaction, for submission and plastic behavior, as well as satisfaction of the 
need for dependence, for unearned privileges, protection, etc.” George Deveureux and Malcolm C. Moss, 
“The Social Structures of Prisons and the Organic Tensions,” Journal of Criminal Psychopathology 4, no. 2 
(October 1942), 317. 
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reassignment surgery, and explicitly identified as female.26 Far from portraying her as at 
risk for sexual assault, Haggarty describes her as being “powerful and influential” in the 
prison because of her breasts and femininity. In prison, according to Haggarty, “the 
Duchess became the female sex symbol of her dreams.” Even though, “she still had a 
male sex organ…she was finally being treated like the woman she always felt she was 
inside.”27 According to Haggarty, the only violence the Duchess experienced was 
perpetrated by other gender nonconforming prisoners because of their jealousy of her 
beauty, femininity, and the (sexual) attention she received. Throughout the study, 
Haggarty describes rampant sexual violence in prisons; the Duchess is the only prisoner 
that he discusses in detail who is neither the victim nor the perpetrator of sexual violence. 
Instead, Haggarty describes the Duchess as flirting and sexually performing for prisoners, 
inciting them to violence that disrupts the institution through her hypersexuality. This 
stark contrast between her story and the others in the book gives the impression that 
gender nonconforming prisoners were powerful and safe from sexual violence, obscuring 
not only the sexual violence that they experienced but also the racialized gender 
normative violence of the prison system more generally.  
Throughout his discussion of the Duchess, Haggarty represents her as hypersexual 
and therefore (queerly) dangerous and unrapable. While Haggarty reduces her femininity 
and female-identity to aspects of her (male) homosexuality, his description of and 
                                                
26 Because Haggarty identifies her but does not let the Duchess identify herself, it is unclear exactly how 
she identified. In the 1970s, it was certainly possible that she identified as transsexual; however, Haggarty’s 
description of her as a “homosexual” could have reflected her identity.  
27 Haggarty, Sex in Prison, 113. Although he does not recognize it as such, Haggarty also describes sexual 
violence perpetrated by staff against the Duchess. For example, he describes an incident in which she was 
caught by a guard stripping for other prisoners. He took her into the guard station and threatened her with 
assault and isolation if she did not tell him where she got the lingerie and who she had sex with. To avoid 
this, she gave him oral sex and claimed that she never had another problem. 
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response to her is simultaneously about her as a male homosexual and a woman.28 Of 
particular importance to Haggarty is that the Duchess looks like a woman—both 
according to staff and other prisoners—and has breasts. Like some of the cross-gender 
identified people that I discussed in the first chapter, the Duchess was initially booked in 
the Women’s House of Detention after her arrest. Haggarty explains that during booking 
staff strip searched her and “discovered” her penis, after which they transferred her to the 
Manhattan House of Detention, known as the Tombs. Like staff, prisoners at the Tombs 
also read the Duchess as female. Haggarty describes the Duchess’s arrival there as 
causing (sexual) disorder:  
Inmates screamed and rattled their cups against the bars of their cells. Men ignored 
guards’ orders to go back in line…“Hey, there’s a real woman in here!” “Hey, hey man, 
we got some real pussy.” “On the second cell block there’s a real piece of ass!” “How did 
that cunt get in this place!” were some of the cries that echoed throughout the Tombs that 
afternoon. The “woman”, the “real pussy” that set off this demonstration was the 
Duchess. She coyly took off her shirt, shook her shoulder-length hair and let it fall loose 
and free. The Duchess did have beautiful pert little breasts, but what those two or three 
hundred excited inmates didn’t know as she rubbed her nipples with her forefinger, 
                                                
28 Scholars who have discussed gender nonconforming prisoners like the Duchess tend to engage with their 
gender nonconformity only as an outward sign of homosexuality. Indeed, prison administrators and social 
scientists, like Haggarty, generally explicitly viewed gender nonconformity as an outward sign of 
homosexuality and justified their treatment of these prisoners primarily through the need to manage or 
eliminate (homo)sexuality and related-violence and disorder. Nevertheless, the reduction of gender 
nonconformity to homosexuality obscures how the construction of trans women as queerly dangerous is 
usually simultaneously about constructions of the dangers of (male) homosexuality and of femininity and 
womanhood. While usually unintentional, this reduction can reinforce the belief that trans women are really 
men, thereby renaturalizing the sex binary and negating the identities of some prisoners who identified as 
female. Moreover, understanding gender nonconformity as only about homosexuality obscures how prisons 
regulate both nonnormative sexuality and gender. Sexuality, of course, tends to be hypervisible, while 
penal regulation of gender is deeply naturalized and therefore not nearly as visible. Nevertheless, it is 
important to mark how the regulation of these two categories is inextricably interconnected but not 
reducible to one another. Chauncey’s somewhat brief discussion of gender nonconforming homosexual 
prisoners in Welfare Island is particularly illustrative of this reduction of gender nonconformity as a 
signpost of homosexuality. Chauncey, Gay New York. Of course, this argument that historians of sexuality, 
particularly of gay and lesbian history, tend to reduce gender nonconformity and cross-gender identity to 
homosexuality has been argued by trans studies scholars. See for example, Shannon Minter, “Do 
Transsexuals Dream of Gay Rights? Getting Real About Transgender Inclusion in the Gay Rights 
Movement,” New York Law School Journal of Human Rights 17 (2000-2001); Aaron H. Devor and 
Nicholas Matte, “ONE Inc. and Reed Erickson: The Uneasy Collaboration of Gay and Trans Activism,” 
GLQ 10, no. 2 (2004). 
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giggled seductively, and flirted with them from behind the locked door of the cell was 
that “this piece of ass” also had a penis.29 
 
These prisoners were not responding to her as a male homosexual but as a woman. They 
were responding to her female body—which, Haggarty insistently reminds us, also has a 
(hidden) penis and is therefore “really” male—especially her breasts. Indeed, her breasts 
presented a particularly pernicious danger—Haggarty later states that they caused 
“pandemonium” in the jail—not only because they elicited (queer) desire but because 
they marked her as (deceptively) female.30 Breasts as a particularly dangerous security 
threat—as a cause of sexual disorder and violence—would become a theme in prison 
administrators’ concerns about trans women in men’s prisons in the following decades. 
Drawing on dominant misogynist narratives of femininity and womanhood (particularly 
nonnormative femininity and womanhood) as dangerous and inciting sexual violence 
from men, Haggarty describes the Duchess as asking (and performing) for it, as desiring 
the attention, and he does not comment on how these catcalls and the (sexual) excitement 
exhibited by the other prisoners indicate that she might be subject to sexual violence (or, 
for that matter, that these responses to her by other prisoners were a form of sexual 
violence).  
While Haggarty primarily discusses the Duchess’s security threat as causing 
sexual disorder among prisoners, implicit in his discussion is that the Duchess is a threat 
to racialized gender normative carceral logics and its naturalized sex binary. The 
Duchess’s mixed sex body—which has both breasts and a penis—produces 
administrative disorder and therefore requires normalization. Haggarty himself 
                                                
29 Haggarty, Sex in Prison, 105.  
30 Ibid., 107. 
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consistently reminds his reader that she is “really” male by marking her repeatedly as 
“deceptive” in her femaleness.31 
In response to the Duchess’s sexual and sexed security threat, jail administrators 
segregated her, cut her hair, and refused to provide her hormone therapy. Haggarty also 
implies that prison officials lamented that they could not remove her breast implants. 
Because of the loss of hormones, as Haggarty explained, “the deceptive womanly 
roundness of her hips fell away.”32 In other words, jail administrators did everything they 
could to strip her of her womanhood or visible femaleness, violent actions justified by her 
supposedly hypersexuality or queer dangerousness. Haggarty’s description of the jail’s 
management of the Duchess highlights some of the mundane regulatory carceral sexual 
violence that I argue is an important feature of the prison system’s management of gender 
nonconforming prisoners. Jail administrators control the intimate contours of the 
Duchess’s body, violently altering it to become more manageable (by making it more 
masculine) within the men’s jail. This carceral sexual violence is legitimized and 
obscured by Haggarty’s—and presumably jail administrator’s—construction of the 
Duchess as an inciter of sexual violence and disorder, a source of administrative disorder, 
and, implicitly, a fraud.  
This construction of gender nonconforming prisoners, like the Duchess, as 
inciting violence also relied on constructions of the (hyper)masculine (racialized) 
criminal perversion of prisoners who they incited to violence. Social scientists and prison 
                                                
31 As Talia Me Bettcher notes, this is a common narrative about trans women; a narrative that is often used 
to justify violence against them. Talia Mae Bettcher, “Evil Deceivers and Make-Believers: On Transphobic 
Violence and the Politics of Illusion,” Hypatia 22, no. 3 (Summer 2007). 
32 Haggarty, Sex in Prison, 107. 
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administrators referenced these masculine prisoners to construct the prison as inevitably 
(sexually) violent; gender nonconforming prisoners were constructed as the volatile 
element that prevented prison administrators from controlling that violence. This 
confluence of criminalized, queer (hyper)masculinity and femininity helped justify and/or 
obscure carceral sexual violence against gender nonconforming prisoners.  
These discourses also produce both feminine and (hyper)masculine categories of 
prisoners as dangerously queer, in mutually constitutive and intersecting ways. Masculine 
prisoners who are incited to violence are queered because of both their violent (criminal) 
desire for gender nonconforming prisoners like the Duchess and their hypermasculinity 
and racialized criminality, two traits that are produced as inherently interconnected. 
Queer studies scholars have used queer to describe non-normativity, especially but not 
limited to gender and sexual nonconformity. As queer of color scholars, such as Roderick 
Ferguson and Cathy Cohen, have shown, white supremacy often queers people of color 
by portraying them as sexually and gender nonnormative and often excessive, dangerous, 
and even monstrous.33 Discourses of racialized nonheteronormativity have long been 
used to justify, organize, and normalize the marginalization, oppression, and 
criminalization of people and communities of color, and racialized criminality, especially 
black male and female criminality, has long been attached to sexual excess, danger, and 
(for black women) gender nonconformity. “Criminals” are constructed as 
nonnormative—and to a certain extent, queer—through their racialization and their 
                                                
33 Roderick Ferguson, Aberrations in Black: Toward a Queer of Color Critique (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2004); Cathy J. Cohen, “Punks, Bulldaggers, and Welfare Queens: The Radical Potential 
of Queer Politics?” GLQ 3 (1997). See also, Jasbir Puar, Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in 
Queer Times (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007). 
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depictions as unable to follow the rules of society. These not-explicitly gendered and 
sexualized nonnormative attributes easily lead to prisoners being seen as sexually and 
gender queer, as sexually excessive, uncontrollable, and violent, constructions reinforced 
by their location in sex-segregated spaces, which are considered inherently sexually and 
gender abnormal. In other words, all prisoners are constructed as dangerously 
nonnormative while certain prisoners are particularly dangerous in sexual and gendered 
queer ways. The prison itself, therefore, is produced as a queer space, a space of 
dangerous nonnormativity, a space frequently marked by (racialized) sexual violence, 
disorder, and danger.34 Within the racialized and queer space of the prison system, sexual 
violence becomes not only unsurprising but expected. Sexual violence and state 
imprisonment are sutured together and naturalized, and prison administrators are vacated 
of responsibility for creating that violence.  
                                                
34 Joey Mogul, Andrea Ritchie, and Kay Whitlock make a similar argument for understanding prisons as 
queer spaces in Queer (In)Justice: The Criminalization of LGBT People in the United States. See also, 
Kunzel, Criminal Intimacy. 
As one researcher explained in 1942, staff saw these sexually and gender nonconforming prisoners as 
“natural products of a degraded group and [‘proof’] that the convicts are depraved and animalistic, for they 
resort to practices abhorred by conventional persons.” Prisoners were seen by staff as inherently different 
from “noncriminal persons” in their actions as well as their dress, speech, and walk: “They are enemies of 
and outcasts from society.” S. Kirson Weinberg, “Aspects of the Prison’s Social Structure,” American 
Journal of Sociology 47 (1942): 721. Queens and wolves together queered the space of the prison in 
dangerous and threatening ways. Julius Leibert—who was a chaplain at San Quentin, Alcatrez, and Folsom 
in the 1950s—described the prison yard as dangerously (racialized) queer space: “Vast and forbidding 
when empty, [the yard] is a monster when packed. Five thousand heads, ten thousand eyes all blind, and a 
million pent-up hungers aching to burst forth—that’s that yard. Perverts on the prowl—‘jockers’ ganging 
up on a fish, ‘queens’ reveling in fights between rivals for their favors, homos pairing off for an affair or 
quarreling like obscene lovers. Gambling rife and incessant—bets on anything and everything—who has 
more lice, the wop or the coon, for instance. The cigarette is king, buying anything from pilfered pies and 
stolen socks to any possible form of sexual depravity.” Julius A. Leibert and Emily Kingsbery, Behind 
Bars: What a Chaplain Saw in Alcatraz, Folsom and San Quentin (Garden City, NY Doubleday and 
Company, Inc., 1965) 25. These writers not only marked all prisoners as sexually and gender queer but 
utilized racialized language—“depraved.” “animalistic,” and “monstrous”—to mark their difference from 
(white) sexually and gender normative society. This racial/sexual/gendered difference justified their 
imprisonment.  
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While social scientific and penological constructions of the prison as a space of 
endemic sexual violence was constructed through discussions of and research on men’s 
prisons, key aspects of this dominant narrative appeared in research and writings on 
women’s prisons. For most prison administrators and researcher, sexual violence was 
attached to masculinity and was only perpetrated by prisoners. This understanding of 
penal sexual violence led to prison writers generally describing sexual violence and 
coercion as rare in women’s prisons, if they mentioned it at all, which functioned to 
occlude endemic staff-perpetrated sexual violence within most women’s institutions. 
Prior to the 1960s, very little research about women’s prisons was published. This 
silence changed in the mid-1960s as a number of sociologists published studies of 
women’s prisons.35 These researchers found that lesbianism was central in women’s 
prison culture. In contrast to the descriptions of a violent and coercive sexual culture in 
men’s institutions, as Kunzel argues in her discussion of this literature, prison researchers 
wrote as if sex among women prisoners was “almost uniformly consensual.”36 Lesbian 
relationship were viewed as pathological but not violent. Often ignoring even their own 
evidence of sexual violence and coercion, writers generally described lesbian 
relationships in prisons as highly emotional, romantic, and domestic. The few writers 
                                                
35 See for example, Sara Harris, Hellhole: The Shocking Story of the Inmates and Life in the New York City 
House of Detention for Women (New York: E.P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1967; Russ Trainer, Prison: School 
for Lesbians (Van Nuys, CA: Triumph News Company, 1968); Rose Giallombardo, Society of Women: A 
Study of a Women’s Prison (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1966); Frederick S. Baldi, My 
Unwelcome Guests (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1959); Haggarty, Sex in Prison.  
36 Kunzel, Criminal Intimacy, 137. Kunzel argues that depictions of lesbianism in prisons during this time 
was generally viewed as not violent in contrast to Estelle Freedman’s discussion of the iconic violent prison 
lesbian. Freeman describes representation of lesbian prisoners as “menacing types” in post-World War II 
popular culture, arguing that the prison lesbian was constructed around the figure of the (sexually) 
aggressive black woman. 
Estelle B. Freedman, “Prison Lesbian: Race, Class, and the Construction of the Aggressive Female 
Homosexual,” Feminist Studies 22, 2 (Summer 1996).  
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who mentioned sexual violence usually blamed gender nonconforming lesbians, 
reconfirming the link between violence and masculinity, but unlike discussions of sexual 
violence and coercion in men’s prisons, violence in women’s prisons was described as 
isolated incidents and not part of prisoner culture. The naturalized sexual difference 
between men and women supposedly explained the striking difference between sexual 
cultures in men’s and women’s prisons, especially regarding physical and emotional 
needs; men were interested in sex and power, women in love and family. Prison 
administrators and social scientists generally concluded that sexual violence and coercion 
was against the nature of women.37 
Because of the naturalization of sexual difference, writers generally even 
described masculine female-classified prisoners as desiring emotional connection and 
long-term relationships over sexual release. As David A. Ward and Gene G. Kassebaum 
explained in their 1965 study of the Frontera Correctional Institution in California, “The 
importance of the emotional component of homosexual relationships is a fundamental 
distinction between the self-image and role behavior of butches and wolves.”38 
Lesbianism was produced as a discourse that denied the possibility of sexual violence in 
women’s prisons both because of the naturalized gendered discourse of women’s 
sexuality and because of the presumption that violence was only committed by prisoners. 
Nevertheless, women’s prisons were still constructed as queer spaces that featured 
                                                
37 For example, Haggarty explained that “sex for a man is a much more immediate, direct, and quickly 
intense experience. A man will rape for sex, both in and out of prison…But such a concept is almost alien 
to a woman. It is hard to imagine a woman, even one in frenzies of sexual anticipation and hunger, capable 
of assaulting or raping a man or woman to satisfy that need for sex.” Haggarty, Sex in Prison, 207. 
38 David A. Ward and Gene G. Kassebaum, Women’s Prison: Sex and Social Structure (Chicago: Aldine 
Pub. Co., 1965), 193.  
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uncontainable queer relationships. Instead of sex being uncontrollably violent, 
relationships between prisoners in women’s institutions—sometimes but not always 
sexual—were viewed as so common that they could not be stopped. In fact, the high 
percentage of prisoners participating in these relationships was a primary reason for the 
usual absence of segregation in women’s institutions. 
In relation to both men’s and women’s prisons, prison administrators and social 
scientists constructed sexual violence as inherently connected to different gendered 
formations of sexualized dangerous. This construction elided the sexual violence 
perpetrated by prison staff—violence that was quite common. In women’s prisons, this 
dynamic almost entirely invisibilized sexual violence; while in men’s prisons, it 
amplified the understanding of sexual dangerousness of prisoners and the prison space 
and legitimized institutional violence against them. Interestingly, femininity was the key 
to obscuring sexual violence in both men’s and women’s prisons: feminine prisoners in 
men’s prisons were produced as hypersexual, queerly dangerous, and therefore 
unrapable; prisoners in women’s prisons who were presumed to be women were 
considered incapable of sexual violence because of the naturalized non-violent nature of 
femininity. While different, in both cases, gendered queerness renders carceral sexual 
violence mundane and unremarkable (either because no one remarked upon it or because 
it was normalized).  
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Legalizing Carceral Sexual Violence 
While Haggarty claimed that the Duchess was never sexually assaulted, the scene 
that he described, of male prisoners incited to disorderly, even violent, desire by her 
queerly feminine body and sexual performance alluded to the possibility—perhaps, 
inevitability—of her violation if there were no bars between her and those prisoners. The 
seemingly contradictory intersection of the discourses that I have discussed—the 
supposed impossibility of sexually violating gender nonconforming prisoners and the 
inevitability of sexual violence in prisons because of the sexually violent hypermasculine 
racialized nature of other prisoners—come together frequently to inform legal cases 
discussing sexual violence against trans women.  
Trans women incarcerated in men’s institutions began to file federal civil rights 
lawsuits challenging the conditions of their incarceration by the early 1980s, and their 
experiences of violence, especially sexual violence, were a frequent theme. By this time, 
prison administrators regularly acknowledged that trans women were at high risk for 
experiencing sexual violence—indeed, this had become their primary excuse for 
segregating trans women. Yet, prison administrator and the courts continued to portray 
gender nonconforming prisoners as queerly dangerous. Within legal documents and 
judicial opinions, these two narratives of impossibility and inevitability of sexual 
violence were often articulated simultaneously, which produced most sexual violence 
against trans and gender nonconforming prisoners as legally unrecognizable as cruel and 
unusual punishment. This process resulted in the naturalization and normalization—even 
the legalization—of most sexual violence within penal institutions. 
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These seemingly contradictory discourses structured the Indiana district court and 
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals opinions regarding Lavarita Meriwether’s 1983 
lawsuit, which I briefly discussed in the previous chapter. Meriwether, a trans woman 
who had been taking hormones for nearly a decade and had undergone a number of 
gender-affirming surgeries, filed a federal civil rights lawsuit challenging her indefinite 
segregation, conditions of confinement, and the denial of medical treatment related to her 
transsexuality in the Indiana prison system. She also alleged that she had survived 
frequent sexual assaults by staff and other prisoners, harassment by staff in both general 
population and segregation as well as repeated and unnecessary public strip searches, 
which staff used as a means to view her feminine body. In some of the first judicial 
opinions regarding an incarcerated trans woman published in the US, an Indiana district 
court and then the Seventh Circuit argued that Meriwether posed “particularly serious 
management problems for prison officials” because her body would create a “volatile and 
explosive situation” within the prison.39 This inevitable “situation” justified her indefinite 
segregation. These decisions rested on the (largely unspoken) assumption that 
Meriwether’s queer, feminine body would incite other prisoners to fight over her, not 
only violating her but, more importantly, disrupting the security of the institution. This 
                                                
39 Meriwether v. Faulkner, 821 F.2d 408, 417 (7th Cir. 1987). Notably, while the Seventh Circuit agreed 
with the district courts logic here, the court reversed and remanded the district court’s dismissal of her 
challenge to her indefinite segregation, arguing that it might constitute cruel and unusual punishment 
(largely because she was a non-violent prisoner who had thirty more years to serve) and therefore violate 
the Eighth Amendment, which the district court had not considered.  
I have found evidence of earlier federal civil rights lawsuits filed by incarcerated trans women that 
either did not result in a published opinion, either because the suit was settled or the court did not publish 
their opinion. See for example, Lynn Marie Scribner, Letter, May 24, 1985, Folder 42, Box 13, Broomfield 
Street Education Foundation Records (M64); Sharon Reynolds, “Wrong Body, Wrong Jail,” n.d., Folder 
53, Box 13, Broomfield Street Education Foundation Records (M64); Vanassa Meriwether, “The Dawn of 
a New Age,” Transsexuals in Prison 1, no. 1 (March 22, 1986), Box 5, Bromfield Street Foundation 
(Collector) Prison Newsletters (M169), Northeastern University Libraries. 
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expected scenario both implicated Meriwether as dangerously queer but also all other 
prisoners in their expected excessive, violent, and uncontrollable sexual desire for her 
queer, feminine body.  
While the courts’ justification for her segregation relied on the assumption that 
Meriwether would inevitably be raped by other prisoners, the two courts differed 
somewhat in their treatment of her allegations of sexual violence. The district court 
dismissed Meriwether’s entire complaint, arguing that she failed to state a claim upon 
which relief could be granted in relation to her challenge to her indefinite segregation and 
the denial of medical treatment. The court did not even address her allegations of sexual 
violence, harassment, and public strip searches. In doing so, the district court constructs 
her as unrapable (by not even bothering to address the allegations) and carceral sexual 
violence—both sexual assault and harassment perpetrated by staff and violent strip 
searches—as legally incomprehensible and unaddressable. The Seventh Circuit reversed 
and remanded the district courts’ decision in part because the district court did not 
address these aspects of Meriwether’s complaint. The court pointed to her transsexuality 
and imprisonment in a men’s prison to demonstrate that her risk of assault was 
“sufficiently serious to require [prison administrators] to take some minimal measures to 
protect her from assault.”40 Yet, the court largely understood “protection” to be 
segregation, arguing that Meriwether’s claims that prison administrators have deliberately 
failed to protect her from sexual violence “is somewhat in conflict with her desire not to 
remain in administrative segregation indefinitely.”41 Despite stating that Meriwether 
                                                
40 Meriwether, 821 F.2d at 417. 
41 Ibid. at 417-8. 
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should also be protected from assaults in administrative segregation, the court largely 
failed to recognize that the problem was not just that prison administrators failed to 
protect her from violence perpetrated by other prisoners but that staff perpetrated a 
substantial portion of the violence that she alleged. This absence of a substantial 
discussion of staff violence—including the strip searches—again rendered carceral sexual 
violence legally unremarkable and incomprehensible. 
The Meriwether decisions demonstrate how juridical knowledge often mobilize 
the twin narratives of inevitability and impossibility constructed in the previous decades 
by penologists and social scientists to make sense of carceral sexual violence against 
trans and gender nonconforming prisoners. Within the decisions, we can also see how 
these contradictory discourses of inevitability and impossibility become compatible as 
they normalize carceral sexual violence and related management techniques. By 
understanding Meriwether’s possible and inevitably violation as only perpetrated by 
prisoners and either ignoring staff-perpetrated violence or suggesting that segregation 
was a place of safety while simultaneously worrying about the security implications of 
Meriwether’s queer dangerousness, Meriwether becomes inevitably subject to rape and, 
essentially, unrapable or unviolatable. Put another way, inevitability only describes 
prisoner-perpetrated sexual violence and impossibility primarily describes staff-
perpetrated and (institutionalized) carceral sexual violence. Moreover, because that 
inevitability of prisoner-perpetrated sexual violence is intimately tied to her queer 
dangerousness, she becomes essentially unrapable, at fault, her queer femininity and 
feminized body are “asking for it.” This queer dangerousness, tied to the inevitability of 
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sexual violence, then justifies certain forms of carceral violence, such as segregation. 
Inevitability and impossibility produce a cycle that normalizes carceral sexual violence. 
Since Meriwether, courts have continued to mobilize these narratives in 
adjudicating complaints alleging sexual violence against trans women. Indeed, courts are 
primary producers of dominant discourses about sexual violence within prisons, 
determining what types of sexual violence and against which prisoners are legitimate or 
illegitimate—and therefore deserving of (state) intervention—and which are even 
recognizable as violence. As a system of norms and a primary arbiter (and perpetrators) 
of state violence, legal constructions of violence are deeply shaped by and help produce 
racialized, gender, and sexual normativity. Civil rights law, like the Meriwether 
decisions, both produces and is an archive of the boundaries of the state’s legitimate 
violence generally and of carceral violence in particular.42 
Seven years after the Seventh Circuit’s Meriwether decision, these discourses 
would similarly structure another case, Farmer v. Brennan, the first and only case about 
an incarcerated trans woman (or any trans person) that the Supreme Court has heard. 
Taken up by the Court in order to help clarify Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, Farmer 
has helped shape the general contours of what the US state believes constitutes 
unconstitutional (and constitutional or legitimate) violence in prisons. 
In March 1989, Dee Farmer—a young African American trans woman who had 
been incarcerated in the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) since 1986—was transferred to 
USP-Terre Haute in Indiana, a federal maximum security men’s penitentiary. After an 
                                                
42 Chandan Reddy, Freedom With Violence: Race, Sexuality, and the US State (Durham: Duke University 
Press, 2011); Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collége de France, 1977-
1978 (New York: Picador, 2009). 
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initial stay in segregation while prison officials decided her placement, which was 
standard practice for all new prisoners, she was released into the general population. A 
week later, she was beaten and raped in her cell by another prisoner. Even though the 
perpetrator threatened to murder her if she reported the rape, she did so a week later. 
While prison officials moved her into segregation, it was reportedly because of her HIV-
positive status—which was seen as a threat to security—not for her safety. A few months 
later, she filed a federal civil rights lawsuit claiming that prison officials were 
deliberately indifferent to her safety and therefore violated the Eighth Amendment’s ban 
on cruel and unusual punishment. In her complaint, Farmer alleged that the BOP failed to 
establish and implement an effective policy for housing transsexuals. She claimed that 
prison officials knew that she had “a feminine appearance, ... [and] would be sexually 
assaulted at USP-Terre Haute.”43 Prison administrators denied any actual knowledge of 
Farmer’s risk of sexual assault. 
A Wisconsin district court dismissed Farmer’s complaint, claiming that because 
prison officials did not have “actual knowledge of a threat to [Farmer’s] safety” they 
were not liable for her rape.44 The court claimed that they could find no evidence that 
administrators had any reason to believe that they could not keep her safe and 
emphasized that Farmer failed to inform officials of any danger. The Seventh Circuit 
affirmed the lower court’s decision with no opinion. Farmer appealed, and the Supreme 
Court agreed to hear the case in 1993. 
                                                
43 Quoted in Brief of Petitioner at 9, Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (No. 92-7247), Nov. 16, 1993. 
44 Quoted in Brief of Respondents at 10, Farmer (No. 92-7247), Dec. 14, 1993.  
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At stake in front of the Supreme Court was not whether Farmer had experienced 
sexual violence—that she had been raped was not in question—but whether prison 
officials should be held constitutionally liable for placing her in a dangerous situation that 
led to her rape. Specifically, the Court was asked to clarify their “deliberate indifference” 
standard. A key part of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence since the mid-1970s, deliberate 
indifference states that a prison administrator can only be found to violate the Eighth 
Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment if he or she knowingly 
disregarded a substantial risk of harm.45  
Farmer argued that the Court should adopt a more expansive definition of 
deliberate indifference that included “obvious risks,” risks that were so obvious that 
prison officials should have known about them. In her own case, Farmer argued that 
whether or not Terre Haute administrators had actually known of a specific threat to her 
safety, the risk of sexual violence for a visibly feminine trans woman like Farmer in a 
maximum security men’s prison was so obvious that they should have known. She argued 
that by placing her in general population at Terre Haute, a prison which was known to be 
particularly violent, prison officials “created an obvious, unreasonable risk of harm.”46 
Moreover, she showed that BOP officials themselves had agreed with this determination 
on multiple occasions. At least one report from a BOP psychologist had noted that she 
would be “subject to a great deal of sexual pressure…because of [her] youth and 
                                                
45 Deliberate indifference is something more than mere negligence and something less than intent to cause 
harm. Stacy Lancaster Cozad, “Cruel But Not So Unusual: Farmer v. Brennan and the Devolving 
Standards of Decency,” Pepperdine Law Review 23 (1995). 
46 She argued, “Indeed, it is hard to imagine a circumstance in which the risk of sexual assault would be 
more obvious.” Reply Brief of Petitioner at 16, Farmer (No. 92-7247), Jan. 3, 1994; Brief of Petitioner at 
65, Farmer (No. 92-7247).  
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feminine appearance.”47 She had also been placed in protective custody at other federal 
prisons because officials believed she was vulnerable to sexual violence. In fact, she had 
sued over this placement, and a district court had ruled against her, finding that placing 
her in general population was an obvious risk.48  
BOP officials admitted that they knew Farmer was a transsexual, was visibly 
feminine, and had not committed violence. They had internal data showing that gay and 
gender nonconforming prisoners were disproportionately sexually assaulted; it was 
common practice within the BOP to segregate gender nonconforming and trans prisoners 
for their “protection”; and Farmer had been segregated for her protection in other BOP 
facilities. Nevertheless, Terre Haute officials argued that they knew of no specific threat 
to Farmer at the time and therefore were not liable. BOP officials petitioned the Supreme 
Court to adopt an “actual knowledge” standard for deliberate indifference, which was the 
standard the district court applied to dismiss the case. In this scenario, a prisoner would 
have to prove that prison officials actually knew of a substantial risk; showing that a risk 
was so obvious that they should have known would not be enough to satisfy the standard. 
In order to justify such a high burden of proof, BOP officials and their supporters 
argued that anything less would make administrating prisons too difficult because prisons 
were inherently violent. In their brief to the Supreme Court, BOP officials argued that 
                                                
47 Quoted in Brief of Petitioner at 12, Farmer (No. 92-7247). 
48 In a previous case, the warden of Terre Haute (who was the warden of USP-Lewisburg, where Farmer 
was then incarcerated, at the time, justified her placement in administrative segregation: “Where a threat to 
security exists, staff may take reasonable steps to alleviate a threat. In your case, institutional staff finds 
that a situation exists which may endanger your life in the general population. While steps are being taken 
to move you to a facility where extra security will not be necessary, it is appropriate to keep you separated 
from anyone who may harm you.” Quoted in Farmer v. Carlson, 685 F. Supp. 1335, 1342 (M.D. Pa., 1988). 
In their decision, a Pennsylvania district court deferred to officials’ decision, saying “clearly, placing 
plaintiff, a twenty-one year old transsexual, into the general population at Lewisburg, a Level Five security 
institution, could pose a significant threat to internal security and to plaintiff in particular.” Ibid. at 1342. 
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because prisons are “volatile” and “inmate violence is often random and unpredictable,” 
risk of assault is “inevitably present” for all prisoners; therefore, the meaning of 
“unreasonably high risk” is different than in the rest of society.49 They claimed that 
sexual violence perpetrated by prisoners “can never be fully controlled, despite prison 
officials’ best efforts.”50 The brief paints a picture of besieged prison administrators, 
doing all they can to keep institutional order and security and protect prisoners from 
violence perpetrated by other prisoners. In their amicus curiae brief supporting BOP 
officials, the attorneys general of thirty-four states also mobilized similar narratives, 
arguing that the “violent nature” of prisons required that courts provide prison officials 
with “substantial deference in matters of institutional security and safety.”51 In their 
arguments, BOP officials and the state attorneys general relied on and reproduced the 
decades old narratives of sexualized and racialized violently hypermasculine prisoners to 
construct the space of the prison as inherently and inevitably violent. In doing so, they 
naturalized violence in prisons, normalized violence as a feature of prisons that the law 
should expect and accept, and securely determined prisoners as the source of that 
violence. The BOP officials and state attorneys general constructed a particular definition 
of sexual violence: individualized sexual assault perpetrated by prisoners that threatens 
the security of the penal institution.  
The state attorneys general further extended the BOP officials’ argument by 
explaining that because non-trans prisoners are sexually assaulted in prisons, trans 
women like Farmer do not deserve “special” protection. Calling violence, sexual assault, 
                                                
49 Brief of Respondents at 15, Farmer (No. 92-7247). 
50 Ibid. at 14. 
51 Amicus Curiae of the States at 13, Farmer (No. 92-7247), Dec. 14, 1993. 
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and sexual pressure “undisputed facts of prison life,” they argued, “Given that prisons by 
their very nature are dangerous and that many inmates live in fear of others, there is no 
principled basis for singling [Farmer] out for special protection solely because of his [sic] 
transsexual status.”52 By erasing distinctions between prisoners, including between 
different levels of risk and between prisoners who perpetrate rape and prisoners who are 
raped, they insinuated that because some prisoners are sexually violent, all prisoners 
deserve to be violated.  
BOP officials used this construction of the inherent violence of prisoners and, 
therefore, prisons as justification for refusing to protect prisoners. Because of the 
supposed inevitability of sexual violence, they argued that any “risk” must be compared 
“to the level of risk ordinarily acceptable” in any given penal institution and that the risk 
must “rise significantly above the level that is ordinarily prevalent.”53 Sexual violence 
becomes a mundane and routine part of daily prison life for prisoners—and therefore 
something that is acceptable or legitimate—while also being a problem for institutional 
security and therefore requiring the management of all prisoners. This narrative also 
legitimizes a significant amount of violence used to stem this (inevitable) sexual 
violence, such as segregation. Within this framework, most sexual violence that trans and 
gender nonconforming prisoners experience could not be legally recognized as cruel and 
unusual punishment. In other words, the arguments from BOP officials and the state 
attorneys general obscured how sexual violence was and is structured into the prison 
system, vacating that system and its agents of the responsibility of creating and sustaining 
                                                
52 Ibid. at 38.  
53 Brief of Respondents at 22, 12, Farmer (No. 92-7247). My emphasis. 
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an “inherently violent” institution while also legitimizing the use of (sexual) violence as a 
tool of control within the violent queer space of the prison.  
While BOP officials and the state attorneys general attempted to render Farmer 
indistinguishable from other prisoners in regards to risk of experiencing sexual violence, 
they also mobilized narratives about the queer dangerousness of gender nonconforming 
prisoners in order to justify her placement in a men’s maximum security penitentiary. 
BOP officials claimed that the reason that Farmer was placed in Terre Haute was because 
she had committed numerous (non-violent) disciplinary infractions, including credit card 
fraud and “having sexual relations with another inmate while knowingly carrying the 
Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV).”54 In both internal BOP records and 
communications with the court, officials conflated Farmer’s record of disciplinary 
segregation and administrative segregation. For example, the progress report that 
accompanied and explained her transfer to Terre Haute noted repeated periods of 
segregation in other institutions but failed to distinguish between disciplinary and 
protective segregation. As Farmer explained in her brief to the court, “The progress 
report gives the erroneous impression that this confinement may have been to protect the 
safety of others, not to protect [Framer].”55 Moreover, a week after her rape, prison 
officials placed Farmer in administrative segregation because “his [sic] status as a high-
risk HIV-positive inmate posed a danger to others.”56 In their brief, the state attorneys 
general described her history of sexual assault in BOP facilities alongside her disciplinary 
                                                
54 Ibid. at 5. 
55 Reply Brief of Petitioner at 23, Farmer (No. 92-7247), Jan. 3, 1994.  
56 Brief of Respondents at 7-8, Farmer (No. 92-7247). 
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record, while also emphasizing her failure to report the violence.57 They further pointed 
to at least one incident in which she was disciplined for having consensual sex with 
another prisoner, labeling her as a threat because she is HIV-positive.58 The juxtaposition 
of her history of sexual violence and her disciplinary history portrayed her as dangerously 
hypersexual and as a sexual security threat, a threat tied to both her nonnormative 
sexuality and gender, and as at fault for that sexual violence and for her rape in Terre 
Haute. 
As a young African American, HIV-positive trans woman, Farmer’s record of 
infractions and discipline was most likely inflated by her race, sexuality, HIV status, and 
gender identity. Trans and gender nonconforming prisoners as well as black prisoners 
report being profiled as particularly troublesome.59 As such, prisoners like Farmer are 
often targeted for punishment and disciplinary segregation in prisons. As I will discuss 
more below, the prohibition of consensual sex has also been an important method of 
criminalizing and constructing trans and gender nonconforming prisoners as sexually 
dangerous. In Farmer’s case, BOP officials explicitly portrayed Farmer as a threat 
because of her HIV status and punished her for it. Black trans women, especially those 
who come in contact with the criminal legal system, were and are quite possibly the 
                                                
57 Farmer had experienced pervasive sexual violence throughout the Federal Bureau of Prisons. She had 
been raped at least once in a previous institution and had experienced sexual pressure both in the general 
population as well as administrative segregation in most of the prisons in which she was incarcerated. Yet, 
Farmer often did not inform prison officials of this violence and harassment, something that is quite 
common among prisoners largely because of the inadequate and often violent responses by prison 
administrators to reports of sexual violence. 
58 At oral arguments, the BOP lawyer explained that the BOP has a policy of placing HIV-positive 
prisoners in administrative segregation “if they are either predators or if they are sexually promiscuous.” 
Transcript of Oral Arguments at 9, Farmer (No. 92-7247), Jan. 12, 1994. This policy in effect conflates 
consensual sex and rape as equally “dangerous,” when performed by an HIV-positive prisoner—and could 
perhaps mark HIV-positive rape survivors as threatening.  
59 Arkles, interview.  
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population hardest hit by HIV/AIDS. Farmer’s HIV-positive status intersects with her 
trans status and her blackness to mark her as especially sexually threatening and 
dangerous to prison security. Prison officials cite this queer dangerousness to justify the 
violence she experienced—both from other prisoners and institutionally—and vacate 
themselves from responsibility. 
Ultimately, the Supreme Court agreed with BOP officials that “deliberate 
indifference” required “actual knowledge” of an imminent threat of violence.60 However, 
instead of using the “inherently violent” nature of prisons as its justification, the Court 
focused on the difference between “punishments” and prison “conditions.” In his 
majority opinion, Justice David Souter argued that because the Eighth Amendment 
outlaws cruel and unusual “punishments” a prison official had to know of and disregard 
“an excessive risk to inmate health or safety” to have his/her actions legally determined 
to be cruel and unusual punishment.61 Without this knowing disregard of a risk, carceral 
violence is a condition, not a punishment, and therefore not unconstitutional under the 
Eighth Amendment. In his discussion of the somewhat different legal context of anti-
discrimination laws and litigation regarding race, legal scholar Alan David Freeman 
explains that racial discrimination can be approached from the perspective of its victim—
who understands discrimination through the conditions that it produces—or its 
perpetrator—who understands discrimination as actions inflicted on a person by 
                                                
60 However, they remanded the case to the district court for further review because they said the district 
court may have placed too much weight on Farmer’s failure to notify prison officials of her risk of harm. 
Farmer, 511 U.S. 825.  
61 Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. 
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another.62 However, the law historically and currently only conceptualizes discrimination 
through the “perpetrator perspective.” In doing so, the law misconceives how 
discrimination and systems of oppression and inequality, such as racism, work, 
individualizing discrimination and negating the existence of structural discrimination (or 
the conditions of discrimination). Eighth Amendment jurisprudence similarly focuses on 
the “perpetrator perspective” as it constructs this distinction “punishment” and 
“conditions,” individualizing and decontextualizing violence within prisons by focusing 
on the individualized motives of prison staff and ignoring institutionalized and structural 
carceral violence. 
Souter’s ability to disaggregate punishment from prison conditions was also based 
on nearly a decade and a half of rulings that continually weakened Eighth Amendment 
protections. As Colin Dayan has discussed in her analysis of Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence, courts interpreted the Eighth Amendment most broadly between the mid-
1960s and early 1980s, during the prisoners’ rights movement.63 In the early 1980s, 
courts, especially the Supreme Court, began to shift away from broad interpretation and 
weaken existing standards. Over the course of the 1980s and 1990s, the Supreme Court 
argued that there was no constitutional mandate for “comfortable prisons” and that 
“deprivations…simply are not punishments” unless prison administrators’ knowingly and 
                                                
62 Alan David Freeman, “Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical 
Review of Supreme Court Doctrine” in Critical Race Theory: The Key Writings that Formed the 
Movement, ed. Kimberlé Crenshaw, et al. (New York: The New Press, 1995). See also, Dean Spade, 
Normal Life: Administrative Violence, Critical Trans Politics, and the Limits of Law (Brooklyn: South End 
Press, 2011). 
63 Colin Dayan, The Story of Cruel and Unusual (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2007). 
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intentionally caused “unnecessary and wanton pain.”64 No matter how much suffering or 
violence a prisoner endured, if a “condition” was not a specific part of their sentence or 
knowingly and wantonly inflicted by prison administrators, the Court did not consider it 
“punishment,” and therefore that condition did not violate the Eighth Amendment. The 
Court also gave prison officials’ decisions an increasing amount of deference, citing their 
“special knowledge” of penal management and security, and ruled that violence or pain 
was sometimes necessary to maintain security and control prisoners. Moreover, the Court 
ruled that prison conditions could not cumulatively reach the level of cruel and unusual 
punishment, an important and effective strategy of prisoners’ litigation in the 1960s and 
1970s; prisoners had to show that they suffered a deprivation of a single identifiable 
“minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities,” such as food, warmth, clothing, or 
adequate medical care.65 
These cases produced the conditions for the legal inability to recognize most 
carceral violence as cruel and unusual punishment, thereby normalizing and legitimizing 
it, by simultaneously arguing that conditions were no longer “punishments” and by 
focusing attention on the motivations of prison administrators while they also extended 
increasing amounts of deference to prison administrator’s “special knowledge.” As 
Dayan explains, “In this juridical calculation, what is harsh, brutal, or excessive turns into 
what is constitutional, customary, or just bearable.”66 The legal reasoning in this new 
                                                
64 Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981); Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986); Dayan, The Story of 
Cruel and Unusual. 
65 Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347. 
66 Dayan, The Story of Cruel and Unusual, 25. 
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Eighth Amendment jurisprudence allowed violence in prison to “pass[] for necessary and 
commonplace.”67  
The Farmer decision continued the narrowing of legally recognizable cruel and 
unusual punishment and the expansion of legitimate carceral violence as it required a 
prison official to act (or fail to act) based on actual knowledge.68 While Souter used 
different language to justify his actual knowledge definition of deliberate indifference, his 
reliance on deference to prison officials and his splitting of conditions and (legally 
recognizable) punishment overlaps in logic and effect with BOP official’s portrayal of 
prisons as inherently violent and nearly uncontrollable.69 The very basis of deference to 
prison officials relies on the construction of prisoners as inherently different from free, 
non-criminalized people. Prison administrators have special knowledge or expertise in 
controlling this (racially/sexually/gender deviant) population; therefore, their knowledge 
produces “conditions” aimed to (legally) control prisoners and maintain security. Under 
these circumstances, the inevitably or inherently dangerous prison, violent conditions are 
not punishment unless a prison administrator consciously and explicitly uses excessive 
                                                
67 Ibid., 39. 
68 Indeed, the ACLU and Stop Prisoner Rape have argued that some courts have interpreted the Supreme 
Court’s definition of deliberate indifference in Farmer v. Brennan as shielding officials from liability in all 
but the most extreme cases, which has disproportionately affected trans and gender nonconforming 
prisoners. Coolman, et al., Still in Danger. 
69 Justice Clarence Thomas made this connection more explicit in his concurring opinion. Like BOP 
officials, Thomas reasoned that prisons are “necessarily dangerous places” because prisoners are “society’s 
most antisocial and violent people.” Because of prisoners’ “close proximity with one another” in prisons, 
“some level of brutality and sexual aggression among [prisoners] is inevitable no matter what the guards 
do…unless all prisoners are locked in their cells 24 hours a day and sedated.” Thomas concurring decision, 
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 858-59. Thomas then argues that any condition of confinement, unless explicitly 
imposed as part of a sentence, cannot be considered “punishment” under the Eighth Amendment, 
explaining: “Because the unfortunate attack that befell [Farmer] was not part of his [sic] sentence, it did not 
constitute ‘punishment’ under the Eighth Amendment.” Ibid. at 859. 
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violence to punish a prisoner. “Cruel and unusual punishment” becomes aberrant, the 
actions of bad administrators that exceed or betray their special expertise.  
By simultaneously focusing on the intent and knowledge of prison officials and 
giving those officials extraordinary deference, the Court legalizes most forms of carceral 
sexual violence, especially those that are integrated into institutional security function. 
Yet, prisoners, especially trans and gender nonconforming prisoners, describe carceral 
sexual violence as an important part of carceral punishment, perpetrated by staff in many 
different forms. Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, including Farmer, produces prisoners 
as dangerous and fungible and strips them of the legal ability to name violence. As Dayan 
argues, “Legally the plaintiff has become a nonreactive body, a defenseless object. 
Subjectivity is the privilege of those in control.”70 This dehumanization is grounded in 
racialized, gendered, and sexualized constructions of prisoners as inherently dangerous 
and violent and trans and gender nonconforming prisoners as queerly dangerous and as 
security threats, which renders most forms of carceral sexual violence as unrecognizable 
as cruel and unusual punishment and therefore as legitimate violence. As Dayan asks, 
“What are legitimate correctional purposes when those incarcerated are arbitrarily 
assumed to be dangerous, unfit, and subhuman?”71 
 
The Limits of Legal Reform: The Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003 
In 2003, the United States Congress unanimously passed the Prison Rape 
Elimination Act (PREA), which aimed to address and reduce rape in penal institutions. 
                                                
70 Joan Dayan, “Legal Slaves and Civil Bodies,” in Materializing Democracy, ed. Russ Castronovo and 
Dana D. Nelson (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002), 85. 
71 Dayan, The Story of Cruel and Unusual, 36.  
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PREA established a zero tolerance standard for prison rape and authorized the 
development and implementation of national standards to prevent, reduce, and punish 
prison rape.72 In order to do this, PREA established the National Prison Rape Elimination 
Commission (NPREC), a bipartisan panel tasked with studying sexual assault in US 
prisons and jails. NPREC held public hearings from 2005 to 2007 and issued their report 
in June 2009. The Department of Justice edited NPREC’s recommended standards and 
finalized the PREA standards in May 2012.73 States are now required to be in compliance 
with these new standards in order to receive full federal funding—non-compliant states 
lose 5% of that funding. Compelled by PREA’s passage, a number of state departments 
of corrections wrote their own policies to address sexual violence. 
PREA is the first national legislation to substantively address sexual violence in 
prisons and work to eliminate that violence, and it, rightly, understands prison rape as a 
problem throughout the US prison system and a source of trauma for prisoners. It has 
incentivized departments of corrections around the US to take sexual violence seriously, 
at least in policy, and provides prisoners and their advocates with additional tools to 
address and challenge sexual violence in penal institutions. The standards also explicitly 
recognize that LGBTI and gender nonconforming people are at increased risk for sexual 
                                                
72 Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003, S. 1435, 108th Cong. (2003). Robert Dumond argues that PREA 
was part of a wave of researchers and penologists addressing sexual violence in prisons in the late 1990s 
and early 2000s, including a flood of studies showing the prevalence of sexual violence, increased media 
attention, states adopting methods to document sexual violence, and states creating training and other 
methods of prevention. Robert W. Dumond, “The Impact of Prisoner Sexual Violence: Challenges of 
Implementing Public Law 108-79 The Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003,” Journal of Legislation 32, 
no. 2 (2006). This increased attention to sexual violence in prisons is probably the result of decades of 
activism by current and formerly incarcerated people and their advocates, such as Just Detention 
International. 
73 “National Standards to Prevent, Detect, and Respond to Prison Rape,” Federal Register 77, no. 119 (June 
20, 2012).  
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violence and offer some solutions. Nevertheless, PREA is extremely limited. Its 
enforcement mechanisms are relatively weak; the 5% federal funding penalty is low, and 
prisoners and their advocates cannot file lawsuits through PREA. Even more importantly, 
the law, the NPREC report, the adopted standards, and state PREA policies do not 
fundamentally change dominant narratives about sexual violence and queer 
dangerousness—in fact, they rely on and reproduce them in a number of ways—and 
include loopholes for security considerations. Prison rape is constructed as individualized 
actions that can be reduced or stopped through state intervention—although, importantly, 
the standards acknowledge and address staff perpetrated violence.  
In her reading of PREA and the NPREC report, Jessi Lee Jackson argues that not 
only do PREA and NPREC misrecognize the prison system’s relationship to sexual 
violence but they also “mobilized racialized fears of aggressive black male sexuality” to 
legitimize and popularize the law.74 She explains that Congressional testimony 
supporting PREA frequently gave the impression that prison rape was overwhelmingly 
perpetrated by black men against white men. Indeed, the text of PREA describes prison 
sexual assaults as “frequently interracial” and explains that this dynamic “significantly 
exacerbates interracial tensions, both within prisons and…in the community at large,” 
echoing social scientific research that blamed prison rape on black male prisoners 
(racially) targeting white prisoners.75 Jackson argues that “racialized understandings of 
                                                
74 Jessi Lee Jackson, “Sexual Necropolitics and Prison Rape Elimination,” Signs 39, no. 1 (Autumn 2013): 
197. 
75 Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003, S. 1435, 108th Cong. (2003): 973. Similarly, the Idaho Department 
of Correction’s “Prison Rape Elimination” policy, which I will discuss in detail below, also names 
“exacerbate[d] interracial tensions because of interracial sexual assaults” as one of eight “consequences of 
prison rape and sexual activity.” Idaho Department of Correction, “Prison Rape Elimination,” 
325.02.01.001, Version 3 (May 20, 2009). 
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sexual abuse in prison” framed how prison rape was defined and addressed in the law and 
the report. While interracial rape certainly happens in prisons and can lead to heightened 
racial tensions among prisoners, the focus on prison rape as racial because of the racial 
identities of the prisoners involved while the violent racialized structure of the prison 
system itself is simultaneously ignored or negated individualizes prison sexual violence 
and portrays the state and prison system as protectors, not perpetrators, and as able to 
solve the problem of prison rape. Jackson’s excellent reading of the NPREC report shows 
how discourses of racialized sexual threat frame PREA, the NPREC report, and the 
adopted standards. These discourses were key to the passage of PREA and its 
construction of sexual violence in penal institutions, and they produced security 
exemptions, which has led to the adoption of standards that obscure and reauthorize many 
forms of carceral sexual violence, particularly those targeting trans and gender 
nonconforming prisoners. 
In order to address trans prisoners’ increased risk of sexual violence, the standards 
require prison administrators to determine housing placement and other concerns for 
trans and intersex prisoners on a case-by-case basis and prohibit blanket policies basing 
placement on genital status alone; nevertheless, they ultimately (re)produce trans and 
gender nonconforming prisoners as potential security threats that need to be addressed by 
prison administrators. The standards state that prison administrators should determine 
placement based on trans and intersex prisoners’ “health and safety” and “whether the 
placement would present management or security problems,” but also should give 
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“serious consideration to the inmate’s own views regarding his or her own safety.”76 
While it is important that the standards advocate for taking a prisoner’s views into 
consideration, those views are framed as, at best, secondary to prison administrators’ 
understandings of health, safety, and security. This language not only implies that trans 
and gender nonconforming prisoners might be threats to security but also mobilizes the 
extraordinary legal deference to prison administrators’ special expertise to manage that 
queer threat, which has legalize and obscured most carceral sexual violence.  
Similarly, the standards authorize pat-down, strip, and body cavity searches as 
commonsensical and necessary aspects of incarceration, renormalizing a practice that 
many trans and gender nonconforming prisoners identify as an important and pervasive 
form of carceral sexual violence. Invasive searches are common occurrences in penal 
institutions, justified as institutional policy because of the perception of prisoners as 
dangerous and untrustworthy. Described as necessary for institutional security, these 
searches are often violent and used to punish or humiliate prisoners, especially those 
whose bodies are seen as sexually ambiguous. Trans and gender nonconforming prisoners 
report being subject to repeated and unnecessary searches—sometimes every time they 
leave their cell—that can be intentionally painful and are sometimes performed in 
public.77 Attorney, community organizer, and activist Andrea Richie describes strip 
searches as “a form of systematic, state-sanctioned sexual assault.”78 While the standards 
                                                
76 “National Standards to Prevent, Detect, and Respond to Prison Rape,” 37110.  
77 “No Where to Turn,” GIC TIP Journal 1, no. 3 (Summer 2001); Paula W., “Paula W.’s Story”; Andrea 
Ritchie, Testimony at Hearing: Lockups, Native American Detention Facilities, and Conditions in Texas 
Penal and Youth Institutions, Austin, Texas (March 26-27, 2007), 
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recognize that they can be a source of trauma for prisoners, they focus their interventions 
almost entirely on cross-gender searches. The standards prohibit cross-gender pat-down 
searches of female (but not male) prisoners in most adult facilities and cross-gender strip 
and body cavity searches for both male and female prisoners, “except in exigent 
circumstances or when performed by medical practitioners.”79 In their commentary on the 
standards, the Department of Justice (DOJ) explains that these “routine” searches involve 
“necessarily intimate touching” and explicitly exempts this touching from being 
considered sexual abuse, unless they are “performed in a manner that evidences an intent 
to abuse, arouse, or gratify sexual desire.”80  
Security fundamentally structures the standards’ construction of searches in two 
primary ways. First, security produces the searches as commonsensically, “necessarily 
intimate” and therefore normative and largely unchallengeable. While the DOJ cites 
numerous statistics and commentary about sexual abuse, including during searches, and 
recognize that these searches—no matter the intent of the officer—can be experienced as 
traumatic, this trauma is quickly displaced by security concerns and, secondarily, by 
monetary costs. For example, while the DOJ acknowledged that male prisoners 
experience sexual abuse in cross-gender pat-down searches, they justify their exemption 
from this ban as a calculation of “benefits,” arguing that male prisoners would 
“benefit…significantly less” than female prisoners while the costs would be significantly 
                                                
79 “National Standards to Prevent, Detect, and Respond to Prison Rape,” 37201. They prohibit cross-gender 
pat-down searches for all prisoners in juvenile facilities and largely except lockups with less than fifty 
prisoners from these requirements. The standards also requires facilities to create policies and procedures to 
allow prisoners to shower, perform bodily functions, and change clothing “except in exigent circumstances 
or when such viewing is incidental to routine cell checks.” Ibid., 37201. 
80 Ibid., 37132, 37116. 
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higher.81 The security need and routinization of such searches also prohibits the DOJ 
from fully addressing the trauma that they cause, reducing their intervention to a 
manageable solution: prohibiting cross-gender searches in some contexts. Second, every 
“requirement” regarding searches includes the security-related exemption: “except in 
exigent circumstances.” This loophole, again, provides deference to the security expertise 
of prison administrators, who decide what constitutes “exigent circumstances.” These 
discourses of security—along with the focus on cross-gender searches—produce sexual 
abuse in searches as individualized, aberrant actions by guards who pervert a practice that 
ensures safety for all. This construction of searches and security also (re)produces 
prisoners’ bodies as necessarily fungible and violatable in order to ensure that safety and 
security and obscures how these searches actually make many prisoners, especially 
gender nonconforming and trans prisoners, insecure by subjecting them to violent, 
traumatically invasive actions. The violatability of prisoners’ bodies becomes even more 
stark as the DOJ recognizes the trauma of such searches.  
The standards also say nothing about how the restrictions on “cross-gender” 
searches apply to trans and intersex prisoners. In their commentary about the standards, 
the DOJ explained that they did not include a provision requiring that prison 
administrators allow trans and intersex prisoners to choose the gender of the staff that 
searched them, for which LGBT advocates had argued, because “such requests have the 
potential to be arbitrary and disruptive to facility administration.”82 Instead, the DOJ 
stated that this problem “can be addressed by properly assigning (or re-assigning) 
                                                
81 Ibid., 37134. 
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transgender and intersex inmates to facilities or housing units that correspond to their 
gender identity, and not making housing determinations based solely on genital status.”83 
By stating that the gender of a prisoner for the purposes of determining which searches 
are “cross-gender” should be determined by that prisoner’s official sex classification, the 
DOJ (re)authorizes prison administrators to determine a trans prisoner’s sex and 
constructs that prisoner’s gender identity as “arbitrary and disruptive to facility 
administration”—or, as queer dangerousness. Under these circumstances, the standards 
would require that trans women (and intersex and gender nonconforming people) in 
men’s institutions be searched by male staff and prohibit searches by female staff and 
trans men (and gender nonconforming and intersex people) in women’s institutions be 
searched by female staff.  
The DOJ’s suggested solution to this problem—“properly assigning” trans and 
intersex prisoners based on their gender identity—fundamentally disregards the reality of 
their own placement requirements. As discussed above, the standards locate the authority 
to determine “proper assignment” with prison administrators. Even as the standards 
prohibit automatic placement based on genital status, they seem to assume that placement 
will still largely be based on genitals or other physical attributes. While the standards 
prohibit searches or physical examinations of trans or intersex prisoners “for the sole 
purpose of determining the inmate’s genital status,” they still produce knowledge of 
genital status as a necessity for the management of these prisoners.84 The standards state 
that if the genital status of a trans or intersex prisoner is unknown, staff should determine 
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that status through conversations with the prisoner, by reviewing their medical records, 
or, if necessary, through an examination conducted by a medical practitioner as part of a 
broader medical examination. The standards, therefore, reinforce the assumption that 
genitals provide information about the essential nature of a trans or intersex prisoner—
and that non-trans-or-intersex prisoners’ genital status can be “known” without 
investigation. In addition, when discussing the placement of trans and intersex prisoners 
in a sex-segregated facility, the DOJ explains that this placement may change over time, 
following hormone treatment or surgery. While a prisoners’ gender identity has some 
impact on their “proper assignment,” it is far from the determining factor, and in many 
cases matters very little. As civil rights attorney Chase Strangio explained to me, 
correctional agencies almost always reject suggestions for practices and policies that 
allow prisoners choice.85 The DOJ’s own dismissal of trans and intersex prisoners’ 
preference for the gender of staff conducting searches is an example of the refusal to 
engage prisoners’ choice and the disregard for their gender identity. The standards, 
therefore, do not fundamentally change the practice of classifying nearly all trans women 
as men and trans men as women, which is the source of a substantial amount of violence. 
Put another way, the assumption of the necessity of physical sex change renders trans 
men and women who do not or cannot physically transition and gender nonconforming 
prisoners as illegible to PREA.  
The focus on cross-gender searches simultaneously overemphasizes gender in 
staff-perpetrated sexual abuse—suggesting that sexual abuse is primarily incited by 
sexual difference with little-to-no engagement with power—while negating how gender 
                                                
85 Chase Strangio, interview by author, August 20, 2013, New York, NY, on file with author. 
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deviance or nonconformity is also a basis for abuse that exceeds the terms of “cross-
gender.” Gender normative carceral logics produce this myopic focus on cross-gender 
searches and the need to create barriers to contact between (essentialized) males and 
females. In doing so, they render gender nonconforming, trans, and intersex prisoners as 
illegible and therefore largely ineligible for protection. 
In addition to normalizing strip, body cavity, and pat-down searches—essentially 
constructing them as not violence, unless intended to be so—PREA also exempts medical 
examinations from being considered abuse (unless intended to be so). PREA states that 
examinations that gather physical evidence or are part of medical treatment in the course 
of investigating a rape as well as “the use of a health care provider's hands or fingers or 
the use of medical devices” during any “appropriate medical treatment” or while 
performing body cavity searches “in order to maintain security and safety within the 
prison or detention facility” are not sexual abuse.86 While the standards prohibit searches 
or physical examinations of trans and intersex prisoners “for the sole purpose of 
determining the inmate’s genital status,” they authorize medical staff to conduct such an 
examination, “as part of a broader medical examination,” “if necessary.”87 In other 
words, both medical and non-medical staff can still forcibly touch a prisoner’s body and 
insert a variety of instruments into their body, including as a response to rape. Trans, 
gender nonconforming, and intersex prisoners report these actions as a frequent form of 
carceral sexual violence. Incarcerated women also report non-consensual gynecological 
                                                
86 Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003, 988-89. 
87 “National Standards to Prevent, Detect, and Respond to Prison Rape,” 37110. 
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exams as a form of carceral sexual violence.88 Because these prisoners, especially those 
who are people of color, are often determined to be particularly dangerous and are also 
disproportionately survivors of prison rape, prison staff are able to justify invasive 
medical exams and searches as regular necessities of managing the order and security of a 
prison. PREA, in other words, produces a legally recognizable definition of sexual 
violence that excludes (and in some cases explicitly legalizes) many important forms of 
carceral sexual violence. 
By mobilizing the rhetoric and practice of deference to prison administrators 
based on their expertise in security, PREA reproduces prisoners’ bodies as fungible and 
violatable, particularly for security purposes. In effect, PREA (re)authorizes prison 
administrators to determine what protection is in practice while remobilizing narratives of 
queer security threat. Indeed, some state prison officials have interpreted PREA to 
legitimize their continued targeting of trans and gender nonconforming prisoners for 
discipline and punishment in the name of protection. 
Idaho prison administrators explicitly do this in their “Prison Rape Elimination” 
policy, which includes a provision requiring “gender appropriate clothing and hygiene.” 
The policy states:  
To foster an environment safe from sexual misconduct, offenders are prohibited from 
dressing or displaying the appearance of the opposite gender. Specifically, male offenders 
displaying feminine or effeminate appearance and female offenders displaying masculine 
appearance to include, but not limited to, the following: hairstyles, shaping eyebrows, 
face makeup, undergarments, jewelry, and gender opposite clothing.89  
                                                
88 Arkles, interview; Levi, Testimony. 
89 Idaho Department of Correction, “Prison Rape Elimination.” While this section notes that it must be 
implemented in accordance with their policy regarding prisoners with Gender Identity Disorder and any 
treatment plans for those prisoners, their GID policy says nothing about access to gendered clothing and 
grooming products. Notably, Idaho’s GID policy is one of the more detailed policies and considered one of 
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While marking gender nonconformity as a cause of sexual violence—and by extension 
marking signs of gender nonconformity as hypersexuality—the policy does not name 
gender nonconforming, trans, or gay prisoners as at increased risk for sexual violence.90 
In doing so, it produces the criminalization (or disciplinization) of gender nonconformity 
as protection for gender nonconforming prisoners and their institutions. Trans and gender 
nonconforming prisoners are constructed as a source of sexual violence, not victims, and 
therefore to blame for their own victimization and related institutional disorder. Put 
another way, they are inevitably subject to sexual violence but unrapable (or at least 
unvictimizable). Moreover, Idaho’s GID policy requires the placement of prisoners in a 
sexed facility based on their “primary physical sexual characteristics,” defined as 
“genitalia and reproductive organs.”91 With such a policy—which effectively means that 
nearly all trans women (and gender nonconforming male-classified people) are in men’s 
institutions and all trans men (and gender nonconforming female-classified people) are in 
women’s institutions—Idaho’s sexual violence elimination policy and GID policy work 
together to eliminate gender nonconformity in Idaho penal institutions. 
 While the prohibition on gender nonconformity explicitly targets gender 
nonconforming and trans prisoners, the policy also prohibits consensual sexual activity 
between prisoners, a prohibition that has long been a means to target trans and gender 
nonconforming prisoners for punishment throughout the US. The Idaho DOC’s pamphlet 
                                                                                                                                            
the better ones. Idaho Department of Correction, “Gender Identity Disorder: Healthcare for Offenders with” 
401.06.03.501 (adopted 10/31/2002). 
90 They explicitly name mentally ill prisoners, youth, and “those who appear to be potential targets for 
sexual predators.” Idaho Department of Correction, “Prison Rape Elimination,” 6. 
91 Idaho Department of Correction, “Gender Identity Disorder,” 5, 2. 
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about the policy for prisoners, “Maintaining Dignity: Prison Rape and Sexual Activity 
Elimination,” explains: “The Idaho Department of Correction has a zero-tolerance policy 
concerning rape and sexual activity in IDOC facilities. Prison rape and sexual activity 
seriously reduce the Department’s ability to fulfill its mission to protect the public and 
successfully return offenders to communities.”92 Here and elsewhere in the pamphlet and 
policy, Idaho prison administrators conflate consensual sexual activity and sexual 
violence as equally dangerous. In their explanation for prohibiting sexual violence, they 
claim that sexual relationships in prison “foster violence,” explaining that “eliminating 
sexual assault and sexual activity promotes a safer environment… [and] promotes an 
atmosphere where people can concentrate on making the changes in their lives that are 
necessary for success upon release.”93 Mobilizing narratives about the danger of 
(homo)sexual activity produced in the early and mid-twentieth century, they explain that 
the “consequences of prison rape and sexual activity” include increased risk that 
survivors of rape “will commit crimes when they are released,” “worsen[ed] racial 
tensions because of interracial sexual assault,” increased violence against prisoners and 
staff, negative psychological and physical effects for survivors, increased risk of 
“insurrection and riot,” and reduced “ability to successfully transition to the community 
and a law-abiding life style when released.”94 This pamphlet and policy produce sex in 
prison as always violent and criminal, as perverting and morally deleterious, a production 
                                                
92 Idaho Department of Correction, Maintaining Dignity: Prison Rape and Sexual Activity Elimination: 
Handbook for Offenders (March 2004), 1. They also prohibit “inappropriate physical contact”, such as 
“lingering touching, physical contact or inappropriate kissing.” 
93 Ibid., 1. 
94 Ibid., 1. The policy also includes these “consequences.” 
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reliant on long-held anxieties about (racialized) queer dangerousness and gender and 
sexual nonnormativity as threat. 
These anxieties intersect with the continued construction of trans and gender 
nonconforming prisoners as (dangerously) hypersexual, inciters of sex, and unrapable to 
authorize prison administrators to target trans and gender nonconforming prisoners for 
discipline and punishment through this prohibition on sexual activity. Staff often assume 
that these prisoners are engaging in sex—whether they are or not—and believe that 
sexual assaults are consensual sex and that all sex is inevitably dangerous (at least to 
institutional order and security). Trans and gender nonconforming prisoners are, 
therefore, punished for their participation in sexual activity, perceived sexual activity, and 
sometimes for surviving sexual assault or rape. Neither the Idaho policy nor PREA and 
its standards challenge these controlling narratives. In fact, they often reproduce them.95 
Put another way, these policies actually make gender nonconforming and trans prisoners 
more vulnerable to sexual violence, not only perpetrated by staff but also by other 
prisoners, as they construct these prisoners as hypersexual and queerly dangerous and 
take away their ability to protect themselves. 
                                                
95 While PREA and its standards do not prohibit consensual sexual activity, they authorize its prohibition 
by state departments of corrections. During the NPREC commission, LGBT advocates recommended that 
the standards include a provision stating that consensual sexual activity should not be prohibited and that 
prisoners should not be disciplined for it. See for example, Strangio and Arkles to Hinchman. However, the 
standards did not include such a provision. Instead, they allowed for the prohibition and disciplining of 
consensual sexual activity but clarified that consensual sexual activity should not be automatically 
classified as sexual abuse. Nevertheless, legal scholar and former staff attorney at the Sylvia River Law 
Project Gabriel Arkles reported that PREA had been used to discipline rape survivors. Arkles described 
how when one of his trans client who had been repeatedly raped (which notably occurred after her repeated 
requests for protective custody were denied) finally reported the violence, she and her rapist were written 
up and disciplined for engaging in sexual conduct. At her hearing, the officer who ruled against her 
repeatedly brought up PREA “as if to shame her, to say that her points weren’t valid.” He questioned why 
she had not reported the rapes immediately, citing PREA as proof that she could and should have done so. 
While this trans woman appealed this decision and won, she still endured a traumatic official response—
initially sanctioned in the name of PREA—to her sexual assault. Arkles, interview.  
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While the Idaho DOC makes some distinction between sexual assault and 
consensual sexual activity, the Massachusetts Department of Corrections (MDOC) almost 
entirely collapses consensual sex into sexual assault and rape in their “Sexually Abusive 
Behavior Prevention and Intervention Policy.” The policy prohibits “all intentional acts 
of sexually abusive behavior or intimacy…regardless of consensual status” and defines 
“sexually abusive behavior” as including “acts of intimacy, sexual contact, sexual abuse 
and staff sexual misconduct.”96 Throughout the policy, no distinction is made between 
consensual sexual activity and sexual assault and rape. Prison administrators argue that 
no prisoner can consent to a sexual relationship, therefore all sex within prisons is at least 
“inherently coercive,” if not violent.97 While prisons are inherently violent and coercive 
institutions and consent can be very complicated within that environment, the 
construction of prisoners as unable to consent not only puts those perceived as 
hypersexual at increased risk of punishment but strips prisoners of a key part of life (for 
many): sexual intimacy and companionship. Sexual intimacy, love, and companionship 
                                                
96 Massachusetts Department of Correction, “Sexually Abusive Behavior Prevention and Intervention 
Policy,” 103 DOC 519 (March 2013), 3, 5. 
97 For example, Paul DiPaolo, MDOC’s PREA manager, explained in an affidavit to a Massachusetts 
district court: “Under PREA, no inmate can consent to a sexual relationship. Correctional officers can never 
know if sexual activity in prison is in consensual. There is something inherently coercive about any sexual 
relationship in prison.” Affidavit of Paul DiPaolo at 2, Battista v. Spencer, No. 05-11456, 2011 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 92010 (D. Mass. 2011), Oct. 3, 2008, 2. DiPaolo further argued that PREA itself does not allow for 
consensual sexual activity among prisoners and that many states have the same policy as Massachusetts 
regarding the absence of consent. Brief of Defendants-Appellants, Battista v. Clarke, 645 F.3d 449 (1st Cir. 
2011) (No. 10-1965), Oct. 25, 2010. See also, Dumond, “The Impact of Prisoner Sexual Violence.” 
In his discussion of PREA with me, Massachusetts antiprison activist Jason Lydon explained that 
prisoners were getting disciplinary tickets for sexual activity and even for talking about their genitals (for 
example, discussing their discomfort with or desire to alter them). In addition to targeting prisoners for 
discipline because of consensual sexual activity, he explained that the increased presence of cameras 
because of PREA also makes prisoners more vulnerable to punishment. Finally, he explained that in his 
experience, while MDOC told prisoners about PREA, staff, including the PREA manager who was in 
charge of addressing sexual violence, were largely unresponsive to or denied requests for assistance from 
prisoners and advocates. While he acknowledged that other advocates had reported that PREA had been 
useful, he found that it had only done harm. Lydon, interview. 
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are often constructed as a core part of what it means to be human. By prohibiting these 
human experiences and rendering them as coercion and violence, prisoners are 
dehumanized and produced as socially dead. 
In addition to targeting trans and gender nonconforming prisoners for punishment, 
Massachusetts prison administrators have used this policy to justify their denial of 
gender-affirming medical treatment for at least a few trans women. For example, prison 
administrators repeatedly referenced this policy in their communications to a 
Massachusetts district court in order to justify their refusal to provide hormone therapy to 
Sandy Jo Battista, a white trans woman classified and housed as male. Officials argued 
that Battista’s bodily feminization through hormone therapy would put her at increased 
risk for sexual violence and disrupt the space of the prison by inciting other prisoners to 
sexual desire and violence. They also argued that her involvement in a few sexual 
relationships with other prisoners, her past experience of sexual and other violence, and 
her history of non-compliance with prison rules (often directly related to her gender 
identity and expression) increased that risk.98  
In keeping with their policy, prison administrators constantly collapsed 
consensual sex into sexual assault. They referred to both Battista’s alleged consensual 
                                                
98 See for example, Defendants’ Memorandum of Law, Battista (05-11456), Dec. 5, 2008; “Gender Identity 
Disorder Security Review” (Aug 8, 2008), Attachment to Defendants’ Memorandum of Law, Battista (No. 
05-11456), Dec. 5, 2008; Defendants’ Sur-Reply to Plaintiff’s Reply, Battista (No. 05-11456), Oct. 7, 
2008; Defendant’s Substitute Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Battista (No. 05-11456), May 17, 
2010; Affidavit of Robert Murphy, Battista (No. 05-11456), Sept. 4, 2008; Depositions of Robert F. 
Murphy, Jr., Battista (No. 05-11456), June 30, 2008; Katrin Rouse, Report of Qualified Examiner to the 
Court (April 1, 2002), Attached to Complaint, Battista v. Murphy, No. 03-12643 (D. Mass, Dec. 16, 2003). 
Massachusetts prison administrators made similar arguments in order to justify their denial of gender-
affirming medical treatment for Teresa Brugliera (see Brugliera v. Commissioner of Massachusetts 
Department of Correction, No.07-40323, D. Mass.) and Michelle Kosilek (see Kosilek v. Maloney, No. 92-
12820, D. Mass.; Kosilek v. Spencer, No. 00-12455, D. Mass.; Kosilek v. Clarke, No. 12-2194, D. Mass.). 
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sexual activity and experiences of sexual violence as a “PREA incidents.”99 Prison 
officials also referenced statistics gathered through PREA that included—but did not 
differentiate between—consensual sexual activity, sexual assault perpetrated by staff, and 
sexual assault perpetrated by prisoners to portray the Massachusetts Treatment Center, 
where Battista was incarcerated, as an exceptionally sexually dangerous place because of 
prisoner-perpetrated violence.100 
Battista’s consensual participation in sexual activity was constructed as the cause 
of the violence that she experienced—an assertion that they substantiated with PREA—
and as a reason to not provide her with necessary medical treatment. In fact, MDOC’s 
PREA manager explained that her “pattern of engaging in high-risk sexual activity” 
impacted “his opinion that providing Battista with female hormones would present a high 
risk of sexual assault.”101 Like the Idaho Department of Corrections, Massachusetts 
prison administrators use PREA’s recognition that trans prisoners are at increased risk for 
sexual assault to prohibit certain kinds of gender nonconformity in their institutions. They 
constructed her feminization through hormone therapy, especially the development of 
breasts, as producing sexual violence and therefore as prohibited under PREA.102 Using 
PREA to support their claims that hormone therapy would increase her risk of sexual 
violence and their policy regarding sexual violence to construct her as hypersexual and 
                                                
99 See, Defendant’s Substitute Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Battista (No. 05-11456); 
Executive Summary: The Alleged Sexual Misconduct by Residents (ND), Attached to Defendants’ Sur-
Reply to Plaintiff’s Reply, Battista (No. 05-11456). 
100 See for example, Defendants’ Sur-Reply to Plaintiff’s Reply, Battista (No. 05-11456), Oct. 7, 2008; 
Defendant’s Substitute Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Battista (No. 05-11456). 
101 Defendants’ Proposed Findings of Fact at 60, Battista (No. 05-11456), July 23, 2010. 
102 For example, they argued that their “concern that if Battista achieves a more feminine appearance, 
including the development of breasts, through hormones treatment [she will be at increased risk for sexual 
violence] is supported by PREA which specifically addresses the issues of transsexualism and the potential 
for victimization.” Defendants’ Proposed Findings of Fact at 54, Battista (No. 05-11456). 
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dangerous, Massachusetts prison administrators both vacated themselves of responsibility 
for her experiences of sexual violence and justified their denial of necessary medical 
treatment as protection and security (for Battista and the institution).  
While one could argue that the Massachusetts and Idaho policies violate the 
PREA standards, I argue instead that they highlight PREA’s limitations and failure to 
account for how sexual violence is structured into penal practices, especially those used 
to manage trans and gender nonconforming prisoners. As a liberal reform, PREA 
produces sexual violence as individual and aberrant and identifies state intervention, 
including increased surveillance, punishment, and other prison management tools, as the 
means to end prison rape.103 As Jackson explains, PREA and NPREC “frame[] increased 
state control over incarcerated bodies as a way to solve the problem of prison rape.”104 In 
doing so, they sever “the structures of prison rape from the carceral system, presenting 
rape by either prisoners or staff as resulting from the absence of carceral power.”105 This 
account negates how carceral control and management strategies strip prisoners of 
agency, choice, and the ability to keep themselves safe, producing much of the violence 
in prisons, while also perpetrating violence against those prisoners through management 
                                                
103 Some feminists, particularly feminists of color, have recently similarly criticized the mainstream 
antiviolence movement’s strategy of relying on the state and criminal legal system as the solution for 
sexual violence, which negates how the state is also a perpetrator of sexual violence and oppression. See 
Smith, Conquest; Beth E. Richie, Arrested Justice: Black Women, Violence, and America’s Prison Nation 
(New York: New York University Press, 2012); Incite! Women of Color Against Violence, The Color of 
Violence; Julia Sudbury, “Rethinking Antiviolence Strategies; Lessons from the Black Women’s 
Movement in Britain,” in Color of Violence, ed. Incite! Women of Color Against Violence; Stormy Ogden, 
“Pomo Woman, Ex-Prisoner, Speaks Out,” in Color of Violence, ed. Incite! Women of Color Against 
Violence; Kristin Bumiller, In an Abusive State: How Neoliberalism Appropriated the Feminist Movement 
Against Sexual Violence (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2008); Kimberlé Crenshaw, “From Private 
Violence to Mass Incarceration: Thinking Intersectionality about Women, Race, and Social Control,” 
UCLA Law Review 59 (2012); James, Resisting State Violence. 
104 Jackson, “Sexual Necropolitics,” 197. 
105 Ibid., 208. 
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practices, often in the name of protection. As critical race, feminist, and queer studies 
scholars have argued, liberal reforms, including those that address violence and 
discrimination through state recognition and intervention, renormalize structural 
inequality and state violence by individualizing violence and discrimination and 
producing the state as a source of protection.106 
While the PREA standards provide prisoners and their advocates with additional 
tools by recognizing that trans and gender nonconforming prisoners are 
disproportionately at risk for experiencing sexual violence—for example, by potentially 
helping prove the “actual knowledge” requirement that Farmer established—the 
standards simultaneously create additional opportunities and incentive for prison 
administrators to target trans and gender nonconforming prisoners for discipline and 
punishment because they do not—and cannot—address structural violence.107 Ultimately, 
PREA falls in line with the racialized gender normative logics of the prison system that 
designate prisoner bodies as sites of insecurity that need containment and can rightfully 
be violated. PREA strengthens the prison system and produces certain forms of carceral 
sexual violence as protection and security. 
 
                                                
106 See for example, Incite! Women of Color Against Violence, The Color of Violence; Spade, Normal Life; 
Freeman, “Legitimizing Racial Discrimination.” 
107 All the advocates that I interviewed were highly critical of PREA but also argued that they would use it 
in their advocacy. In fact, Owen Daniel-McCarter, attorney and co-founder of the Transformative Justice 
Law Project, argued that because PREA acknowledges that prison rape exists and is a serious problem, it 
sets a new tone that might produce cultural change. Owen Daniel-McCarter, interview by author, 
September 5, 2013, Chicago, IL, on file with author; Strangio, interview; Williams, interview; Arkles, 
interview. My criticisms of PREA, its standards, and the related state department of corrections policies is 
not a criticism of prisoners and their advocates’ participation in shaping those standards or in using them to 
address sexual violence. 
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While there have been major shifts in penological, social scientific, and legal 
discussions of sexual violence in prisons since the early twentieth century—from little 
acknowledgement of sexual assault and rape to Congress unanimously passing a national 
law that recognizes and aims to eliminate prison rape—sexual violence against all 
prisoners, but especially trans and gender nonconforming prisoners, remains a prominent 
feature of carceral power, and the narrative of the simultaneous inevitability and 
impossibility of sexual violence against trans and gender nonconforming people endures. 
Today, like in the past, discourses of inevitability authorize various forms of carceral 
violence—including segregation, invasive searches, and restrictions on gendered 
clothing, grooming products, and expressions—while impossibility relieves prison 
administrators from responsibility for sexual violence experienced by trans and gender 
nonconforming prisoners. In other words, this enduring narrative, along with the 
interconnected narrative of men’s prisons as sites of uncontrollable sexual violence 
perpetrated by racially hypermasculine prisoners, continues to normalize and legitimize 
carceral power and carceral sexual violence, even obscuring some of it from being 
recognized as violence. These narratives are another product of the racialized gender 
normative logics of the US prison system, as carceral power targets and punishes 
racialized, gendered, and sexual nonnormativity and produces such nonnormativity as a 
(sexual) security threat. As such, gender nonconforming and trans prisoners play a key 
role in dominant narratives legitimizing incarceration and state violence, and they 
experience that carceral sexual violence particularly acutely, as carceral power produces 
them as inherently fungible.  
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Chapter Four 
 
“A Serious Medical Need?”:  
Carceral Necropower and Access to Gender-Affirming Medical Treatment 
 
 
In 2009, Robert Murphy, the Superintendent of the Massachusetts Treatment 
Center, the Massachusetts Department of Correction’s (MDOC) security hospital, 
concluded his “security review” of hormone treatment for Sandy Jo Battista, a white trans 
woman who was civilly committed to the Treatment Center, by stating, “The use of 
hormone therapy as well as other potential ‘feminizing’ physical changes are not 
supported due to the serious and potential security contraindications to his [sic] safety in 
this facility.”1 Throughout his security review, Murphy constructed Battista as queerly 
dangerous, as the source of (sexual) violence and institutional disorder. He argued that 
hormone therapy’s feminizing effects—causing her “to have breasts and a feminine 
appearance”—would “create a significant risk” both to Battista’s safety and the security 
and order of the Treatment Center. By concluding that MDOC should not provide 
Battista with hormone therapy because it posed a security threat, Murphy constructed 
institutional security as the determining factor in whether to provide penal medical 
treatment. According to this security review and the policy that mandated it as necessary 
to authorize the gender-affirming medical treatment within MDOC institutions, prisoners’ 
health and mental and bodily needs are secondary to security concerns. 
                                                
1 Robert Murphy, “GID Treatment Security Review – Sandy Jo Battista” (Sept. 1, 2009) at 5-6, Kosilek v. 
Spencer, 889 F.Supp.2d 190 (D. Mass. 2012), Sept. 16, 2011. See also Murphy’s preliminary security 
review, in which he made similar determinations. Affidavit of Paul DiPaolo, Battista v. Dennehy, No. 05-
11456, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92010 (D. Mass. 2011), Oct. 3, 2008. 
In 2003, Battista was adjudicated to be a “sexually dangerous person” and committed to the MTC for 
one day to life. She had originally been incarcerated in 1983 for a term of 12-20 years following her 
conviction for a sex offense. She was released from her criminal sentence in 2001 but was immediately 
civilly committed. Attached to Complaint, Battista v. Murphy, No. 03-12643 (D. Mass., Dec. 16, 2003). 
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In Murphy’s six-page security review, we see a convergence of the discourses and 
practices that I have discussed over the past three chapters, justifying his effort to deny 
Battista access to gender-affirming medical treatment. Approximately half of the security 
review details Battista’s commitment and disciplinary history—including allegations or 
charges that were never proven—and focuses on sexual incidents, both consensual and 
forced. Citing MDOC’s PREA policy—which collapses consensual sexual activity and 
sexual assault as equivalently dangerous to prisoners’ safety and institutional security—
Murphy argued that her history of surviving sexual assaults and her participation in 
“improper sexual relationships” with a few other prisoners demonstrated her “lack of 
good judgment,” portraying her as manipulative, deceptive, and dangerous.2 By focusing 
on Battista’s supposed disciplinary infractions and consensual sexual activity alongside 
her history of experiencing sexual violence and the supposed management problems of 
her (potentially) feminized body, Murphy portrays prison officials as protectors who are 
consistently thwarted by Battista’s queerly dangerous actions and embodiment, thereby 
constructing the denial of hormone therapy as legitimate violence or as necessary to 
maintaining security. 
Murphy wrote this security review in the context of a long legal battle over 
Battista’s access to gender-affirming medical treatment, particularly hormone therapy. 
                                                
2 Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee at 54, Battista v. Clarke, 645 F.3d 449 (1st Cir. 2011) (No. 10-1965), Dec. 7, 
2010. For example, in his 2008 preliminary security review, Murphy argued that she was “not a reliable 
reporter” and that she “has a history of noncompliance with DOC rules.” Affidavit of Robert Murphy at 3-
5, Battista (No. 05-11456), Sept. 4, 2008. Battista’s lawyers criticized Murphy’s review as pretextual, as 
demonstrating that no matter what the results of therapy, Battista will never receive hormones due to 
security concerns. Moreover, they claim that the review was conducted in one hour and did not review the 
treatment plan or talk to her providers nor did they individually assess her housing situation nor did they 
take into account the harm that denying her hormones would do to her. Plaintiff’s Reply to Defendant’s 
Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Prelim. Inj., Battista (No. 05-11456), Sept. 19, 2008. 
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Battista, who was originally incarcerated for a criminal conviction in 1983, began to 
request gender-affirming medical treatment and access to women’s clothing in 1995 as 
part of her effort to live as a woman in MCI-Norfolk, a medium security men’s prison. 
Over the next sixteen years, MDOC officials consistently denied or delayed evaluations 
and gender-affirming treatment. During that time, Battista filed numerous federal civil 
rights lawsuits, struggled with depression, and attempted self-castration a few times while 
also living her life as a woman in men’s prisons.3 Her efforts, which I will detail in the 
second section, resulted in a Massachusetts district court ordering in 2010 (upheld by the 
First Circuit in 2011) that MDOC provide her with hormone therapy.4 
Battista’s victory is an exception rather than an example of the experiences of 
incarcerated people trying to access gender-affirming medical treatment in prisons and 
jails. Instead, her experiences prior to the 2010 ruling much more accurately exemplifies 
trans prisoners’ access to such treatment. Departments of corrections around the US are at 
best reluctant to provide and frequently do all they can to obstruct access to gender-
affirming medical treatment. While this reluctance or obstruction is in part the product of 
poor or inadequate health care in penal institutions around the US, gender-affirming 
medical treatment is also exceptionalized, explicitly marked as a (queer) security 
                                                
3 Affidavit of Direct Testimony of Sandy J. Battista, Battista (No. 05-11456), May 12, 2010; Affidavit of 
the Plaintiff, Battista (No. 05-11456), Oct. 17, 2005. See, Battista v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts (No. 
97-3487A), Battista v. Murphy (No. 02-10137), Battista v. Battista v. Murphy (No. 03-12643), and Battista 
v. Spencer (No. 05-11456). 
4 Transcript of Hearing on Motion to Stay Execution of Modified Preliminary Injunction Order Pending 
Appeal, Battista (No. 05-11456), Aug. 23, 2010; Battista v. Clarke, 645 F.3d 449 (1st Cir. 2011). While this 
was an important victory, it cannot be separated from the great cost that precipitated it. It took sixteen years 
of advocacy, which put her in increased danger as she antagonized a system and administrators who had 
(almost) complete control over her body and life.  
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concern.5 For example, MDOC administrators consistently argued that providing Battista 
with hormone therapy “would significantly hinder the Department in fulfilling its 
constitutionally-imposed duty to protect Battista and provide for the institutional security 
of the Treatment Center.”6 In other words, departments of corrections, including MDOC, 
usually erect additional barriers through policy and practice to gender-affirming treatment 
within the existing landscape of poor penal healthcare. 
This chapter examines the carceral logics regarding the provision and denial of 
gender-affirming medical treatment by examining federal civil rights litigation, like 
Battista’s, that addresses trans women’s access to such treatment within men’s penal 
institutions.7 Most of the ways that prison administrators shape and restrict access to 
                                                
5 For a discussion of inadequate penal healthcare, see Andrew P. Wilper, et al., “The Health and Health 
Care of US Prisoners: Results of a Nationwide Survey,” American Journal of Public Health 99, no. 4 
(2009); Sasha Abramsky and Jamie Fellner, Ill-Equipped: US Prisons and Offenders with Mental Illness 
(New York: Human Rights Watch, 2003); Joel H. Thompson, “Today’s Deliberate Indifference: Providing 
Attention Without Providing Treatment to Prisoners with Serious Medical Needs,” Harvard Civil Rights-
Civil Liberties Law Review 45 (2010). For recent lawsuits about penal healthcare, see Brown v. Plata, 131 
S.Ct. 1910 (2011); Parsons v. Ryan, No. 12-00601 (D. Ar.). 
6 Defendant’s Substitute Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 38, Battista (No. 05-11456), May 17, 
2010. 
7 The chapter focuses on hormone therapy and to a lesser extent sex reassignment surgery. However, it is 
important to note that gender-affirming medical treatment is a much broader category that includes not only 
hormone therapy and sex reassignment surgery but other surgeries, electrolysis, preventative care such as 
mammograms, and other medical care. Gabriel Arkles notes that hormone therapy is not the only treatment 
that trans prisoners have difficulty accessing. For example, he explained that it is common for trans women 
who have complications with silicone injections to not get proper treatment and that mammograms are very 
difficult to get in men’s prisons. In addition, trans prisoners often have difficulty accessing ostensibly non-
transgender-related medical care, especially mental healthcare, because of transphobia among providers. 
Trans prisoners often experience verbal and even physical violence at the hands of medical staff. Many 
medical staff view them as manipulative and question their gender identity. Gabriel Arkles, interview by 
author, August 12, 2013, Boston, MA, on file with author; Alisha Williams, interview by author, August 
19, 2013, New York, NY, on file with author; Owen Daniel-McCarter, interview by author, September 5, 
2013, Chicago, IL, on file with author.  
In addition, most prison systems categorize access to gendered clothing and grooming products 
associated with the sex that is not that of the facility as simultaneously a medical and security concern. 
Most departments of corrections, prisons, and jails have regulations governing gendered clothing and 
grooming products that restrict or deny access to products or clothing viewed as “cross-gender,” such as 
makeup or dresses in men’s institutions, which are justified as matters of security. Generally, the only 
exceptions officially make to these regulations are when access to these items and treatments are prescribed 
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gender-affirming medical treatment—such as the power to hire and fire providers—are 
invisible and borne out of the overwhelming power that prison staff have to control the 
minutia of prisoners’ and institutional life. Federal civil rights lawsuits—especially those 
that are won by the incarcerated person, which are litigated for many years and even 
decades, producing hundreds of documents and requiring prison administrators to 
articulate their position multiple times—provide glimpses into the mechanisms and 
justifications for denying (or, less frequently, providing) access to such treatment.8 I 
argue that within the penal space gender-affirming medical treatment is securitized, or 
produced as a security concern, and therefore restricted. This securitization is produced 
from the intersection of carceral necropolitics and racialized gender normative logics.  
In his seminal essay “Necropolitics,” postcolonial theorist Achille Mbembe 
argues that sovereign power defines “who matters and who does not, who is disposable 
                                                                                                                                            
by physicians as part of a treatment for GID. In addition, trans women report being targeted for disciplinary 
action and accumulating charges and punishments as both a direct and indirect result of their female 
identities and expressions. For example, many are charged with offenses, such as disobeying direct orders, 
defying institutional rules, or possessing contraband because they illicitly obtain or make gendered 
grooming products and clothing that are banned by institutional regulations. See for example, Cynthia 
Osborne, “Psychosexual Evaluation Report for Ophelia De’lonta” (March 31, 2004), Attached to 
Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, De’lonta v. Angelone, No. 99-00642 
(W.D. Va. April 7, 2004); Community Access Board Annual Review (April, 21, 2004), Attached to 
Affidavit of Gregory J. Hughes, Battista (No. 05-11456), Oct. 7, 2002; Williams, interview. 
Finally, the focus on trans women in men’s prisons is the product of my archive. All the cases that I 
found involved trans women, nearly all of whom were in men’s prisons. There is very little information 
about trans men in women’s prisons. Even the activists and advocates that I talked to had very limited 
experience with transmasculine clients. However, anecdotal evidence suggests that incarcerated trans men 
face similar barriers to accessing gender-affirming medical treatment as incarcerated trans women. See, 
Jason Lydon, interview by author, February 5, 2014, over phone, on file with author; Gianna E. Israel, 
“Transsexual Inmate Treatment Issues,” GIC TIP Journal 2, no. 4 (Fall 2002). 
8 Nevertheless, the use of these federal civil rights cases as an archive is also limiting. These cases, 
especially the successful ones like Battista’s, represent a very small percentage of incarcerated trans and 
gender nonconforming people in men’s prisons. Importantly, the only litigants whose complaints are taken 
seriously by courts—even if they ultimately do not rule in their favor—are trans women who can articulate 
their femaleness in binary, normative terms. They are also disproportionately white. 
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and who is not.”9 Focusing on colonialism, Mbembe argues that sovereign or state power 
subjugates certain forms of “life to the power of death.”10 Mbembe draws from and 
refines Foucault’s theory of biopower, which argues that certain formations of power 
produce life through managing populations. Foucault argues that racism fractures 
populations, orienting certain populations towards life and letting others die.11 Arguing 
that sovereign power does not just “let die,” Mbembe theorizes necropower as actively 
producing “death-worlds,” or “new and unique forms of social existence in which vast 
populations are subjected to conditions of life conferring upon them the status of living 
dead.”12  
While Mbembe focuses on the colony, prison is also site of necropower. The 
prison system, as it warehouses an increasing proportion of racialized and otherwise 
deviant populations, exposes those confined in them to violence and various forms of 
death. Prisoners are taken from their communities and generally denied the right to vote 
or participate in civic life. They are dehumanized and denied most rights, self-
determination, the ability to keep themselves safe, and the ability make even the most 
basic choices. In other words, they are produced as civilly and socially dead, as “putative 
‘nonsubjects.’”13 The death zone of the prison erases imprisoned people’s individuality, 
                                                
9 Achille Mbembe, “Necropolitics,” Public Culture 15 (2003): 27. His emphasis. 
10 Ibid., 39. 
11 See Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality: An Introduction (New York: Vintage Books, 1978); 
Michel Foucault, “Society Must Be Defended”: Lectures at the Collége de France, 1975-1976 (New York: 
Picador, 1997). 
12 Ibid., 40.  
13 Dylan Rodríguez, Forced Passages: Imprisoned Radical Intellectuals and the U.S. Prison Regime 
(Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 2006), 37. See also, Dylan Rodríguez, “(Non)Scenes of 
Captivity: The Common Sense of Punishment and Death,” Radical History Review 96 (2006); Ethan Blue 
and Patrick Timmons, “Editor’s Introduction,” Radical History Review 96 (2006); Alan Eladio Gómez, 
“Resisting Living Death at Marion Federal Penitentiary, 1972.” Radical History Review 96 (Fall 2006). 
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humanity, and status as social and knowing subjects; to paraphrase Grace Kyungwon 
Hong, to be criminalized, especially racially criminalized, “is to not own oneself.”14 But, 
prisons also expose prisoners to premature (biological) death, as Ruth Wilson Gilmore 
has argued, through, for example, violence, poor medical care, and poor nutrition and 
sanitation.15  
Thus, the prison is a “death-world,” consigning prisoners to the status of “living 
dead.” Critical prison studies scholars, like Gilmore, have argued that the necropolitical 
structure, logics, and practices of carceral spaces and administrations are produced 
through and organized by white supremacy and racialization. Carceral necropower is also 
organized by racialized gender normativity. As racialized gender normativity produces 
gender nonconformity as a threat to institutional security, as queer dangerousness, as 
something that needs to be contained, it exposes gender nonconforming people to social, 
civil, and premature (biological) death. Put another way, queer dangerousness 
necessitates necropower. As with all prisoners, medical treatment for trans prisoners is 
shaped by necropower. Racialized gender normativity constructs gender-affirming 
medical treatment as dangerous and threatening, justifying the (necropolitical) denial of 
treatment. 
Health care is an important site of carceral necropower and a source of both social 
death and premature biological death. While gender-affirming medical treatment is not 
                                                
14 Grace Kyungwon Hong, The Ruptures of American Capital: Women of Color Feminism and the Culture 
of Immigrant Labor (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2006), 8.  
15 Ruth Wilson Gilmore, Golden Gulag: Prisons, Surplus, Crisis, and Opposition in Globalizing California 
(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2007).  
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usually life-or-death, for many trans people it is life-or-social death.16 By denying trans 
prisoners access to gender-affirming medical treatment, prison administrators negate their 
identity, capacity to know themselves, and bodily integrity. This denial immobilizes 
them, fixes them in (gendered) time. It can also cause significant psychological and 
physical pain. The death space of the prison alters the very definition of “medical 
necessity,” and, therefore, the norms of medicine and the provision of medical 
treatment.17 It is a space where healing and wholeness cannot exist; where “do no harm” 
is replaced with do not inflict unnecessary pain. “Unnecessary” is, of course, defined by 
legal, prison, or medical actors, not prisoners or patients. In other words, there is a range 
of legitimate violence that can be (constitutionally) perpetrated against prisoners. As 
such, medical treatment gets legitimately folded into the security apparatus of the prison 
system, effectively securitizing medical authority and, in particular, gender-affirming 
medical treatment as it is identified as a particularly pernicious security threat. “Security” 
functions as the most explicit articulation of necropower in the provision and denial of 
gender-affirming medical treatment.  
In part because the law, through the Eighth Amendment, guarantees the provision 
of “necessary” medical treatment, incarcerated trans people do sometimes gain access to 
                                                
16 However, it can be a source of premature death. As Owen Daniel-McCarter explains, one dangerous 
aspect of transgender-related medical treatment is that many penal medical providers have little to no 
knowledge of hormone treatment, including understanding its affects, its interactions with other medication 
(such as HIV medication or insulin), or the appropriate levels, and trans people who are provided with such 
treatment often do not have access to regular check ups. Daniel-McCarter, interview. Moreover, some 
incarcerated trans people commit or attempt to commit suicide or attempt self-castration, which can be life 
threatening.  
17 Prison administrators and a few courts explicitly argued this point. For example in Battista, the First 
Circuit explained that “medical ‘need’ in real life is an elastic term: security considerations also matter at 
prisons or civil counterparts, and administrators have to balance conflicting demands.” Battista, 645 F.3d 
454.See also, Kosilek v. Nelson, 221 F. Supp. 2d 156 (D. Mass. 2002); Deposition of Meredith R. Cary, 
De’lonta v. Johnson, 708 F. 3d 520 (4th Cir. 2013) (No. 11-00257), June 5, 2013. 
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gender-affirming medical treatment. While departments of corrections tend to restrict or 
block access to gender-affirming medical treatment, most allow their medical staff to 
provide such treatment, including hormone therapy but not sex reassignment surgery, at 
least in policy.18 However, in practice, access to such treatment is inconsistent, 
complicated, and even arbitrary.19 The process of evaluation, diagnosis, and treatment is 
usually long and convoluted and always requires trans prisoners to articulate their gender 
identity and medical “need” in ways that are recognizable to prison medical authorities.20 
                                                
18 A growing number of departments of corrections have officially policies regarding access to gender-
affirming medical treatment, but most still do not. However, all departments of corrections, in policy or 
practice, prohibit the provision of sex reassignment surgery, and, to my knowledge, no department of 
correction has ever done so.  
19 In discussing the provision of hormone treatment in the New York state system, Arkles explained that 
there “didn’t seem like there was a lot of sense to” who received hormones and who was denied access. 
Arkles, interview. 
Because all of the lawsuits that I examine in this chapter are initiated by a trans woman incarcerated in 
a men’s institution, I will not examine gender-related medical treatment in women’s prisons. From the little 
available information, access to gender-related medical treatment seems to be even more difficult and 
unlikely in women’s prisons, but trans men probably also encounter similar obstacles and problems as trans 
women in men’s prisons. Arkles explained that access to gender-related medical treatment is “pretty 
nonexistent” in New York state’s women’s prisons. In fact, he explained that New York State Department 
of Corrections and Community Supervision (DOCCS) administrators told him that there were no trans men 
in their facilities at all, even though advocates and prisoners told them otherwise. Arkles interview. Chase 
Strangio reported that the ACLU was assisting an incarcerated trans man in gaining access to testosterone 
therapy. This trans man was held in a women’s prison where he initially received testosterone, but prison 
doctors later lowered then discontinued the treatment. Chase Strangio, interview by author, August 20, 
2013, New York, NY, on file with author. 
20 For example, the New York State policy requires a process that is very long and complicated that 
generally takes a year and a half or longer. A prisoner must first request an evaluation through sick call. A 
New York Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (DOCCS) physician then determines if 
they should go to a specialist. If so, the prisoner is taken to a specialist for an evaluation. The only 
specialist that DOCCS uses resides in Buffalo and has a regular practice. He, therefore, can only do one or 
two evaluations per month, and it generally takes a few months to write the report. If this specialist 
recommends treatment, a DOCCS physician then determine which treatment to provide, and, if that 
treatment includes hormone therapy, the prisoner must see an endocrinologist, who determines if hormones 
are medically appropriate. Only after going through this entire process can a prisoner receive hormone 
therapy. Williams, interview.  
Many departments of corrections in policy or practice require trans prisoners to have undergone 
prescribed hormone therapy prior to incarceration in order to continue hormone therapy while in prison. 
Because access to prescribed hormone therapy often requires resources—including money, medical 
insurance, access to gender-affirming doctors, educational privilege, whiteness, and/or the ability to 
articulate one’s gender and sexual identity in recognizable, normative ways—incarcerated trans women, 
who are disproportionately low-income and nonwhite, have little-to-no access to affordable gender-
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Because all prisoners are denied self-determination, prison administrators only recognize 
medical authority to determine “need” and access.21 In this way, while the denial of 
(adequate) medicine in the prison system around the US is more obviously necropolitical, 
the provision of medicine is as well. Prison administrators and systems tend to provide 
only the most minimal medical treatment, treatment designed to primarily keep 
someone’s body alive.22 Medical providers also routinely participate in many different 
forms of carceral violence—from sanctioning the denial of medical treatment to 
participating in body cavity searches and other invasive exams. In this regard, 
medicine—which is generally biopolitical in perspective, or a technology to foster life—
is almost entirely reoriented toward necropower. 
 
“Evolving Standards of Decency” 
Imprisoned trans women began to advocate for access to gender-affirming 
medical treatment by the 1970s, if not earlier, and at least some were provided hormone 
                                                                                                                                            
affirming medical treatment prior to their incarceration. Because of this, many who were taking hormones 
prior to their incarceration were only able to access them on the black market, which prison administrators 
do not recognize as legitimate treatment. Even when trans women are provided with hormone therapy, their 
treatment is often inconsistent, poorly managed, and/or they are provided with a low or even less than a 
therapeutic dose. Arkles, interview; Williams, interview.  
21 As Dean Spade has written about, the law generally relies on medical authority to determine rights and 
establish (legal) gender identity and sex classification for trans and gender nonconforming people. While it 
may seem less problematic for medical professionals to determine gender-affirming medical treatment, it is 
not their involvement that is at issue but how the law and prison system relies on medical authority to 
recognize “medical need” and to determine who should have access to and how they have access to such 
treatment, far beyond determining what treatments are safe. Dean Spade, “Resisting Medicine, 
Re/modeling Gender,” Berkeley Women’s Law Journal 18 (2003); Dean Spade, “Compliance Is Gendered: 
Struggling for Gender Self-Determination in a Hostile Economy,” in Transgender Rights, ed. Paisley 
Currah, Richard M. Juang, and Shannon Minter Price (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 
2006). 
22 In practice, they often fail at even this minimal level of treatment. See, Brown, 131 S.Ct. 1910; Parsons, 
No. 12-00601 (D. Ar.). See also, Wilper, et al., “The Health and Health Care of US Prisoners”; Abramsky 
and Fellner, Ill-Equipped. 
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therapy in the 1970s and 1980s. For example, Diane Quirros, who New York Department 
of Corrections officials described to media as the first transsexual in the New York State 
prison system, was provided with hormone therapy during her incarceration in the late 
1970s.23 Some trans women were provided with hormone therapy by doctors associated 
with the California Medical Center at Vacaville in the 1980s.24 Despite these examples, 
most were denied treatment, and by the early 1980s, a few incarcerated trans women 
began filing federal civil rights lawsuits in response to prison administrators denying 
them gender-affirming medical treatment.25 
The relative newness of these requests for sex-reassignment treatments, despite 
the existence of cross-gender-identified people in penal institutions for many decades, 
reflects the larger history and context of transsexuality and medical treatment for 
transsexuality in the US. While medical sex reassignment began to be performed in 
Western Europe in the 1920s, before the 1960s, most US doctors and sexologists 
classified cross-gender-identified people as homosexuals and were either unaware of 
European sex reassignment operations or believed that cross-gender identity was a 
psychological problem appropriately treated with psychotherapy, not surgery. In the 
1950s and perhaps earlier, a few US doctors supported medical sex reassignment, some 
of whom privately performed sex reassignment surgery for a small number of patients. 
No doctor was more vocal in his support or instrumental in legitimizing such treatment 
                                                
23 Quirros also attempted to get the New York Department of Corrections to provide sex reassignment 
surgery, but prison administrators refused. Ralph Gardner Jr., “Prison of Gender,” The Soho News, 
February 4, 1981, Folder: Transexualism, International Gay Information Center collection – (Ephemera—
subjects), New York Public Library. 
24 Jennifer Orthwein, email to author, March 8, 2014. 
25 For a discussion of the general denial of treatment in the 1980s, see Lynn Marie Scribner, “Lockdown: 
The Incarcerated Preoperative Transsexual,” Folder 53, Box 13, Broomfield Street Education Foundation 
Records (M64), Northeastern University Libraries. 
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than Harry Benjamin, a German-born endocrinologist, who in the late 1940s and 1950s 
coined the term “transsexual,” along with psychiatrist David O. Cauldwell, and advocated 
for medical sex reassignment treatment.26 In the late 1960s, spurred by Benjamin’s 
advocacy as well as individual and emergent collective advocacy by trans people 
themselves, a few university hospitals opened gender identity clinics, which openly 
performed sex reassignment surgery for a small number of patients, primarily trans 
women. These clinics were an important catalyst to the legitimization of such treatment 
in the US.27 This legitimization, along with increased media attention and trans activism, 
led to an increasing number of people learning about the possibility of medicalized “sex 
change” and requesting hormonal and surgical sex-reassignment. 
While most doctors still rejected sex reassignment surgery as proper treatment, 
those who performed it, especially those affiliated with university clinics established a 
standardized gatekeeping system to control access to treatment. While most university 
clinics closed in the early and mid-1970s, doctors in private practice began to take their 
place, which effectively expanded the availability of such medical treatment, but only for 
those who could afford it. By the end of the 1970s, hormone therapy and sex 
reassignment surgeries had become more accepted and established treatments for 
                                                
26 While Benjamin strongly supported medical sex reassignment, Cauldwell did not. Joanne Meyerowitz, 
How Sex Changed: A History of Transsexuality in the United States (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2002). See also David O. Cauldwell, “Psychopathia Transexualis,” Sexology 16 (1949); Harry 
Benjamin, The Transsexual Phenomenon (New York: The Julian Press, Inc., 1966). 
27 Johns Hopkins was the first to open such a clinic in 1966. Over the next two and a half years, they 
received almost 2000 requests for treatment but only performed sex reassignment surgery for twenty-four 
patients. The University of Minnesota, Northwestern University, Stanford University, University of 
Washington, University of California Los Angeles, and others soon after opened their own clinics. 
Meyerowitz, How Sex Changed. See also Susan Stryker, Transgender History (Berkeley, CA: Seal Press, 
2008); Dallas Denny, “Transgender Communities of the United States in the Late Twentieth Century,” in 
Transgender Rights. 
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transsexuality, and in 1979 the of the Harry Benjamin International Gender Dysphoria 
Association—now known as the World Professional Association for Transgender Health 
(WPATH)—was founded. At its founding meeting, the organization approved its first 
Standards of Care, which officially sanctioned hormonal and surgical treatment, but not 
on demand, further institutionalizing the medical gatekeeping system. The following 
year, “transsexualism”—which would later become Gender Identity Disorder and 
recently Gender Dysphoria—appeared in the American Psychiatric Association’s revised 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM). 
In the 1960s and 1970s, as medical sex reassignment treatment became more 
established and institutionalized in the US, trans people also began to petition to change 
their legal sex classification with legal claims that were increasingly substantiated with 
medical consensus. They also soon legally challenged crossdressing laws, legal name 
changes, access to legal marriage, experiences of discrimination, and access to gender-
affirming medical treatment via Medicaid.28 These cases not only brought transsexuals to 
the attention of the law for the first time but also required courts to begin to develop 
precedents regarding legal interpretations of gender-affirming medical treatment. 
                                                
28 Meyerowitz, How Sex Changed; Andrew N. Sharpe, Transgender Jurisprudence: Dysphoric Bodies of 
Law (New York: Routledge-Cavendish, 2006). Regarding crossdressing laws, see Columbus v. Zanders, 
No. 74AP-88, 1974 Ohio App. LEXIS 3187 (1974); City of Chicago v. Wilson, 75 Ill. 2d 525 (1978). 
Regarding name changes, see Mtr. Of Anonymous v. Weiner, 270 N.Y.S.2d 319 (1966); Matter of 
Anonymous, 314 N.Y.S.2d 668 (1970). Regarding marriage, see Anonymous v. Anonymous, 325 N.Y.S.2d 
499 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1971); M.T. v. J.T., 355 A.2d204 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1976). Regarding discrimination, 
Voyles v. Ralph K. Davies Medical Center, 403 F. Supp. 456 (N.D. Cal. 1975); Grossman v. Bernards 
Township Bd. Of Educ., No. 74-1904, 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16261 (D. N.J. 1975); Richards v. USTA, 
400 NYS 2d 267 (Sup. Ct. 1977); Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984). Regarding 
Medicaid, J.D. v. Lackner, 80 Cal. App. 3d 90 (1978); Minnesota Dept. of Public Welfare, 257 N.W.2d 
816, 819 (Minn. 1977). 
  208 
Therefore, in the early 1980s, the first federal civil rights lawsuits regarding 
access to gender-affirming medical treatment in penal institutions were adjudicated 
during a time when professional standards for treatment and diagnostic criteria had been 
institutionalized and courts had been addressing transsexuals’ legal concerns for nearly 
two decades.29 Within this context, courts almost immediately recognized that 
transsexuality was a “serious medical need” that required some form of treatment in 
accordance with the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment.30 Since 
its 1976 Estelle v. Gamble ruling, the Supreme Court has included medical care within 
the purview of the Eighth Amendment. Estelle held that prison officials and doctors 
violate the Eighth Amendment if they exhibit “deliberate indifference to serious medical 
needs.”31 In order to prove that medical care constitutes “cruel and unusual punishment” 
a prisoner must show that her medical treatment “shocks the conscience” or “offends 
evolving standards of decency” (which is referred to as the objective component) and 
must prove that prison officials were “deliberately indifferent” to her serious medical 
                                                
29 Because I primarily relied on legal databases to find relevant court cases, I only had access to published 
opinions and cases that were available in these databases. Not all lawsuits garner a published judicial 
opinion and not all published opinions are included in these databases (although most are). It is, therefore, 
possible that there were earlier lawsuits. I found evidence elsewhere, primarily in prisoner newsletters, of 
lawsuits from the early 1980s that I did not find in the legal databases. It is likely, however, that there were 
no earlier published opinions before Supre v. Ricketts, 596 F. Supp. 1532 (D. Colo. 1984), decided in a 
Colorado district court in 1984, because Supre nor later cases cited any earlier decisions. 
It should also be noted that federal civil rights lawsuits had been a vital strategy of self-advocacy and 
activism by prisoners since the prisoners’ rights movement in the 1970s. By filing lawsuits, incarcerated 
trans women utilized one important tactic of self-advocacy that many other prisoners have used to 
challenge their incarceration and the conditions of that incarceration over the past few decades, a tactic that 
can change those conditions and reduce violence in some instances. 
30 Nearly all lawsuits and their decisions primarily focused on a question of whether the medical treatment 
(or the lack of medical treatment) that these trans women received violated the Eighth Amendment’s ban 
on cruel and unusual punishment. While litigants often utilized other constitutional standards, such as equal 
protection and due process, to make their arguments in their complaints, courts rarely, if ever, thought other 
constitutional standards were appropriate or useful. 
31 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). 
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need (which is referred to as the subjective component).32 The Eighth Amendment 
requires that prison systems work within a basic standard of legitimate violence, with 
courts maintaining and sometimes redrawing those limits, based on dominant social 
norms. These limits help to maintain the legitimacy of the prison system and 
incarceration as the norm in US society. Yet, the Court acknowledges that the “standard 
of decency”—or what constitutes legitimate or constitutional violence and illegitimate or 
unconstitutional violence—changes or “evolves” over time. This “evolving standard of 
decency,” therefore, allows the Court to recognize that changes in medical norms, like 
those regarding transsexuality, impact Eight Amendment jurisprudence’s understanding 
of adequate medical care and “serious medical need.”  
While the Eighth Amendment standard requires prisons to provide adequate 
medical care, penal medical care is reduced to its barest “medical necessity,” stripping 
medicine down to a physical or biological life-saving or sustaining technology, instead of 
something that improves or enhances life. Life in prison, therefore, becomes “bare life.”33 
Put another way, the necropower of the prison space reduces medicine to its barest form. 
In practice, few prison systems even meet this bare requirement, as prison health care 
often produces premature death. It is at this point of the production of biological death 
that courts occasionally intervene.34 
                                                
32 Ibid. at 106. See also, Wilson v. Seiter, 501 US 294 (1991); Farmer v. Brennan, 511 US 825 (1994). It is 
important to emphasize that proving the objective component, that medical treatment “shocks the 
conscience” or is otherwise inadequate or violent, is not enough to establish unconstitutional treatment, 
litigants must also prove the “subjective” component, that prison administrators were knowingly deliberate 
indifference. This is an extremely high bar, especially for incarcerated litigants, who are almost always 
acting as their own lawyers and have little-to-no access to resources. 
33 Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (Stanford, CA: Stanford University 
Press, 1998).  
34 See for example, Brown, 131 S.Ct. 1910. 
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While courts put some limits on the inadequacy of prison health care, they have 
also constructed a constitutional framework through Eighth Amendment jurisprudence 
that renders constitutional a great deal of medical neglect and outright denial of 
treatment. Courts have consistently found that prisoners are not entitled to their choice of 
treatment and have constructed mechanisms for prison officials to shape what that care 
looks like. The Supreme Court has established that the standard specifically prohibits 
“unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain…totally without penological justification.”35 
In determining what pain is “unnecessary and wanton,” courts “must fairly weigh the 
practical constraints facing prison officials,” particularly regarding maintaining order and 
security.36 In developing this standard, courts simultaneously put limits on carceral power 
and carceral violence while (re)rendering constitutional the necropower of the prison 
system as it is manifested in security discourses. This constitutional necropower is 
apparent in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence as it codifies some pain and violence as 
necessary and legitimate and denies imprisoned people any authority over or legitimate 
knowledge about their medical needs, authorizing prison administrators to both determine 
appropriate medical treatment and legitimate violence (within certain limits). This 
standard is primarily concerned with the functioning, order, and security of the prison but 
must balance those “needs” with the general continuation of the bare life of prisoners. 
                                                
35 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976). Conditions may be “restrictive and even harsh” without 
violating constitutional norms. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). See also Kosilek, 221 F. 
Supp. 2d 156. 
36 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173. See Estelle, 429 U.S. 97; Wilson, 501 U.S. 294; Rhodes, 452 U.S. 337. See also, 
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979), which states that “prison administrators...should be accorded wide-
ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed 
to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security.” Ibid., 547. 
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In 1987, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals became the first court to explicitly 
rule that transsexuality might constitute a serious medical need in the prison setting in 
Meriwether v. Faulkner, thereby pulling the question of access to gender-affirming 
medical treatment under the purview of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. In 1983, 
Lavarita Meriwether, a trans woman incarcerated in Indiana, sued the Indiana 
Department of Corrections after prison administrators denied her access to gender-
affirming medical treatment, which she argued violated her right under the Eighth 
Amendment to adequate medical care.37 Prior to her incarceration in 1982, Meriwether 
had undergone hormone therapy for nine years under the supervision of a doctor. While 
medical staff at the Reception-Diagnostic Center confirmed her diagnosis of gender 
transsexualism, staff decided to “treat her as any other anatomical male,” and she was 
assigned to the Indiana State Prison, a men’s institution, without a prescription for 
hormones.38 At the prison, she was denied all medical treatment for her transsexualism, 
including hormones and psychotherapy, and the Medical Director told her that he would 
make sure that she would not receive hormone therapy as long as she was incarcerated in 
the Indiana Department of Corrections. 
Initially, an Indiana district court dismissed her claim, concluding that 
transsexualism was not a “serious medical need” and that hormone therapy was an 
“elective medication” that maintained “a physical appearance and life style in order to 
satisfy [her] psychological belief.”39 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed the district 
                                                
37 These claims regarding transgender-related medical treatment were part of the same lawsuit that I 
discussed in Chapter Two. 
38 Meriwether v. Faulkner, 821 F.2d 408, 410 (7th Cir. 1987). 
39 Ibid., quoted at 411. 
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court’s decision, finding that transsexualism was a “serious medical need” and that 
Meriwether, therefore, stated a legitimate claim.40 While coming to nearly opposite 
conclusions, the district and Seventh Circuit courts relied on the same framework to make 
their rulings, recognizing only the knowledge and authority of medicine and prison 
administrators. The key element that led these two courts to different rulings was 
different interpretations of who or what constituted the primary parties of the 
disagreement. The district court framed the dispute as between Indiana prison and 
medical officials and Meriwether—who “elected” to undergo hormone therapy to 
“satisfy” her “belief,” or put another way, she was attempting to exercise choice. The 
Seventh Circuit, on the other hand, framed the dispute as between Indiana prison 
administrators and medical authority—which categorized transsexualism “as a serious 
psychiatric disorder.”41 In the district court’s framing, only one party (prison officials) 
had expertise or legitimate knowledge. However, for the Seventh Circuit, both parties had 
claim to legitimate knowledge.  
As Michel Foucault has argued, within the law, medical opinion constitutes a 
“discourse of truth,” legitimized by its scientific and institutional status.42 As we have 
seen, carceral knowledge, too, is framed as a “discourse of truth” through prison 
administrators’ expertise in security, punishment, and incarceration more generally. In his 
work tracing the emergence of medical (particularly psychiatric) authority and the prison 
                                                
40 Ibid., quoted at 411. 
41 Ibid. at 411. The court also relies on legal precedent—gender dysphoria had been determined to be a 
serious medical need in cases that examines transsexuality outside of the prison context, cases that also 
relied on medical authority. 
42 Michel Foucault, Abnormal: Lectures at the Collége de France, 1974-1975 (New York: Picador, 1999), 
6. In Abnormal, Michel Foucault argues that medical/psychiatric testimony has “specific effects of truth 
and power” that have considerable juridical effects and even produce juridical truth. Ibid., 42. 
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in the West, Foucault shows that medical, carceral, and juridical knowledge-power are 
interrelated modern techniques of power and social control. He argues that each 
institution produced and were produced from the power of normalization and its 
imperative to identify, “know,” and control “abnormal individuals.”43 Through the power 
of normalization, each of these formations of power-knowledge produces, legitimizes, 
naturalizes, and extends each other, especially their power to know and punish or manage 
the abnormal or the dangerous. That transsexuality had become a recognized medical or 
psychiatric condition by established medical authorities and that medical standards of 
treatment had been constructed were, therefore, key to the Seventh Circuit’s ruling and 
ability to understand medical knowledge about transsexuality as “truth.”  
These medical standards of treatment, which began to be developed and 
institutionalized in the US in the late 1960s and 1970s with the emergence of gender 
identity clinics, were fundamentally structured by normalization. While the legitimization 
of sex reassignment treatment represented a major shift in thinking about sex and gender 
at the time, doctors remained deeply invested in White gender and hetero-norms, and 
these investments structured the gatekeeping system and medical model of transsexuality 
that they created.44 The medical model of transsexuality, in part, was designed to 
                                                
43 Foucault, Abnormal; Foucault, Discipline and Punish; Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population: 
Lectures at the Collége de France, 1977-1978 (New York: Picador, 2009). While Foucault discusses a 
form of psychiatric expertise that is different from what I am discussing here (simply put, expertise on 
competence to stand trial, an explanation of the motive for the crime, or the insanity defense, my words, not 
his), the forging of the link between juridical power-knowledge and medical power-knowledge, and the 
core of the juridical recognition of medical power-knowledge that he describes is still applicable to this 
different setting.  
44 Trans studies scholars have long offered this critique of the medical model of transsexuality. See, for 
example, Meyerowitz, How Sex Changed; Denny, “Transgender Communities of the United States”; 
Spade, “Compliance is Gendered”; Spade, “Resisting Medicine, Re/modeling Gender”; Susan Stryker, 
“Transgender History, Homonormativity, and Disciplinarity,” Radical History Review 100 (2008); Stryker, 
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restablilize a naturalized binary sex system that was inextricably attached to White 
gender norms—in other words, to racialized gender normativity. As Dan Irving has 
argued, doctors only opened the gates to treatment for the most “productive” transsexuals 
and extended and strengthened “hegemonic discourses of citizenship and productivity 
that buttressed the [white supremacist, heteronormative, capitalist] economy.”45 
“Criminality,” as a sign of (racialized) non-productivity, was a barrier to gaining access 
to treatment. Yet, much of the medical literature also attached criminality and “social 
parasitism” to transsexuality, constructing transsexuals as mentally ill, pathological, 
threatening, and dangerous. Even supportive doctors often viewed transsexuals, 
especially trans women, as manipulative, narcissistic, burdensome, and potentially 
dangerous, and in part (paternalistically) relied on these representations to justify the 
gatekeeping system.46 
University clinics sought patients, as historian Joanne Meyerowitz explains, who 
would looked and acted “like conventional men and women” and “avoided 
‘exhibitionism’ and promised to live ‘quietly.’”47 At least some, if not all, screened for 
criminal histories and excluded those with felony records.48 In the late 1960s and early 
1970s, these clinics received thousands of applications from transsexuals around the US 
and only accepted a few dozen. Under these circumstances, they wielded enormous 
                                                                                                                                            
Transgender History; Sandy Stone, “The Empire Strikes Back: A Posttranssexual Manifesto,” in The 
Transgender Studies Reader, ed. Susan Stryker and Stephen Whittle (New York: Routledge, 2006); David 
Valentine and Riki Anne Wilchins, “One Percent on the Burn Chart: Gender, Genitals, and Hermaphrodites 
with Attitude,” Social Text 52/53 (Autumn/Winter 1997); Dan Irving, “Normalized Transgressions: 
Legitimizing the Transsexual Body as Productive,” Radical History Review 100 (Winter 2008). 
45 Irving, Normalized Transgressions.” 
46 See for example, Benjamin, The Transsexual Phenomenon. 
47 Meyerowitz, How Sex Changed, 225. 
48 The University of Minnesota program did so. Thomas Kando. Sex Change: The Achievement of Gender 
Identity Among Feminized Transsexuals (Springfield, IL: Charles C Thomas Publisher, 1973). 
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power, offering new life through sex reassignment treatment for only the most normative 
transsexuals (or those who could perform normativity most effectively), shaping the ways 
that transsexuals would publicly articulate their identities.49 They also resigned thousands 
of others who could not conform to these racialized, gendered, and sexual standards to 
various forms of death, sometimes literal physical death but more frequently the social 
death of living in a body that feels “wrong” and having one’s identity constantly negated 
by society, medicine, and the state. Put another way, only a small class of transsexuals—
those with monetary and educational resources and who could at least articulate a white 
gender and heteronormative (postsurgical) identity—could gain access to such treatment. 
The transsexuals who were most likely to be incarcerated—who were disproportionately 
low-income, non-white, and unemployed or underemployed—were unlikely to have 
successfully navigated such a normalizing system. While the standards were not as 
tightly controlled by the time the Seventh Circuit heard the Meriwether case, the 
standards of treatment continued to be defined by racialized gender normativity.  
This medical investment in racialized gender normativity intersected with similar 
carceral and juridical investments. According to each site of knowledge-power, 
incarcerated trans women were a particular type of abnormal individual, in need of 
correction, normalization, and/or containment. As an abnormal individual who resided in 
the death space of the prison system, Meriwether could not be a source of legitimate 
                                                
49 As doctors during this time noted and trans historians have reflected upon, trans people would often read 
about and learn the language of the medical gatekeeping system, telling doctors what they wanted to hear in 
order to gain access to treatment. This tactic had the unfortunate side effects of reinforcing both the medical 
construction of transsexuality as invested in normative binary sex/gender—which would become an 
important source of tension between trans people and some feminists—as well as doctors’ perception of 
trans people as manipulative. See, Stone, “The Empire Strikes Back.” 
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knowledge. The district court, therefore, ruled against her. While the Seventh Circuit 
ostensibly ruled in her favor, the court never cites her as a source of knowledge, relying 
only on medical “truth” (about transsexuality and about her).50 Meriwether was able to 
argue her claim only by demonstrating that her need was objective and substantiated by 
medical authority. Her previous diagnosis and treatment was, therefore, key to the 
Seventh Circuit’s ruling. Her medical history not only functioned as medical testimony 
but her experience of “severe withdrawal symptoms” produced from prison 
administrators’ denial of her (previously prescribed) hormone therapy allowed her to 
show physical, bodily suffering and need, which was visible and objective to the court 
and did not require them to rely on Meriwether’s subjective articulation of her needs.51 In 
contrast to Meriwether’s (recognizable) physical suffering and her (legitimate) medical 
diagnostic and treatment history, the Medical Director’s refusal to provide any treatment 
looked bigoted, arbitrary, and against medical norms and showed potential deliberate 
indifference. 
While the Seventh Circuit ruled that transsexuality might constitute a serious 
medical need, it also classified it as controversial and complex, finding that any 
                                                
50 In fact, the court argued that one of its criteria for determining that transsexuality could be categorized as 
a “serious medical need” was that it “is not voluntarily assumed and is not a matter of sexual preference.” 
Meriwether, 821 F.2d at 412. While the court uses this language to distinguish transsexuals from 
homosexuals and transvestites, it also functions to negate Meriwether’s self-determination. Importantly, 
very similar language would be used by a Massachusetts district court fifteen years later in its ruling that 
required the Massachusetts Department of Corrections to provide Michelle Kosilek with hormone therapy. 
In their description of GID, the court emphasizes that “the consensus of medical professionals is that 
transsexualism is biological and innate. It is not a freely chosen ‘sexual preference’ or produced by an 
individual's life experience.” Kosilek, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 163. 
Of course, this denial of self-determination is an extension, or a particularized version, of the denial of 
self-determination by the law, the prison system, and medicine for all prisoners as they are produced as 
socially dead. 
51 Meriwether, 821 F.2d at 410. 
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treatment, therefore, would satisfy the constitutional requirement.52 Indiana prison 
administrators had potentially violated her constitutional rights because they provided no 
treatment at all, not because they refused to provide her with hormone therapy 
specifically (despite her previous prescription). The court explained that because of the 
“wide variety” of treatment options for transsexuality and “the highly controversial 
nature of some of those options” courts should “defer to the informed judgment of prison 
officials as to the appropriate form of medical treatment.”53 Here, we can see how 
carceral knowledge (or “prison official”) and medical authority are often collapsed in the 
adjudication of access to gender-affirming medical treatment. The court’s use of “prison 
officials,” instead of specifically prison medical staff, allows prison administrators and 
security staff—along with medical staff—to legitimately determine medical treatment for 
(transsexual) prisoners. Medical treatment, therefore, becomes a security concern, 
suturing security and medical treatment in the (necropolitical) prison setting. Gender-
affirming medical treatment is securitized. 
The Meriwether decision helped establish a framework through which courts 
would interpret trans women’s civil rights claims to gender-affirming medical treatment 
in penal institutions into the present. In the following decades, courts continued to 
function within this framework of carceral and medical authority, but they changed their 
understanding of what constituted adequate treatment, “evolving” their “standards of 
                                                
52 Indeed, the two previous opinions had similarly argued that transsexual prisoners were constitutionally 
entitled to some kind of treatment, but each of the plaintiffs had been offered psychotherapy and therefore 
lost their cases. Supre, 596 F. Supp. 1532; Lamb v. Maschner, 633 F. Supp. 351 (D. Kan. 1986). 
53 Meriwether, 821 F.2d at 414. 
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decency” as medical authority, both inside and outside the prison system, “evolved” its 
understandings of the norms for such treatment.  
Through the 1980s and 1990s, courts continued to portray transsexuality as 
controversial and difficult to diagnose and treat, reflecting both the still relatively newly 
developed standards for providing gender-affirming medical treatment (which remained 
controversial) outside prisons and the rarity of requests for such treatment inside prisons. 
Conflict in these cases was either between incarcerated trans women’s “self-diagnoses” 
(those who had not been diagnosed prior to their incarceration) and prison medical 
authority, who both refused to treat and to diagnose them with transsexualism or gender 
identity disorder, or between medical authority on the outside (in the form of prior 
diagnoses) and prison administrators and medical staff, who refused to continue 
treatment.54 Trans women generally lost the former type of cases and had mixed results in 
the latter. In those cases in which trans women were denied all treatment, they often 
prevailed, like Meriwether. However, if prison medical staff and administrators provided 
psychotherapy—which was and probably remains the most common form of “treatment” 
offered to incarcerated trans people—courts generally ruled in prison administrators’ 
favor, finding that psychotherapy satisfied their constitutional requirement.55 
                                                
54 For the first type, see for example, Farmer 511 US 825. For the second type, see Meriwether, 821 F.2d 
408; Phillips v. Michigan Department of Corrections, 731 F. Supp. 792 (W.D. Mich. 1990); South v. 
Gomez, No. 97-15191, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 30063 (9th Cir. 1997).  
55 The only exception to this general rule that I found prior to the 2000s was Phillips, in which a Michigan 
district court in 1990 ordered the Michigan Department of Corrections to provide hormone therapy to an 
Marty Phillips, a trans women incarcerated in the Michigan system. Phillips had had lived as a woman for 
most of her life and had been on hormones for many years prior to her incarceration; she had even been 
provided with hormone therapy while she was in jail. Nevertheless, when the physician at the prison 
“discovered” that she had testicles, he determined that there was no medical indication for estrogen. The 
court ruled in Phillips’ favor by relying on expert medical testimony, all of whom diagnosed her with 
transsexualism. In ordering that the Michigan Department of Corrections provide hormone treatment, the 
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In nearly all cases, medical staff offering such psychotherapeutic treatment had 
little-to-no previous experience with transsexuality and some were openly hostile. 
Prisoners had to comply with these prison medical staff, under even the worst 
circumstances, because any refusal to participate would void their claims in courts 
because they “refused treatment” that departments of corrections provided.56 For 
example, Dee Farmer’s claims that the Federal Bureau of Prisons was deliberately 
indifferent to her medical needs were repeatedly dismissed by a number of courts 
throughout the late 1980s and 1990s, in part because she was offered psychotherapy. At 
the Federal Correctional Institution at Oxford, Wisconsin, the only psychologist that was 
made available to her diagnosed her as a transvestite and not a transsexual—despite her 
being previously diagnosed with transsexualism—and therefore determined that she was 
not entitled to treatment.57 Farmer challenged his diagnosis and argued that this 
constituted a refusal to provide treatment. Despite prison administrators and the court 
categorizing the psychologist’s diagnosis as “misinformed,” a Wisconsin district court 
dismissed her case because, as prison officials argued, she had been offered 
                                                                                                                                            
court argued that prison administrators’ conduct was “particularly egregious” because it “actually reversed 
the therapeutic effects of previous treatment.” Phillips, 731 F. Supp. at 800. 
56 See for example, Long v. Nix, 86 F.3d 761 (8th Cir. 1996), in which the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals 
described how Long “repeatedly refused to cooperate with prison psychologists and psychiatrists over the 
past twenty years” and recounted a series of hostile encounters between long and mental health staff. The 
court claimed that “In contrast to Long's behavior, the record shows that prison officials have been 
responsive to Long's requests for treatment when they were reasonable.” Ibid. at 763. The court blamed 
Long for the failure of psychotherapy, stating, “We reject Long's contention that the Eighth Amendment 
requires the Iowa Department of Corrections to provide Long with a "sensitive" psychotherapist trained in 
gender-identity issues.” Ibid. at 766. 
57 Farmer v. Haas, No. 90-1088, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 3549, (7th Cir. 1991).  
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psychological services but had not used those services, thereby refusing the “provided 
treatment.”58 
In the 2000s, these dynamics began to change as courts stopped regularly 
referring to transsexuality as “controversial,” prison medical staff became more likely to 
diagnose GID and recommend hormone therapy, and some departments of corrections 
institutionalized written policies regarding gender-affirming medical treatment. These 
changes reflected changing US social and medical attitudes toward trans people and 
gender-affirming medical treatment. The 1990s saw the emergence of vibrant transgender 
activism around the US. One prominent focus of this activism was the medical 
establishment, and transgender activists helped expand access to gender-affirming 
medical treatment, loosen (although not eradicate) medical gatekeeping systems, and 
produce a new generation of affirming providers, especially in major cities.59 While 
access to gender-affirming medical treatment was liberalized and become more 
accessible generally, access to affirming doctors and treatment became increasingly 
uneven across geography, class, race, and mental and physical ability. Some doctors 
                                                
58 Ibid. at *8. This case continued past this first district court decision and illustrates the difficulty of these 
cases and the vulnerability of incarcerated trans litigants, who are pro se—or acting as their own lawyers—
the vast majority of the time. The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court’s decision, arguing that Farmer 
had made many requests for treatment after her meeting with the psychologist and was “systematically 
denied…any treatment for her transsexualism,” and remanded the case. Ibid. at *11-12. The remanded case 
eventually went to trial and the jury found in favor of the prison administrators. The trial hinged on the 
question of whether Farmer had or had not requested treatment. She largely relied on copies of requests for 
treatment that she sent prison administrators, and prison administrators claimed that these requests for 
treatment were forgeries. The trial essentially was about who the jury believed more. Farmer appealed the 
jury verdict, specifically regarding the judge’s denial of appointing her a lawyer. The Seventh Circuit 
upheld the district court’s judgment, justifying this decision not only by claiming that she had successfully 
litigated the case through a prior appeal and conducted herself well at trial but also noted that “No doubt a 
good lawyer would have done better than Farmer, and might have won; but if this were the test, district 
judges would be required to request counsel for every indigent litigant.” Farmer v. Haas, 990 F.2d 319, 322 
(7th Cir. 1993). 
59 Stryker, Transgender History; Meyerowitz, How Sex Changed.  
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continued to function under the original gatekeeping system, while others, especially 
those affiliated with LGBT communities and health care centers in major cities, began to 
offer treatment almost on demand, breaking down much but not all of the gatekeeping 
system. However, even in major cities, the populations of trans people who were most 
likely to end up imprisoned—low-income trans women of color—continued to have the 
least access to such treatment. This dynamic, therefore, continued to produce 
circumstances in which only a small percentage of the trans women requesting hormone 
therapy and sex reassignment treatment in prisons had pre-incarceration diagnoses and 
hormone prescriptions.60 Nevertheless, the general shifts in increased access to gender-
affirming medical treatment impacted prison health care. 
While prison administrators continued to generally be averse to providing gender-
affirming medical treatment, particularly hormone therapy and sex reassignment surgery, 
the doctors they employed seemed to be more likely—although not very likely—to 
diagnose trans women with GID and prescribe hormone therapy. Some trans women 
were therefore able to access hormone therapy, but prison administrators continued to 
block treatment for most prisoners. One important mechanisms that prison administrators 
developed to block such treatment in the late 1990s and 2000s were new official 
institutional policies, most of which stated that prison medical staff could only provide 
gender-affirming medical treatment at the same level (or less than) prisoners had been 
prescribed prior to their incarceration. While these policies allowed for the small number 
of incarcerated trans people who had been officially prescribed hormones prior to their 
                                                
60 Many incarcerated trans women were only able to access hormones prior to their incarceration—and 
sometimes while incarcerated—via the black market. These trans women entered prison on hormones but 
lacked a prescription. 
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incarceration to continue their prescriptions, they barred those who did not have prior 
prescriptions from ever gaining access to hormone treatment while incarcerated, and they 
barred all prisoners from accessing any surgical treatments.61 These “freeze-frame” 
policies, which “froze” trans prisoners as the level of “change” that they entered prison 
with, were perhaps the most obvious and explicit example of the carceral necropolitical 
control over access to such treatment, as prison officials almost entirely usurped control 
of medical treatment. Trans prisoners were frozen in time, unable to grow or change. In 
effect, their gendered lives stopped. For those who had been on hormones prior to their 
incarceration but had been only able to access them via the black market, which prison 
officials did not recognize as legitimate treatment, they were not frozen in time, but lost 
time, forcefully reverted back to a prior bodily form. These “freeze-frame” policies, 
therefore, were and are a (necropolitical) technology of dehumanization and social death, 
as growing and changing are key aspects of life and being human. 
By the late 1990s and early 2000s, courts began to consider civil rights lawsuits 
challenging the denial of hormone therapy following its recommendation by prison 
medical staff. These cases produced a somewhat new set of disputing parties: prison 
medical staff, who were barred from providing such treatment either in practice or by 
policy, and prison officials.62 Courts in the 1980s and 1990s generally viewed any 
medical opinion, whether or not the medical professional had any experience with 
transsexuality or gender-affirming medical care, as authoritative and any type of 
                                                
61 In practice, even those prisoners who had prior prescriptions often had great difficulty getting prison 
officials and medical staff to continue their prescriptions at all or at appropriate levels.  
62 In some cases, prison medical staff did not even bother to evaluate, diagnose, and recommend treatment 
for trans prisoners because of department-wide freeze-frame policies.  
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treatment—which was usually psychotherapy—as satisfactorily fulfilling the 
constitutional requirement. However, in the 2000s, they began to distinguish between 
“prudent” and non-prudent medical opinions. In particular, courts looked to the Standards 
of Care (SOC) as the “prudent professional standards” or “accepted professional 
judgment,” governing the norms of GID-related treatment protocols.63 By this time, the 
SOC explicitly stated that psychotherapy was not intended to cure GID and that 
hormones were not only standard treatment but also “medically necessary” in many 
cases.64 Because of these shifts in transgender-related medical norms inside and outside 
prisons, courts began to occasionally, if rarely, order departments of corrections to 
provide hormone therapy to some trans women, including those who had not been 
prescribed hormones prior to their incarceration. While courts did not always rule in trans 
prisoners’ favor in cases that involved in practice (or individualized) denial of treatment, 
they almost uniformly struck down freeze-frame policies.65 In doing so, these courts 
again clarified the limits of carceral (necro)power, ruling that departments of corrections 
                                                
63 Battista v. Dennehy, No. 05-11456, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12484, at *24, 25; Konitzer v. Frank, 711 F. 
Supp. 2d 874, 906 (E.D. Wisc. 2010). For explicit citation of the SOC in order to determine that hormone 
therapy might be medically necessary, see Kosilek, 221 F. Supp. 2d 156; Gammett v. Idaho State Board of 
Corrections, No. 05-00257, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55564 (D. Idaho 2007); Sundstrom v. Frank, 630 F. 
Supp. 2d 974 (E.D. Wisc. 2007); Konitzer, 711 F. Supp. 2d 874; Fields v. Smith, 712 F. Supp. 2d 830 (E.D. 
Wisc. 2010); De’lonta v. Johnson, No. 11-00257, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124983 (W.D. Va. 2011); 
Soneeya v. Spencer, 851 F. Supp. 2d 228 (D. Mass. 2012); Kosilek, 889 F.Supp.2d 190; Kosilek v. 
Spencer, 740 F.3d 733 (1st Cir. 2014). Importantly, many decisions did not explicitly cite the SOC but still 
relied on its constructions of treatment norms and protocols.  
64 See, Harry Benjamin International Gender Dysphoria Association, The Standards of Care for Gender 
Identity Disorders, Fifth Edition (Düsseldorf: Symposion Publishing, 1998). 
65 See for example, Brooks v. Berg, 270 F. Supp. 2d 302 (N.D. N.Y. 2003); Kosilek, 221 F. Supp. 2d 156; 
Barrett v. Coplan, 292 F. Supp. 2d 281 (D. N.H. 2003); Fields, 712 F. Supp. 2d 830; Soneeya, 851 F. Supp. 
2d 228; Adams v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 716 F. Supp. 2d 107 (D. Mass. 2010); Kosilek, 889 F.Supp.2d 
190. The exception was Farmer v. Hawk-Sawyer, in which a DC district court found that the BOP’s freeze-
frame policy was “rational,” in part because they claimed that the policy did “not preclude putting an 
inmate on hormone therapy after admission.” Farmer v. Hawk-Sawyer, 69 F. Supp. 2d 120, 127n8 (D. D.C. 
1999). Eleven years later, the same policy was declared unconstitutional in Adams, 716 F. Supp. 2d 107.  
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could not institute blanket policies denying a specific type of treatment in all cases but 
could still deny treatment based on the individual circumstances of a prisoner and the 
individual needs of institutional security. Therefore, despite the changes in the legal 
determination of what constituted “adequate treatment,” penal medical treatment 
remained sutured to security. 
While in the 1980s and 1990s, prison officials could utilize (carceral) medical 
language and arguments to justify their denial of gender-affirming medical treatment 
because prison medical staff rarely diagnosed trans woman with GID and even more 
rarely recommended hormone therapy. In the changing context of the 2000s, the 
increased likelihood that prison medical staff might prescribe hormone therapy produced 
the imperative for prison administrators to shift their arguments, relying more centrally 
and explicitly on the argument that such treatment would create substantial institutional 
security problems. 
 
Securitizing Gender-Affirming Medical Treatment 
The construction of feminized or feminine (queer) bodies as dangerous security 
threats was not new, as I have argued throughout this dissertation, but the shift in 
transgender-related medical treatment norms inside and outside prisons in the 2000s 
necessitated prison administrators to more explicitly rely on security language to 
(constitutionally) deny treatment. Security discourses had been a part of legal struggles 
over such treatment since they began in the 1980s. Prison administrators argued or 
implied that providing such treatment would endanger institutional security, and courts 
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located prison administrators’ specialized knowledge and their constitutional authority to 
shape medical treatment in their supposed security expertise. Underlying these 
constructions of security was the ever-present specter of queer dangerousness, 
prominently functioning to define insecurity and disorder and justifying different norms 
regarding the gender-affirming medical treatment within the penal space. Authorized by 
constitutional standards as well as the necropower of the prison as a supposedly total 
institution, prison administrators participated and continue to participate in medical 
decisions. This power alongside discourses of queer dangerousness effectively securitized 
gender-affirming medical treatment, authorizing security to function as a central feature 
of medical decisions regarding the provision of such treatment. 
While the last section examined the relationship between law, carceral 
(necro)power, and medicine, this section examines more specifically how prison 
administrators articulated their refusal to provide gender-affirming medical treatment in 
the last two decades. To do so, I will consider Battista’s case in greater detail as well as 
the Massachusetts Department of Corrections arguments against providing gender-
affirming medical treatment to trans prisoners in general. Over the past two decades, 
MDOC’s refusal to provide gender-affirming medical treatment has been the subject of 
numerous federal civil rights lawsuits, a number of which were ultimately decided in the 
incarcerated trans woman’s favor.66 These cases, particularly Battista’s and Michelle 
                                                
66 Kosilek filed her original lawsuit in 1992, Kosilek v. Maloney (No. 92-12820, D. Mass.), but a 
Massachusetts district court did not rule on it until 2000 and 2002. See also, Kosilek, 221 F. Supp. 2d 156. 
See also, Kosilek v. Spencer (No. 00-12455, D. Mass); Battista v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts (No. 
97-3487A); Battista v. Murphy (No. 02-10137, D. Mass.); Battista v. Murphy (03-12643, D. Mass.); 
Battista v. Spencer (No. 05-11456); Soneeya v. Spencer (No. 07-12325); Brugliera v. Commissioner of 
Massachusetts Department of Correction (No. 07-40323); Alexander v. UMass Medical School (No. 09-
10776).  
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Kosilek’s, both of which were drawn out for over a decade, provide a window through 
which to view not only the tactics used by MDOC administrators to deny incarcerated 
trans women gender-affirming medical treatment but also the reasoning and justifications 
for that denial. In response to these lawsuits, especially Kosilek’s, MDOC adopted a 
series of official policies and unofficial practices in their efforts to shape medical 
treatment, arguing that at least some control over medical treatment was necessary 
because of security. 
From at least the 1990s—when I first found evidence of trans women incarcerated 
in MDOC requesting treatment—to the present, MDOC administrators have staunchly 
opposed providing gender-affirming medical treatment. Prior to the mid-2000s, MDOC 
administrators primarily deployed two (interrelated) tactics to control and block such 
treatment within their institutions: hiring medical providers who would not diagnose GID 
or recommend hormone therapy or sex reassignment surgery and obstructing medical 
evaluations and treatment. These tactics successfully blocked Battista from receiving an 
evaluation from experts in transgender-related medical care for nearly ten years, from 
when she began to request an evaluation and treatment in 1995 to 2004. Without medical 
authority to substantiate her claims to treatment, a Massachusetts district court repeatedly 
found that MDOC’s refusal to provide hormone therapy was constitutional. 
MDOC first authorized an evaluation of Battista in 1997, after delaying or 
ignoring her requests for nearly two years. This evaluation was performed by a 
psychiatric consultant with no experience with GID and who never met with Battista. By 
conducting a “peer review” of her medical records, this consultant determined that 
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Battista did not have GID and recommended counseling and psychological testing.67 
Soon after, Battista filed a federal civil rights lawsuit, and, in 1998, a Massachusetts 
district court dismissed her complaint, arguing that because she was self-diagnosed, she 
“has failed to proffer reliable evidence, such as a medical diagnosis rendered by a 
physician, confirming her assertion.”68 Moreover, because Battista refused to participate 
in counseling with a provider who did not have expertise in GID, the only option given to 
her, the court determined that even if she could “prove” that she was a transsexual, 
MDOC administrators were not deliberately indifferent to her medical need because she 
was offered counseling and “refus[ed] to cooperate.”69 Battista filed another lawsuit in 
2002, which was dismissed for similar reasons.70 
Meanwhile, in 2000, in response primarily to Kosilek’s lawsuit, MDOC adopted a 
freeze-frame policy, which stated, in part, that “security and operational concerns do not 
allow inmates to dress and function as members of the opposite sex.”71 This policy 
institutionalized and continued MDOC’s general practice of obstructing and of folding 
security into considerations of such treatment. For example, before adopting this policy, 
                                                
67 Victoria Russell, “Report re: Sandy Jo Battista” (March 17, 1997), Attached to Memorandum of Law in 
Support of the Opposition of Defendants to Plaintiff’s Request for a Prelim. Inj., Battista (No. 05-11456), 
July 22, 2005. 
68 Memorandum and Order on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative Motion for Summary 
Judgment at 12, Battista (No. 97-3487A), June 1, 1998. 
69 Ibid. at 13. 
70 The court again claimed that Battista was receiving some treatment because she was ostensibly 
undergoing therapy. Memorandum and Order, Battista (No. 02-10137), Nov. 4, 2002. 
71 Quoted in Kosilek, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 171. This policy, which was referred to as their “Guidelines for 
Mental Health Treatment of Inmates with Gender Identity Disorder,” was drafted by a doctor who had no 
knowledge of GID or the Standards of Care. As a result of this policy, mental health staff created a 
treatment plan for Kosilek. This plan’s primary goal was to help Kosilek develop “coping mechanisms to 
relieve [the] stress” related to her gender identity disorder. She was to be offered therapy sessions every 
two weeks to help her “to develop self-soothing strategies without violating DOC rules.” The doctor who 
primarily authored the treatment plan told Kosilek that “self-soothing strategies” meant “to think pretty 
thoughts.” Quoted in ibid. at 172. This doctor also stated that the treatment plan offered Kosilek nothing 
and that she did not feel that she was permitted to provide therapy to Kosilek.  
  228 
then-Commissioner of Corrections Michael Maloney had made it clear to the University 
of Massachusetts Medical Correctional Health Services (UMMS)—who then provided 
medical and mental health services to MDOC prisoners as a private contractor—“that 
[he] did not want to provide Kosilek or any other inmate hormones or sex reassignment 
surgery.”72 As a result, UMMS looked for an expert who would support this viewpoint 
and found a Canadian doctor, Robert Dickey, who believed that sex reassignment surgery 
should never be considered for a prisoner and advocated for freeze-frame policies. 
Dickey’s views and his status as a doctor and “expert” in transgender-related medical 
treatment helped legitimize MDOC’s attempts to construct different norms for gender-
affirming medical treatment outside and inside prisons, marking penal medicine as 
exceptional because of (necropolitical) security concerns.  
By requesting a doctor with these views and adopting a freeze-frame policy, 
MDOC administrators attempted to keep control over the provision of gender-affirming 
medical treatment, even as they privatized and contracted out medical services for 
prisoners. Part of a larger neoliberalization of the US state, many states have privatized 
various aspects of their prison systems, from prisons themselves to food services to 
industry to health care.73 While most states have not privatized their health care, a sizable 
number have done so, either in part or all, like Massachusetts. Prison administrators often 
argue that this allows them to reduce costs or that while providing health care is 
constitutionally required it is not a part of their core mission or specialization as prison 
                                                
72 Kosilek, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 169. 
73 For a discussion of privatization in the US prison system see, Angela Y. Davis, Are Prisons Obsolete? 
(New York: Seven Stories Press, 2003); Loïc Wacquant, Prisons of Poverty Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2009); Byron Eugene Price, Merchandizing Prisoners: Who Really Pays for Prison 
Privatization (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2006). 
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administrators and therefore should be outsourced. However, privatization also reduces 
their control over prisoners’ lives.  
The hiring of medical staff and experts is an important mechanism that 
departments of corrections utilize to shape medical treatment. Prison administrators tend 
to hire medical staff—as well as medical experts for litigation—who are unlikely to 
diagnose a prisoner with GID or recommend hormone therapy and sex reassignment 
surgery. Indeed, trans prisoners and their advocates report that penal medical staff usually 
either know nothing about transsexuality and gender-affirming medical treatment or hold 
discriminatory and pathologizing views of them.74 For example, the psychiatric 
consultant who conducted Battista’s first evaluation in 1997 called her name change and 
request for gender-affirming medical treatment “bizarre at best and psychotic at worst” 
and referred to sex reassignment surgery as “mutilating” and hormone therapy as 
“abnormal.”75 Another psychologist called her desire to transition an “obsession” and 
“distorted” thinking, explaining that her supposed belief that sex reassignment surgery 
                                                
74 A few advocates made anecdotal observations in this regard. Lydon, interview; Strangio, interview; 
Arkles, interview. See also, Israel, “Transsexual Inmate Treatment Issues”; “S. Raechel Leigh,” GIC TIP 
Journal 4, no. 1 (Winter 2003); Janet Loftin, “A Transsexual’s Experience in the California Department of 
Corrections (CDC),” GIC TIP Journal 4, no. 4 (Fall 2004); “Sarah J. Babcock,” GIC TIP 2, no. 3 (Summer 
2002). This tendency was also an important component in a number of legal cases.  
Some medical staff are supportive. See, “Razjohn Monique Smyer,” GIC TIP Journal 2, no. 4 (Fall 
2002); “Deanna,” GIC TIP Journal 1, no. 4 (Fall 2001). However, departments of corrections often fire 
medical staff who attempt to provide gender-affirming medical treatment. MDOC had a long-standing 
tactic of firing or attempting to fire consultants who diagnosed trans women with GID and recommended 
hormone treatments. For example, in 2000, MDOC terminated its relations with Marshall Forstein after he 
evaluated Kosilek and recommended that she be treated in accordance with the Standards of Care. After 
Kosilek won her first lawsuit, Dr. David Seil evaluated Kosilek, diagnosing GID and recommending 
hormones, electrolysis, and reevaluation after a year for sex reassignment surgery. Following this 
evaluation, MDOC also terminated its relationship with Seil. Memorandum and Order on Eighth 
Amendment Claim, Kosilek v. Spencer, No. 00-12455, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124758, Sept. 4, 2012. In 
2007, MDOC administrators also fired UMMS as their mental health provider at least in part because their 
consultants recommended sex reassignment surgery for Kosilek. Soneeya, 851 F. Supp. 2d 228.  
75 Victoria Russell, “Report re: Sandy Jo Battista.” 
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was the solution to her problems “reflects unrealistic fantasy and magical thinking.” He 
claimed that her “inability to reflect on alternative ways of understanding his [sic] 
condition and ways to deal with it…took on an irrational life of its own.”76 
Unsurprisingly, neither provider diagnosed her with gender identity disorder nor 
recommended any treatments, other than psychotherapy. Yet, these were the only two 
medical experts that were made available to Battista until 2004, and it was partially on 
the basis of these evaluations that a district court dismissed two of her complaints.  
As administrators of a supposedly total institution, prison officials are able to 
manipulate the minutia of prisoners’ lives, including which medical providers they have 
access to. This authority to control every facet of institutional life renders invisible and 
normalizes a great deal of carceral violence, including poor health care. In other words, 
because of their power to control nearly every facet of carceral life, prison administrators 
are not only constitutionally sanctioned to choose medical providers, thereby shaping 
medical treatment, but hiring decisions and similar methods of shaping medical treatment 
are rarely scrutinized by courts. However, because MDOC privatized and contracted out 
their medical and mental health services, certain regularized strategies of obstructing and 
controlling gender-affirming medical treatment (and other health care)—most notably 
their ability to chose which doctors to hire and fire and to exert pressure on medical staff 
in unofficial ways—became visible to the district court and the object of judicial scrutiny 
when MDOC came into conflict with the contracted providers. 
                                                
76 J. Tyler Carpenter, “Psychological Assessment Report” (Oct. 4, 1997) at 6, 5, Attached to Memorandum 
of Law in Support of the Opposition of Defendants to Plaintiff’s Request for a Prelim. Inj., Battista (No. 
05-11456). For other examples, see Ronald S. Ebert, “Psychological Evaluation re: Sandy Jo Batista” (Oct. 
19, 2001), Attached to ibid.; David Campopiano and Robert Prentky, “I.D.P. Intake & Assessment Report” 
(Nov. 18, 1998), Attached to ibid.; Victoria Russell, “Report re: Sandy Jo Battista.” 
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In the early 2000s, amid ongoing litigation, MDOC administrators attempted to 
mediate some of their loss of control produced from the privatization of prisoner health 
care. In addition to institutionalizing their freeze-frame policy, in 2002, MDOC amended 
its contract with UMMS to stipulate that MDOC would be responsible for the costs of 
GID-related hormone and surgical treatment and that any recommendation for a change 
in a prisoner’s GID treatment required the approval of a number of high level MDOC 
administrators and a security review conducted by the Director of the Health Services 
Division and the Commissioner of Corrections. This new contract further exceptionalized 
and securitized GID-related treatment. Few, if any, other treatments were paid for by 
MDOC, instead of UMMS, and GID was the only medical or mental health “condition” 
for which UMMS was required to seek approval from MDOC administrators before 
providing treatment.77 Nevertheless, UMMS still had control over the choice of 
providers.  
In 2003, following a court decision that required MDOC to replace their freeze-
frame policy with a more permissive policy, UMMS hired the Fenway Community 
Health Center, an LGBT community health care clinic in Boston, to conduct evaluations 
for GID and recommend treatment. As an LGBT-community-based clinic, Fenway’s 
providers generally function under a model of transgender healthcare that centers self-
determination, and they soon began to diagnose MDOC-incarcerated trans women with 
GID and recommend gender-affirming treatment. It is important to emphasize that if 
MDOC had not privatized their health care, thereby contracting out the authority to 
                                                
77 Defendant’s Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Kosilek (No. 00-12455), Aug. 21, 2006; 
Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, Kosilek (No. 00-12455), March 10, 
2006; Deposition of Dr. Arthur Brewer, Kosilek (No. 00-12455), Jan. 27, 2006. 
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determine which experts to hire, Fenway would never have been selected as the outside 
expert for GID-related care. In fact, MDOC administrators attempted to dissuade UMMS 
from retaining Fenway. At a 2004 executive staff meeting between MDOC staff and 
UMMS staff, a MDOC staff member argued that Fenway might be too sympathetic to 
prisoners and too quick to recommend treatment. Instead, they recommended another 
provider, Cynthia Osborne, a social worker who had worked as an expert for a few other 
departments of corrections, arguing that she “may do more objective evaluations” and 
was “more sympathetic to DOC position.”78 UMMS, nevertheless, hired Fenway, and 
their providers’ diagnoses and treatment recommendations changed the litigation 
situation, reducing (although not entirely eradicating) MDOC administrator’s ability to 
speak through medical authority to justify blocking the provision of gender-affirming 
medical treatment. Instead, MDOC administrators began much more frequently to 
explicitly articulate security concerns in order to justify the continued denial of treatment. 
In 2004, Fenway providers diagnosed Battista with GID and recommended 
hormone therapy, and in August 2005, an endocrinologist prescribed hormones.79 MDOC 
blocked UMMS from administering this prescribed treatment, at first with no 
explanation, only later explaining, after numerous inquires by Battista, that they had put 
an administrative “hold” on her prescription, pending a “security review” to determine 
                                                
78 Kosilek, 740 F.3d at 742. 
79 This evaluation was, in part, an outcome of her second lawsuit, which, despite being dismissed by the 
court suit, led MDOC administrators to agree to provide Battista with “a comprehensive medical and 
psychological evaluation regarding his [sic] claimed gender disorder” and develop a new treatment plan. 
Quoted in Plaintiff’s Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 6, Battista (No. 05-11456), May 
3, 2010. However, it took nearly two years for the evaluation to happen. 
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whether she could be housed safely while undergoing hormone therapy.80 This security 
review was never conducted and, a few months later, Battista filed another federal civil 
rights lawsuit.81 This new lawsuit set MDOC against their medical providers (both 
Fenway and UMMS, who supported Fenway’s recommendations for treatment). In order 
to justify their continued denial of treatment, MDOC administrators increasingly and 
explicitly constructed Battista as a queer security threat both through their security 
expertise and by hiring medical experts to repackage their security arguments in medical 
expertise. 
MDOC administrators relied on their established policy infrastructure, sanctioned 
by the constitutional standard of judicial deference to prison administrators because of 
their security expertise, to justify their requirement of a security review and the indefinite 
delay on Battista’s hormone therapy. They offered the court little other explanation for 
years, nor did they conduct the security review, as they continued to delay Battista’s 
medical treatment as long as possible. Following a rebuke by the district court judge in 
2008, MDOC administrators began to explicitly argue that Battista as a (queer) sexual 
threat to security, a threat that would worsen, even become unmanageable, if she was 
provided with hormone therapy. 
                                                
80 Quoted in Complaint at 9, Battista (No. 05-11456), July 5, 2005. After her diagnosis, the only treatment 
she received was counseling with a mental health administrator with no prior experience with GID. These 
sessions were not psychotherapy but brief “check-ins” once a month, often for less than five minutes. First 
Amended Complaint, Battista (No. 05-11456), Jan. 10, 2008. Because of the delay in hormone treatment, 
she had an emotional breakdown and was put on antidepressants. She requested that the “security review” 
be expedited do to the continual deterioration in her mental health. She relieved no response. In May 2005 
she was removed from general population and placed in segregation on administrative watch because of 
“another emotional breakdown over the stress and anxiety she was experiencing.” Complaint at 9, Battista 
(No. 05-11456). 
81 Complaint, Battista (No. 05-11456). 
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While there was no discussion of her sexual activity during the early years of 
litigation, in 2008, MDOC officials began to focus on her involvement in consensual 
sexual activity as a primary reason that she was a threat to her own safety and to 
institutional security and should, therefore, be denied access to hormone therapy.82 
Echoing long articulated constructions of queer dangerousness and security threat, 
MDOC administrators argued that this sexual activity would put her at greater risk for 
experiencing sexual violence, explaining that her sexual conduct (according to them) had 
caused her to experience sexual and physical violence in the past, and that this history 
“increases the risk that [Battista] will engage in similar prohibited sexual behaviors with 
other residents if feminized,” which “could lead to jealousy and violence among other 
residents,” causing disorder.83 In addition, MDOC officials repeatedly argued that 
Battista’s (potentially) feminized body would invite sexual violence and institutional 
disorder, especially in the context of a security hospital that housed “sex offenders.”84 For 
                                                
82 This sexual activity seemed to be in the context of a few long-term relationships with other prisoners 
over the course of a number of years. See for example, Defendant’s Substitute Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, Battista (No. 05-11456). 
83 Defendants’ Sur-Reply to Plaintiff’s Reply to Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiff’s Renewed Motion for 
a Prelim. Inj. At 8, Battista (No. 05-11456), Oct. 7, 2008. 
84 See for example, Joint Status Report, Battista (No. 05-11456), Aug. 5, 2008; Brief of Defendants-
Appellants, Battista (No. 10-1965), Oct. 25, 2010; Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
Battista (No. 05-11456); Deposition of Robert F. Murphy, Jr., Battista (No. 05-11456), June 30, 2008. In 
response, Battista repeatedly emphasized that since 1995 she had lived openly as female—including 
changing her name, altering her clothing in a feminine style, wearing homemade makeup, and styling her 
hair—in the general populations of a number of men’s prisons and that she had never experienced violence 
because of it. She argued that her female identity and expression had never caused “undue disruption, 
disorder, or distraction within the DOC” and had never presented any security problems, “other than a few 
derogatory comments by a few of your correctional officers.” Complaint at 13, Battista (No. 05-11456); 
Battista to Robert Murphy at 2, Battista (No. 05-11456), April 27, 2005. See also, Affidavit of Direct 
Testimony of Sandy J. Battista, Battista (No. 05-11456). 
Battista also argued that MDOC administrators claims that their actions were based on a concern for 
her safety as a prisoner who was vulnerable to violence were inconsistent with her experiences. For 
example, in a 2005 letter, she described how she had been double bunked with a prisoner who was twice 
her size and strength and was considered one of the MTC’s most violent residents. While she never had a 
problem with him, she argued that “If concerns for residents safety and security were a legitimate concern 
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example, in his deposition, Murphy expressed concerns that her femininity could disrupt 
the space of the prison:  
I would anticipate that residents would begin to talk about [Battista’s hormone 
treatment]. Because they’re sex offenders, they would probably speak of it in referenced 
context of their own offending and attractiveness to victims and identifying victims. It 
would probably be discussed in the treatment groups, treatment staff would have to be 
familiar and prepared for it. The housing officers would have to be vigilant in monitoring 
it and there would be some serious safety concerns for both the residents as well as if it 
developed into dynamics where other residents became attracted to that resident and 
certain jealousies and collusions could develop. It could be very problematic to manage.85 
 
In other words, Battista presented an institutional security threat both because of her 
sexualized behavior and because of her (sexualized) feminine embodiment. This threat 
would permeate the institution, requiring all staff to attend to the heightened danger. 
MDOC administrators portrayed hormone therapy as not only a threat that would extend 
and enhance Battista’s queer dangerousness, but a technology that would “render it 
impossible for the DOC to fulfill its constitutionally-imposed duty to protect Battista and 
provide for institutional security.”86 Instead of being life sustaining or enhancing 
treatment, within the necropolitical space of the prison, gender-affirming medical 
treatment became a threat to institutional life and order, and the (violent) denial of 
medical treatment became “protection” for Battista.  
MDOC administrators also continued to shape medical authority in order to deny 
Battista hormone therapy and to delegitimize the Fenway providers’ recommendation of 
                                                                                                                                            
your subordinates would not be housing residents in double rooms with more aggressive inmates and 
clearly disregarding claims made by such residents of being harassed and intimidated while double-
bunked…DOC chose to ignore any risk here in the name of overcrowding.” Battista to Robert Murphy at 4, 
Battista (No. 05-11456). She consistently asserted that she had no concerns about her safety and 
emphasized that she worked to keep herself safe. In doing so, Battista asserted that she protected herself, 
with the help of other prisoners, and positioned MDOC as not a protector but as a source of violence. 
85 Deposition of Robert F. Murphy, Jr. at 75, Battista (No. 05-11456). While MDOC officials repeatedly 
referenced the Treatment Center’s population of “sex offenders” as particularly problematic and sexually 
dangerous to Battista, in other cases, including Kosilek and Soneeya, they largely argued that same thing 
about other prison populations that were not composed entirely or primarily of “sex offenders.”  
86 Brief of Defendants-Appellants at 28, Battista (No. 10-1965). My emphasis. 
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hormone therapy. In 2005, they hired Cynthia Osborne to act as their own expert to “peer 
review” the Fenway report. MDOC officials knew of Osborne because she had 
previously acted as an expert witness for the Virginia Department of Corrections and 
Wisconsin Department of Corrections regarding lawsuits similarly challenging the denial 
of hormone therapy to trans women prisoners.87 Massachusetts prison officials were, 
therefore, aware that Osborne believed that criminality was a “contraindication” for 
hormone therapy and transgender-related surgery. Unsurprisingly, Osborne heavily 
criticized the Fenway report in her “peer review” and recommended that Battista not be 
provided with hormone therapy and that she undergo more thorough evaluations.88  
Osborne’s assessment was largely consistent with other assessments performed by 
MDOC-hired “experts,” who advocated for very restricted access to gender-affirming 
medical treatments. These experts not only generally believed that medical sex 
reassignment was highly controversial and rarely, if ever, medically necessary, but also 
frequently shared MDOC officials’ arguments that criminality—or the supposed 
                                                
87 Osborne had also similarly “peer reviewed” Fenway providers’ recommendation that Kosilek be 
provided with sex reassignment surgery a few months earlier. 
MDOC administrators also used other tactics to delay and obstruct UMMS from providing gender-
affirming medical treatment. For example, in a letter to MDOC administrators, UMMS doctors complained 
that they had been waiting “quite a while” for approval of treatment for a few patients following their GID 
diagnoses by Fenway doctors. They charged that MDOC officials seemed to be intentionally delaying 
treatment, noting that officials requested increasingly detailed information regarding treatment 
recommendations on multiple occasions, which “seem to ignore our many discussions regarding this topic.” 
They also note that these requests “appear contrary to the procedure DOC has requested we follow for 
handling the treatment of these patients…Rather than providing us with a response approving or denying 
the treatment recommendations for these patients, you have sent us letters requesting further details, which 
we believe have already been explained to you, without approving or denying the specific treatment 
recommended.” Kenneth L. Appelbaum and Arthur Brewer to Peter Heffernan at 2, Battista (No. 05-
11456), Sept. 1, 2005, 2. 
88 Osborne was originally hired to “peer review” Fenway providers’ recommendation for sex reassignment 
surgery. Addressing this action by MDOC, the Director of the UMMS Mental Health Program later 
testified that he could think of no other case in which they sought a second consultant to review their 
original consulting specialist’s recommendation that seemed to be clinically appropriate. Plaintiff’s 
Consolidated Requests for Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Kosilek (No. 00-12455), Aug. 18, 
2006.  
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dangerousness of prisoners—and security concerns within penal institutions changed the 
provision of medical treatment and the usefulness of guidelines like the Standards of 
Care.89 These medical experts collapsed medical and security language, creating a penal 
medical language shaped by carceral necropower. 
For instance, Osborne stated that Battista—as well as the other trans women that 
she evaluated—displayed high levels of “sociopathy and/or psychopathy,” which she 
inextricably tied to criminality.90 She argued that while “not every prisoner displays high 
levels of sociopathy or psychopathy, many do, and most have, by definition, engaged in 
antisocial behaviors.”91 Here, Osborne collapsed the legal and security status of prisoner 
or criminal and the medical status of sociopathy, or the official DSM diagnosis of 
Antisocial Personality Disorder, and marked them as “contraindications for hormones 
and surgery.”92 Residence in a prison became indicative of a medical pathology, a 
diagnostic criterion, and criminality was produced as medicalized dangerousness. In her 
                                                
89 See for example, Cynthia Osborne, “Psychosexual Evaluation Report for Ophelia De’lonta”; Victoria 
Codispoti, “Psychiatric Transgender Evaluation of Ophelia De’lonta” (Jan. 15, 2007), Attached to 
Declaration of Don Bradford Hardin, Jr., De’lonta (No. 11-00257), July 12, 2013; Cynthia S. Osborne, 
“Peer report review for Sandy Jo Battista” (Oct. 10, 2005), Attached to Response of Defendants to 
Plaintiff’s Oct. 17, 2005 Affidavit, Battista (No. 05-11456), Oct. 26, 2005; Chester W. Schmidt, Jr., 
“Psychological evaluation of Michele L. Kosilek” (Nov. 23, 2005), Attached to Defendant’s Disclosure of 
Expert Testimony, Kosilek (No. 00-12455), Dec. 2, 2005; Cynthia S. Osborne, “Inmate evaluation of 
Michelle Kosilek” (Nov. 27, 2005), Attached to Ibid.; Cynthia S. Osborne, Evaluation of Scott Konitzer 
(a.k.a. Donna Dawn Konitzer) (Jan. 31, 2005), Attached to Brief in Support of Plaintiffs’ Emergency 
Motion for a Prelim. Inj., Fields v. Smith, 712 F. Supp. 2d 830 (E.D. Wisc. 2010) (No. 06-00112), June 27, 
2006. Dickey also diagnosed Kosilek with Antisocial Personality Disorder. George R. Brown, Evaluation 
re: Michelle Lynn Kosilek (Oct. 12, 2005), Attached to Plaintiff’s Corrected Disclosure of Expert 
Testimony, Kosilek (No. 00-12455), Dec. 31, 2005. Brown, however, did not diagnose her as such. 
90 Osborne, “Peer report review for Sandy Jo Battista,” 2. 
91 Ibid., 7.  
92 To emphasize her point she claimed that this was the case “without exception…in reputable gender 
clinics throughout the world.” Osborne, “Peer report review for Sandy Jo Battista,” 7. She made similar 
points in her evaluations of Kosilek and De’lonta. Cynthia S. Osborne, “Peer report review for Michelle 
Kosilek” (May 20, 2005), Attached to Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary 
Judgment, Kosilek (No. 00-12455); Cynthia Osborne, “Psychosexual Evaluation Report for Ophelia 
De’lonta.” 
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discussion of the ascription of sociopathy and Antisocial Personality Disorder to gang 
members, ethnic studies scholar Lisa Cacho draws on Foucault to argue that these 
diagnostic categories function as “conditions,” permanently marking gang members as 
inherently abnormal and incorrigible. “Sociopathy” constructs certain forms of 
criminality—for Cacho, the racialized status criminality of “gang member”—as disease 
and disability, categories that have long been used to justify “state-sanctioned violence as 
necessary for national survival.”93 Cacho argues that these medical diagnoses and 
language help substantiate the construction of gang members as a permanently 
criminalized group, as “ineligible for personhood,” or as socially dead. While 
“transgender” or gender nonconformity function quite differently than “gang member”—
which functions as a racialized criminal status, a status that marks the bodies folded into 
it, generally young men of color, as already and inherently dangerous—the racialized 
death-world of the prison marks gender nonconformity as already and inherently 
dangerous, as a threat to the life or survival of the institution.  
Experts also inextricably connected gender nonconformity and transsexuality with 
criminality and sociopathology, sometimes even viewing some trans women’s gender 
identity as a product of their prison experiences. For example, one of Battista’s evaluators 
discussed the “acceptance by other inmates” and the “sub cultural conditioning in the 
                                                
93 Lisa Cacho, Social Death: Racialized Rightlessness and the Criminalization of the Unprotected (New 
York: New York University Press, 2012), 70. See also Douglas C. Baynton, “Disability and the 
Justification of Inequality in American History,” in The New Disability History: American Perspectives, ed. 
Paul K. Longmore and Lauri Umansky (New York: New York University Press, 2001); Lorna A. Rhodes, 
Total Confinement: Madness and Reason in the Maximum Security Prison (Berkeley, CA: University of 
California Press, 2004).  
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prison environment” as aspects that fed her gender identity.94 In her evaluations of 
Battista and Kosilek, Osborne argued that “the isolation of prison life” may have 
“inflamed and rigidified the fixation and over valuing of a cross gender identity as the 
inmate’s only possible solution for internal conflict.”95 In her evaluation of Kosilek, she 
pondered, “Is there a possibility that ‘developing’ GID satisfies the narcissistic need of 
some inmates (e.g. those high in psychopathy) to be different and to draw attention to 
themselves?”96 She also claimed that there was an “apparent association between GID 
and criminality” because the prevalence of GID in incarcerated people seemed to be 
higher than in non-incarcerated populations.97 By producing transsexuality or cross-
gender identity as the product of the death space of the prison, these medical experts 
constructed incarcerated trans women’s gender identities and requests for gender-
affirming medical treatment as not only illegitimate but criminal, dangerous, and 
sociopathic. 
Battista and other trans women, therefore, were marked as sociopathic both 
because of their confinement in penal institutions and because of their sexual and gender 
deviance and insistence on defining their own identities and medical needs. For example, 
Battista’s participation in a few long-term sexual relationships over the course of a 
                                                
94 Quoted in Katrin Rouse, Report of Qualified Examiner to the Court (April 1, 2002) at 5, Attached to 
Complaint, Battista (No. 03-12643), Dec. 6, 2003. 
95 Osborne, “Peer report review for Michelle Kosilek,” 11. She included the same phrase nearly word-for-
word in her evaluation of De’lonta and the sentiment in her evaluation of Battista. See Osborne, 
“Psychosexual Evaluation Report for Ophelia De’lonta,” 28; Osborne, “Peer report review for Sandy Jo 
Battista.” 
96 Osborne, “Inmate evaluation of Michelle Kosilek,” 13. 
97 Ibid., 13. In her evaluation of De’lonta, Osborne also interpreted De’onta’s self-advocacy, assertion of 
her female-ness, survival strategies, and incidents of self-defense against sexual violence as indicative of 
criminality, psychopathy, impulsivity, and poor behavioral control. She viewed De’lonta’s refusal to 
comply with institutional regulations restricting her femininity and female-identity as evidence that 
“criminality has continued to be a problem” for De’lonta. Osborne, “Psychosexual Evaluation Report for 
Ophelia De’lonta.” 
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number of years as well as her advocacy for necessary medical treatment were 
categorized by MDOC officials and their medical experts, like Osborne, as examples of 
her deviance, manipulation, and dangerousness, as “a symptom of sociopathology” and 
criminality. This transformation of generally socially acceptable behavior into sociopathy 
and criminality, as Cacho argues, is the product of the construction of abnormality as “the 
sociopath’s afflicted core.”98 All behavior, especially that which challenges institutional 
regulations and norms, is rendered suspect, dangerous. This triad of transsexuality, 
criminality, and sociopathology then allowed experts like Osborne to argue that 
“criminality and sociopathy” contraindicate gender-affirming medical treatment and that 
treatment standards, particularly the Standards of Care, were inappropriate for the prison 
setting because they did not address security. In her peer review of Battista, Osborne 
argued that providing hormone therapy might “cater to and fuel” her “personality 
instability,” “worsening symptoms of entitlement and manipulativeness.”99 She, 
therefore, concluded that MDOC administrators’ delay in providing such treatment was 
“responsible.”100 Moreover, Osborne asserted that prescribing hormones to incarcerated 
trans people “reflects, rather than compliance with the existing SOC, an explicit 
violation” because, she claimed, sociopathology and criminality reflected an inability to 
meet readiness criteria.101 
Manipulativeness, both as a diagnostic criteria for sociopathology and related 
diagnoses as well as a criterion for queer dangerousness and security threat, was an 
                                                
98 Cacho, Social Death, 71. 
99 Osborne, “Peer report review for Sandy Jo Battista,” 3. 
100 Ibid., 13. In her report on Kosilek, she also warns that providing treatment could “cater to, and thereby 
deepen” Kosilek’s “pathologies.” Osborne, “Peer report review for Michelle Kosilek,” 12. 
101 Osborne, “Peer report review for Sandy Jo Battista,” 7-8.  
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important overlapping discourse in carceral security-speak and DOC-hired expert 
medical opinions, not only for Battista and MDOC but in similar cases around the US.102 
Prison administrators frequently framed trans women’s self-advocacy for gender-
affirming medical treatment as manipulative, deceitful, and examples of their “attitudes 
of entitlement,” in other words as sociopathic. “Manipulation” functions as a particular 
gendered and sexualized symptom of sociopathology, often constructed as a danger or 
pathology of womanhood and femininity, and is inextricably connected to common 
constructions of trans people—especially trans women of color—as liars and deceivers, 
constructions that often legitimize violence against them.103 In other words, 
“manipulative” functions for prison administrators and their medical experts as a specific, 
feminized formation of queer dangerousness or criminality. By constructing trans women 
as manipulative, sociopathic, and criminal, prison administrators and their experts could 
argue that denying access to gender-affirming medical treatment was a necessary 
infliction of pain. While courts did not always agree, they continued to legitimize the 
securitization of medical treatment—or, the inclusion of security considerations in 
determining medical treatment.  
                                                
102 See for example, Affidavit by Luis Spencer, Kosilek (No. 00-12455), Feb. 16, 2006; Memorandum of 
Law in Support of the Opposition of Defendants to Plaintiff’s Request for a Prelim. Inj., Battista (No. 05-
11456); Osborne, “Psychosexual Evaluation Report for Ophelia De’lonta”; Osborne, “Peer report review 
for Sandy Jo Battista”; Osborne, “Peer report review for Michelle Kosilek”; Codispoti, “Psychiatric 
Transgender Evaluation of Ophelia De’lonta”; Long, 86 F.3d 761; Supre v. Ricketts, 792 F.2d 958 (10th Cir, 
1986), dissenting opinion.  
103 Talia Mae Bettcher, “Evil Deceivers and Make-Believers: On Transphobic Violence and the Politics of 
Illusion” Hypatia 22, no. 3 (Summer 2007): 43-65. 
In her discussion of mental illness and maximum security prisons in Washington state, Lorna A. 
Rhodes also has notes that prison staff often refer to prisoners as “manipulative.” In fact, she argues that 
prison workers are “socializ[ed] to expect manipulation by inmates.” Rhodes, Total Confinement, 165. 
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The Massachusetts district court’s decision regarding Battista’s case illustrates 
this dynamic. Following yet another round of evaluation by a new GID-specialist 
contractor, diagnosis of GID, further psychotherapy, and eventual recommendation and 
prescription for hormone therapy that was again delayed by MDOC administrators 
pending a security review, in late 2009, Murphy filed the security review of Battista’s 
hormone therapy with which I began this chapter, which put an indefinite hold on 
Battista’s hormone therapy. In 2010, the district court ruled in favor of Battista and 
ordered that MDOC administrators provide her with hormone therapy, finding that for 
over a decade MDOC officials had been “deliberately indifferent to the genuine medical 
need of [Battista] for hormone therapy to address…a substantial risk of serious harm if 
her Gender Identity Disorder is not treated in that fashion.”104  
Despite ruling in Battista’s favor, which included finding that Murphy’s security 
review did not legitimize MDOC’s denial of hormone therapy, the district court 
essentially upheld the practice of reviewing the security implications of gender-affirming 
medical treatment and potentially denying such treatment based on security concerns. 
Calling Battista “a willful and manipulative figure who wants what she wants when she 
wants it,” the district court argued that there was good “reason for the DOC to be 
concerned about her highly sexualized activity, which has an effect of roiling the 
environment at the Treatment Center through her development of various kinds of sexual 
relationships.”105 Nevertheless, as the First Circuit Court of Appeals explained in their 
2011 decision upholding the district court decision, MDOC administrators “forfeited” the 
                                                
104 Transcript of Hearing on Motion to Stay Execution of Modified Preliminary Injunction Order Pending 
Appeal, Battista (No. 05-11456), 49. 
105 Ibid., 61, 65. 
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deference courts were required to show prison administrators by engaging in “a knowing 
and intentional strategy” of delays, pretextual security arguments, and obstruction 
tactics.106 
While limiting MDOC administrators’ power to determine (or deny) Battista 
access to gender-affirming medical treatments, the court sanctioned the securitization of 
gender-affirming medical treatment in prisons, citing Battista’s queer dangerousness to 
justify this securitization. As a different Massachusetts district court explained in its 2002 
opinion in Kosilek’s first case, an opinion that ruled that MDOC officials had to provide 
Kosilek with hormone therapy:  
The duty of prison officials to protect the safety of inmates and prison personnel is a 
factor that may properly be considered in prescribing medical care for a serious medical 
need. It is conceivable that a prison official, acting reasonably and in good faith, might 
perceive an irreconcilable conflict between his duty to protect safety and his duty to 
provide an inmate adequate medical care. If so, his decision not to provide that care 
might not violate the Eighth Amendment because the resulting infliction of pain on the 
inmate would not be unnecessary or wanton. Rather, it might be reasonable and 
reasonable conduct does not violate the Eighth Amendment.107 
 
In other words, “practical constraints imposed by the prison environment,” or the 
securitization of medical care, potentially justifies the denial of gender-affirming medical 
                                                
106 Battista v. Clarke, 645 F.3d 449, 455 (1st Cir. 2011); Transcript of Hearing on Motion to Stay Execution 
of Modified Preliminary Injunction Order Pending Appeal, Battista (No. 05-11456), 49. For example, 
Kathleen Dennehy, the Commissioner of Corrections from 2004 to 2007, had stated that she was 
determined not to be the first prison official to provide sex reassignment surgery to a prisoner, testifying 
that she would rather retire than obey an order from the Supreme Court to do so. The First Circuit found 
that “acting on this determination, Dennehy engaged in a pattern of pretense, pretext, and prevarication to 
deny Kosilek the sex reassignment surgery that the DOC doctors prescribed.” Memorandum and Order on 
Eighth Amendment Claim at 12, Kosilek (No. 00-12455). When a specialist retained by DOC doctors 
recommended sex reassignment surgery while she was Deputy Commissioner, she participated in a 
decision to have him fired. When she became Commissioner, she stopped certain prescribed treatments for 
Kosilek and other trans prisoners, supposedly to review their cases, and long delayed decisions on whether 
such treatments would be allowed. She was also centrally involved in hiring Osborne. Ibid. 
107 Kosilek, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 161. 
  244 
treatment.108 Securitization renders constitutional the carceral violence of denying 
treatment in many, if not most, cases. 
 
Sex Reassignment Surgery and Carceral Medical Treatment’s Death Logic 
In 2012, a Massachusetts district court ordered MDOC administrators to provide 
Kosilek with sex reassignment surgery in an opinion ruling that MDOC had been 
deliberately indifferent to Kosilek’s serious medical need by denying her such 
treatment.109 This ruling, which was upheld in 2014 by the First Circuit Court of Appeals, 
was the first time a US court ordered a department of corrections to provide sex 
reassignment surgery to a prisoner. While the case is ongoing because MDOC 
administrators appealed the First Circuit’s opinion, Kosilek’s case may indicate a change 
or “evolution” in the legal “standards of decency” related to the treatment of GID in 
penal institutions. Because all departments of corrections have official policies or 
unofficial practices of housing prisoners based on their genital status, the possibility of 
providing prisoners with sex reassignment surgery has somewhat different security 
implications, as MDOC argued to the courts.  
Kosilek, who was incarcerated in 1992 to a life sentence with no possibility of 
parole, spent her first ten years in prison in litigation with MDOC in an effort to force 
prison administrators to provide her with gender-affirming medical treatment, which 
MDOC officials refused to provide her at least in part because they argued it was a threat 
to institutional security. In 2002, the district court ordered MDOC officials to allow 
                                                
108 Ibid. at 161. 
109 Kosilek, 889 F.Supp.2d 190.  
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“qualified medical professionals” to evaluate Kosilek and recommend treatment.110 
Following the ruling, MDOC administrators approved hormone therapy for Kosilek, after 
the then-Superintendent of MCI-Norfolk, where she was incarcerated, conducted a 
security review, finding no security concerns related to the treatment.111 In 2003, she 
began hormone therapy, and a year later, she began to request an evaluation for sex 
reassignment surgery. After almost a year of repeated inquiries from Kosilek, UMMS 
authorized an evaluation by the Fenway Clinic, and in 2005, Fenway providers 
recommended sex reassignment surgery.112 MDOC officials blocked this treatment, 
arguing that sex reassignment surgery would create major security problems. Kosilek, 
once again, filed a federal civil rights lawsuit. 
As they had in other litigation, MDOC administrators offered both (and 
interrelated) medical and security justifications for their denial of treatment. First, MDOC 
administrators challenged Fenway’s evaluation and recommendation as inappropriate. In 
particular, they argued, through their medical experts, that the Standards of Care’s “real 
life experience” requirement, which requires trans people to live full-time as their 
preferred sex for a year prior to sex reassignment surgery, could not be fulfilled in a 
prison setting.113 For example, Osborne argued that life in prison “presents an inherent 
                                                
110 Kosilek, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 162. The court, however, did not rule that MDOC officials had been 
deliberately indifferent and therefore did not find their actions to be unconstitutional. Instead, the court put 
the MDOC “on notice” that if they did not provide treatment, they would be violating Kosilek’s rights. 
111 Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, Kosilek (No. 00-12455); 
Memorandum and Order on Eighth Amendment Claim, Kosilek (No. 00-12455).  
112 Amended Complaint, Kosilek (No. 00-12455), July 15, 2005; Kevin Kapila and Randi Kaufman, 
Evaluation re: Michelle Kosilek (Feb. 24, 2005), Attached to Memorandum of Law in Support of 
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Kosilek (No. 00-12455), Jan. 17, 2006.  
113 MDOC administrators manipulated medical authority in three important ways to substantiate this 
argument. First, they used policy. Their 2000 “Guidelines for Mental Health Treatment of Inmates with 
Gender Identity Disorder” explicitly explained that the “real life experience” “cannot be afforded inmates 
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and irresolvable contradiction to the standards regarding the real life experience.”114 The 
argument that a “real life experience” could not be achieved in prison was substantiated 
by arguing both that incarcerated people are, as Osborne explained, “usually individuals 
who are not and cannot make adequate psychosocial adjustment in the real world, and 
who would rarely if ever succeed in a real life experience in the real world” and because 
the prison puts limits on trans women’s “feminization.”115  
In making this argument, MDOC administrators and their medical experts set up a 
trap that prisoners cannot get out of. Incarcerated trans women’s confinement in prison 
produces them as criminal and sociopathic, which helps justify prison administrators’ 
control over the minutia of their lives, including confining them in men’s institutions and 
                                                                                                                                            
since security and operational concerns do not allow inmates to dress and function as members of the 
opposite sex.” Quoted in Kosilek, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 171. However, the district court ultimately found this 
blanket ban on sex reassignment surgery, which was part of MDOC’s freeze-frame policy, to be 
unconstitutional, as treatment decisions had to be based on individual assessment. 
Second, they used their power to hire medical staff. In 2007, MDOC administrators terminated UMMS 
as their mental health provider at least in part because the Fenway providers recommended sex 
reassignment surgery for Kosilek. MDOC hired a new contractor, MHM Services, Inc., an out-of-state for-
profit corporation, who then assumed responsibility for GID-related treatment and hired a new GID-
specific subcontractor, Stephen Levine, a psychiatrist affiliated with Case Western University in Ohio. 
Levine had testified as an independent, court appointed expert earlier in Kosilek’s legal proceedings, where 
he stated that the SOC were not applicable to incarcerated people, questioned the effectiveness of gender-
affirming medical treatment, and argued the “real life experience” was not possible in the prison setting. 
Soneeya, 851 F. Supp. 2d 228; Defendant’s Revised Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
Kosilek (No. 00-12455), May 15, 2007. 
Third, they hired medical experts, like Osborne, who agreed with this position on the “real life 
experience.” See for example, Schmidt, Jr., “Psychological evaluation of Michele L. Kosilek”; Kosilek, 221 
F. Supp. 2d 156, recounting the opinion of another DOC consultant, Dr. Dickey; Victoria Russell to 
Kathleen Dennehy (n.d.), Attached to Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff’s Renewed Motion for Prelim. 
Inj., Battista (No. 05-11456), Aug. 6, 2008; Transcript of Hearing on Motion Session with Closing 
Arguments, Kosilek (No. 00-12455), Dec. 21, 2009. 
The aim of the “real life” experience is to allow trans people to demonstrate to their providers that that 
they can live as their preferred gender and also gives them a glimpse into what that life will be like. This 
requirement is controversial among trans people. The most recent version of the Standards of Care, 
published in 2011, relaxes this requirement. 
114 Osborne, “Psychosexual Evaluation Report for Ophelia De’lonta,” 27; Osborne, “Peer report review for 
Michelle Kosilek,” 5. 
115 Osborne, “Psychosexual Evaluation Report for Ophelia De’lonta,” 27; Osborne, “Peer report review for 
Michelle Kosilek,” 5; Codispoti, “Psychiatric Transgender Evaluation of Ophelia De’lonta,” 17. 
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restricted their access to feminine clothing and grooming products. They are, therefore, 
unable to live as women and prove not only that they can “adjust” to life as a woman but 
also “adjust” to non-criminal life. They are then denied access to medicalized sex 
reassignment technologies that might allow them to be incarcerated in a women’s prison, 
thereby “experiencing” what life is like as a woman.116 This trap and the argument that 
incarcerated trans women cannot participate in the “real life” experience produces the 
space of the prison as a “death-world,” a space outside of “real life.” In particular, these 
death logics produce prisoners, like Kosilek, who will never be released from prison as 
the living-dead, as biologically living but unable to participate (ever again) in “real life.” 
Drawing on similar themes constructing Kosilek as the living-dead, MDOC 
administrators also argued that Kosilek’s post-surgical placement would create 
unmanageable security problems. While MDOC’s practice, like all departments of 
corrections around the US, is to place trans prisoners based on their genital status, MDOC 
administrators argued that they could place her neither back in Norfolk (which they 
implied was their default placement) nor in MCI-Framingham, MDOC’s only women’s 
prison. MDOC officials argued that her placement in either prison “would place 
substantial burdens on the DOC with regard to its ability to provide for internal order and 
security. The potential risk to the safety of [Kosilek], as well as to the safety of inmates, 
staff, and the public is significant should the surgery be approved.”117 In other words, 
                                                
116 In addition, many of these incarcerated trans women were incarcerated at least in part because they were 
trans or were connected to their experiences of marginalization because of being trans, including life-long 
experiences of violence, economic marginalization, familial or spousal abuse, and mental health problems. 
Their experiences of carceral and medical violence continued that cycle as well. 
117 Defendant’s Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 41, Kosilek (No. 00-12455). They 
also expressed concerns with the security problems of providing treatment, which might require her 
  248 
MDOC administrators described Kosilek’s potential post-surgical placement as an 
administrative disaster, which would threaten the security of any institution.  
MDOC administrators argued that she would face violence in either institution 
because she is a trans woman and that her presence might disrupt the order of the 
institution. While the reasoning of these arguments was similar (she was a queer security 
threat), the specifics looked very different in a few key ways. In their discussions of 
placing her in Norfolk, officials almost entirely focused on her “substantial risk” of 
experiencing sexual violence and argued that this also “raise[d] climate issues at the 
prison.”118 In most cases, their emphasis was on the former (her risk for sexual violence) 
over the latter (her disruption of the space of the prison), although the two were 
inextricably linked, as they are in most carceral discourses about trans women as security 
threats. On the other hand, MDOC officials expressed numerous concerns about her 
placement in Framingham, primarily focusing on their strong belief that she “would have 
a significant adverse impact upon the climate of the prison.”119 While they also expressed 
concerns about her experiencing violence, this concern was framed as secondary to her 
disruption of the institution.  
MDOC administrators were concerned that her crime—she was convicted of 
murdering her wife—would create a safety and security problem. They argued that 
because a high percentage of women in Framingham have histories of sexual and 
                                                                                                                                            
transportation out-of-state because there were no surgeons who performed sex reassignment surgery in 
Massachusetts. 
118 Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 6, 16, Kosilek (No. 
00-12455). See also Affidavit by Luis Spencer, Kosilek (No. 00-12455). 
119 Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 6, Kosilek (No. 00-
12455). 
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domestic violence and of mental illness, her presence would be troubling to many 
prisoners; could “cause a great deal of fear and anxiety” and anger; “would exacerbate 
the mental health problems experienced by the female inmates”; and could, therefore, 
“destabilize” the prison.120 They also argued that these women would target her for 
violence. Interestingly, MDOC officials and at least one of their experts expressed a 
specific concern about “more aggressive, larger female[s] or females displaying more 
masculine characteristics” perpetrating violence against Kosilek.121 Moreover, they 
expressed concern that Kosilek would perpetrate violence against the other women, 
despite having no history of violence since she was incarcerated. For example, in his 
assessment of Kosilek, after acknowledging that she had been “stable” and not involved 
in violence at Norfolk, the Director of MDOC’s Research and Planning Division, who 
served as MDOC’s expert witness on sexual violence in prisons, stated that that “if 
[Kosilek] were to be placed in a new environment, with more vulnerable females, 
and…where he [sic] might be under stress, with a different social dynamic, it is not 
implausible that he [sic] could manifest a more aggressive posture.”122 MDOC officials 
also claimed that she would be stronger than many of the women in Framingham and 
                                                
120 Quoted in Defendant’s Revised Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 56, Kosilek (No. 
00-12455); Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 17, Kosilek 
(No. 00-12455). See also, A. F. Beeler to Richard McFarland, “Security Aspects of Inmate’s Kosilek’s 
Request” (Dec. 2, 2005), Defendant’s Disclosure of Expert Testimony, Kosilek (No. 00-12455), Dec. 2, 
2005; Robert W. Dumond, “Outline of Key Issues to be Discussed by Robert W. Dumond, Relative to 
Risks of Victimization for Individuals who are Transgendered in Incarcerated Settings” (Dec. 2, 2005), 
Attached to ibid. 
121 Dumond, “Outline of Key Issues to be Discussed,” 5. He expressed similar concern in his testimony, 
claiming that “in the last 15 years, there’s a growing network of female offenders who … are committing 
more violent crimes and they’ve adopted more traditional masculine types of attitudes and attributes and 
they’ve imported them into the prison culture even in female settings. So there’s a cadre of women in 
prison who have adopted the same type of violent, aggressive approaches, which had not been manifested 
in female settings.” Quoted in Defendant’s Revised Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 
57, Kosilek (No. 00-12455). 
122 Dumond, “Outline of Key Issues to be Discussed,” 5. 
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therefore more of a threat and that she would be an escape risk, at least in part because of 
her supposed greater strength.123  
While prison administrators expressed serious concerns about security whether 
she was placed in a men’s or women’s facility, the specifics of those concerns were 
altered by the differently gendered spaces of those institutions and the supposed sexed 
natures of those confined within them. In reference to housing in both Norfolk and 
Framingham, Kosilek was portrayed as the likely victim of violence and as a source of 
disorder because of the queer dangerousness of her feminized body, which they often 
explicitly linked to the queer threat of other prisoners, either of sexual violence 
perpetrated by male prisoners in Norfolk or queer gender-based violence perpetrated by 
gender nonconforming prisoners in Framingham. However, prison administrators were 
clearly much more troubled by her potential placement in Framingham and, unlike in 
their discussions of Norfolk, repeatedly emphasized that Kosilek would likely perpetrate 
violence. In their discussions of Framingham, prison administrators treated Kosilek as a 
predatory male, who would be lured into committing violence by the presence of women, 
and as inherently stronger and more difficult to contain than the (non-trans) female 
prisoners. This assumption, too, was rooted in her embodied queer dangerousness. While 
her body would be feminized, prison administrators still viewed it as inherently a male 
body, which would abnormally inhabit a supposedly female space. To MDOC 
administrators, male and female bodies were inherently and naturally different, with male 
                                                
123 MDOC administrators argued that “the perimeter security of the area where the general population is 
housed is not sufficient to house a medium security male inmate with a security risk ‘B’ rating…there are 
legitimate concerns that plaintiff’s physical strength would be sufficient to overcome the prison’s current 
perimeter security for the general population areas.” Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s 
Motion for Summary Judgment at 18, Kosilek (No. 00-12455). 
  251 
bodies being stronger and more physically dangerous and violent. Indeed, their claims 
that Kosilek possessed greater strength seemed to be entirely based on the fact that she 
was classified as male. Kosilek was described as being approximately five feet and seven 
inches tall and 137 pounds, not much bigger than the average woman, nor does MDOC 
have a policy of segregating or placing very strong or large female-classified prisoners in 
men’s prisons. Like in Battista’s case, MDOC administrators’ construction of Kosilek as 
a threat to security hinged largely on sex(uality). They explicitly argued that she would 
be subjected to sexual violence in Norfolk, and, while they never explicitly said so, their 
discussions of the assumed violence she would commit in Framingham implied that some 
might be sexual, that her sexual difference along with her criminality would naturally 
produce sexual violence.124  
In MDOC’s arguments about Kosilek’s post-surgical placement, Kosilek becomes 
administratively unclassifiable, the detritus of the prison system’s racialized gender 
normative sex-segregation, which produces sexual difference as inherent, unalterable, and 
mutually exclusive as well as gender nonconformity as dangerous. In Psychiatric Power, 
Foucault argues that disciplinary systems, including the prison, produce “something like 
                                                
124 According to both Kosilek and MDOC officials, she had never been sexually assaulted nor did she 
participate in consensual sexual activity. In fact, in her first fifteen years of incarceration, she only received 
one disciplinary ticket, and it was for using homemade makeup. Brown, Evaluation re: Michelle Lynn 
Kosilek. 
Unsurprisingly, all discussions or concerns about violence exclusively focused on prisoners, either 
Kosilek committing violence or other prisoners committing violence against her. MDOC administrators 
framed themselves as protectors, even arguing that the fact that Kosilek had not committed violence while 
in prison was not her doing but was the prison’s, explaining that she had “done well” in Norfolk because of 
its “unique setting” and “good staff.” Transcript of Hearing on Motion Session with Closing Arguments, 
Kosilek (No. 00-12455). Yet, like other prisoners, Kosilek reported that the only threats to her safety had 
come from staff. For example, she reported experiencing verbal abuse from some correctional officers; she 
was “routinely subjected to humiliating pat searches in which [male] corrections officers put their hands on 
her chest where she has noticeable breasts”; and she was required for many years to shower in view of 
other prisoners and staff.124 That violence disappears—or is legitimized—as prison administrators frame 
Kosilek as dangerous and their actions as protective. 
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a residue…something like ‘the unclassifiable.”125 Foucault identifies “delinquents”—or 
those deemed inherently dangerous and incorrigible, uncorrectable by a disciplinary 
system—and the mentally ill—who he calls “the residue of all residues” as they cannot 
be assimilated to any of society’s disciplines—as examples of such “residue” or “the 
unclassifiable.”126 As “the stumbling block in the physics of disciplinary power,” the 
unclassifiable, therefore, threaten disciplinary and classificatory systems and are in need 
of containment.  
While all incarcerated trans women to a certain extent exceed the prison system’s 
racialized gender normative classification system—hence their production as security 
threats and as queerly dangerous—prison-provided sex reassignment surgery marks 
Kosilek as wholly unclassifiable. As MDOC administrators argued that she would be 
unclassifiable post-surgery, they also explained that if Kosilek had undergone sex 
reassignment surgery prior to her incarceration she would have been placed in 
Framingham and may have been able to be safe there. While MDOC officials explained 
the difference between these two scenarios as about her “notoriety” (notoriety, it should 
be emphasized, that was produced from her need to sue MDOC in order to receive 
medical treatment), carceral necropower, in fact, marks prison-provided sex reassignment 
surgery and the surgically altered body that it constructs as dangerous and different from 
sex reassignment surgery outside prison.  
Kosilek’s dangerous and unclassifiable post-surgical body, therefore, would need 
to be contained, and MDOC administrators argued that she would have to be placed in 
                                                
125 Michel Foucault, Psychiatric Power: Lectures at the Collége de France, 1973-74 (New York: Picador, 
2003), 53. 
126 Ibid., 53, 54. 
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maximum security segregation in either Norfolk or Framingham for her “own protection, 
the protection of others and to maintain the safe and orderly operation of” either 
institution.127 MDOC administrators argued that this scenario was untenable both because 
it would be administratively and financially burdensome for MDOC and because it would 
significantly worsen her situation—especially as it might have to be for the rest of her 
life. In contrast, MDOC administrators argued that trans people are “able to live with that 
pain, that anxiety, that uncomfortableness [of not having sex reassignment surgery] for 
10, 20 or 30 years… That’s very different than an appendix, a person with an appendix 
that bursts, who will have to get treatment.”128 They repeatedly argued that they could 
manage Kosilek and her “pain” through antidepressants and suicide prevention strategies. 
Outlining their suicide prevention programs for prisoners in their briefs to the court, 
MDOC administrators explained that upon winning the case, they would immediately 
place Kosilek “in a secure area pending [her] assessment by mental health staff.”129 
                                                
127 Dumond, “Outline of Key Issues to be Discussed,” 5. See also, A. F. Beeler to Richard McFarland, 
“Security Aspects of Inmate’s Kosilek’s Request”; Affidavit by Luis Spencer, Kosilek (No. 00-12455); 
Kathleen Dennehy, “Defendant Department of Correction’s Report on Anticipated Safety and Security 
Concerns Arising from the Allowance of Inmate Michelle Kosilek’s Request for Sex Reassignment 
Surgery” (n.d.), Attached to Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s Motion for Summary 
Judgment, Kosilek (No. 00-12455); Affidavit of Lynn Bissonnette, Kosilek (No. 00-12455), Feb. 17, 2006. 
Many of the legal documents submitted by the MDOC that asserted that she would have to be placed in 
segregation also emphasized the unpleasantness of the segregation units in both Norfolk and Framingham, 
which were highly restrictive and isolating. They argued that both units would be a dramatic change from 
her conditions in Norfolk, would be required for the remainder of her life, and would not only adversely 
affect her mental health but also potentially negatively impact the climate of either institution. See also, 
Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Kosilek (No. 00-12455); 
Affidavit by Luis Spencer, Kosilek (No. 00-12455). 
128 Transcript of Hearing on Motion Session with Closing Arguments at 43-44, Kosilek (No. 00-12455), 
Dec. 
129 Defendant’s Revised Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 42, Kosilek (No. 00-12455). 
The question of Kosilek committing suicide was an important feature of the case, as Kosilek had repeatedly 
stated that if she did not receive necessary treatment, she would probably kill herself. MDOC 
administrators and their medical experts called her discussions of suicide “manipulative” and 
contraindications for sex reassignment surgery. Yet, they also argued that her lack of suicide attempts or 
self-injury since starting hormone therapy was evidence that she was receiving adequate treatment. 
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Presumably, this “secure area” would be suicide watch, which often entails isolation in a 
strip cell, where a prisoner is confined with nothing, not even their clothing, for hours to 
days. For prison administrators, adequate treatment is keeping Kosilek physically alive. 
Kosilek, therefore, becomes the living-dead.  
 
Carceral necropower, coupled with racialized gender normative constructions of 
queer dangerousness, securitizes gender-affirming medical treatment, transforming 
transgender-related health care into an exceptional, dangerous type of medical treatment 
and necessitating the denial of medical treatment for incarcerated trans women. While 
courts have constructed boundaries around the legitimate denial of treatment, they have 
simultaneously sanctioned this securitization of gender-affirming medical treatment and 
the continued construction of gender nonconformity, particularly when embodied by the 
queer transfeminine body, as dangerous, as a threat to institutional security. Carceral 
violence, therefore, continues to function largely unabated, as medical and carceral 
institutions are empowered to control and define trans prisoners’ medical needs and 
treatment.  
While trans studies scholars and activists have long argued that the medical 
establishment has set up a medical gatekeeping system, designed to control access to 
treatment as well as discipline trans people into conforming to normative models of 
transsexuality and racialized hetero- and gender norms, within penal institutions, prison 
administrators act as another layer of gatekeeper, establishing policies defining access to 
treatment. Prison administrators and security staff are usually intimately involved with 
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the provision of gender-affirming medical treatment, defining that treatment as a problem 
of security as well as medicine and shaping treatment into something somewhat different 
than on the outside. In doing so, the experience and definition of such treatment is 
transformed. For trans people who utilize gender-affirming medical treatments outside of 
prison, that treatment is life-affirming and enhancing. For those who are imprisoned, 
even when they are able to access such treatment, carceral, medical, and legal logics 
produce it as a technology to ensure the continuation of bare (biological) life; medical 
care becomes an extension of the death logics of the prison, producing the living-dead. 
Marked by the racialized, nonnormative, necropolitical space of the prison, both 
incarcerated trans women who seek to access gender-affirming medical treatment and 
that treatment itself are transformed into queer dangerousness. In so doing, carceral 
necropower fractures trans experience, especially regarding health care. In 
conceptualizing “queer necropolitics,” Jasbir Puar argues that racialized sexual pathology 
and deviance—what she calls “queerness as population”—are targeted for death as a key 
part of the mechanism that enables normative “queer liberal subjects” to be folded into 
life.130 Criminalization and imprisonment are a key part of queer necropolitics. Those 
trans people—like myself—who are not targets for criminalization and imprisonment can 
be folded back into life and access gender-affirming medical treatments with relative 
ease. Those who are targets—not only those currently incarcerated but those formerly 
                                                
130 Jasbir Puar, Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times (Durham: Duke University Press, 
2007), 24. See also, Jin Haritaworn, Adi Kuntsman, and Silvia Posocco, “Introduction,” in Queer 
Necropolitics, ed. Jin Haritaworn, Adi Kuntsman, and Silvia Posocco (New York: Routledge, 2014); C. 
Riley Snorton and Jin Haritaworn, “Trans Necropolitics: A Transnational Reflection on Violence, Death, 
and the Trans of Color Afterlife,” in the Transgender Studies Reader 2, ed. Susan Stryker and Aren Z. 
Aizura (New York: Routledge, 2013). 
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incarcerated or from segments of trans communities that are the prime targets of 
criminalization, especially low-income trans women of color—are subject to state 
violence, denial of medical treatment, and the living death of incarceration.  
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Conclusion 
 
Life and Resistance in a Space of Death:  
A “Queer Antiprison Politic” 
 
 
In 1999, Ophelia De’lonta, an African American trans woman incarcerated in 
Virginia, filed a federal civil rights lawsuit against the Virginia Department of 
Corrections (VDOC), claiming that they were deliberately indifferent to her serious 
medical need and requesting a court order for hormone therapy. Incarcerated since 1983, 
De’lonta began to request treatment in 1987. Four years later, in 1993, a VDOC 
physician prescribed hormone therapy, which was abruptly terminated in 1995 when she 
was transferred to a different prison.1 In 2003, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, ruled 
that VDOC may have been deliberately indifferent to De’lonta’s serious medical need by, 
in part, arguing that: “The most harmful effect of the cessation of the hormone treatment, 
however, was that De’lonta developed an uncontrollable urge to mutilate her 
genitals…De’lonta’s need for protection against continued self-mutilation constitutes a 
serious medical need to which prison officials may not be deliberately indifferent.”2 
While the Fourth Circuit discussed De’lonta’s self-injury and self-castration attempts as 
                                                
1 While the court records are unclear about the circumstances around this prescription, it does not seem to 
have been part of a specific effort to evaluate her for GID, and the record indicates that the prescription was 
inconsistently filled. This prescription may be an example of a sympathetic doctor providing treatment to 
De’lonta. Despite this, the other circumstances of the VDOC’s denial of gender-affirming medical 
treatment for De’lonta are similar to those I outlined in the previous chapter.  
2 De’lonta v. Angelone, 330 F.3d 630, 632, 634 (4th Cir. 2003). This decision reversed and remanded 2001 
Virginia district court opinion, which dismissed her case for failure to state a claim. The court found that 
the VDOC had provided her with “some sort of treatment”—primarily Prozac—and was therefore not 
deliberately indifferent to her medical need. Quoted in Brief of Appellant at 11, De’lonta v. Angelone, 330 
F.3d 630 (No. 01-8020), May 20, 2002. In 2004, De’lonta and the VDOC settled the case, which eventually 
led to her again receiving hormone therapy and being allowed to dress and live as a woman “to a limited 
extent.” The settlement also led to VDOC adopting a new policy regarding access to gender-affirming 
medical treatment. First Amended Complaint at 7, De’lonta v. Johnson, No. 11-00257, 2011 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 124983 (W.D. Va. 2011), May 3, 2013. 
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evidence of harm and inadequate treatment by VDOC administrators, their framing 
constructs her racialized, gender nonconforming body as out of control and in need of 
containment and protection by those same prison administrators. In doing so, the court 
constructs De’lonta as agency-less in her own self-injury and self-castration attempts 
(they are out of her control), as a “depersonalized person,” as the living-dead.3  
Yet, De’lonta’s communications with the district and Fourth Circuit courts and 
her testimony reveal a more complex story. Initially acting as her own lawyer, De’lonta 
consistently framed her self-injury and self-castration attempts as “uncontrollable” and 
“compulsive.” For example, in her appeal brief to the Fourth Circuit, she explained that 
since she was taken off hormones in 1995, she “felt compelled to mutilate her genitals 
and remove her testicles,” arguing that VDOC must provide her with “treatment that will 
not cause her compulsively to continue to castrate herself, thereby inflicting grievous 
physical and additional mental injury upon herself.”4 In an earlier memorandum to a 
Virginia district court, she describes herself as “the victim of this violence,” requesting to 
be “protected from it, not treated (as she has been) as a malicious perpetrator of said 
violence.” She further explained,  
This is the law. “Being violently assaulted in prison is simply not ‘part of the penalty that 
criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society.’” Had another inmate inflicted 
upon Ms. De’lonta the grievous harms here at issue over a period of years, we would not 
be debating whether the Eighth Amendment requires [prison administrators] to act in her 
defense. The Eighth Amendment’s proscriptions do not change because (having been 
denied conventional treatment for her condition and being treated with derision instead) 
Ms. De’lonta is unable to stop harming herself.5 
                                                
3 Colin Dayan, The Law is a White Dog: How Legal Rituals Make and Unmake Persons (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2011), 32. 
4 Brief of Appellant at 7, 25, De’lonta (No. 01-8020). At this point in her litigation, lawyers from the 
American Civil Liberties Union were representing her. However, the strategy and language I am discussing 
was well established by this time. 
5 Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendants Angelone and Johnson at 9, 
De’lonta v. Angelone, No. 99-00642 (W.D. Va. Feb. 11, 2004). 
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Here, De’lonta strategically uses a disempowering narrative of lack of control in order to 
wield legal arguments “proving” that VDOC administrators were liable and deliberately 
indifferent to her medical need. Since the law does not recognize prisoners as sources of 
legitimate knowledge, De’lonta preempts the law’s desubjugation and, in doing so, 
provides language and framing that was taken up nearly word-for-word by the Fourth 
Circuit in its favorable ruling. In other words, while the courts’ framing of her self-
castration reads as if De’lonta has no control or agency, that the self-injury is a pathology 
to be controlled by prison medical and security staff, this framing is derived from how 
De’lonta chose to frame her self-injury and self-castration attempts. 
Elsewhere, De’lonta provides a different explanation of her self-castration 
attempts. During one of the evaluations with a VDOC medical expert, she described how 
she hoped to do enough damage or cause an infection in order to get a doctor to complete 
her castration, explaining, “I don’t consider it’s hurting myself…I have no other way to 
resolve the problem…It relieves the pressure for awhile…it’s like having a migraine 24-
7.”6 In her discussion of her self-injury and self-castration attempts in the documentary 
Cruel and Unusual, she explained, “I felt that maybe if I could start it that they would 
have to finish it. I wanted to get rid of my testicles to stop the hormone testosterone…I 
feel that they are not supposed to be there anyway. So that just led me to, at every 
opportunity I could get, to cut.”7 In these non-legal venues, De’lonta does not frame her 
                                                
6 Quoted in Cynthia Osborne, “Psychosexual Evaluation Report for Ophelia De’lonta” (March 31, 2004) at 
17, Attached to Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, De’lonta (No. 99-00642), 
April 7, 2004. 
7 Cruel and Unusual, directed by Janet Baus, Dan Hunt, and Reid Williams (Alluvial Filmworks, 2006) 
DVD.  
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self-castration attempts as lack of control or as violence done to her. Instead, she explains 
that she is performing self-surgery, providing herself with necessary treatment that is 
denied to her by VDOC administrators. Thus, De’lonta does not claim that there is no 
violence being done in this situation but, instead, locates the source of violence in her 
inability to access gender-affirming medical treatment, in the prison system’s 
necropolitical control of her body and access to medical treatment.  
De’lonta is not unique in her attempts to self-castrate. Self-castration—both 
attempts that resulted in complete castration and, much more often, that did not—were 
frequent themes in trans women’s lawsuits.8 These actions of bodily self-injury or self-
                                                
8 While I have no way of determining how common attempts at self-castration are, it is not uncommon. See 
for example, Supre v. Ricketts, 596 F. Supp. 1532 (C. Colo. 1984); Supre v. Ricketts, 792 F.2d 958 (10th 
Cir. 1986); Farmer v. Hawk, 991 F. Supp. 19 (D. D.C. 1998); Farmer v. Moritsugu, 163 F.3d 610 (D. D.C. 
1998); Farmer v. Hawk-Sawyer, 69 F. Supp. 2d 120 (D. D.C. 1999); White v. Farrier, 849 F.2d 322 (8th 
Cir. 1988); Kosilek v. Maloney, 221 F. Supp. 2d 156 (D. Mass. 2002); Barrett v. Coplan, 292 F. Supp. 2d 
281 (D. N.H. 2003); Stevens v. Williams, No. 05-1790, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44544 (D. Or. 
2006);Gammett v. Idaho State Board of Corrections, No. 05-00257, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55564 (D. 
Idaho 2007); Gammett v. Idaho State Board of Corrections, No. 05-00257, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66456 
(D. Idaho 2007); Sundstrom v. Frank, No. 06-00112, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76597 (E.D. Wis. 2007); 
Konitzer v. Alba, No. 07-00527, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86741 (E.D. Wis. 2007); Battista v. Dennehy, No. 
05-11456, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12484 (D. Mass. 2006); Konitzer v. Frank, 711 F. Supp. 2d 874 (E.D. 
Wis. 2010); Isaak v. Idaho Department of Correction, No. 06-00033, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70298 (D. 
Idaho 2007); Adams v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 716 F. Supp. 2d 107 (D. Mass. 2010); Battista v. Clarke, 
645 F.3d 449 (1st Cir. 2011); Soneeya v. Spencer, 851 F. Supp. 2d 228 (D. Mass. 2012); Kosilek v. 
Spencer, No. 00-12455, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124758 (D. Mass. 2012). See also, “Kitty,” GIC TIP 
Journal 2, no. 4 (Fall 2002); Breänna, “Mrs. Breänna Lynn Destiny’s Story,” Black & Pink Newsletter 
(November 2010); “‘Was’ Pre-Op,” GIC TIP Journal 1, no. 4 (Fall 2001); Rebecca Boone, “Idaho Settles 
Lawsuits from Transgender Inmates,” GIC TIP Journal 10, no. 3 (Fall 2009). See also, Cruel and Unusual; 
George R. Brown, “Autocastration and Autopenectomy as Surgical Self-Treatment in Incarcerated Persons 
with Gender Identity Disorder,” International Journal of Transgenderism 12, no. 1 (2010). 
Interestingly, one of the earliest federal civil rights lawsuits brought by an incarcerated trans women—
in fact, it seems to be the first with a published opinion—centers on the aftermath of a self-castration 
attempt. In 1981, Shauna Supre, a trans woman incarcerated in Colorado, attempted to castrate herself. 
When prison officials took her to the hospital, she refused any treatment that did not involve removing her 
testicles. Following numerous consultations—with psychiatrists to determine whether she was insane or 
incompetent (they determined that she was not), with Supre’s lawyer and the Attorney General’s office—
her doctors completed the surgery that she began. Supre’s case is the only one that I have found in which 
doctors completed a prisoner’s self-castration attempt. Following the surgery, while her doctors 
recommended that she begin estrogen treatment, the Colorado Department of Corrections refused to 
provide them. In response, Supre filed a federal civil rights lawsuit challenging their denial of hormone 
therapy as cruel and unusual punishment. The district court judge pushed hard for a settlement and 
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surgery lead to an important question that I will (far too briefly) consider in this 
conclusion: What do agency, resistance, and life look like in a space of death? 
This dissertation has focused on penal policies and practices, carceral power and 
violence, and the power of the prison system, law, medicine, and social science in 
constructing sex, queer dangerousness, and security. While carceral power produces 
prisoners as “depersonalized persons,” as the living-dead, stripping them of self-
determination and bodily autonomy, prisoners are not agency-less. They are not actually 
dead.9 They continue to live and, in doing so, exert power on the prison system and 
prison administrators. As Michel Foucault argues, power flows in all directions. 
Incarcerated trans and gender nonconforming people—like all prisoners—constantly 
challenge and alter the workings and space of the prison system, an important factor 
leading to their construction as dangerous and as security risks. Resistance and life in a 
carceral space of death cannot be disentangled from the prison system’s (failed) aim to 
exert totalizing control over prisoners’ minds, bodies, and ability to communicate. 
Because their lives and bodies are so constrained and controlled and because they are 
subject to constant state violence, actions, choices, or mundane ways of living that are 
taken for granted outside of prisons can be great acts of resistance within the death space 
of the prison, and prisoners take enormous bodily and mental health risk when they resist 
and make life choices outside those sanctioned by prison administrations. Self-castration 
attempts (both failed and successful) are illustrative of this entanglement. 
                                                                                                                                            
eventually allowed an indefinite continuance on the condition that the DOC provide “treatment with low 
level doses of female hormones.” Supre, 596 F. Supp. at 1534. 
9 Unless, of course, they are. Imprisonment does lead to premature death, and, of course, the US state does 
kill prisoners. 
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Attempts at self-castration and other forms of self-injury are simultaneously 
products of carceral violence—of the denial of medical treatment, the inability for 
prisoners to chose their own medical providers or seek second opinions, the extreme 
bodily restrictions that prisoners live under, and carceral necropower. They are resistance 
strategies for some trans women.10 Like De’lonta, other incarcerated trans women who 
attempted self-castration described their motivations as self-treatment to address extreme 
psychological pain that prison administrators not only disregarded but worsened. For 
example, in a note to Idaho prison administrators written before she successfully self-
castrated, Jenniffer Ann Spencer explained that she self-castrated because “I am a 
transgenderd [sic] individual and I could stand the sight of them no more. This is not a 
suicide attempt. This is simply a way for me to remmady [sic] my problem.”11 When 
prison staff asked her why she “had gone through something so painful,” she responded 
that “it was much more painful to live as a transgender.”12 Similarly, in a 2001 request to 
prison administrators for surgical castration, Sandy Jo Battista explained that she lived 
daily with “mental torment…over my identity issues” and that being “forced to live with 
a growth on my bodies that does not belong there is unbearable at times.”13 She explained 
that this “torment” might lead her to castrate herself. Nine years later, following multiple 
                                                
10 In marking self-castration as “resistance,” I do not mean to romanticize it or deny its very harmful and 
potentially life-threatening consequences. Indeed, De’lonta’s self-castration attempts resulted in numerous 
emergency hospital visits and even surgical interventions (although, notably, doctors never completed her 
desired castration). Trans women risk their lives every time they attempt to self-castrate, primarily because 
of loss of blood or infection.  
11 Quoted in Gammett, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55564, at *23. See also, Rebecca Boone, “Idaho Settles 
Lawsuits from Transgender Inmates,” GIC TIP Journal 10, no. 3 (Fall 2009). 
12 Quoted in Gammett, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55564, at *23. 
13 Sandy Jo Battista to Robert Murphy, “Request to Purchase Female Clothing and Elect Non-Medically 
Necessary Treatment (‘Surgical Castration’) at my Own Expense” (Sept. 10, 2001) at 2, Attached to 
Complaint, Battista v. Murphy, No. 03-12643 (D. Mass., Dec. 16, 2003). 
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self-castration attempts, she explained that she attempted to castrate herself because “I 
simply wanted to be normal and, in my mind, being normal does not include having 
testicles.”14 For these trans women the pain of imprisonment in both prison and their un-
surgically-altered bodies—two forms of imprisonment that are deeply interconnected for 
many similarly situated trans women—was unbearable. While prison administrators 
stripped them of choice about legitimate medical treatment and medical providers, they 
chose instead to treat themselves, thereby exerting agency over their own bodies. 
While these trans women describe their self-castration attempts as a means of 
healing, of moving forward with their lives, of living, prison administrators viewed them 
as a manifestation of queer dangerousness, as a threat to institutional security, and treated 
them as such. To courts, prison administrators described self-castration attempts and 
other self-injury as “manipulative” and products of trans prisoners’ supposed personality 
disorders, or sociopathology, and within their institutions, they generally responded to 
these actions with punishment, violence, and various forms of segregation. For example, 
following a self-castration attempt in 2010, VDOC administrators charged De’lonta with 
“self-mutilation or other intentionally inflicted self injury,” an official disciplinary 
offense, and sentenced her to twenty days in isolation.15 Even when she was not officially 
                                                
14 Affidavit of Direct Testimony of Sandy J. Battista at 11, Battista (No. 05-11456), May 12, 2010 
15 Many prison systems, including VDOC, prohibit self-injury and categorize it, either officially or 
unofficially as a disciplinary offense. Prisoners are, therefore, often punished for engaging in various forms 
of self-injury, including suicide attempts. Terry Kupers, Prison Madness: The Mental Health Crisis Behind 
Bars and What We Must Do About It (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1999); Human Rights Watch, Sasha 
Abramsky and Jamie Fellner, Ill-Equipped: US Prisons and Offenders with Mental Illness (New York: 
Human Rights Watch, 2003). See for example, Virginia Department of Corrections, “Offender Discipline, 
Institutions,” 861.1 (Sept. 1, 2011). 
In their communications with the courts, VDOC administrators repeatedly referred to her self-
castration attempts as manipulative and products of her supposed personality disorders. For example, her 
therapist and the Chief Psychiatrist determined that her self-castration attempts “were not directly related to 
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charged with and punished for “self-mutilation” or a related disciplinary offense, VDOC 
administrators frequently placed her in solitary confinement, or in strip cells, following a 
self-castration attempt, where she would have been not only confined alone under 
constant supervision but she is stripped of all clothing and property.16 De’lonta explained 
that for years she “underwent a cycle of repeated self-mutilation followed by confinement 
in five-point restraints.”17 Similarly, in response to a self-castration attempt in 2005, 
MDOC administrators placed Battista in segregation on a mental health watch, “clothed 
in nothing but a security wrap.”18 Prison administrators also issued an Observation 
Behavior Report, the civil commitment version of a disciplinary report.19 By placing trans 
women like De’lonta and Battista in segregation—whether it is disciplinary segregation, 
mental health watch, or a strip cell—prison administrators attempt to (re)assert total 
control over trans women’s bodies, holding them in a state of extreme psychological pain 
and resecuring them to a space of gendered death.  
By categorizing self-castration attempts as manipulation, disassociating them 
from Gender Identity Disorder, and attaching them to sociopathology, prison 
administrators attempted to use acts of self-castration as evidence justifying their denial 
                                                                                                                                            
her gender identity disorder,” instead they attributed them to her borderline personality disorder. Quoted in 
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for a Prelim. Inj. and to Compel Access to Plaintiff at 26, 
De’lonta (No. 11-00257), July 12, 2013. 
16 In one case, she was placed in a strip cell and told that she would not be allowed out unless she signed a 
treatment plan devised by the mental health staff, which she “reluctantly” signed. Quoted in Brief of 
Appellant at 11, De’lonta (No. 01-8020). 
17 Ibid. at 7. 
18 Affidavit of the Plaintiff, Sandy J. Battista at 2, Battista v. Dennehy, No. 05-11456, 2011 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 92010 (D. Mass. 2011), Oct. 17, 2005; Second Affidavit of Lawrence M. Weiner, Battista (No. 05-
11456), Oct. 26, 2005. She was taken off mental health watch after a day and released back into general 
population within three days after she told staff that she would not self-injure again. 
19 Plaintiff’s Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Battista (No. 05-11456), May 3, 2010. 
Like VDOC administrators, MDOC administrators referred to Battista’s self-castration attempts as an 
example of her “acts of manipulation.” Defendant’s Substitute Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 
33, Battista (No. 05-11456), May 17, 2010. 
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of hormone therapy or sex reassignment surgery.20 In doing so, they constructed self-
castration attempts as dangerous to penal institutions and security. In fact, MDOC 
administrators argued that providing sex reassignment surgery to Michelle Kosilek after 
she stated that she would attempt to self-castrate or kill herself if she was denied 
treatment “would undermine [their] ability to effectively manage the Massachusetts 
prison system.” MDOC administrators explained that by “acced[ing] to manipulative 
threats of self-harm by inmates seeking to force prison administrators to meet their 
demands for special treatment would be “a significant security concern” and would 
“reward the manipulative behaviors and encourage[] other inmates to engage in similar 
behaviors.”21 Explaining that these “threats,” therefore, justified their denial of treatment, 
they stated, “if [Kosilek] is successful in obtaining SRS, the message sent to inmates in 
the Massachusetts DOC is that threats of self-injurious behavior can be used to obtain the 
desired benefits previously denied. To provide plaintiff with SRS in response to such 
threats will only encourage other inmates to engage in similar manipulative behaviors 
which will adversely impact the Commissioner’s ability to preserve internal order and 
discipline within the prison system.”22 Threat of self-castration in response to the denial 
of necessary treatment as well as a history of such attempts made Kosilek ineligible, 
according to MDOC administrators, for the very treatment that would eliminate her need 
                                                
20 See for example, Chester W. Schmidt, Jr., “Psychological evaluation of Michele L. Kosilek” (Nov. 23, 
2005), Attached to Defendant’s Disclosure of Expert Testimony, Kosilek v. Spencer, No. 00-12455, 2012 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124758, Dec. 2, 2005; Cynthia S. Osborne, “Inmate evaluation of Michelle Kosilek” 
(Nov. 27, 2005), Attached to Defendant’s Disclosure of Expert Testimony, Kosilek (No. 00-12455), Dec. 2, 
2005; Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Kosilek (No. 00-
12455), Jan. 17, 2006; Defendant’s Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Kosilek (No. 00-
12455), Aug. 21, 2006; Affidavit by Luis Spencer, Kosilek (No. 00-12455), Feb. 16, 2006. 
21 Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 7, 19, Kosilek (No. 
00-12455). 
22 Ibid. at 19-20. 
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to self-castrate. Kosilek’s assertion of control over her own body and medical treatment 
in opposition to the control of prison administrators is framed as a threat to MDOC 
administrators’ ability to keep control of all prisoners. Kosilek, her “threats” of self-
castration, as well as her potential (prison-provided) sex reassignment surgery become a 
form of queer dangerousness, and, therefore, the proper objects of carceral control. 
MDOC administrators further argue that there is legal precedent allowing prison 
administrators to take steps to thwart similar “manipulative” uses of a prisoner’s body 
and health “to obtain specific privileges … or specific medical treatment” and offer the 
example of MDOC obtaining court authorization to force feed prisoner who “have 
undertaken life-threatening hunger strikes in order to force the DOC to meet their 
demands for transfers or other benefits.”23 The analogy between hunger strikes and self-
castration attempts here is apt. While hunger strikes are more readily associated with 
resistance or protest, both hunger strikes and self-castration attempts are methods of 
resisting the conditions of carceral necropower by strategically using one of the few 
resources that imprisoned people have at their disposal: their bodies. By exposing 
themselves to harm and premature death, prisoners challenge the (not quite) total control 
of carceral necropower—both over their bodies and over their deaths. But, importantly, 
this exposure to harm and premature death is in the service of life, as prisoners attempt to 
change individual or collective conditions within prisons.24 This analogy also helps us 
                                                
23 Ibid. at 20. See also, Defendant’s Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Kosilek (No. 00-
12455); Defendant’s Revised Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Kosilek (No. 00-12455), 
May 15, 2007; Transcript of Hearing on Motion Session with Closing Arguments, Kosilek (No. 00-12455), 
Dec. 21, 2009. 
24 For brief discussion of hunger strikes and necropower, see Sarah Lamble, “Queer Necropolitics and the 
Expanding Carceral State: Interrogating Sexual Investments in Punishment,” Law and Critique 24, no. 3 
(November 2013). 
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better understand self-castration attempts as a potential form of resistance to the 
racialized gender normative carceral death logics.  
 
A Queer Antiprison Politics 
[Trans girls] already, from the moment we decide to be a transgendered person, are living outside the law. 
The moment this dick-swinging motherfucker wants to put a dress on and head on down the street to go to 
the store or something like that, they have broke the law…We can be beaten, attacked, and killed, and it’s 
OK… You are already a convict for just how you express yourself and you might start to live a lifestyle of a 
person that is living outside the law. Because you can’t get a legitimate job, you can’t get a chance in 
school, you can’t get a chance to function and survive as a part of mainstream society. So, immediately, 
once you’ve done this, you’re part of the [prison industrial complex]. Whether you get there right away or 
you slowly build toward it, but every step that you take, takes you another step closer to it. – Miss Major25 
 
In the passage above, Miss Major—a formerly incarcerated African American 
trans woman, a long-time trans and prison activist, and current Executive Director of the 
TGI Justice Project—reminds us that many trans people, especially trans women of color, 
become involved in the prison system by simply living their lives.26 But, even more 
profoundly, she marks gender nonconformity or trans-status as “living outside the law,” 
as already “part of the [prison industrial complex].” This formulation helps us understand 
how the carceral production of gender nonconformity as queer dangerousness is a 
specific manifestation of a larger pattern of criminalization of gender nonconformity and 
                                                                                                                                            
Trans prisoners have also engaged in hunger strikes, joining in with larger organized hunger strikes 
that have occurred in numerous states, including California and Illinois, in the past few years, or engaging 
in individual hunger strikes in order to gain access to gender affirming medical treatment. For example, 
De’lonta did so on at least two occasions, and VDOC administrators seemed to categorize these hunger 
strikes as another example of her “self-injurious behaviors.” Osborne, “Psychosexual Evaluation Report for 
Ophelia De’lonta,” quoted on 10. See also, Long v. Nix, 86 F.3d 761 (8th Cir. 1996); Gender Anarky, 
“Select Writings,” http://www.warren-wilson.edu/~empower/Gender_Anarky_Read.pdf. See also, Lydon, 
interview; Brown, “Autocastration and Autopenectomy.” 
25 Jayden Donahue, “Making It Happen, Mama: A Conversation with Miss Major,” in Captive Genders, ed. 
Eric A Stanley and Nat Smith (Oakland, CA: AK Press, 2011), quoted on 277. 
26 The TGI Justice Project is an organization that works on issues faced by trans people in the criminal legal 
system while centering the work and experiences of low-income trans women of color who are or have 
been incarcerated. See their website at www.tgijp.org. 
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trans status—both within the criminal legal system and US society broadly speaking—
which exposes all trans people, but especially trans people of color who are marked as 
dangerous and criminal by race as well, to state violence and state-imposed death. 
Yet, as the mainstream LGBT movement gains more influence, it becomes 
increasingly invested in the criminal legal system. Calling this investment “queer 
penality,” Sarah Lamble argues that these politics literally channel social, 
epistemological, political, and economic resources towards the prison system and state 
practices of punishment and violence, state practices that, notably, target queer and trans 
people.27 Lamble and other scholars have argued that this queer penality is a symptom of 
“queer necropolitics” and represents an investment in state racism and violence.28 In 
Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times, Jasbir Puar theorizes “queer 
necropolitics” as constructing conditions for “the differences between queer subjects who 
are being folded (back) into life and the racialized queernesses that emerge through the 
naming of populations,” consigning them to death.29 For Puar and others, race—and 
particularly racialized gender and sexual nonnormativity or “racialized queerness”—
fundamentally fractures queerness, as those who can conform to and embody (White) 
homonormativity are (re)included under the umbrella of state protection and citizenship-
                                                
27 Sarah Lamble, “Queer Investments in Punitiveness: Sexual Citizenship, Social Movements and the 
Expanding Carceral State,” in Queer Necropolitics, ed. Jin Haritaworn, Adi Kuntsman, and Silvia Posocco 
(New York: Routledge, 2014); Lamble, “Queer Necropolitics and the Expanding Carceral State.” 
28 See also, Jin Haritaworn, Adi Kuntsman, and Silvia Posocco, “Introduction,” in Queer Necropolitics; 
Morgan Bassichis and Dean Spade, “Queer Politics and Anti-Blackness,” in Queer Necropolitics; Che 
Gossett, “We Will Not Rest in Peace: AIDS Activism, Black Radicalism, Queer and/or Trans Resistance,” 
in Queer Necropolitics; Elijah Adiv Edelman, “‘Walking While Transgender’: Necropolitical Regulations 
of Trans Feminine Bodies of Colour in the Nation’s Capital.” in Queer Necropolitics; Anna M. 
Agathangelou, M. Daniel Bassichis, and Tamara L. Spira. “Intimate Investments: Homonormativity, Global 
Lockdown, and the Seductions of Empire,” Radical History Review 100 (Winter 2008). 
29 Jasbir Puar, Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times (Durham: Duke University Press, 
2007), 35. 
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life while those who embody racialized gender and sexual nonnormativity are exposed to 
state violence, containment, and death. Importantly, both sides of this binary are 
inextricably intertwined. LGBT people have been able to lay recognizable claims to 
citizenship and state protection through appealing to (homo)normativity, state racism, and 
state violence and helping produce conditions of death for the racially queer. By 
centering legal recognition and formal inclusion through in hate crimes legislation, 
“marriage equality,” open inclusion in the US military, and the eradication of formal 
barriers to “equal citizenship,” as well as full participation in the neoliberal, capitalist 
economy, LGBT rights politics often, as Morgan Bassichis and Dean Spade argue, also 
“unwittingly reproduce and are productive of the fundamental structures of anti-
blackness, settler colonialism, and permanent war undergirding the United States.”30 In 
other words, queer necropolitics and queer penality are a constitutive aspect of 
homonormative—and even emergent transnormative—politics and embodiments, which 
invests LGBT rights in white life and normative citizenship.  
Produced from (carceral) racialized gender normative logics, queer dangerousness 
should be understood as interconnected with (or one type of) racialized queerness. 
Carceral constructions of queer dangerousness not only expose trans and gender 
nonconforming prisoners to targeted carceral violence and various forms of death but also 
sever incarcerated trans and gender nonconforming people from the imagined (by LGBT 
rights politics) LGBT community. Thus, incarceration and racialized criminalization are 
central technologies in the production of racialized queerness and the bio- and 
necropolitical fracturing of LGBTQ populations. As Jin Haritaworn, Adi Kuntsman, and 
                                                
30 Bassichis and Spade, “Queer Politics and Anti-Blackness,” 194. 
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Silvia Posocco argue in their introduction to the recent anthology, Queer Necropolitics, 
incarceration and queer penality have become “a method for the production of 
respectable and innocent genders and sexualities that are worthy of visibility, recognition 
and protection.”31  
Central to these arguments against queer penality and homonormative politics is 
an understanding of the criminal legal system as inherently (racially, gender, and 
sexually) violent, as producing violence not only for those in prison but for those who are 
connected to criminalized communities outside prisons, including marginalized trans and 
queer communities. Put another way, as racialized gender normativity both functions as a 
constitutive logic of the US prison system and produces (incarcerated) gender 
nonconformity as queer dangerousness, the prison system is fundamentally designed to 
target trans and gender nonconforming people for violence and containment. Thus, 
prisons and the broader criminal legal system do not and cannot make queer and trans 
people safe—in fact, queer and trans people cannot be safe as long as prisons exist. 
Justice cannot exist in a space of death nor can an institution of death—an institution 
designed to oppress and do violence to marginalized populations—end oppression, do 
justice, or heal individuals, communities, and society. Critics of queer penality and 
homonormative politics, therefore, call for prison abolition or, to use Beth Richie’s term, 
a “queer antiprison politic” that addresses the criminal legal system as inherently a white-
supremacist-hetero-gender-normative institution.32  
                                                
31 Haritaworn, Kuntsman, and Posocco, “Introduction,” 16. 
32 Beth Richie, “Queering Antiprison Work: African American Lesbians in the Juvenile Justice System,” in 
Global Lockdown: Race, Gender, and the Prison-Industrial Complex, ed. Julia Sudbury (New York: 
Routledge, 2005), 83. See also, Morgan Bassichis, Alexander Lee, and Dean Spade, “Building an 
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While the prison system has been a primary site of contemporary struggles for 
racial and economic justice since at least the 1970s, it is increasingly also (and 
interconnectedly) a site of the struggle for gender and sexual justice.33 Often in 
opposition to this mainstream LGBT rights politics, there is vibrant and growing radical 
queer/trans activism that centrally engages with the prison system, much of which is 
prison abolitionist, and queer antiprison politics have been imagined and enacted by 
incarcerated and formerly incarcerated trans, queer, and gender nonconforming people, 
like Miss Major, for decades. While this work includes the construction of and 
participation in queer and trans political organizations and movement building inside and 
outside prisons, we should also include within this formulation of queer antiprison 
politics both self-castration attempts and the quotidian, often mundane tactics of living 
gendered lives within the (gender) death space of the prison. For as long as prison 
administrators have identified gender nonconformity as a problem, gender 
nonconforming prisoners in both men’s and women’s penal institutions have resisted 
gendered restrictions and death, altering prison-issued clothing to make it more feminine 
or masculine, making their own makeup, making jewelry, binding their chests to make 
them look more masculine, dying their hair with ink and growing it out, changing their 
                                                                                                                                            
Abolitionist Trans and Queer Movement with Everything We’ve Got,” in Captive Genders; S. Lamble, 
“Transforming Carceral Logics: 10 Reasons to Dismantle the Prison Industrial Complex through 
Queer/Trans Analysis and Action” in Captive Genders. 
33 Black nationalists and other radical activists and scholars articulated the prison system as a white 
supremacist institution, arguing that its abolition was key to abolishing white supremacy. See George L. 
Jackson, Blood in My Eye (New York: Random House, 1972); Assata Shakur, Assata: An Autobiography 
(Chicago: Lawrence Hill Books, 1987); Angela Y. Davis, ed., If They Come in the Morning: Voices of 
Resistance (New York: Third Press, 1971). See also, Angela Y. Davis, Are Prisons Obsolete? (New York: 
Seven Stories Press, 2003); Julia Sudbury, “Celling Black Bodies: Black Women in the Global Prison 
Industrial Complex” Feminist Review 80 (2005); Dylan Rodríguez, Forced Passages: Imprisoned Radical 
Intellectuals and the U.S. Prison Regime (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 2006); Michael 
Hames-García, Fugitive Thought: Prison Movements, Race, and the Meaning of Justice (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2004). 
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names and pronouns, having sex, building communities, and loving one another.34 In 
doing so, we can identify a queer antiprison political tradition that stretches back over 
one hundred years. 
 
 
                                                
34 For a discussion of these strategies in men’s prisons, see Joseph Fulling Fishman, Sex in Prison: 
Revealing Sex Conditions in American Prisons (National Library Press, 1934); Frank Samuel Caprio, 
Female Homosexuality: A Psychodynamic Study of Lesbianism (New York: The Citadel Press, 1954); Paul 
Warren, Next Time Is for Life (New York: Dell Publishing Company, Inc., 1953); George Sylvester 
Viereck, Men into Beasts (New York: Fawcett Publications, Inc., 1952); Samuel Kahn, Mentality and 
Homosexuality (Boston: Meador Publishing Company, 1937); John Irwin and Donald Cressey, “Thieves, 
Convicts, and the Inmate Culture,” Social Problems 10, no. 2 (Autumn 1962); Prisoner X, Prison 
Confidential (Los Angeles: Medco Books, 1969). For women’s prisons, see Rose Giallombardo, Society of 
Women: A Study of a Women’s Prison (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1966); Sara Harris, 
Hellhole: The Shocking Story of the Inmates and Life in the New York City House of Detention for Women 
(New York: E.P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1967); Russ Trainer, Prison: School for Lesbians (Van Nuys, CA: 
Triumph News Company, 1968); Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, The Alderson Story: My Life as a Political 
Prisoner (New York: International Publishers, 1963); David A. Ward and Gene G. Kassebaum, Women’s 
Prison: Sex and Social Structure (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1965); Prison Materials Collection, 
Kinsey Institute Library and Special Collections, Indiana University. See also, Regina Kunzel, Criminal 
Intimacy: Prison and the Uneven History of Modern American Sexuality (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2008). 
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